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The Co-Production of Property Rights: Theory and Evidence from a Mixed-Right System in Southern Mexico

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dc.contributor.author Kauaneckis, Derek
dc.date.accessioned 2015-10-08T19:09:54Z
dc.date.available 2015-10-08T19:09:54Z
dc.date.issued 2005 en_US
dc.identifier.uri http://hdl.handle.net/10535/9891
dc.description.abstract "This dissertation presents a framework for explaining variation in property right institutions as a result of interactions among decision-makers at three levels; formal government actors, the community of right-holders and individual right-holders. It uses a simple game-theoretic model where enforcement is the mechanism linking levels of interaction to the property institution. Property rights are understood as a function of the value of the resource to which a right has been assigned and the cost of enforcement. It recognizes that representatives of formal government, including bureaucrats, regulators and various types of law enforcement and monitoring agents do not uniformly enforce claims to property. Right- holders make decisions about contributions to the production of a property right institution based on expectations of external third-party enforcement, levels of peer-enforcement and their own ability to individually enforce property claims. This combination of different types of enforcement activities determines the structure of rights that ultimately results. The theoretical framework is applied to the empirical case of mixed-right system among communities bordering a National Park in the southern Mexican state of Campeche. Data collection incorporated a structured survey administered across a selection of twelve communities and semi-structured survey administered across a selection of twelve communities and semi-structured interviews with public and private agency officials. The results support the institutional economics perspective that resource value is fundamental to agency officials. The results support the institutional economics perspective that resource value is fundamental to understanding property right institutions, and that enforcement activity influences the type of right. However, it provides additional evidence that is the actions by different types of enforcement agents; bureaucratic, community and individual, which ultimately determines the specific structure of property rights. While the research focuses on property rights to environmental resources, the framework is useful for understanding rights across a variety of public policy areas." en_US
dc.language English en_US
dc.subject public policy en_US
dc.subject coproduction en_US
dc.subject institutional economics en_US
dc.subject land tenure and use en_US
dc.subject property rights en_US
dc.title The Co-Production of Property Rights: Theory and Evidence from a Mixed-Right System in Southern Mexico en_US
dc.type Thesis or Dissertation en_US
dc.type.published unpublished en_US
dc.type.methodology Case Study en_US
dc.publisher.workingpaperseries Indiana University en_US
dc.type.thesistype Ph.D Dissertation en_US
dc.coverage.region Central America & Caribbean en_US
dc.coverage.country Mexico en_US
dc.subject.sector Land Tenure & Use en_US
dc.subject.sector Social Organization en_US


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