| dc.contributor.author |
Ostrom, Elinor |
|
| dc.date.accessioned |
2012-07-23T19:56:18Z |
|
| dc.date.available |
2012-07-23T19:56:18Z |
|
| dc.date.issued |
1985 |
en_US |
| dc.identifier.uri |
https://hdl.handle.net/10535/8225 |
|
| dc.description.abstract |
"The apprent contradiction between some of our cases and the current interpretation given to major theories of collective action led me to re-examine the theories of Garrett Hardin and Mancur Olson to ascertain if these theories had been adequately understood. Given space constraints, I can only summarize my conclusions here. Garrett Hardin's theory is generally well-understood and the empirical evidence presented in some of the case studies represents a challenge to his theory. On the other hand, Mancur Olson's theory is not well-understood due in part to a lack of consistency and clarity in his original presentation." |
en_US |
| dc.language |
English |
en_US |
| dc.subject |
Workshop |
en_US |
| dc.subject |
collective action |
en_US |
| dc.subject |
institutions |
en_US |
| dc.subject |
institutional analysis--IAD framework |
en_US |
| dc.title |
The Rudiments of a Revised Theory of the Origins, Survival, and Performance of Institutions for Collective Action |
en_US |
| dc.type |
Conference Paper |
en_US |
| dc.type.published |
unpublished |
en_US |
| dc.type.methodology |
Case Study |
en_US |
| dc.publisher.workingpaperseries |
Workshop in Political Theory and Policy Analysis, Indiana University, Bloomington, IN |
en_US |
| dc.subject.sector |
Social Organization |
en_US |
| dc.subject.sector |
Theory |
en_US |
| dc.identifier.citationconference |
Common Property Resource Management, Board on Science and Technology for International Development (BOSTID) |
en_US |
| dc.identifier.citationconfdates |
April |
en_US |
| dc.identifier.citationconfloc |
Annapolis, Maryland |
en_US |