| dc.contributor.author |
Bravo, Giangiacomo |
|
| dc.contributor.author |
Squazzoni, Flaminio |
|
| dc.date.accessioned |
2013-01-03T15:33:44Z |
|
| dc.date.available |
2013-01-03T15:33:44Z |
|
| dc.date.issued |
2012 |
en_US |
| dc.identifier.uri |
https://hdl.handle.net/10535/8617 |
|
| dc.description.abstract |
"This paper investigates the interplay of incentives, sanctions and voluntary participation in commons dilemmas. We performed a modified public good game experiment to examine the effect of exit, rewards and punishment, as well as that of the interplay between exit and rewards and punishment, on cooperation. We found that punishment had a stronger effect than rewards on cooperation if singularly considered, whereas rewards had a stronger effect when combined with voluntary participation. This can be explained in terms of 'frame effect' as the combination of exit and rewards might induce people to attach higher expected payoffs to cooperative strategies and expect more good behaviour from other individuals." |
en_US |
| dc.language |
English |
en_US |
| dc.subject |
social dilemmas |
en_US |
| dc.subject |
incentives |
en_US |
| dc.subject |
cooperation |
en_US |
| dc.title |
Exit, Punishment and Rewards in Commons Dilemmas: An Experimental Study |
en_US |
| dc.type |
Conference Paper |
en_US |
| dc.type.published |
unpublished |
en_US |
| dc.type.methodology |
Case Study |
en_US |
| dc.subject.sector |
Social Organization |
en_US |
| dc.subject.sector |
Theory |
en_US |
| dc.identifier.citationconference |
Design and Dynamics of Institutions for Collective Action: A Tribute to Prof. Elinor Ostrom, Second Thematic Conference of the IASC |
en_US |
| dc.identifier.citationconfdates |
29 November - 1 December |
en_US |
| dc.identifier.citationconfloc |
Utrecht University, Utrecht, the Netherlands |
en_US |