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PDF
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Type:
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Conference Paper |
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Author:
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Skjølsvold, Tomas Moe |
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Conference:
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Governing Shared Resources: Connecting Local Experience to Global Challenges, the Twelfth Biennial Conference of the International Association for the Study of Commons |
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Location:
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Cheltenham, England |
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Conf. Date:
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July 14-18, 2008 |
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Date:
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2008 |
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URI:
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https://hdl.handle.net/10535/983
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Sector:
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Social Organization
Water Resource & Irrigation |
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Region:
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Africa |
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Subject(s):
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institutions
institutional design
conflict
resource management
irrigation
water resources
IASC
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Abstract:
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"The prospect of designing social institutions, thereby manipulating behaviour, preferably in a pro-social way, is alluring to agents who in good intention seek to help in management of common pool resources. This paper looks at institutional design from a theoretical point of view while illustrating with empirical examples from two case-studies in the central region of Malawi. One is a small-scale irrigation system, the other a borehole providing clean drinking water. I argue that when designing new institutions one must consider the institutional set-up (e.g. power-structure, social customs and value-orientations) already present in any given locale, and that failing to do so may do more harm than good. Outcomes may range from failure to cooperate and breakdown of the social system to degradation, and in the worst case; collapse of the resource and even violent conflict. This is discouraging to people advocating a 'blueprint' approach to the subject. Previous warnings about similar issues are numerous. Dolsak and Ostrom (2003) warn external donors wanting to fund and initiate common-property regimes about the dangers of new rules not corresponding to social customs, norms and value-orientations of those on whom they are imposed. Henrich and Smith (2004) notes that what cues westerners into cooperation will probably differ from what cues a Mapuche Indian. My goal is that this paper may provide useful insights into how one can avoid conflicts or 'institutional clash' between newly designed institutions and local institutions. The paper is based on data collected in conjunction with the Malawian Land Tenure and Social Capital project (University of Malawi/ Norwegian Institute of Urban and
Regional Research)."
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