Dictators with Empty Pockets:

A Political Concessions Model of Africa's Democratization

Clark C. Gibson*

Barak Hoffman

Department of Political Science
University of California, San Diego

Paper prepared for the 2002 Annual Meetings of the American Political Science Association, Boston MA.

Correspondence:
Clark Gibson
9500 Gilman
La Jolla CA 92093-0521
858.822.5140
ccgibson@ucsd.edu

*Karen Ferree and Neal Beck kindly provided useful comments on this paper.

Abstract

Dozens of African countries experienced political liberalization in the late 1980s and 1990s. One after another, undemocratic regimes on the continent began allowing the formation of opposition parties, a freer press, and multiparty elections. Despite such extraordinary, continent-wide shifts in the political landscape, analysts have had little success in accounting for this general change. In fact, existing research is contradictory. Some studies argue that economic wealth leads to political liberalization while others claim poverty has driven this change; some studies assert that foreign aid forced incumbents to open their regimes while others find evidence that aid delayed democratic reform. Further, no study has explained well the timing or extent of political liberalization across Africa. We argue that the key to explaining the political changes in Africa is the pressure exerted by patronage networks on rulers. We model how domestic and international shocks of the 1980s and 1990s influenced the choices of politicians who remain in power by supporting their patronage networks. Such factors forced leaders to make a series of political concessions to their opposition. We test the concessions model using ordered probit estimation and time series data for all sub-Saharan African countries. We find that variables associated with patronage are significant factors in explaining the timing and extent of political liberalization in Africa, but variables associated with economic condition and aid are generally weak. We also show that the argument helps to account for the persistence of patronage politics in Africa in the post-transition period.

1. Introduction

Dramatic political changes swept across Africa in the late 1980s and 1990s. One after another, autocratic regimes on the continent consented to the formation of opposition parties, a freer press, and multiparty elections. By the end of 1994, 29 countries had held 54 elections, with observers hailing the majority as "free." These elections boasted high turnouts and many clear victories: voters removed eleven sitting presidents, and three more had declined to run in these "founding" elections. During 1995--1997, 16 countries staged second-round elections, so that by 1998 only four countries in all of sub-Saharan Africa had not staged some sort of competitive contest during the 1990s (Bratton & van de Walle 1997). Given the continent's poor record of competitive elections in the post independence period, this recent spate of elections clearly signaled that some form of political change had come to Africa (Gibson 2002).

Despite such extraordinary, continent-wide shifts in the political landscape, analysts have had little success in accounting for the timing or extent of this change. In fact, existing research is contradictory. Some studies argue that economic wealth leads to political liberalization while others claim poverty drives the change. Some studies assert that foreign aid forces incumbents to open their regimes while others find assert that donor assistance merely bolsters autocratic rulers. And no theory of systematic political change in Africa has provided reliable empirical support.

We argue that there is a clear logic to the political changes in Africa that have occurred since the end of the Cold War. This logic begins with the well-known concept of neopatrimonialism, in which rulers stay in power by maintaining a patronage network. We create a model of neopatrimonialism in which a ruler funds his network at some minimum level tailored to his political economy. Domestic and international factors in the late 1980s and early 1990s combined to inhibit rulers' supply of patronage resources, reducing their ability to support their

followers and buy off their opponents. As reductions continued, rulers eventually conceded political power – as little as possible and with reversals -- to their opponents. These different sets of concessions has led to the highly variable political outcomes in Africa today: a few entrenched democracies amidst a landscape of fragile democracies and non-democracies.

2. Explaining Political Change in Africa

While economic factors appear to be at the heart of the political changes in Africa, analysts pose contradictory theories for the relationship between economic conditions and political liberalization. On the one hand, broad theories link democracy with modernization, so that increasing levels of industrialization, wealth, education, and urbanization all create conditions conducive to stable elected government (Moore 1966, Lipset 1960). Huntington (1991), for example, argues that democracies tend to "break out" in countries with per capita incomes that range from $1000 to $3000. Neo-Marxists and even new institutionalists also contend that a strong middle class is necessary before the advent of democracy (Mamdani 1987, Anyang' Nyong'o 1987, Beckman 1989, Fatton 1992, Sklar 1994, Taylor 1999, Bates 1994, 1999).

Evidence from Sub-saharan Africa does not support the relationship between development and democracy. Only a handful of African countries meet Huntington's development thresholds, while more than a handful can claim to be democratic. Widner (1994a, pp. 49--51) finds no association linking political liberalization in Africa with growth of gross domestic product (GDP), per capita GDP, or extent of the rural workforce. Neither does she find a relationship between reform and states experiencing windfalls in natural resources. These results resonate with the work of Przeworski et al. (2000), who see no association between per capita income and transitions to democracy (but find a strong relationship between income and the staying power of

democracy). Recent history shows that being a relatively rich African country does not explain political change (Bratton & van de Walle 1997).

In contradiction to the development-leads-to-democracy theories, scholars also inculpate the economic crises endured by African countries as a cause for their political changes. The link appears obvious: the economies of Africa performed so poorly in the 1970s and 80s that both elites and masses tired of their undemocratic political leaders and demanded political change (e.g., Ake 1993, Westebbe 1994, Bratton & van de Walle 1997). But economic crisis theories experience difficulty explaining the timing or extent of political change across the continent (Widner 1994a). Some countries experienced worse economic conditions in the 1970s than in the late 1980s, stretching the thread from economic cause to political consequence quite thin. Additionally, some of the richest *and* poorest economies had extensive prodemocracy movements (e.g., Malawi and South Africa) (Bratton & van de Walle 1992, 1997). Thus, neither poverty nor wealth appears systematically related to Africa's recent political transformation.

Research on the importance of foreign aid to recent African politics is similarly contradictory about its role in promoting democracy. One set of studies asserts that foreign aid -- especially demands for economic and political reform associated with structural adjustment programs -- is critical to forcing incumbents to open up their autocracies. Many argue that the high social costs of these externally demanded reform programs, in addition to the state's already austere budgets, led to popular and elite dissatisfaction, and prompted growing opposition to incumbent regimes (Nelson 1990, Sandbrook 1990, Lancaster 1991, Gibbon et al. 1992, Bangura 1992, Lubeck & Watts 1994). Elites working within the besieged regime might also withdraw their support as its weakness increases (Ake 1996, Ihonvbere 1996b, Chabal & Daloz 1999, van de Walle 2001). Yet little evidence supports this argument. Neither foreign aid, nor development assistance, nor

structural adjustment programs have been found to vary with African countries political changes (Widner 1994, van de Walle 1994, Grosh 1994, Bratton & van de Walle 1997).

Other scholars argue that aid sustains rather than undermines African rulers. They claim that African politicians understand the difficulty of monitoring aid, as well as the consistent pressure that IFIs and bilateral donors have to disburse it (Bates 1994, van de Walle 2000). (A particularly weak oversight regime for foreign aid characterized the Cold War period.) Given this incentive structure, rulers will do their best to exploit the system and to funnel such aid to their patronage networks; they will resist making any significant reforms (Collier and Dollar 1999, Roderick 1996, Toye 1992, van de Walle 1996, World Bank 2001). Bratton and van de Walle, for example, find a significant, negative relationship between political conditionality and political liberalization (Bratton & van de Walle 1997: 151). The debate remains unsettled: scholars argue both that international assistance undermines and solidifies the rule of Africa's autocrats.

Theories that feature political rather than economic phenomena to account for changes in Africa politics tend to rely on factors idiosyncratic to each country, such as their political history, previous structure of political competition, emergence of new leaders, or ethnic structure. While such work acknowledges the concurrence of external factors (the end of the Cold War, the decrease in foreign aid, and the rise of donor conditionalities) they argue that domestic factors within each country are the most important causes of political transformation. In one of the few studies that attempt comparative tests of such domestic political factors, Bratton and van de Walle (1997) find interesting but unstable results: political protest is positively related to democratic extent (as change measured from 1988-1994) but negatively related to democratic level (as measured in 1994); number of elections held before transitions is positively related to

the number of political protests, but negatively related to the extent of political liberalization; and extent of political opposition is positively related to extent of democratization but negatively related to the level of democratization. Given these results and the statistical methods employed, we still have little reliable evidence for any systematic theory of Africa's recent political changes.[1]

3. The Structure of Politics in Africa

While contradictions pervade current efforts to explain political liberalization in Africa, striking agreement exists about the general structure of politics before these transitions: neopatrimonialism. Bratton and van de Walle characterize neopatrimonialism as a system in which an individual

> "rules by dint of prestige and power; ordinary folks are treated as extensions of the 'big man's' household, with no rights or privileges other than those bestowed by the rules. Authority is entirely personalized, shaped by the ruler's preferences rather than any codified system of laws. The ruler ensures the political stability of the regime and personal political survival by providing a zone of security in an uncertain environment and by selectively distributing favors and material benefits to loyal followers who are not citizens of the polity so much as the ruler's clients." (Bratton & van de Walle 1997: 61)

In essence, a neopatromonial regime makes the government a transfer pump: the government collects resources and distributes them to its supporters. While such resource transfers may be a feature of many political systems, in a neopatrimonial regime, according to van de Walle (2001), it comprises the primary objective of the government. The basic structure of neopatrimonial regimes, therefore, consists of three sectors: the "ins", the "outs", and the government. The government derives its support by providing patronage to the "ins" and funds this by taxing the "outs".

The economic strategy of neopatrimonial regimes is to transform the resources of the state into resources for patronage, and African governments created economic policies with significant commonalities in pursuit of this goal. Among other things, neopatrimonial rulers have incentives to create state-owned, public enterprises since they can provide subsidized goods and generate employment. Rulers will also create monopsony marketing boards that pay farmers below market prices for agricultural products to subsidize urban consumption, since political opposition generally emerges from within cities (Bates 1981). And rulers favor overvaluing their currencies to subsidize imports. Through these and other tactics, rulers attempt to target employment and subsidies to followers and potential opponents (often overlapping categories), without much regard to economic productivity. In fact, Herbst (2000) argues that leaders in many African nations had incentives to prevent development in order to perpetuate the system of "ins" and "outs." For example, underinvesting in transport and communication between the urban and rural areas allowed rulers to more easily maintain their monopsony marketing boards, and thus continue food subsidies to the urban sector.

The structure of neopatrimonial regimes makes them predisposed to economic crises (Gulhati 1990, Herbst 1990, and van de Walle 1994. Economic policies that flow from neopatrimonial logic discourages economic activity by generating high rates of inflation, high levels of debt and deficits, and distorted tax regimes and exchange rates. The microeconomic policy environment was also characterized by the opaque application of rules and lack of regard for the rule of law, dampening investment.

Neopatrimonialism provides a central clue to why economics should be linked to African political changes, and why macroeconomic indicators cannot tell us much about political transformation. Neopatrimonialism includes both economic and political features: the economic

becomes the political only by means of patronage institutions. Economic shocks must be translated through a patronage system to understand its political effects. A similar shock, for instance, may produce varying political consequences depending on the structure and extent of a particular patronage network. However, while each African leader's system of patronage will vary with a country's particular history, the logic of neopatrimonialism remains similar.

4. A Political Concessions Model of African Liberalization

Despite the extensive agreement about the neopatrimonial structure of African politics, scholars have not systematically applied these concepts to the recent political liberalizations in Africa. We do so here by developing a simple model of a neopatrimonial ruler's choices in a period of declining resources, which we call a political concessions model. At the center of the model is the ruler. The ruler remains in power by maintaining a patronage system, which means he must provide for his followers and buy out possible rivals. The specific resources and distributive mechanisms of patronage networks vary by the cultural, economic, and political institutions found in particular countries. Still, every ruler faces the task of keeping his network at a level that ensures incumbency.

The ruler is rational: he will devote the minimum amount of resources necessary to remain in power. Excess resources can be consumed, saved, or invested in areas the ruler thinks might extend his rule. Since a ruler faces some uncertainty in the flow of resources he controls, he can also be expected to accumulate reserves when possible to maintain his incumbency in times of declining or fluctuating resources.

Like the variation between the size and extent of patronage networks, this minimum threshold will also differ by country, and will depend upon factors like the number and power of

his followers and rivals, and the structure of the country's economic and political institutions. The extent of urbanization in his country is of critical concern to a ruler. Since higher levels of urbanization reduce the costs for the opposition to organize and increase citizen demand for public goods, the ruler's patronage costs should be higher in more urbanized countries.

When his resources fall below the minimum necessary to sustain his network and thus his office, the ruler may choose either to repress or to concede rights to his political opponents. Repression is always costly and highly uncertain: the military's allegiance to the ruler may be in question, and should repression fail, an incumbent loses both resources and options while galvanizing opposition groups. Concessions, composed of a transfer of economic and political rights, are less costly and leave more options open to the ruler if they do not work as intended. A ruler will offer a portfolio of concessions determined by his resources, his perceptions about how they weaken his incumbency, and the demands of his rivals. It is difficult to know a priori the exact mixture of concessions a ruler might yield. In different contexts the transfer of what is ostensibly an economic right – such as a floating exchange rate – may in fact weaken a ruler's grip on office more than the granting of a political right, such as allowing political rallies. Whatever the combination, a ruler will bequeath the opposition the minimum set of rights at any given time to maintain his incumbency.

As resources continue to dwindle, more concessions will follow. From allowing open discussion of multiparty politics, the ruler may then accede to the legalization of opposition parties, and then to a discussion of an election, and then to an election itself. Since each step constitutes a transfer of political power from the incumbent to his challengers, each step will be resisted, and be characterized by delay and reneging.

Rulers will allow multiparty elections only as a last resort. While the incumbent may still stand a good chance of wining an election, staging such a contest still allows for the possibility of losing – and thus rulers will avoid such contests until their ability to maintain their patronage network is severely eroded. As a free and fair election impinges on a ruler's chances to manipulate an election – and increases his chances of defeat – they are a ruler's very last concession, short of voluntary abdication.

A political concessions model generates several implications about Africa's recent political liberalization. First, no clear division exists between the economic realm (international and domestic) and domestic political outcomes: patronage networks filter the effects of domestic and international economics. Economic decline does not shape the political fortunes of rulers equally. Those rulers that possess more extensive patronage networks to support will be forced to bequeath more political rights to their opponents than rulers who can remain in power with less extensive networks. It is no surprise, therefore, that studies find no direct links between macroeconomic indicators and African political change, and why contradictions exist in attempts to explain the relationship between economic levels and political outcomes. Most of these studies focus on the supply side of patronage, but generally fail to account for its demand.

By showing how economic crises can become political crises for African neopatrimonialism, the model also helps to explain the timing of Africa's recent liberalizations. Neopatrimonial regimes in Africa weaken when their rulers are unable to distribute sufficient patronage (Herbst 2000). Although economic growth was poor in most African countries in the 1970s and 1980s, rulers had sufficient external resources from which fund their networks. International financial institutions were quite willing to lend money during this period without strict economic and political conditions. The aid coming from the Soviet Union and the United States during the

Cold War also allowed neopatrimonial rulers to maintain their patronage networks in spite of their sputtering domestic economies. From 1989 to 1994, however, total bilateral and multilateral international aid dropped over 50%. Without sufficient revenue, rulers had to concede political benefits to opposition forces that were manipulating social dissatisfaction (van de Walle 2001).

The model thus generates expectations about the influence of foreign aid on Africa's political landscape. After the Cold War, aid levels fell, and any aid that was disbursed came with far more restrictive conditions. This meant that the resources available to rulers declined, and that the likelihood of receiving more aid while ignoring their conditions decreased. The decline in foreign aid meant that rulers increasingly strained to keep their patronage networks together. In the political concessions model, that aid decrease sparked political reform in the form of concessions.

While offering a general explanation of political transformation in Africa, the model also allows for the widely different experiences within each country. The existence and rate of political liberalization varies with the nature of a ruler's network and resources, and the nature of his political opposition.

5. Specification of the Model and Hypotheses

We construct a statistical model to test the implications of neopatrimonialism on African political liberalization. The basic form of the model is:

$$\text{Political Liberalization}_{i,t} =$$

$$a + ß_1(\text{Control Variables}_{i,t-j}) + ß_2(\text{Patronage Pressure}_{i,t-j}) + ß_3(\text{External Assistance}_{i,t-j})$$

$$+ ß_4(\text{Government Revenue}_{i,t-j}) + \varepsilon_i$$

We discuss the construction of each of the model's variables below.

Political Liberalization

Political liberalization is measured on a five-point scale (0 to 4).

- Zero: Strict limits on political organization; president has announced no intentions to change.
- One: Announcement by President that political liberalization will take place or announcement that an election will take place.
- Two: Formal change of constitution to open political system or formal lifting of ban on political organization.
- Three: Multiparty election.
- Four: Free and fair multiparty election

The scale assumes that incumbents do not want to give up power. Each shift to a larger number on the scale represents a concession to opposition groups. In the absence of a significant political event in either direction, the political liberalization variable remains constant. The tables below (Tables 1 and 2) present how we translated events into scores for the dependent variable. The data cover the years 1984 to 1995: this start date allows for lags in the explanatory variables.

(Insert Tables 1 and 2 about here.)

The scale measures movement towards liberalization from the perspective of a stylized incumbent ruler, rather than a scale of the quality of a democracy. The concessions model is only mildly correlated with other measures (e.g. R = .24 with Polity); it purposively moves away from conventional approaches due to its emphasis on patronage politics rather than democratic transitions or their consolidation (e.g., Diamond 1996, 1999; Barkan 1999)

Control Variables

The model contains three control variables: a lagged dependent variable, a time trend, and Bratton and van de Walle's (1997) Modal Regimes.

- Lagged dependent variable. Because the best indicator of the degree of political liberalization in any period is the degree of political liberalization in the previous period (a country's political liberalization value remained the in two consecutive years in 80% of our observations; see Table 2), we use a lagged dependent variable in our model.
- Time trend. The trend variable captures the increasing tendency for the foreign policies of industrial democracies to push for political liberalization over this period. This pressure was coupled with threats about decreasing external assistance.
- Regime type. These scores come from Bratton and van de Walle (1997) who hypothesize that regimes that there are five regimes types in sub-Saharan Africa in terms of degree of competition and participation: Plebiscitary One-Party System (low competition, medium participation), Military Oligarchy (low/medium competition, low participation), Competitive One-Party System (medium competition, medium participation), Settler Oligarchies (medium/high competition, low/medium participation), and Multiparty System (medium/high competition, medium/high participation). Following their Bratton and van de Walle's discussion, we code the regime classification from 1 to 5, from least exclusionary to most inclusive. (Regime type does not have a direct correlation with development.[2])

Patronage pressure

While at the center of a neopatrimonial regime, patronage is a difficult variable to measure for at least three reasons. First, in most cases leaders seek to keep such information hidden. Second, many of the forms that patronage can take defy precise quantification: granting

special licenses to supporters for imports will not appear in a government's balance sheet. Third, forms of patronage are likely to vary by the cultural, economic, and political institutions found within any particular country e.g., in some cases the patronage system may overlap with one ethnic group while in other it may include a handful of them.

We include three variables to capture the pressure put upon rulers by their patronage networks: 1) a proxy for the network itself, 2) urbanization, and 3) an interactive term. Our proxy for a patronage network combines two measures that we argue correlate with the level of political patronage in most African countries: government subsidies and government wages. Each measure captures a distinct part of a patronage network. Wages reflect the extent to which an incumbent allocates resources to formal employment, a scarce commodity in most African countries. Subsidies reflect the extent to which an incumbent supports certain economic sectors and, by implication, his followers from those sectors. To facilitate cross-country comparison, we deflate employment and subsidies by government expenditure and aggregate them into the single patronage measure. While incumbents have devised numerous and ingenious ways to reward their followers, we believe our measure will captures a significant portion of a patronage network. Further, our measure of patronage is readily comparable across countries and time.

Urbanization

Urbanization increases neopatrimonial rulers' costs. First, rival parties are easier to organize in more urbanized countries. Consequently, patronage networks should be more expensive to maintain -- and therefore less stable -- in more highly urbanized countries. Second, urbanization should increase the demand for patronage. As the number of people living in cities rises, the number of people with access to the government increases, so the effective demand for public goods (e.g., schools) and private goods (e.g., jobs) rises. Urbanization also increases the

demand for subsidies, such as for electricity and food, leading to less flexibility in government spending and increased demands for patronage. Urbanization, thus, reduces the costs of organizing opposition and increases demand for government expenditure.

Patronage and Urbanization

The discussion above suggests that there is a reason to suspect that the sum of patronage and urbanization and/or the interactive effect of patronage and urbanization may be greater than the sum of the individual effects. As a result, we test both the sum of patronage and urbanization and an interactive term, patronage*urbanization.

External Assistance

We employ three measures of external assistance in the model. The first measure is current and lagged total aid loans (concessional/ODA and non-concessional) in per capita terms and as a percent of GDP. We use current and lagged aid to account for the possibility that there may be a time lag between aid disbursal and aid expenditure. The second measure is arms imports as a percent of total imports. We use arms imports to test the argument that the reduction in arms flows after the Cold War made it more difficult for countries to use repressive policies (e.g., Clapham 1996). The third measure is grants, as a percent of GDP and per capita. By the late 1980s, grants were a larger source of resource transfer to sub-Saharan Africa than loans (see appendix figures 1 and 2). However, whereas loans are provided directly to the government, grants often do not flow through the government budget. As a result, it is far more difficult (but not impossible) to use grants as a source of patronage. Nevertheless, for completeness, we do test grants and provide the results in the appendix.

It is difficult to forecast the impact of foreign assistance on political liberalization for at least two reasons. First, our model does not assume that reduced external assistance makes all

neopatrimonial regimes equally less stable; there is an intervening variable, which we are defining here as patronage pressure. More generally, the ability of leaders to accommodate reduced resources is to reduce spending. Because some leaders can withstand reduced flows of external assistance better than other leaders can, the direct impact of external assistance on the stability of neopatrimonial regimes is not clear. Second, it is not the only the quantity of external assistance but the context in which external assistance is provided that is relevant for the impact of external assistance on neopatrimonial regimes. We argue that during the Cold War rulers could easily transform external assistance into a resource for patronage. With the end of the Cold War, donors began to provide less assistance generally, and the assistance became imposed with more onerous conditions. As a result, the impact of external assistance is not straightforward. On the one hand, reduction in external assistance should make patronage networks less durable, suggesting that the coefficient on external assistance should be negative: as external assistance declines, neopatrimonial regimes should become less stable. On the other hand, because donor conditions during the period we examine were becoming increasingly tied to economic and political conditions, it is possible that the coefficient on external assistance could be positive: only countries that demonstrated a commitment to political liberalization received external assistance.

Government revenue

Governments that collect more taxes should be able to distribute more patronage, *ceteris paribus.* Van de Walle (2001) argues that neopatrimonial regimes fall because of the reduced extractive capacity of the government. We test revenue and a percent of GDP and lagged revenue as a percent of GDP.

6. Results

Tables 3, 4, and 5 present our results. Given the discrete nature of our dependent variable and given that the majority of the changes in the dependent variable are one-point changes (70%), we use ordered probit to test the model. Table three shows the results of our base-line models. The first row for each variable is the coefficient and the second row is the p-value of the z-statistic. (The significance of probit models is shown through z-statistics, not t-statistics, because probit estimates are derived from a standard normal distribution.) We have corrected the standard errors for serial correlation and heteroskedasticity.[1]

(Insert Table 3 here)

Control Variables

The time trend and lagged dependent variable have the expected sign and are statistically significant at the 95% level at least in all models. The significance of the trend variable suggests that some external pressure to liberalize, independent of reductions in external assistance, played a significant role in liberalization. Bratton and van de Walle's regime classification also has significant explanatory power and the sign is in the correct direction: the more inclusive the prior regime, the greater the probability for liberalization.

Political Patronage and Urbanization

Patronage is statistically significant at the 95% level in both models, while urban is statistically significant at the 95% level using aid as a percent of GDP, but is statistically significant only at the 90% level when per capita aid is used. Combined, both patronage and urban are statistically significant at the 95% level using aid as a percent of GDP, but are statistically significant only at the 90% level when tested against aid per capita. The sum and the

product of patronage and urbanization are statistically significant at the 99% level in all equations. This provides strong evidence that patronage networks become less stable as urban centers grow, and is consistent with Herbst's (2000) argument about disincentives for development for African leaders. The low coefficient on the product term stems from the large magnitude of the variable.

External Assistance

Consistent with the aid and economic reform literature surveyed earlier, we find no support for the impact of external loans on the pressure to reform (although the time trend may be capturing a significant amount of rising pressure). Using grants as a percent of GDP and grants per capita produces a positive coefficient when patronage variables are included but produces no statistically significant results when patronage variables are not included (appendix tables one and two). As a result, the grants data does not provide support for the hypothesis that external assistance had a systematic impact on political liberalization. Models with arms imports are not shown because the results were not statistically significant.

Revenue

Current and lagged revenue have no statistically significant explanatory power in our model. This casts doubt on van de Walle's (2001) argument that reduced capacity of neopatrimonial regimes to extract revenue was a critical factor in the downfall of many neopatrimonial regimes in the region.

---

[1] There is no direct technique for correcting standard errors in probit models for serial correlation. We corrected the standard errors using the Huber-White estimation procedure and clustered by country to account for correlation of errors within countries. We thank Neal Beck for helpful suggestions for estimating the model.

7. Robustness and Extensions

Tables four, five, and six reflect our check for the robustness of the results by testing a number of political and economic variables that researchers argue impacts political liberalization. To test that the level of economic development affects political liberalization, we use per capita GDP. To test that economic crises influence political liberalization, we use the growth rate of GDP, the growth rate of GDP per capita, and the government budget balance as a percent of GDP. To test whether the domestic political situation affected liberalization (beyond information contained in the lagged dependent variable), we use the number of protests per year per country. Table four reports the results using aid per capita and table five reports results using aid as a percent of GDP.

(Insert tables 4-6 here)

Patronage-Urbanization

Adding economic and political factors does not diminish the explanatory power of the sum and product of patronage and urban. Moreover, the patronage-urbanization interactive term is the only non-control variable that is statistically significant in every equation. That our patronage-urban interactive term is statistically significant at the 99% level in every equation is striking given the explanatory power of the lagged dependent variable and the time trend. Patronage alone is statistically significant at the 95% level in all models while urbanization alone is statistically significant at the 95% level in only six of the ten models. Using both patronage and urban produce statistically significant results for both variables at the 95% level in four out of five equations using aid as a percent of GDP but in only one equation when per capita aid is used are both patronage and urban statistically significant at the 95% level. In all models, patronage and urban are statistically significant at the 90% level.

Level of Development

The level of economic development has little explanatory power in these models.

Economic Conditions

Tables four and five suggest that countries that had rapid economic growth were more likely to liberalize, contrary to the suggestion that economic crises lead to political liberalization. The tables also suggest that the larger budget balance induce political liberalization, supporting the theory that economic crises lead to political liberalization. As a result, the models suggest opposite conclusions about the impact of domestic political conditions for liberalization. Table six examines the robustness of the economic variables by removing the patronage and urban terms. Only one variable, GDP growth, remains statistically significant at the 95% level (table seven examines average GDP growth by year and level of political liberalization). However, given that per capita GDP growth did not produce statistically significant results even at the 90% level when patronage and urbanization were removed casts some doubt on the strength of this result.

Political Conditions

Equations nine and ten show that political protest did not play a significant role in liberalization. Regime type certainly suggests that there were meaningful variations among neopatrimonial regimes; this is consistent with our theory that demand for patronage will vary across regimes. That political protest was not significant shows not that protests are irrelevant for decisions to liberalize, but that dissatisfaction protest alone is not enough. The dissatisfaction must filter through the patronage process. For example, van de Walle argues that reduction in patronage may influence opportunistic elites to mobilize popular discontent. This is also

consistent with our data in that the costs of developing a political opposition should fall as urbanization rises.

8. Discussion

The African ruler of the 1980s appeared safely in power. While his declining domestic economy restricted his ability to entrench his regime more deeply, the extant combination of domestic and international resources allowed him to fund his patronage network to a level that not only allowed him to remain in office, but also to brush aside internal and external demands for democratic change. The end of the Cold War quickly changed this status quo: the ruler no longer had sufficient resources to support his followers and to mollify his opponents. To prevent losing office, rulers promised greater economic and political rights while trying to minimize the actual concessions they made. Still, many rulers had to concede significant rights to remain in office. Those rulers with more extensive patronage networks felt this squeeze most deeply and conceded more rights to opposition group, including multiparty elections. Several former autocrats fell from power completely.

The political concessions model helps to tie together the facts, theories, and conventional wisdoms associated with Africa's recent liberalization. It accounts for not only for the post 1989 timing of the political transformations on the continent, but also for the variation in the rate and extent of those changes across countries. It includes the centrality of economic shocks, but incorporates them in a model that makes such shocks politically meaningful. And it combines both the international and domestic factors identified by scholars as important without artificially separating them in any attempt to identify a single origin for Africa's political changes.

The political concessions model also contributes to several recent debates in the study of African politics. First, the model's focus on patronage and concessions moves us away from viewing the idea of democracy as the motivation for African liberalization, and away from the staging of multiparty elections as the sine qua non of democratization. Instead, elections are only one point of many on a continuum of concessions that incumbents yield to their opposition. Elections remain important insofar as they indicate an incumbent is experiencing severe difficulties maintaining the relationships necessary to stay in power. The model thus sheds light on the "electioneering" debates among observers of Africa that doubted the transformative powers of elections (Abbink & Hesseling 2000).

This is not to deny the extent or depth of conviction that Africans hold for real democratic change in their countries: indeed, many politicians and citizens died for those very beliefs. What the model does indicate is that neopatrimonialism possesses a particular logic to it, one that does not need autocrats to experience ideological conversion to explain political liberalization. The structure of the political concessions model demonstrates that autocrats can become democrats under certain circumstances.

Additionally, the political concessions model gives us some insight as to why observers express ambivalence about current African politics. While hopes for a democratic revolution were high in the early 1990s, observers now lament the politics as usual found in Africa and the shallowness of its democracy (Chege 1996, Villalón 1998, Lemarchand 1992, Bates 1994, Clapham & Wiseman 1995,). Opposition parties are weak and actively harassed by new governments (Monga 1999). Second elections, where held, are of declining quality (Bratton & Posner 1999). New leaders tend to be recycled old politicians constructing "virtual democracies" that do just enough to keep financial aid flowing (Joseph 1999d; see also Ake 1996, Chabal &

Daloz 1999, Ottaway 1999a, Joseph 1991). Indeed, Young (1999a) asserts that the democratizing reforms that have occurred in Africa have fallen far short of any reasonable criteria for consolidation. But if neopatrimonialism remains at the foundation of most African states, we should not expect the flowering of democracy in the short to medium term on the continent. Yes, voters in some instances threw out incumbents, and there are a handful of cases of apparent democratic consolidation. Yet without deeper structural changes in the relationship between politics and economics, new officeholders face sets of incentives and tools quite similar to their predecessors.

Neopatrimonial politics is firmly entrenched in Africa. Through recent political changes, reduced aid flows, and the rise of globalization, the logic of political organization remains the same across much of the continent. Data show this remarkable resilience.

While the mean level of external assistance dropped 60% from 1984 to 1995, and the median level fell 70%, these declines are in sharp contrast to the mean level of patronage for the same years. Whether compared to percent GDP (see Figure 1), or percent of government expenditure, the mean level of patronage does not differ substantially between the beginning and the end of the sample period. These data imply that patronage is one of the more inelastic items in the budgets of many African governments.[3]

(Insert Figure 1 and Figure 2 about here.)

The political concessions model, together with trends in our measure of patronage, indicate that the leaders of the new, weak democracies in Africa follow the same logic of patronage politics as the autocrats from whom they inherited power. These analyses support the view held by many observers – despite perhaps their hopes to the contrary -- that the "Third Wave" of democracy in sub-Saharan Africa is very shallow. African political liberalization may

be more about the competition between those who will distribute patronage, rather than eliminating the entrenched and extensive patronage systems from politics.

Figure 1. Aid and Patronage (Percent of GDP)



Figure 2. Aid and Patronage (Percent of Government Expenditures)



Table 1: Detailed Political Liberalization Data

	0	1	2	3	4	Total
Angola	9	1	1	1		12
Benin	6		1		5	12
Botswana					12	12
Burkina Faso	6	1		5		12
Burundi	9	1	1	1		12
Cameroon	6		1		5	12
Cape Verde	7	2			3	12
Chad	1	1	1			12
CAR	6	1	1	4		12
Comoros	7	2	1	2		12
Congo, DR	7	5				12
Congo, Rep.	7	1			4	12
Cote d'Ivoire	6			6		12
Equatorial Guinea	7	1	1	3		12
Eritrea	1	1	1			12
Ethiopia	7	3	2			12
Gabon	6	2	1	3		12
Gambia					12	12
Ghana	6	1	1	4		12
Guinea	4	3	2	3		12
Guinea Bissau	7	1	2		2	12
Kenya	7	1		4		12
Lesotho	7	4			1	12
Liberia	12					12
Madagascar	5	1	3		3	12
Malawi	8	1	1		2	12
Mali	6	1	1	4		12
Mauritania	7		1	4		12
Mauritius					12	12
Mozambique	8		2		2	12
Namibia	4	1			7	12
Niger	4	4	1		3	12
Nigeria	7	1	4			12
Rwanda	1	1	1			12
Sao Tome & Principe	6	1	1		4	12
Senegal					12	12
Seychelles	7	1	1		3	12
Sierra Leone	9	2	1			12
Somalia	12					12
South Africa	6	1	3		2	12
Sudan	12					12
Swaziland	8		1	3		12
Tanzania	7	1	3	1		12
Togo	5	3	1	3		12
Uganda	12					12
Zambia	6		1		5	12
Zimbabwe					12	12
Total	**308**	**51**	**43**	**51**	**111**	**564**

Table 2: Autocorrelation in Political Opening Data

		Lagged Political Score				
		0	**1**	**2**	**3**	**4**
	0	257	2	4	2	1
	1	33	16	0	1	1
Political	**2**	9	21	13		
Score	**3**	1	3	12	35	
	4		4	11	0	91

Table 3: Results from Baseline Models

Model	**1**	**2**	**3**	**4**	**5**	**6**	**7**	**8**	**9**	**10**	**11**	**12**	**13**
Lagged Dependent Variable	**1.03**	**1**	**1**	**1.08**	**1.08**	**0.99**	**0.99**	**1.06**	**1.07**	**1.06**	**1.07**	**1.07**	**1.08**
	<.01	**<.01**	**<.01**	**<.01**	**<.01**	**<.01**	**<.01**	**<.01**	**<.01**	**<.01**	**<.01**	**<.01**	**<.01**
Regime Type	**0.24**	**0.22**	**0.22**	**0.19**	**0.2**	**0.23**	**0.23**	**0.22**	**0.22**	**0.22**	**0.21**	**0.21**	**0.2**
	<.01	**<.01**	**<.01**	**<.01**	**<.01**	**<.01**	**<.01**	**<.01**	**0.03**	**0.02**	**0.03**	**0.03**	**0.04**
Trend	**0.13**	**0.13**	**0.13**	**0.15**	**0.15**	**0.13**	**0.13**	**0.15**	**0.15**	**0.15**	**0.15**	**0.15**	**0.15**
	<.01	**<.01**	**<.01**	**<.01**	**<.01**	**<.01**	**<.01**	**<.01**	**<.01**	**<.01**	**<.01**	**<.01**	**<.01**
Patronage				**0.02**	**0.02**			**0.02**	0.02				
				0.02	**0.04**			**0.02**	0.08				
Urban						**0.01**	0.01	**0.02**	0.02				
						0.02	0.07	**0.03**	0.06				
Patronage + Urban										**0.02**	**0.02**		
										<.01	**<.01**		
Patronage*Urban												**0.0005**	**0.0006**
												<.01	**<.01**
Aid/GDP		-0.92		1.67		-0.51		3.55		3.36		2.66	
		0.58		0.62		0.78		0.28		0.32		0.41	
Aid Per Capita			0.002		0.003		-0.001		-0.002		-0.002		-0.002
			0.07		0.26		0.83		0.6		0.63		0.55
Revenue/GDP		0.01	0.003	0.01	0.006	0.001	0.001	0.003	0.003	0.002	0.003	0.003	0.004
		0.38	0.68	0.22	0.51	0.9	0.84	0.74	0.77	0.79	0.77	0.36	0.69
Pseudo-R Squared	0.48	0.47	0.47	0.5	0.5	0.47	0.47	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.5
N	517	431	431	300	300	431	431	300	300	300	300	300	300

Note: First row of each variable is the coefficient; second row is the p-value. Bolded values have a p-value of .05 or less.

Table 4, Part I: Robustness Check (Aid Per Capita)

Model	**1**	**2**	**3**	**4**	**5**	**6**	**7**	**8**	**9**	**10**
Lagged Dependent Variable	**1.07**	**1.07**	**1.08**	**1.06**	**1.07**	**1.08**	**1.08**	**1.09**	**1.07**	**1.08**
	<.01	**<.01**	**<.01**	**<.01**	**<.01**	**<.01**	**<.01**	**<.01**	**<.01**	**<.01**
Regime Type	**0.21**	**0.23**	**0.23**	**0.32**	**0.21**	**0.2**	**0.22**	**0.22**	**0.3**	**0.2**
	0.03	**0.02**	**0.01**	**<.01**	**0.03**	**0.04**	**0.02**	**0.02**	**<.01**	**0.04**
Trend	**0.14**	**0.15**	**0.15**	**0.16**	**0.14**	**0.14**	**0.15**	**0.15**	**0.16**	**0.14**
	<.01	**<.01**	**<.01**	**<.01**	**<.01**	**<.01**	**<.01**	**<.01**	**<.01**	**<.01**
Patronage + Urban	**0.02**	**0.02**	**0.02**	**0.02**	**0.02**					
	<.01	**<.01**	**<.01**	**<.01**	**<.01**					
Patronage*Urban						**0.0006**	**0.0006**	**0.0006**	**0.0007**	**0.0005**
						<.01	**<.01**	**<.01**	**<.01**	**<.01**
Aid Per Capita	-0.003	-0.002				-0.003	-0.003	-0.002	-0.002	-0.002
	0.55	0.46				0.49	0.39	0.41	0.64	0.57
Revenue/GDP	0.002	0.002				0.003	0.003	0.002	0.0007	0.004
	0.87	0.86				0.8	0.76	0.8	0.95	0.66
Per Capita GDP	<.001					<.0001				
	0.72					0.73				
Per Capita GDP Change		**2**					**1.93**			
		0.03					**0.04**			
GDP Change			**2.04**					**1.98**		
			<.01					**<.01**		
Budget Balance				**-0.03**					**-0.03**	
				<.01					**<.01**	
Protests					0.09					0.09
					0.69					0.66
Pseudo-R Squared	0.5	0.5	0.51	0.51	0.5	0.5	0.51	0.51	0.51	0.5
N	297	297	295	300	300	297	295	295	300	300

Note: First row of each variable is the coefficient; second row is the p-value. Bolded values have a p-value of .05 or less.

Table 4, Part II: Robustness Check (Aid Per Capita)

Model	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
Lagged Dependent Variable	**1.09**	**1.08**	**1.09**	**1.07**	**1.08**	**0.99**	**0.99**	**0.99**	**1**	**0.99**
	<.01	**<.01**	**<.01**	**<.01**	**<.01**	**<.01**	**<.01**	**<.01**	**<.01**	**<.01**
Regime Type	**0.19**	**0.21**	**0.21**	**0.28**	**0.2**	**0.23**	**0.24**	**0.25**	**0.24**	**0.23**
	0.04	**0.02**	**0.02**	**<.01**	**0.04**	**<.01**	**<.01**	**<.01**	**<.01**	**<.01**
Trend	**0.14**	**0.15**	**0.16**	**0.16**	**0.15**	**0.13**	**0.13**	**0.13**	**0.12**	**0.13**
	<.01	**<.01**	**<.01**	**<.01**	**<.01**	**<.01**	**<.01**	**<.01**	**<.01**	**<.01**
Patronage	**0.02**	**0.02**	**0.02**	**0.02**	**0.02**					
	0.05	**0.03**	**0.03**	**0.01**	**0.05**					
Urban						0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01
						0.14	0.07	0.07	0.09	0.08
Aid Per Capita	-0.0003	0.002	0.002	0.004	0.003	-0.001	-0.0005	-0.0005	-0.001	-0.0004
	0.93	0.31	0.31	0.07	0.28	0.71	0.8	0.83	0.65	0.86
Revenue/GDP	0.002	0.005	0.005	0.003	0.007	0.0002	0.0005	0.0001	0.006	0.002
	0.81	0.56	0.6	0.75	0.48	0.98	0.94	0.98	0.42	0.83
Per Capita GDP	0.0001					<.0001				
	0.25					0.59				
Per Capita GDP Change		1.87					1.23			
		0.05					0.18			
GDP Change			**1.98**					**1.49**		
			<.01					**0.04**		
Budget Balance				**-0.03**					-0.006	
				<.01					0.52	
Protests					0.1					0.07
					0.63					0.68
Pseudo-R Squared	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.51	0.5	0.47	0.47	0.47	0.48	0.47
N	297	295	295	300	300	428	425	425	396	431

Note: First row of each variable is the coefficient; second row is the p-value. Bolded values have a p-value of .05 or less.

Table 4, Part III: Robustness Check (Aid Per Capita)

Model	1	2	3	4	5
Lagged Dependent Variable	**1.07**	**1.07**	**1.07**	**1.06**	**1.07**
	<.01	**<.01**	**<.01**	**<.01**	**<.01**
Regime Type	**0.22**	**0.23**	**0.23**	**0.32**	**0.21**
	0.03	**0.02**	**0.02**	**<.01**	**0.03**
Trend	**0.14**	**0.15**	**0.15**	**0.16**	**0.14**
	<.01	**<.01**	**<.01**	**<.01**	**<.01**
Patronage	0.02	0.02	0.02	**0.02**	0.02
	0.08	0.06	0.06	**0.03**	0.1
Urban	0.02	**0.02**	**0.02**	**0.02**	0.02
	0.09	**0.04**	**0.05**	**0.02**	0.06
Aid Per Capita	-0.002	-0.003	-0.002	-0.002	-0.002
	0.52	0.45	0.49	0.65	0.59
Revenue/GDP	0.002	0.002	0.001	-0.001	0.004
	0.87	0.86	0.9	0.93	0.73
Per Capita GDP	0.00001				
	0.77				
Per Capita GDP Change		**2**			
		0.03			
GDP Change			**2.04**		
			<.01		
Budget Balance				**-0.03**	
				<.01	
Protests					0.09
					0.63
Pseudo-R Squared	0.5	0.5	0.51	0.51	0.5
N	297	295	295	300	300

Note: First row of each variable is the coefficient; second row is the p-value. Bolded values have a p-value of .05 or less.

Table 5, Part I: Robustness Check (Aid/GDP)

Model	**1**	**2**	**3**	**4**	**5**	**6**	**7**	**8**	**9**	**10**
Lagged Dependent Variable	**1.06**	**1.07**	**1.07**	**1.05**	**1.06**	**1.07**	**1.08**	**1.08**	**1.07**	**1.07**
	<.01	**<.01**	**<.01**	**<.01**	**<.01**	**<.01**	**<.01**	**<.01**	**<.01**	**<.01**
Regime Type	**0.23**	**0.24**	**0.24**	**0.32**	**0.22**	**0.21**	**0.23**	**0.23**	**0.3**	**0.21**
	0.02	**0.01**	**0.01**	**<.01**	**0.02**	**0.03**	**0.02**	**0.02**	**<.01**	**0.03**
Trend	**0.15**	**0.16**	**0.16**	**0.16**	**0.15**	**0.15**	**0.16**	**0.16**	**0.16**	**0.15**
	<.01	**<.01**	**<.01**	**<.01**	**<.01**	**<.01**	**<.01**	**<.01**	**<.01**	**<.01**
Patronage + Urban	**0.02**	**0.02**	**0.02**	**0.02**	**0.02**					
	<.01	**<.01**	**<.01**	**<.01**	**<.01**					
Patronage*Urban						**0.0006**	**0.0006**	**0.0006**	**0.0007**	**0.0006**
						<.01	**<.01**	**<.01**	**<.01**	**<.01**
Aid/GDP	3.31	2.88	2.74	1.49	3.59	2.58	2.16	2.03	0.67	2.9
	0.33	0.37	0.4	0.63	0.28	0.43	0.49	0.52	0.82	0.37
Revenue/GDP	0.004	0.0005	0.0001	-0.002	0.003	0.005	0.001	0.001	-0.0001	0.004
	0.74	0.95	0.99	0.89	0.73	0.68	0.87	0.91	0.99	0.66
Per Capita GDP	-0.0001					-0.0001				
	0.8					0.77				
Per Capita GDP Change		**1.82**					1.76			
		0.04					0.06			
GDP Change			**1.91**					**1.86**		
			<.01					**<.01**		
Budget Balance				**-0.03**					**-0.03**	
				<.01					**<.01**	
Protests					0.12					0.12
					0.55					0.55
Pseudo-R Squared	0.5	0.5	0.51	0.51	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.51	0.51	0.5
N	297	295	295	300	300	297	295	295	300	300

Note: First row of each variable is the coefficient; second row is the p-value. Bolded values have a p-value of .05 or less.

Table 5, Part II: Robustness Check (Aid/GDP)

Model	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
Lagged Dependent Variable	**1.09**	**1.09**	**1.09**	**1.08**	**1.09**	**0.99**	**0.99**	**0.99**	**1**	**0.99**
	<.01	**<.01**	**<.01**	**<.01**	**<.01**	**<.01**	**<.01**	**<.01**	**<.01**	**<.01**
Regime Type	**0.2**	**0.21**	**0.21**	**0.26**	**0.19**	**0.23**	**0.24**	**0.25**	**0.25**	**0.23**
	0.04	**0.02**	**0.02**	**<.01**	**0.04**	**<.01**	**<.01**	**<.01**	**<.01**	**<.01**
Trend	**0.15**	**0.15**	**0.16**	**0.15**	**0.14**	**0.13**	**0.13**	**0.13**	**0.12**	**0.13**
	<.01	**<.01**	**<.01**	**<.01**	**<.01**	**<.01**	**<.01**	**<.01**	**<.01**	**<.01**
Patronage	**0.02**	**0.02**	**0.02**	**0.02**	**0.02**					
	0.02	**0.02**	**0.02**	**0.01**	**0.02**					
Urban						0.01	**0.01**	**0.01**	**0.01**	**0.01**
						0.11	**0.02**	**0.02**	**0.03**	**0.02**
Aid/GDP	2.71	1.31	1.19	-0.01	1.86	-0.39	-0.43	-0.49	-3	-0.37
	0.4	0.69	0.72	0.99	0.59	0.84	0.81	0.78	0.16	0.84
Revenue/GDP	0.003	0.009	0.009	0.009	0.01	-0.0001	0.0001	-0.0004	0.004	0.001
	0.76	0.28	0.31	0.37	0.2	0.99	0.98	0.95	0.56	0.88
Per Capita GDP	**0.0001**					0.0001				
	0.04					0.78				
Per Capita GDP Change		**1.94**					1.22			
		0.05					0.18			
GDP Change			**2.02**					**1.49**		
			<.01					**0.04**		
Budget Balance				**-0.02**					-0.01	
				<.01					0.21	
Protests					0.12					0.06
					0.56					0.7
Pseudo-R Squared	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.47	0.47	0.47	0.48	0.47
N	297	295	295	300	300	428	425	425	396	431

Note: First row of each variable is the coefficient; second row is the p-value. Bolded values have a p-value of .05 or less.

Table 5, Part III: Robustness Check (Aid/GDP)

Model	1	2	3	4	5
Lagged Dependent Variable	**1.05**	**1.07**	**1.07**	**1.05**	**1.06**
	<.01	**<.01**	**<.01**	**<.01**	**<.01**
Regime Type	**0.22**	**0.24**	**0.24**	**0.32**	**0.22**
	0.03	**0.02**	**0.01**	**<.01**	**0.03**
Trend	**0.15**	**0.16**	**0.16**	**0.16**	**0.15**
	<.01	**<.01**	**<.01**	**<.01**	**<.01**
Patronage	**0.02**	**0.02**	**0.02**	**0.02**	**0.02**
	0.02	**0.02**	**0.02**	**0.01**	**0.03**
Urban	0.02	**0.02**	**0.02**	**0.02**	**0.02**
	0.09	**0.03**	**0.03**	**<.01**	**0.03**
Aid/GDP	3.45	3.13	3	1.59	3.73
	0.29	0.33	0.36	0.58	0.26
Revenue/GDP	0.003	0.001	0.001	-0.001	0.004
	0.75	0.89	0.92	0.91	0.69
Per Capita GDP	-0.0001				
	0.9				
Per Capita GDP Change		**1.86**			
		0.04			
GDP Change			**1.94**		
			<.01		
Budget Balance				**-0.03**	
				<.01	
Protests					
Pseudo-R Squared	**0.5**	**0.51**	**0.51**	**0.51**	**0.56**
N	**297**	**295**	**295**	**300**	**300**

Note: First row of each variable is the coefficient; second row is the p-value. Bolded values have a p-value of .05 or less.

Table 6: Robustness Check

Model	1	2	3	4	5	6
Lagged Dependent Variable	**1**	**1**	**1**	**1**	**1.01**	**1.02**
	<.01	**<.01**	**<.01**	**<.01**	**<.01**	**<.01**
Regime Type	**0.23**	**0.23**	**0.23**	**0.24**	**0.22**	**0.24**
	<.01	**<.01**	**<.01**	**<.01**	**0.02**	**<.01**
Trend	**0.13**	**0.13**	**0.14**	**0.13**	**0.12**	**0.11**
	<.01	**<.01**	**<.01**	**<.01**	**<.01**	**<.01**
Aid Per Capita	0.002		0.002		0.002	
	0.08		0.07		0.13	
Aid/GDP		-0.87		-0.92		-3.36
		0.6		0.58		0.12
Revenue/GDP	0.002	0.005	0.002	0.004	0.007	0.009
	0.78	0.47	0.82	0.5	0.38	0.25
Per Capita GDP Change	1.21	1.27				
	0.2	0.19				
GDP Change			**1.5**	**1.55**		
			0.04	**0.04**		
Budget Balance					-0.002	-0.01
					0.8	0.16
Pseudo-R Squared	**0.47**	**0.47**	**0.47**	**0.47**	**0.37**	**0.47**
N	**425**	**425**	**425**	**425**	**396**	**396**

Note: First row of each variable is the coefficient; second row is the p-value.
Bolded values have a p-value of .05 or less.

Table 7: Average GDP Growth by Year and Political Liberalization Level

	0	1	2	3	4
1985	2.9%				4.5%
1986	2.2%				5.4%
1987	1.9%				5.3%
1988	4.2%	4.4%			7.0%
1989	3.1%	2.9%	6.7%		3.9%
1990	2.1%	1.0%	2.6%	-1.1%	4.9%
1991	3.9%	0.8%	-0.5%	4.5%	3.6%
1992	1.2%	-3.6%	0.6%	0.7%	1.8%
1993	-5.5%	-1.9%	2.0%	-0.1%	2.4%
1994	-11.7%	2.7%	2.1%	2.7%	1.5%
1995	9.9%	-6.6%	3.2%	5.3%	3.8%

Appendix Table 1: Results Using Grants

Model	**1**	**2**	**3**	**4**	**5**	**6**	**7**	**8**
Lagged Dependent Variable	**1.08**	**1.11**	**1.08**	**1.1**	**1.07**	**1.09**	**1.07**	**1.09**
	<.01	**<.01**	**<.01**	**<.01**	**<.01**	**<.01**	**<.01**	**<.01**
Regime Type	**0.22**	**0.24**	**0.23**	**0.24**	**0.23**	**0.25**	**0.24**	**0.25**
	0.03	**0.01**	**0.01**	**0.01**	**0.02**	**<.01**	**0.01**	**<.01**
Trend	**0.14**	**0.12**	**0.14**	**0.13**	**0.14**	**0.11**	**0.14**	**0.13**
	<.01	**<.01**	**<.01**	**<.01**	**<.01**	**<.01**	**<.01**	**<.01**
Patronage * Urban	**0.0006**	**0.0007**	**0.0005**	**0.0005**				
	<.01	**<.01**	**<.01**	**<.01**				
Patronage + Urban					**0.02**	**0.02**	**0.01**	**0.02**
					<.01	**<.01**	**<.01**	**<.01**
Grants/GDP	0.02				0.02			
	0.48				0.49			
Lagged Grants/GDP		**0.04**				**0.04**		
		0.01				**<.01**		
Grants Per Capita			**0.005**				**0.005**	
			0.03				**0.04**	
Lagged Grants Per Capita				**0.008**				**0.01**
				<.01				**<.01**
Revenue/GDP	0.004		-0.003		0.003		-0.003	
	0.61		0.8		0.69		0.78	
Lag Revenue/GDP		0.001		-0.01		0.0002		-0.01
		0.89		0.27		0.99		0.28
Pseudo-R Squared	0.5	0.51	0.51	0.52	0.5	0.51	0.51	0.51
N	297	289	300	293	297	289	300	293

Note: First row of each variable is the coefficient; second row is the p-value. Bolded values have a p-value of .05 or less.

Appendix Table 2: Robustness Check for Grants

Model	1	2	3	4
Lagged Dependent Variable	**0.99**	**0.99**	**0.98**	**0.99**
	<.01	**<.01**	**<.01**	**<.01**
Regime Type	**0.24**	**0.23**	**0.25**	**0.24**
	<.01	**<.01**	**<.01**	**<.01**
Trend	**0.13**	**0.11**	**0.13**	**0.12**
	<.01	**<.01**	**<.01**	**<.01**
Grants/GDP	-0.003			
	0.73			
Lagged Grants/GDP		0.004		
		0.51		
Grants Per Capita			0.003	
			0.25	
Lagged Grants Per Capita				0.004
				0.09
Revenue/GDP	0.008		0.005	
	0.27		0.55	
Lag Revenue/GDP		0.006		0.001
		0.42		0.88
Pseudo-R Squared	**0.47**	**0.46**	**0.47**	**0.47**
N	**434**	**417**	**437**	**431**

Note: First row of each variable is the coefficient; second row is the p-value. Bolded values have a p-value of .05 or less.

Appendix Figure 1: Nominal Per Capita Grants and Loans to Sub-Saharan Africa: 1984-1995



Appendix Fiugure 2. Real Per Capita Grants and Loans to Sub-Saharan Africa: 1984-1995, 1984 Dollars



Endnotes

[1]There are several possible sources for the instability of Bratton and van de Walle's statistical findings. First, their models do not directly include economic variables. As a result, there may be an omitted variable bias. While they do test variables that refer to economic phenomenon, they are not economic per se: For example, their variable "number of structural adjustment programs" is not really an economic indicator and does not reflect the amount of aid dispersed (nor does it capture bilateral aid). Second, a sample size of 42 may not be large enough to produce statistically meaningful results. Finally, many of their factors are averages over time employed in static tests, rather than time series data.

[2] While the correlation between regime type and per capita GDP is 0.26 and significant, it serves as a poor proxy for level of development. Over the sample period, per capita GDP in Plebiscitary One-Party Systems was $796; in Military Oligarchies $308; in Competitive One-Party System $829; in Settler Oligarchies $3046; and in Multiparty System $1461. It should be noted that only Namibia and South Africa are settler oligarchies and that while the five Multiparty Systems in the sample, Botswana, The Gambia, Mauritius, Senegal, and Zimbabwe, did have a higher per capita GDP, there was extreme variation within the category. Botswana and Mauritius had a per capita GDP of about $2850 while The Gambia, Senegal, and Zimbabwe had per capita GDP of about $500.)

[3]This is consistent with findings in the economics literature that civil service reform tends to be one of the more difficult domestic economic reforms to undertake.

Literature Cited

Abbink J, Hesseling G, eds. 2000. *Election Observation and Democratization in Africa.* New York: St Martin's.

Ake C. 1993. The unique case of African democracy. *Inernational Affairs* 69:239—44.

Ake C. 1996. *Democracy and Development in Africa.* Washington, DC: Brookings Institution.

Anyang' Nyong'o P, ed. 1987. *Popular Struggles for Democracy in Africa.* NJ: United Nations University. Zed Books.

Bangura Y. 1992. Authoritarian rule and democracy in Africa: a theoretical discourse. See Gibbon et al. 1992, pp. 39--82

Barkan J. 1999. Regime change in Africa. *Journal of Democracy* 10:165--70

Bates RH. 1981. *States and Markets in Tropical Africa*. Berkeley: University of California Press.

Bates RH. 1994. The impulse to reform in Africa. See Widner 1994a, pp. 13--28

Bates RH. 1999. The economic bases of democratization. See Joseph 1999e, pp. 83--94

Beckman B. 1989. Whose democracy? Bourgeois versus popular democracy. *Review of African Political Economy* 45(46):84--97

Bratton M, Posner DN. 1999. A first look at second elections in Africa. See Joseph 1999e, pp. 377--408

Bratton M, van de Walle N. 1992. Toward governance in Africa: popular demands and state responses. See Hyden & Bratton 1992, pp. 27--56

Bratton M, van de Walle N. 1997. *Democratic Experiments in Africa: Regime Transitions in Comparative Perspective.* New York: Cambridge University Press

Chabal P, Daloz JP. 1999. *Africa Works: Disorder as Political Instrument.* Indianapolis: Indiana University Press

Chege M. 1996. Between Africa's extremes. See Diamond & Plattner 1996, pp. 350--57

Clapham CS. 1996. *Africa and the International System: the Politics of State Survival.* Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press

Clapham C, Wiseman JA. 1995. Assessing the prospects for the consolidation of democracy in Africa. See Wiseman 1995, pp. 220--32

Collier, P, Dollar D. 1999. Aid Allocation and Poverty Reduction. Aid Effectiveness Research, World Bank

Diamond L. 1996. Toward democratic consolidation. See Diamond & Plattner 1996, pp. 226--40

Diamond L, Plattner MF, eds. 1999. *Democratization in Africa.* Baltimore, MD: John Hopkins University Press

Fatton R. 1992. *Predatory Rule: State and Civil Society in Africa.* Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner

Gibbon P, Ofstad A, Bangura Y, eds. 1992. *Authoritarianism, Democracy and Adjustment: The Politics of Economic Reform in Africa.* Coronet Books

Gibson C. 2002. Of Waves and Ripples: Democracy and Political Change in Africa in the 1990s. *Annual Review of Political Science* 5: xx-xx.

Grosh B. 1994. Through the structural adjustment minefield: politics in an era of economic liberlization. In J.Widner *Economic Change and Political Liberalization in Sub-Saharan Africa.* Baltimore, MD: John Hopkins University Press: 29-46.

Gulhati, R. 1990. Who Makes Economic Policy in Africa and How? *World Development* 18 (8): 1147-1161.

Herbst J. 1990. The structural adjustment of politics in Africa. *World Dev.* 18:949—58

Herbst, J. 2000. *States and Power in Africa*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Huntington SP. 1991. *The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century.* Norman: University Oklahoma Press

Ihonvbere JO. 1996b. Where is the third wave? A critical evaluation of Africa's non-transition to democracy. *Africa Today* 43:343--68

Joseph R. 1991. Africa: the rebirth of political freedom. *Journal of Democracy* 2:11--24

Joseph R. 1999. State, conflict and democracy in Africa. In Joseph, *State, Conflict, and Democracy in Africa.* Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, pp. 3--14

Lancaster C. 1991. Democracy in Africa. *Foreign Policy* 85:148--65

Lemarchand R. 1992. African transitions to democracy: an interim (and mostly pessimistic) assessment. *Africa xxxxx Insight* 22:178--85

Lipset SM. 1960. *Political Man: the Social Bases of Politics.* Garden City, NY: Doubleday

Lubeck PM, Watts M. 1994. An alliance of oil and maize? The response of indigenous and state capital to structural adjustment in Nigeria. In *African Capitalists in African Development*, ed. B Berman, C Leys, pp. 214--35. Boulder: Lynne Rienner

Mamdani M. 1996. *Citizen and Subject: Contemporary Africa and The Legacy of Late Colonialism*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press

Monga C. 1999. Eight problems with African politics. See Diamond & Plattner 1999, pp. 48--62

Moore B Jr. 1966. *Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy, Lord and Peasant in the Making of the Modern World*. Boston: Beacon

Nelson J, ed. 1990. *Economic Crises and Policy Choice: The Politics of Economic Adjustments in the Third World*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press

Ottaway M. 1999a. *Africa's New Leaders: Democracy or State Reconstruction?* Washington, DC: Carnegie Endow. Int. Peace

Przeworski A, Alvarez ME, Cheibub JA, Limongi F. 2000. *Democracy and Development: Political Institutions and Well-Being in the World, 1950--1990*. New York: Cambridge University Press

Rodrik, D. 1996. Understanding Economic Policy Reform." *Journal of Economic Literature*, 34 (March):9-41

Sandbrook R. 1990. Taming the African Leviathan. *World Policy Journal* 7:673--701

Sklar RL. 1994. Social class and political action in Africa: the bourgeoisie and the proletariat. See Apter & Rosberg 1994, pp. 117--44

Taylor SD. 1999. Race, class and neopartimonialism in Zimbabwe. See Joseph 1999e, pp. 239—66

Toye, J. 1992. Interest Group Politics and the Implementation of Adjustment policies in Sub-Saharan Africa. In P. Mosley ed. *Development Finance and Policy Reform*. New York: St. Martin's Press, pp: xx-xx

van de Walle N. 1994. Neopatrimonialism and democracy in Africa, with an illustration from Cameroon. See Widner 1994b, pp. 129--57

van de Walle N. 2001. *African Economies and the Politics of Permanent Crisis, 1979--1999*. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press

Villalón LA. 1998. The African state at the end of the twentieth century. See Villalón & Huxtable 1998, pp. 3--26

Westebbe R. 1994. Structural adjustment, rent seeking and liberalization in Benin. See Widner 1994b, pp. 80--100

Widner JA. 1994. Political reform in Anglophone and Francophone African countries. See Widner 1994b, pp. 49--79

Widner JA, ed. 1994b. *Economic Change and Political Liberalization in Sub-Saharan Africa.* Baltimore, MD: John Hopkins University Press

Young C. 1999. Africa: an interim balance sheet. See Diamond & Plattner 1999, pp. 63—82