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Coalition Governments, Cabinet Size, and the Common Pool Problem: Evidence from the German States

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dc.contributor.author Baskaran, Thushyanthan
dc.date.accessioned 2013-08-19T17:22:31Z
dc.date.available 2013-08-19T17:22:31Z
dc.date.issued 2013 en_US
dc.identifier.uri http://hdl.handle.net/10535/9069
dc.description.abstract "The theoretical literature on common pool problems in fiscal policy suggests that government fragmentation increases public expenditures. In parliamentary regimes, the fragmentation hypothesis refers to (i) coalition governments and (ii) cabinet size. This paper explores the effect of coalition governments and cabinet size on public expenditures with panel data covering all 16 German States over the period 1975-2010. Identification is facilitated by the large within-variation in the incidence of coalition governments and the size of the cabinet in the German States. In addition, I exploit a feature of state electoral laws to construct a credible instrument for the likelihood of coalition governments." en_US
dc.language English en_US
dc.relation.ispartofseries CEGE Discussion Papers, no. 165 en_US
dc.subject coalitions en_US
dc.subject common pool resources en_US
dc.title Coalition Governments, Cabinet Size, and the Common Pool Problem: Evidence from the German States en_US
dc.type Working Paper en_US
dc.type.methodology Case Study en_US
dc.publisher.workingpaperseries Center for European Governance and Economic Development Research, Goettingen, Germany en_US
dc.coverage.region Europe en_US
dc.coverage.country Germany en_US
dc.subject.sector Theory en_US


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