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Abstract:
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"Early studies by Elinor Ostrom focused on ways of providing urban public goods in metropolitan areas. She argued that a polycentricity of public and private agents and community-based organizations providing services performed better. In recent decades, American metropolitan cities have promoted the creation of Business Improvement Districts (BIDs) in their central areas, delegating to them responsibilities such as the management of public space, provision of public safety, and cleaning services. The BIDs, which are community-based organizations run by private property owners within the district, have succeeded in general at reducing crime rates and at economic revitalization. This success is often explained by Ostrom’s theory. David Harvey, however, criticizes BIDs for the increase in property values; excluding the homeless, street vendors, and activists from public spaces; and changing these spaces into commercialized, homogeneous areas. More theoretically, he notes that Ostrom did not consider the type of legal framework required to control the polycentric governance and enable dialogues between multi-level agencies and among people. This paper considers the legal-theoretical question raised by Harvey, based on long-term participatory observations of BIDs in San Francisco and interview surveys in New York City. By examining this question, this paper aims to characterize the role of law in polycentric governance, which assures a rightness of city."
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