Comparing and Explaining the Success of a Common Endowed with Different Degrees of Sanctioning

Found at: https://hdl.handle.net/10535/8218
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Type:	Conference Paper
Author:	Ostmann, Axel; Wojtyniak, Beate; Beckenkamp, Martin
Conference:	Workshop on the Workshop 2
Location:	Workshop in Political Theory and Policy Analysis, Indiana University, Bloomington, IN
Conf. Date:	June 9-13
Date:	1999
URI:	https://hdl.handle.net/10535/8218
Sector:	Theory
Region:
Subject(s):	Workshop game theory common pool resources--theory monitoring and sanctioning--theory uncertainty--theory
Abstract:	"Commons are institutions that induce a kind of social dilemma, a 'situation in which private interests are at odds with the collective interests'. Often a group of members manage a common pool resource like fish, meadow, forest or water. The members of a common are competitors in use: What one user takes affects the chances for other users. Under the assumption of rational actors game-theoretical analyses of such commons prescribe an overuse of the resource for a large and relevant class of situations. There are static and dynamic environments."

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