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Conservation Development Programmes in Protected Areas- Perspectives of Land-Use in Game Management Areas in Zambia

By

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ABSTRACT

Zambia has one of the largest protected areas in Southern Africa. The area under protection cover a total of 23 million hectares representing an estimated 30 percent of the country's total land area. The protected areas in Zambia consist of 19 national parks and 34 Game Management Areas (GMAs). The GMAs alone cover 16.6 million hectares accounting for 22 percent of the total land area. The Game Management Areas (GMAs) span some of the most deprived areas in Zambia vis-à-vis socio-economic development. The GMAs are often considered marginal agricultural regions. They are remote and characteristically poor in social services and communication infrastructure. Because these areas were considered marginal regions, the Zambian Government in collaboration with some donors and international conservation agencies saw wildlife utilisation as a potentially viable land-use option. Thus, wildlife utilisation programmes such as the Administrative Management Design (ADMADE) and the Luangwa Integrated Rural Development Project (LIRDP) were conceived and promoted with an inflexible premise that wildlife utilisation was a requisite for successful and sustainable development in the GMAs. This paper argues that instead of improving the livelihoods of the local communities, these programmes have in fact accentuated their economic marginalisation as they have ignored the development of agriculture the main livelihood strategy for the majority of the people in these regions. The critical questions the paper raises are: to what extent have these wildlife utilisation programmes being promoted in the GMAs been shaped by local priorities and patterns of resource use? To what extent do international donors, international conservation agencies, government agencies, private sector agencies and national political interests influence land-use in these GMAs?

Introduction

Zambia has one of the largest wildlife protected areas in Southern Africa. Two types of wildlife protected areas exist- the national park and the Game Management Area (GMA). These protected areas for wildlife cover a total of 23 million hectares, representing an estimated 30 percent of the country's total land area. The wildlife estate is comprised of 19 national parks and 36 Game Management Areas (see fig.1). National parks cover 6.4 million hectares, representing 8.4 percent of the total land area while GMAs cover16.6 million hectares accounting for 22 percent of the total land area (GRZ: 1994).

Zambia's protected areas for wildlife date back to the colonial era. In the quest to protect wildlife the British colonial administration introduced the Game Ordinance, 1925. The Game Ordinance was the forerunner of the many other wildlife legislation that provided for the creation of game reserves, national parks and controlled hunting areas (Dodds & Patson: 1968). The Game Management area Declaration Order, 1971 provided for the creation of a new category of protected area, namely, the Game Management Area (GMA) originally called controlled hunting area (CA) in the colonial period.

The GMAs which serve as buffer zones to national parks have been the subject of experimental conservation development projects/programmes in the last one and half decades. These projects have been established with the duo objectives of conserving wildlife animals with the cooperation of the local inhabitants on one hand, and letting some wildlife-derived revenues accrue to the latter and enhance their socio-economic welfare. The paper notes that while the stated policy and intent of these conservation development projects is meant to meet the needs of the local communities while

ensuring the cooperation of the local people in conservation of wildlife, the actual outcomes of these programmes have been contrary to the stated policy. It is argued that this difference in stated policy or intent and actual practice is to a large extent a result of the different interests arising from multiple actors in these development initiatives. The paper argues that the wildlife utilisation programmes being promoted in the GMAs are not being shaped by local priorities and patterns of resource use but by powerful external actors such as donors, international conservation agencies, private sector agencies, government agencies, and national political interests. The paper concludes that instead of improving the livelihoods of the local communities, the wildlife utilisation development programmes have in fact accentuated their economic marginalisation as they have ignored the development of agriculture the main livelihood strategy for the majority of the people in these regions.

This paper draws upon a mass of literature based on original research and other publications. The author has also undertaken original research in some of the GMAs on related topics.

Land-Use in National Parks and Game Management Areas

Land-use can simply be defined as the purpose to which land is assigned or devoted. Planning for the use of land is often times taken to be an activity of the 'experts'. It is thus the planning experts who ultimately determine land-use. In both the national parks and GMAs, land-use planning has been the preserve of ecologists and/or biologists. Thus, in many cases recommendations made by the experts are in line with or biased towards their field of training. There has been little input from sociologists and economists. The poor rural people are merely 'consulted'. As observed in one report, "...much as one would like it to be a bottom-up approach,

land use planning is still perceived as a top-down process and a tool for government to achieve its objectives"(quoted in Donahue; 1997).

According to Dodds & Patton (1968), the government policy and subsequent guidelines regarding the use and management of national parks and GMAs have supported the protected areas approach. Thus, national parks were established to preserve certain sections of the country's indigenous environments for the enjoyment and education of the general public. No major developments are allowed in the national parks except infrastructure such as roads, rest areas and other non-permanent structures. No human settlement is allowed in the national parks. The colonial authorities first designated GMAs in 1938 then called Controlled Hunting Areas. They were established in areas considered by the wildlife department to contain significant numbers of game animals (Astle: 1999). The GMAs were established on land used for subsistence cropping or grazing by local inhabitants. GMAs span some of the most deprived areas in Zambia vis-à-vis socio-economic development. The areas are often considered marginal agricultural regions, are remote and characteristically poor in social services and communication infrastructure (Donahue: 1997). These areas designed to serve as 'buffer zones' around national parks. The principal objective was to prevent disruptive land-use practices while conserving wildlife within these areas at optimum variety and abundance commensurate with other land uses (IUCN: 1976). The colonial administration policy in the GMAs was to separate people from wildlife in the reserves, and special regulations were instituted that permitted local people to hunt game animals. The colonial administration did not hesitate to gun down any animal that threatened crop, livestock or humans. Neither did the administration institute any local community development programmes in these areas based on wildlife-derived revenue (Astle: 1999). In these areas, humans have continued to co-habit with wildlife while engaging in cultivation and livestock keeping. However, hunting of game animals is

regulated through licence or other permit. Snaring or any form of hunting without permit, even for subsistence is regarded as poaching and carries heavy penalties.

Conservation Development Projects in the Game Management Areas

Policing of the wildlife protected areas, particularly the GMAs failed as the wildlife department had limited personnel and suffered from financial cuts from central government in the last years of colonial rule. The local inhabitants in the GMAs began to poach in defiance of the law and when they could, assisted commercial poachers from outside in exchange for small gifts. As the spectre of poaching, especially of the commercial type took its toll during the 1970s and much of the 1980s wildlife in most GMAs was under serious threat of depletion. The Rhinoceros population almost became extinct while the elephant population reduced drastically. The humiliation suffered by the wildlife department prompted a fundamental reversal of the protectionist conservation thinking, characterised by 'top-down' model of resource protection in the GMAs.

The Zambian government in collaboration with some donors and international conservation agencies in the early 1980s mooted a school of thought that holds that wildlife conservation and utilisation is a potentially viable economic land use option in these areas than the other more traditional land-use practices such as agriculture. Thus, community conservation projects such as ADMADE and LIRDP were promoted with an inflexible premise that wildlife utilisation was a requisite for successful and sustainable development in the GMAs. Thus, local communities were co-opted in these programmes with a view that they participate in, and bear the responsibility for the management and utilisation of wildlife resources in their areas. The objective of the wildlife department was to ensure that the needs of the local

communities be satisfied while guaranteeing wildlife conservation (Mwenya et al: 1990).

These initiatives attempting at involving local communities in wildlife resource conservation were not an isolated phenomenon taking place in Zambia alone. The initiatives developed in tandem with a general worldwide movement from traditional state control to increased involvement of local communities in management of conservation areas, which led to the coining of the term 'community-based conservation' (Johnson: 1997). Counterpart terms such as community-based conservation, community wildlife management, collaborative management and integrated conservation and development programmes with similar principles are used (Adams and Hulme: 1999). The new approach sought to reverse the 'top-down', centre-driven conservation by focussing on the people who bear the costs of conservation (Western and Wright 1994). Two outcomes were, therefore, expected from community-based conservation - the maintenance and preservation of habitats and species on one hand, and the improvement of social and economic welfare of the local community on the other (Little: 1994 quoted in Johnson: 1997).

Different models of community-based conservation projects that seek to link wildlife conservation with social and economic welfare of local communities have gained ground in Africa. In Southern Africa, such programmes/projects are being implemented in Botswana (the Natural Resources Management Programme), Namibia (the Living in a Finite Environment- LIFE), and Zimbabwe (the Communal Areas Management Programme).

The Administrative Management Design- ADMADE, and the Luangwa Integrated Resource Development Project-LIRDP which has now changed name to South Luangwa Area Management Unit- SLAMU) both grew out of the Lupande Research

and Development Projects between 1997 and 1984. Since its inception LIRDP has concentrated its activities in South Luangwa National Park and the adjacent Lupande GMA while the ADMADE project became a nationwide programme that was established in most of Zambia's GMAs. Although the two projects/programmes undertook somewhat different approaches to wildlife conservation development they both appear to have met similar constraints and have had similar outcomes vis-à-vis local communities. This paper makes a brief description of ADMADE only in the box 1 below. In the discussion that follows, however, some references are made to LIRDP as well.

Box 1
Administrative Management Design (ADMADE)

ADMADE is strictly a wildlife resource based programme with a focus on wildlife management with community involvement. The basic premise for the ADMADE programme is that communities in GMAs will interact responsibly with wildlife so long there are tangible benefits accruing to them from the exploitation of the wildlife resource. This 'philosophy', as it came to be referred, has been implemented in more than 30 of Zambia's 36 GMAs.

The ADMADE initiative is based on two principles:

- that revenues generated from wildlife resources return to local communities in form of cash for community development initiatives and direct employment in wildlife utilization related activities within GMAs; and

- establishing a system of user rights with defined rights of access to wildlife resources for the communities inhabiting GMAs or living around national parks.

ADMADE's objectives are:

- to provide an effective network of buffer zones for National Parks and a self-supporting wildlife management units;

- to provide a self-sustained management programme for long term protection of wildlife resources in GMAs;

- to develop an improved and sustainable basis for supporting local community projects;

- to foster a closer and more cooperative relationship between the NPWS and local communities on wildlife affairs;

- to earn foreign exchange from the wildlife estate for the government central treasury; and

- to stimulate the development of entrepreneurship and skills among residents needed to support the management of renewable wildlife resources.

ADMADE Resource Base

- Safari hunting and concession and hunting fees provide over 90 percent of ADMADE revenues. Quotas for safari, national and resident hunting are set annually by the NPWS. Revenue generated within GMAs is administered by the Wildlife Conservation Revolving Fund (WCRF) a unit within the NPWS System created in 1984 with the objective to supplement government funding to National Parks and Wildlife Service (NPWS) in the conservation of wildlife in the country, by generating revenue from wildlife based activities such as safari hunting and game viewing.

- Donor assistance has also been used especially in initial investments. Donors to ADMADE included, New York Zoological Society, USAID, and WWF.

Revenue Distribution Mechanism

The WCRF collects and disburses all revenues derived from safari hunting concession fees

and licenses paid for at NPWS. The system of distribution of revenues determined by the NPWS at the inception of the ADMADE programme is as follows:

- 50% goes directly to Government Central Treasury;

The remaining 50% is distributed as follows:

- 40% for game management in the earning area and is supposed to be disbursed monthly;
- 35% goes to the GMA's Community fund for development projects; and
- 25% retained within the NPWS for WCRF overheads and ADMADE administration at national level.

No cash dividends go to individuals or households.

Not all GMAs operating an ADMADE programme are able to generate sufficient revenue. Only about 10 GMAs rich in wildlife have been able to generate a 'satisfactory' level of income. The rest of the GMAs classified as "depleted" receive little or no income at all. The "depleted" GMAs have been serviced through the 25% revenues retained by the NPWS for ADMADE administration at national level.

Organisational Structure

- ADMADE as a programme is administered through a number of structures. These are: the headquarters based in Chilanga; Wildlife Management Authorities (WMAs); Wildlife Management Units; and Wildlife Management Sub-Authorities.

- Wildlife Management Authorities (WMAs): these are district level structures were supposed to be composed of area Chief(s); the District Development Secretary designated as its Chairperson; Wildlife Warden of the area supposed to act as its Secretary; local politicians (Member of Parliament and elected Councillors) and directors of commercial companies with interests in wildlife in the area. Since the inception of ADMADE the WMAs have hardly functioned and have been quite irrelevant to the ADMADE programme.

- Wildlife Management Unit: are administrative wildlife management units. In most cases a Unit corresponds to an existing GMA, which is also a site of a traditional chiefdom. In some situations, one Unit will share two chiefdoms. The Unit consists of a Unit leader - an NPWS civil servant specially trained to implement community-based wildlife management; NPWS Scouts; village scouts, and other staff. The Unit's responsibilities include, inter alia: anti-poaching activities; collection of wildlife data; community conservation education; and health education.

- Wildlife Management Sub-Authority (or Sub-Authority for short): established for every chiefdom with an ADMADE project. It is composed of the area chief (its chairperson), village headmen, elected councillors, head teachers, a district council representative and the unit leader (its secretary). The responsibilities of the Sub-Authority included, inter alia: making decisions regarding the allocation of 35% share of funds to community projects; resolution of resource management problems within chiefdoms; and approval of local resident hunting permits.

Policy and Legal Framework

It was not until 1993 that the government through its revised *Policy for Wildlife in Zambia 1993* endorsed a community-based approach to wildlife management. This policy 'recognised' communities in GMAs as 'custodians of wildlife.'

For about a decade, ADMADE had no legal recognition. It operated largely as a framework of administrative arrangements. The legal authority of wildlife management in the GMAs, thus, remained effectively with the NPWS.

Legislative and policy reforms in the wildlife sector were undertaken, however, in 1998. These reforms facilitated for the establishment of the Zambia Wildlife Authority (ZAWA) and the community level institutions in the GMAs referred to as Community Resource Boards (CRBs). These are described below.

sources: Mwenya et al (1990); Tilley (1995); Chisulo (1995); GRZ (1994).

Discussion

Most economic analyses or cost-benefit analyses would suggest that wildlife management in GMAs is of significantly greater economic value than any of the more traditional forms of development. While this economic assumption could be true or held as true, the ultimate issue that needs to be established is whether and/or how that economic value accrues to the mass of the local rural inhabitants of these areas. Experiments have a limited duration, and in Zambia we have learnt many lessons from the set of what I will call 'first-generation' wildlife conservation development programmes. For more than a decade there is nothing to show for the efforts of ADMADE and LIRDP in alleviating rural poverty. Safari hunting, the main income generating activity for ADMADE (and LIRDP) has generated very low incomes effectively compromising the economic benefits that were expected to trickle down to local communities (Chisulo: 1995). The low wildlife populations in most GMAs (only about 10 GMAs are said to be relatively well stocked) have resulted in low incomes realised from safari hunting. This situation was further compounded by the fact that the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species (CITES) to which Zambia is part imposed a ban on trade in elephant products since 1989, (WRI, UNEP, UNDP: 1992). This convention seriously eroded the anticipated resource base of ADMADE. Elephants, a resource with enormous economic potential to alleviate poverty in GMAs could, therefore, not be utilized

(Chisulo: 1995).

The benefit-sharing mechanism adopted by ADMADE further imposed significant limits to the level of economic benefits that would eventually trickle down to the producer GMAs (see box 1 above). A calculation of the benefit-sharing mechanism described above shows that in fact only about 17.5 percent of the total revenues generated from wildlife utilization in each GMA is directed to the local communities (Steiner and Rihoy: 1995). The bulk of the revenues, thus, go to the Central Government Treasury and the NPWS. The benefit sharing mechanisms for both ADMADE and LIRDP were decided without consulting the local people whose 'needs' these programmes have purportedly been trying to satisfy.

At their inception both projects identified the development of community infrastructure projects such as school classroom blocks, health centres and hammer mills as a way of sharing benefits from wildlife utilization. Such infrastructure, however, took ordinarily long to complete for the community to appreciate it. Revenue generated from safari hunting has been far too inadequate to make any major improvement in community social infrastructure provision (Hachileka et al: 1998; Tilley: 1995). While infrastructure projects have been undertaken in the ADMADE and LIRDP areas, their level of provision does not make any difference from that existing in other rural areas without such programmes. ADMADE has never distributed income dividends to local communities while LIRDP tried to incorporate the dividends approach that failed as the dividends were to inadequate to meet the households needs.

Even though most GMAs are characteristically marginal agricultural regions, agriculture has remained local people's principal economic activity and the main source of their income. A research by Hachileka et al (1998) in Lupande GMA

(LIRDP project area) and Mumbwa GMA (ADMADE project area) established that the local people felt that the objectives of these projects did not reflect their immediate needs such as food security and health services. In fact, the local communities were not prepared to reinvest a substantial amount of their community share of revenues in wildlife management. This shows that local communities in these areas had not prioritised wildlife resources within their resource base. Astle (1999: 87) observes, in a survey carried out by the Provincial Planning Unit in Mambwe area of the Luangwa valley in 1990, that "...almost half of the people identified lack of food as their most serious problem, nearly a quarter said lack of good water, the same fraction identified lack of transport, and the remainder wanted more implements and other inputs for farming." Tilley (1995: 12) also noted at a community workshop in Namwala GMA (ADMADE project area) to identify land-use plans for the improvement of the GMA, the participants generally felt that "...their immediate needs were improved food supply, water, health and education. The means for achieving these [needs], through wildlife generated funding, was only considered [by the participants] to be a vague future possibility." Further, a survey undertaken by Matenga and Kapungwe in 2001(forthcoming) also established that agriculture was the major source of income for the local communities in Chiawa and Bangweulu GMAs (both ADMADE project areas).

Given the fact that local communities' economic livelihoods have not been dependent on wildlife generated revenues is it not the case that the importance attached to conservation in these areas is detrimental to the development of subsistence agriculture thereby exacerbating local peoples' economic marginalisation? The wildlife utilisation land-use option has, in the main, failed to deliver the economic benefits promised to the local communities by the conservation development programmes. For the GMA local inhabitants, wildlife utilisation does not have a comparative financial advantage over other land-use options such as

agriculture. Research has shown that local community members' principal source of income is agriculture followed by other sources unrelated to wildlife.

But why is the school of thought that wildlife has inherent economic advantages over other uses of land in GMAs (NPWS: 1998) still persistent in the face of strong empirical evidence against this narrative? There exist multiple actors with different interests in the wildlife sector that shape the direction of official policy and other outcomes. The actors range from government departments and officials, traditional leadership, local government, national leaders, to the private sector, aid donors and international conservation agencies. The influence of the International conservation and development agencies have approaches to action, organisation and legitimisation linked to their position as international institutions. Development agencies such as the World Bank and the donor community's interest in the wildlife sector lies in the promotion of the market. As observed by Adams and Hulme (1999), the logic is that the market as opposed to the state permits the economic values of conservation resources to be unlocked and therefore correct the perverse incentives of the past in order to achieve the sustainable development of conservation resources through their becoming part of the local and global economy. International conservation agencies such as WWF and IUCN's major interest is with biodiversity conservation, and their attempts at involving the community is simply a by-product to their main objective. The private sector, in particular the safari operators, are interested in profits from trophy hunting. Government agencies, in particular the wildlife department is interested in the wildlife-derived revenues accruing to their departments and so does the local government. Politicians too also exert their influence for their own purposes.

The relationships between the various actors are quite complex, at times forming alliances, at other times becoming competitive. The aid donors push for the

acceptability of their policy agendas using aid funds as a carrot while the national government crave for donor funds. At the beginning of restructuring the wildlife department (NPWS) in 1996 to the Zambia Wildlife Authority (ZAWA) through the EDF/NPWS Sustainable Wildlife Management Project, the European Union's Development Fund promised to spend US$6 million towards the exercise for a period of three years (EDF/NPWS: undated). However, at some moment during the restructuring exercise, the Zambian government felt that national sovereignity was at stake by giving the European Union a lot of say in running the wildlife sector. The interests of the two actors moved from forming an alliance to competition. Thus, the much anticipated donor funds failed to materialise seriously jeopardising the operations of ZAWA and consequently the welfare of the local communities in the GMAs.

Private sector agencies often ally themselves with government agencies and officials to exert their influence for the formulation of policies that serve their needs. However, the interests of these actors sometimes become competitive. A recent example is when the Minister of Tourism, Environment and Natural Resources Levison Mumba disregarded the tender procedure for the allocation of the 2002 safari hunting concessions (The Post, Wednesday March 27, 2002). The Minister nullified the tenders that were awarded by the legally constituted committee comprising ZAWA, Zambia National Tender Board, Zambia Association of Chambers of Commerce and Industry, representatives of traditional leaders in GMAs and other stakeholders and instead awarded the concessions "administratively" himself. This action led to a public outcry, as observed by former Agriculture Minister Dr Guy Scott: "He [Minister of Tourism] has upset everyone associated with the sector, ZAWA, the tender board, the communities in game managemement areas, the safari operators and the trophy hunters who are currently meeting in Las Vegas to make their bookings for the year 2002"(The Post, Wednesday March 27,

2002, p. 4). Four safari operators led by Leopard Ridge safari Limited and one community representative took court action that led to a court order reversing the Minister's action.

Zambia Wildlife Authority/Community Resource Boards

What then is the future of the wildlife conservation development projects in Zambia? Although the architects of ADMADE and LIRDP and their proponents may not admit failure of these projects, there had been consensus on their deficiencies. During the last half of the 1990-decade a debate about the future direction of wildlife management became the subject of many workshops. As indicated in one of the documents that originally elaborated on the ADMADE programme. "... the institutionalisation of ADMADE programme will be to legitimise it by enacting its various components, into the Wildlife Act of Zambia" (Mwenya et al: 1990).

Thus, in 1998, a major donor assisted restructuring exercise in the management of wildlife was undertaken with the enactment of a new law to govern wildlife management and conservation. The new legislation- *Zambia Wildlife Act, 1998,* transformed the NPWS into the Zambia Wildlife Authority a body corporate, with a view to make it more effective in wildlife management. In anticipation of this new legislation, a new *Policy for National Parks and Wildlife in Zambia (1998)* was passed. In this policy (NPWS: 1998: 9) it is indicated that:

> Government recognises the intrinsic strength of the ADMADE philosophy
> whereby local people and other landholders, including the state are accepted as
> the best custodians of the wildlife and other renewable resources on their land.

It was, however, not until the year 2000 that ZAWA officially launched its operations. Among other functions, ZAWA is expected to share in partnership with

the local communities the responsibilities of management in the GMAs, and to enhance the economic and social well being of local communities in these areas (GRZ: 1998). Furthermore, it was the expectation that ZAWA would facilitate "the active participation of local communities in the management of the wildlife estate" (NPWS: 1998: 8) To achieve these objectives the new wildlife legislation provides for the establishment of the Community Resources Boards (CRBs), which fundamentally alters the earlier ADMADE approach to wildlife management and benefit sharing at the community level.

The CRB is defined as (GRZ: 1998)

> A local community along geographic boundaries contiguous to a chiefdom in a Game Management Area or an open area or a particular chiefdom with common interest in the wildlife and natural resources in that area...

CRBs bring a new dimension to the wildlife sector management in Zambia. The formation of these local level institutions in the GMAs represent the first ever-legal framework that provides for community participation in natural resource management in the country. The CRB concept derives from years of efforts to see change in the manner wildlife was to be managed at both national and local levels.

At the time of restructuring the NPWS to ZAWA, the expectation was that the existing ADMADE Sub-Authorities in the GMAs would quickly transform into legally registered Community Resources Board (CRBs) through democratically elected representation of the local communities (NPWS: 1998). A CRB is to comprise seven to ten elected representatives. Two of these will be appointed by the chief (traditional leader of a chiefdom) in whose area the board is established, and the local authority (District Council) in the area respectively. According to the new legislation, the Chief (local traditional leader) of an area will not longer chair the CRB but merely serve as a patron. This was meant to remove the local Chief's

alleged undue influence in local level decision-making in wildlife management and distribution of benefits.

It is generally stated in the current wildlife legislation that safari-hunting proceeds, which previously were split between the National Treasury and the NPWS, would all be returned to the CRB to enhance the socio-economic development of the local communities in the Chiefdom (NPWS: 1998). The levels and types of use of such revenues by the CRB would be determined in a management plan for that area.

Although the new wildlife legislation does not settle the thorny issue of letting communities establish full ownership or proprietorship of wildlife in the GMAs, it is mostly likely to enhance the formal role of communities in making independent decisions over the use of locally managed wildlife resources. The legislation provides more power to local communities through CRBs to manage wildlife animals and other natural resources under their jurisdiction and to negotiate Co- management agreements to allow communal land to be used as equity in joint tourism development ventures with tour operators. If the implementation of this approach follows what is stated in the new policy for wildlife and the new Wildlife Act, 1998, then the local communities would have more management control in these development initiatives with a greater likelihood of deriving the bulk of the income earned from them. The situation on the ground, however, suggests that the noble intentions that led to restructuring the former NPWS to a body corporate have remained mere intentions to-date. No single CRB has been legally registered so far and ZAWA has been appropriating all the revenues accruing from wildlife utilisation in the GMAs since its inception. This is contrary to what is stated in the wildlife policy and the Wildlife Act 1998. The current void appears to have stemmed from a struggle between the government and the donor community over the control of wildlife in the country with the latter withholding the much-promised aid to the

sector. In the meantime, ZAWA has been delinked from effective government funding forcing it to retain all the wildlife related revenues supposed to go to the communities for the sustenance of its operations. The local communities' needs and priorities have yet again been pushed to the backyard.

CONCLUSION

What can we conclude about the hitherto, implemented wildlife-based community conservation programmes in Zambia? It is hard to criticize the wildlife utilisation development projects established in Zambia's GMAs. These programmes have been the subject of many learned papers and research. Theoretically, the conservation projects represent a radical, if not revolutionary departure from the protected areas conservation approach, which did not take into consideration the needs of communities living adjacent to national parks. Practically, however, the projects have operated as 'top down' programmes initiated, planned and implemented externally by the wildlife department, international conservation agencies and donors, and facilitated locally by the all-powerful chiefs and other local rural elites.

We can, therefore, conclude that wildlife conservation development programmes like ADMADE and LIRDP have been more or less a subtle approach to defuse local opposition towards the wildlife conservation agenda of government whose ultimate purpose has been the preservation of wildlife species and habitats in line with the wishes of international conservation agencies. Ecological necessities and potential economic benefits from conservation and utilisation of wildlife have served to legitimise the establishment of the wildlife conservation development programmes without paying due regard to the actual needs or priorities of the local inhabitants in the GMAs. It follows from this, therefore, that although the promotion of social and economic welfare has been one of the intended outcome of community-based

wildlife conservation development programmes, in ADMADE and LIRDP, this ideal has not produced any tangible benefits. In ADMADE project areas for instance, much of the wildlife-derived revenues in the GMAs have been appropriated by the Central Government, NPWS (now ZAWA) leaving insignificant revenues for the enhancement of the economic and social well being of local communities in the GMAs. Even for LIRDP project where most of wildlife revenues go to the GMA, these have proved too inadequate for uplifting the standards of living for rural dwellers. In the meantime, private safari hunting companies and the state agencies continue to profiteer at the expense of the traditional landholders.

In the face of overwhelming evidence of failure, exposed by numerous independent evaluations of these programmes, they are still being promoted and presented as a panacea for the development of the GMAs. If most of the GMAs are depleted why favour wildlife conservation development projects rather than promote agriculture or other form of development that will be more beneficial to the local people? Research has shown that local communities in the GMAs do not see wildlife as a source for development funds. For the majority of the ordinary local people, wildlife animals are simply a source of protein. For them, ADMADE and LIRDP have only made it practically impossible to ever legally access game meat. Community members can only hunt for subsistence purposes if they own a licensed firearm whose possession is a conditionality to purchase a hunting licence from the annual local residents hunting quota. Most frequently, however, the majority cannot afford the hunting licence fees as they are pegged prohibitively. Meanwhile community members have to contend with the costs of living with wildlife such as crop damage, while continuing to hope that their welfare would improve one time. I am not downplaying the ecological importance of wildlife conservation in these areas but there is need for a well researched, a more integrated and diversified approach to resource management in the GMAs than is currently the case.

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