

Local institutions and the management of common property.

by Frode Gundersen

Department of Economics and Social Science, Agricultural University of Norway
Box 5033, N-1432 Ås

Paper prepared for the Fifth Common Property Conference. Reinventing the Commons. 24 - 29 May 1995, Bodø, Norway.

I. The fragmented political-administrative landscape.

The responsibility for management of common property resources in mountain areas in Norway are divided between different the municipalities and different state authorities where the Ministry of Environment is one of several state authorities. The different authorities are using different laws and implementing different policies and supporting different local interest resulting a fragmentation of the public policy.

Two central dimensions in the studies of public policy-processes concerning the management of common property resources in the outfield areas like mountains, forrest and marshes is first the fact that the public administration is that it is fragmented into sectors and these sectors dominate the public policy-process.(Dahl- Jacobsen 1967, Strand 1977) The second feature is the dualistic character of the local institutions. They can be regarded both as instrument for the implementation of state policy and as local democratic institutions.(Kjellberg 1980, Strand 1985)

The political sectors.

The public administration are characterized by a permanent and specialized division of tasks and of hierarchical organizations. The political and administrative landscape are divided into sectors. One sector can be distinguished from another by its unity in values, focus of interests, opinions about problems in the society and the causes of this problems. The sector system have a developed capacity to concentrate on a set of problems which are well-defined. It can mobilize political energy and the technical solutions. On the other hand the sector is not very fitted to discover and solve new problems not clearly can be defined within the sector.

The sector have its own "clients" and the "clients" access to the political decisionmakingprocess is to stay close to the sector. In this sense organization will influence the politics because it influence which group the sector listen to. The access-structure can further make conditions for a blocking of certain types of politics to be decided. Strand (1977) emphasis three characteristic features of the sector-system:

First, the sector-definition of what is to be a problem in the society is important as a premiss for decisions also in formally superior political bodies. The sector act with more or less autonomy in the system which can be a problem for the political governance.

Second, the sector will try to protect itself against premisses and influence from other sectors. The professions in the sector play an important role in this process. But the sectors do deliver premisses to each others. Some sectors are better to both protect itself and influence the others.

Third, some sector have more or less "dominant characteristics". This means that the other sector have to calculate this sector in its own plans. A dominant sector will be relatively homogenous concerning its interests, have a profession, deliver clearly identified products, have the control over its own planning and implementation and be able present

its opinion at an early stage when political problems are showing at the scene.

The municipality institution.

The municipality institution in Norway have a dualistic character. On the one hand it function as a link in the national governing system. The most of the activity in the municipalities are implementation of the central state policy. The municipalities ha a role as administrative bodies for the state and have a lot of tasks related to implement national policy. On the other hand the municipalities are local political institutions. The decisions taken is made according to the rules made by the parliament but the decisions in the municipalities is made by local politicians (Kjellberg, 1980:9). In what degree the municipalities have autonomy or are dominated by the central government will vary from sector to sector.

This duality-perspective can also be used for studying the administration of the municipality. On the one hand the administration is a part of the public administration related to their position. Their role as administrators is to produce decisions in accordance with national directions and laws. On the other hand they are municipal officials. They shall produce decisions that is going to be discussed in political fora. The local politician take the formal decision in the case.

II. Management of the outfield⁽¹⁾ resources.

The management of the commons have since long time ago a struggle between local economic interests as farmers on the one side and different strong economic actors outside the local community as the state on the other side. There have been a struggle between the local landowners and the political leaders of the municipalities. The local landowners wanted to have influence over the commons and the State wanted to ensure that the important timber resources was exploited by the state and in a economic rational matter. The Ministry of Agriculture got the responsibility for this forestry. This was regulated in the act for commons 1857 which have been revised in Fjelloven, the Mountain Law from 1920 that was revised in 1981 and 1992 (Sevatdal 1984).

The local institution Fjellstyret have the responsibility for the management of large state property. The goal is both vise management for the environmental resources and exploitation of the resources in the purpose to make profit and to take consideration to local economic interests and culture. The members of Fjellstyret are local representatives and they have a difficult job to balance between the different interest.

¹ The expression "outfield" is an english word for the norwegian "utmarksressurser" which includes mountains, forrests and marshs

Since 1972 the Ministry of Environment have been public authority for nature protection, game management, inland fishery management and recreation. But this "green sector" have been very fragmented by several policy fields with different traditions, common norms of behavior that is important for what the officials do as appropriate behavior (March and Olsen 1989) In this sector we have different policy fields that have a very different history. Some of this policy field have developed almost separately from the other fields. We can identify three different traditions within the "Green line" that have different traditions both in the connection to the environmental administration as well as in policy, ideas and strategies.

The environmental administration in Norway have been and are still very heterogeneous. (Gundersen 1994, Jansen 1989) It is necessary concentrate on the development of the administration with the responsibility of certain tasks (Thompson) or policy-fields within the environmental administration(Gundersen 1994) with its own history and a relatively autonomous position in the environmental administration.

There have been a continuation of the responsibility for special tasks, use of instruments, professions and the relations to interest groups, environmental organizations and scientific communities within this policy-fields that have survived reorganizations. In this perspective this units have typical the typical features of an institution. (March and Olsen 1989)

One reason for this is that the environmental administration on the central and county-level is relative young in Norway (and in other countries). The Ministry of environmental protection, MD was the first environmental ministry in the world and was established in 1972. The environmental administration on have been fragmented to several types of offices and have been reorganized several times. It was established as a an important operative county agency, MVA, for the MD in 1982.

The expression environmental conservation is a relative new expression in the Norwegian public debate. It was introduced in the governments 5-year program from 1964. The plan used the term "environmental planning". This symbolized an interesting dimension of the environmental policy and administration in Norway because a central part of it has been connected to the regional planning administration from 1964. (Gundersen 1988)

The establishment of the Administration there where tensions between the work for recreation and the development of the regional planning.

The planning traditions first aim has been to establish planning in the municipalities and on the regional level. The problem for this tradition was to be to close connected to different environmental sector-traditions could reduce the legitimacy of the planning both within strong administrative sectors and among the political leaders of the municipalities. (Hol 1974) This direction also wanted to integrate nature protection, recreation and work against pollution in the regional planning. The older expression was nature protection, recreation, game management, inland-fishery management that included traditions that included administrative bodies, connections to natural scientific institutions and to interest groups.

Both the scientific environmental protection tradition (Gundersen 1988) and the recreational tradition (Gundersen 1991) regarded that regional planning may be used as a tool for their aims but it could also be used to work out plans for to build on areas where these traditions wanted protection.

Therefore especially the nature-protection tradition wanted an extension of the law for nature protection. The scientific groups within the Norwegian society for protection of nature managed to modernize the law of nature protection in two steps in 1954 and in 1970. The aim was to use this law also in the local and regional planning but the article 1 and 2 in the law was never implemented into practical policy because the authorities wanted to give the development of a new planning law the first priority.

III. The administrative tradition of the inland fishery- and game management.

The game- and inland-fishery administration with research bodies was established in the beginning of the century as a part of the agricultural sector which established a tradition that had its influence many years after game-management as a policy-field was taken over by the Ministry of Environment in 1972. The two Ministries represent different tasks, different cultures and different clients.

Both these policy-fields were relatively isolated from the other fields in the Green line, and the municipality-sector. The game-management was from the beginning of the century a part of the agricultural sector. It had an institute at the agricultural high school in Norway at Ås and four district officers that constitute a hunting administration in close connection to the institute at Ås and the Ministry of Agriculture. (Gundersen 1991)

The law of hunting in 1899 and 1937 gave landowners exclusive right to hunt. A committee from the Ministry of Agriculture appointed a committee in 1937 where the representatives from the agricultural organizations took an active part in the discussions. The committee proposed to establish a hunting administration at the county and municipal level. The representative of the hunting and fishing organization for the working class and the representatives for the small farmers wanted to abolish the landowners' right to do hunting and to give equal right to do hunting. (Gundersen 1991 side 32)

But the Ministry of Agriculture partly supported the landowners in its propositions to the parliament in 1949 (Ot.prp 41/1949 "Om ny jaktlov"). The right to hunt for landowners was sustained but the law opened up for a common permission for hunting "In areas that were proper to that use". The administration was under the Ministry of Agriculture with four district representatives and from 1951 hunting committees were established as a local part of this public sector. The committee had part-representations from both the landowners and the foresters. Together with the hunters these groups dominated these committees in the years to follow. An empirical study of this committee concluded that it was dominated by the local agricultural interests and played a less important role in the political activities in the municipalities. (Gundersen 1991)

From 1965 the Agency for game and inland-fishery management under the Ministry for Agriculture took over this policy-field. This strengthened this policy-field as a sector. In 1972 the DVF became an Agency under MD.

In 1981 a law of game-management passed parliament but the organization of the game-management at the county and municipality level was intact. Even the reorganization of the DVF to DN in 1987 did not affect the organization on the county and municipal level very much.

On the county level the officers in game-management and in inland-fishery was not very integrated in the department for environmental protection at the prefects office.

There have been a continuation from the situation in 1951. The game-management was until the beginning of the 1990s a sector quite independent of the political authoritative in the municipalities and independent of the other policy-field in the "Green line".

The representatives in different types of environmental committees in the municipalities are in a similar situation like the members of Fjellstyret.

In the state commons the Fjellstyret have the authoritative to take decisions concerning hunt, fishery, agriculture. In the management of the game Fjellstyret made proposals to the game committee or the committee for the environment which can propose changes. Fjellstyret send the proposal out to the public and after that make a decision.

The economic interests of Fjellstyret can be contradictory to the interests of the game interest. Fjellstyret can also feel the pressure from groups in the community that want to do more fishing and hunting.

- There are established special committees to take care of the management of the wild reindeer because the reindeer use large areas. The important committee is villreinnemda, (wild reindeer committee). This committee consist of representants of the game committees situated in the reindeer area. The conditions for the Villreinnemda are closely regulated by the agency for nature protection, DN.

There have been a pressure from the agricultural sector for to take over the tasks from the inland-fishery and game-management to the regional and local officers of the agricultural sector.

The pressure for rationalizing the local state committees in the mid of the 80s was taken up by the representant for the professions of the agricultural sector. This representant want to promote an extension of the forestry sector to handle with nature management including both inland fishery, game management, recreation and nature management. The agriculture want to subsume this tasks under an extensive management. The district officers of the forestry sector managed to get an agreement with the N-department in the MD to establish an experiment in which the local foresters where secretary for the local committee for game-management. In 1986 the foresters supported by the agricultural sector wanted to make this arrangement permanent at the same time the foresters want to redefine their own tasks to be tasks that was nature management. They promote a strategy to integrate nature

management and forestry.

In 1987 the MD together with the organization for the municipalities, NKS, established a program to introduce a communal environmental organization. The program lasted from 1988 to 1991, the MIK-program and ended up in a reform that every municipality could establish its own environmental organization. At the same time there have been initiatives to develop the exploitation of the natural resources specially to develop new types of tourism. From 1992 the local state committees was communalized. The intention was to give the committees a more active role in the planning and policy-making process in the municipalities (Gundersen 1991)

This paper will compare the state committees for game management in the municipalities in the period from 1985 to he 1990 with a committee for game management that was introduced as a test for a administrative reform in 1988. We collected materials about the efficiency, profile and influence in local politics.

The main purpose of this paper is to examine how members of local institutions with responsibility for the management of mountain areas behave when they are under pressure from both environmental authorities to implement national environmental objectives and from different local economic actors to develop the agriculture or the local tourism.

In the study of the reorganization of the game management committee at the municipality level it is a chance to uncover at least three different social and political processes

- 1) If the game management committee in the municipality have a close connection to a political sector that have tasks to exploit nature-resources will lead the politicians in the committee to situation where they are on both side of the table. They can voluntarily or be forced to act in accordance with policy of the sector-authoritatives or in accordance with the interests of local economic exploiters. The process will be dominated by resource mobilization.
- 2) If the game management committee have a relative autonomy, administrative and political resources the argument for the protection of the habitat of the game can have a chance to influence the planning and decision-process in the municipality. The process would be dominated by actors in the local planning process. The game management can be transformed to environmental management.
- 3) If the members of the game management want to support the game interests but are forced by the economic interests the members can make decisions that can reduce the pressure and bring them out of the unpleasant situation. This is a central theme in the studies of cognitive conflict.

In the next chapter we shall introduce theoretical perspectives to this kind of questions.

III. Theoretical perspectives in the study of decision processes in local institutions.

A) The purposive-rationalistic perspective.

This perspective emphasis on interest articulation and the creating of the political agenda by economic interests groups that act strategically to get influence for their own economic interests. This is central point in the resource-mobilization tradition in sociology and political science.(Oberschall 1973, Tilly 1978). The decisionmaking process are strongly influenced by the economic actors political resources and political strategy. The tradition of the institutions are not of decisive importance because the mobilization-process are more important. Organized interests of different types in alliance with groups of politicians can get influence.

B) An Institutional perspective.

An institutional⁽²⁾ perspective will focus on how processes within and between formal affect on which themes that will be defined as problems and brought to the political agenda, what kind of solutions that are been chosen and if this solutions leads to goal-attainment. The political cases in communes will be influenced by the administrative and political treatment in the municipality and by organized interests taking part in the case. In Institutional theory the actors preferences and interests are interpreted not as something exogenous but something that are produced and reproduced within the political process.

Institutions are dominated by actors that have opinions, intentions, and act on the base in accordance with what the rules for the institution tells us what is appropriate to act in different situations. The newcomers interpretations of appropriate action are formed to shape with the other members interpretation in discussions within the institution.

This socialization process will be formed by another logic than the strictly calculating. It is a base for the construction of meaning and identity. These socially constructed topologies of action will create life-world structures in the institutions and its environment.

March & Olsen (1984), March & Olsen (1989), Meyer & Rowan(1977), Berger & Luckmann(1967), Selznick (1949).

² This direction are heterogent. In "The new institutionalism"; Walter Powell and Paul DiMaggio devellops a perspektiv in close connection to older theories about politics and democracy.

Structural elements that are relative stable in institutions are

a) moral structures, b) cognitive structures, c) resource structures and d) behavior rule structures. March & Olsen (1989) Institutions give rule and resources and codes for action to roles.

March & Simon (1957) use balance as a model for the institutions. Stability have priority to change. The stability can be reproduced because the institutions have action- and interpretation-programs. They have a capacity to act, interpret and create difficulties for other type of action and interpretation. In this way political institutions are buffers against coincidences and violation of public norms.(corruptions)

Different institutions have different set of rules. One important implication of this approach is the hypothesis that an attempt to reorganize the institution will succeed if the attempt is accordance with the tradition, logic and dynamic of the institution.

Local institutions and the community.

New-institutionalism have picked up important elements from etnometodology and Cultural theory. Etnometodology focus on how the actor **interpret** the situation, interpret the others actions and the actor use a reservoir of lifeworld- based knowledge. The focus is important to come to "the actor's point of view". The problem of this approach is the difficulty to explain stabile pattern of action.

The local culture are often constitute as resistant norms or a resistant collective against the central government(Douglas and Wildawsky 1984). The culture often have a typical interpretation of reality in dichotomies like "we and the others", "the community and the state".

Members of local institutions recruited from economical interest-groups can be regarded as purposive rational actor, as agents for their economic interests. But this interpretation

are not able to interpret value-rational action which are characterized by a belief in the value of the action in itself independent of the result of the action.

Value-rational action either related to lifestyle, ethical conviction can be related to the peoples socialization during their ground up period in the society.

Such a socialization to values, routines of actions and practical skills are important to analyze as distinctive feature for a local representant in institutions that have the responsibility for game management. Hunters may have a lifestyle where the outfield have status as " the area where I always have hunted" and the practical management of the game is for the hunter both a mean and goal in it self. The social actors are producing its identity in an ongoing process.(Giddens 1991)

C) Cross-pressure and cognitive conflict.

General consistence-theory is based on the principle of cognitive consistency which tells us that people are active to establish a conformity between his attitudes and his action. The change of attitudes and change of action generally is a part in the efforts to reduce inconsistency. According to these theories the person want to be active to get information that can strengthen his own interpretation of the reality.⁽³⁾

Cognitive conflict are often associated with inner conflict or cognitive - affective dissonas. Cross-pressure or the cross-pressure studied in the political science is characterized by a stabile situation with incongruence between the individual and sosio-economic groups or and small groups that the individual identifies himself with. Lazarsfeldt et al 1968(s 55-60)

Officials in the municipalities and members of political committees can experience hard pressure from opposite directions that it could be difficult to take a decision and when the decision is taken it can be as an attempt to reduce this unpleasant pressure.

The result can be that the game committee or the committee for the environment, either as a collective or the member individually decide to:

- 1) be passive and withdraw from the conflict, or
- 2) be the advocate of one of the parts in the conflict and disavow the argument for the other part, or
- 3) claim that there is no contradictions between the different interest.

One important political feature is the "non - decision processes" which for example means that decisions about the use of outfield-areas in the municipality are made after a limited public process without any discussion.

³ L. Festinger: A Theory og Cognitive Dissonance", Stanford 1957, chapter 8,9 and 10.

IV. The ten mountain municipalities in the south part of Norway.

Our project was a part of the MIK-evaluation and was extended to a study of the situation for game-interests in municipalities with large mountain-areas where game management specially management of wild reindeer is an important task.

Our MIK-evaluation included two MIK-municipalities in Oppland county, one of them is a reform-municipality, one MIK municipality in Hedmark and one reform-municipality

30 of the 90 municipalities which participated in the MIK-program made a proposal to transfer the game management from the state authorities to the municipality.

We chose three municipalities in the county Hordaland. One MIK, and two state committees, three municipalities in the county Buskerud. One was MIK the other two had a state committee for game management. The three municipalities in the two counties Hordaland and one in Buskerud have large areas in Hardangervidda national park.

Municipality	County	MIK/ State	Reform-municipality
Lom	Oppland	MIK	
Dovre	Oppland	MIK	Reform
Rendalen	Hedmark	MIK	
Engerdal	Hedmark	Municiple*	Reform
Ål	Buskerud	MIK	
Nore og Uvdal	Buskerud	State	
Hol	Buskerud	State	
Odda	Hordaland	MIK	
Eidfjord	Hordaland	State	
Ulvik	Hordaland	State	

Conflicts between game and human activities in the ten municipalities.

All the ten municipalities have large areas within national parks. The national parks are established land owned by the state except part of the national park Hardangervidda which also includes areas of private property. This is one reason behind the local opposition against the Hardangervidda national park. The municipality Nore og Uvdal and Eidfjord have areas of private property within the national park.

The municipalities Lom, Dovre, Engerdal, Hol og Ål and partly Nore og Uvdal have mountain areas owned by the state and called state commons. The three municipalities on the western part of Hardangervidda and Rendalen in Hedmark have large areas of private property. Rendalen also have a big area of a private common which includes a private owned reindeer heard.

The outfield areas in the ten municipalities are habitats for different game which leads to typical conflicts with economic interests. This conflict have been regulated by different rules and traditions.

The mountain-areas have conflict between game interest , construction activities specially building of cottages and other tourist facilities, snow-scooter in the winter and car driving in the summer in the outfield.

The conflict between wild reindeer and construction activities are big in 9 of the ten municipalities. (With the exception of Engerdal) The conflict is considerable in Dovre and can increase in Dovre, Hol and Ål. In Eidfjord there have been made constructions some years ago but the there exist not similar plans in the beginning of the 90th.

The tourist trade to influence the living areas of the reindeer in all the ten municipalities except Engerdal. This activity seems to influence the reindeer in a bigger amount than the construction activity.⁽⁴⁾ Building of cottages seems to be a big problem for the living areas of the reindeer in all the municipalities.

The areas within and surround the Hardangervidda national seems to be more threatened by different construction and tourist activities than other areas. In this area the conflicts between economic interests and protection of the areas of the reindeer are more manifest. But the environmental authorities want to establish new national parks and extend the old in the two municipalities in Oppland and Hedmark. The political leaders in the municipalities are negative to parts of this proposal.

⁴ The tourism have a significant influence on the habitat areas of the wild reindeer in Hol, Ål, Eidfjord, Ulvik Dovre, Lom og Nore og Uvdal a bit less in Rendalen and Odda. In Dovre and Rendalen the tourism also affect habitats of the moose.

The snow-scooter problem seems to be biggest in Engerdal at the border to Sweden where the inhabitants want to introduce the same liberal practice as in Sweden.

The conflict between state authorities and local actors about the use of the areas within the national park Hardangervidda is today mainly a conflict about the extensions of old roads and the use of different vehicles in the national park. Increasing cross-country skiers and use of snow-scooter is perhaps a bigger problem than building of cottages.

In Ål and Hol there have been extensions of the cross-country ski-tracks in the last part of the 80th. The competition between the different tourist areas and the different tourist companies to have the best prepared cross-country ski tracks is an increasing problem. The tourist demands to use more and more of the landscape. If one area or tourist company withdraw popular cross-country ski-tracks because of the reindeer it means less income both for the companies and for the person that prepares the tracks. This person is often a local farmer. The farmer regards the tracks as permanent and that they have a kind of rights to get income from the preparation of the tracks.

The main valley and the forest near the center are habitats for moose, deer, roe-deer and other wild animals. These areas are threatened by tourist constructions, building of cottages, the building of roads, forestry, and extraction of gravel. The central areas are often the same areas where these animals cross the valley from one forest habitat to another.

In Rendalen and Engerdal there are significant conflicts between a large and modern forestry and the protection of the habitat of the moose, roe deer, different species of birds. In Engerdal where 85 % of the area is state common there is a conflict about to cut in the mountain forest or not. There is a considerable local pressure to cut in this forest because this will be income to the local forest administration and a local sawmill at Drevsjø in Engerdal. The forest administration, Statens skoger (today Statsskog) is a big employer in the commune. The manager of the forestry in the state common, Femund skogforvaltning are in a cross-pressure because he both is responsible to protect the mountain forest and at the same time to get enough timber to the local sawmill.

One special problem is the extraction of gravel from the rivers. This affects both the fish, game and the landscape. The extraction areas in Dovre are situated in the middle of important routes for moose and deer. The head official of environment authorities at the county meant this was the biggest environmental problem in this commune. Several proprietors want to exploit this resource and sell it to the sector for building of roads in the district. The politicians in the municipality came under pressure from the proprietors and the road sector to give permission to extract gravel from the river.

There are a small tribe of wolverine in the eastern part of the mountain areas in Dovre. The farmers in the neighbor commune Lesja have had problems because the wolverine have attacked their sheep. But it is sepsis in the two communes against the management of the wolverine tribe from the agency for nature protection. This has led to actions from farmers in the district to organize a hunt on wolverine.⁽¹⁾

Figur nr. Konflikter mellom type vilt og type næringsingsinteresser i de ti fjellkommunene.

	villrein	elg, skogs- fugl	rovdyr, rov- fugler
tamrein	Engerdal Rendalen?		Engerdal
anleggsvirk. i fjellet	Eidsfjord Ulvik, Dovre Odda, (Lom)		Dovre
Turistnæring i fjellet	Eidfjord, Hol Ulvik, Nore og Uvdal, Dovre Ål, Lom, Odda	Dovre Ål, Hol	Dovre
Hyttebygging og hytteut- leie i fjellet.	Rendalen, Hol Engerdal, Ål Nore-og Uvdal Dovre	Rendalen Engerdal Hol, Ål Nore og Uvdal Dovre	?
snøscooter og bilkjøring i utmarka	Engerdal, Ål Rendalen, Hol Nore og Uvdal	Engerdal, Ål Rendalen, Hol Nore og Uvdal	Engerdal Rendalen, Hol Dovre, Nore og Uvdal
skogbruk i fjellet	Rendalen? Engerdal?		
Skogbruk i mer produktiv skog		Rendalen Engerdal Hol, Ål, Nore og Uvdal Dovre	
turistanlegg dalside og vei i dal og dalsiden		Dovre, Ål Hol, Rendalen	
sauehold i utmark			Engerdal Rendalen (Dovre)
Jordbruk		Rendalen, Engerdal, Ål Dovre, Hol Nore og Uvdal	

Political dominance in the municipalities.

In the ten municipalities the economic interests that wants to exploit the outfield areas have a strong position among both the politicians and the administration.

The four MIK-communes, Lom, Dovre, Rendalen and Ål wanted to participate in the program to integrate the management of the outfield resources with development of economic activity in the same areas. Nature protection that oppose this strategy have a weak position in the municipalities. We can find the same situation in the other six municipalities.

But the different economic interests that use the outfield may have opposite interests in using the area. There are conflicts between the tourist and the agricultural sector. The two sector also have different traditions and culture which make obstacles to cooperation.

In Hol, og Ål, Eidfjord og Ulvik the tourist industry have strong political support in the municipality. In the other municipalities the politicians wants to make plans for the tourist activities in the area. This development is clear in Hol.

In the municipalities with areas in Hardangervidda national park it seems that the local political authorities supports the local economic actors who are in conflict with the national environmental authorities about the use of the areas in the national park.

This is a very clear impression of the situation in Eidfjord. The political leadership of the municipality wants to fight back the environmental authorities.

In Lom, Rendalen and Engerdal the municipality had been active to find a compromise between nature protection and economic activity in the outfield.

In Rendalen the political leaders want to increase the tourism to get more jobs to the commune.

Lom seems to have the most restrictive line to permit the economic interests to use the outfield-resources. One reason for this is that the municipality have made an attempt to be a "national center for nature and culture" (Mydske and Gundersen 1991).

Political and administrative organization of the game management in the ten municipalities.

	KOMMUNAL			STATLIG
	Hovedutvalg miljøvern	annet hovedutvalg	underutvalg for hovedutvalg	statlig nemd
Miljøvern-konsulent MIK-stilling	Lom Rendalen Engerdal		(Ål, Odde)	
Herredsskogmester eller annen ansatt i skogsektor		Dovre	Ål	Hol, Nore og Uvdal
sekretær fra annen etat eller uten etatstilknýt.				Eidsfjord Ulvik
Ingen ansatt sekretær			Odde	

6 committees have the old state committee in action. Two of this committees have been taken inn to the municipality-administration. In 3 of the 6 municipalities which have kept the old state committee is this connected to the local forestry administration.

In Lom and Rendalen a main political committee for nature-resource administration in the municipality have the responsibility for the game management. The situation in Engerdal is special because the main political committee also are the board for the state common in the commune which include 85% of the area of the commune.

In Lom, Engerdal, Ål and Rendalen the municipal environmental official is the formal secretary of the committee but only in the two municipalities Lom and Engerdal that the official had the responsibility for the practical game management.

The local administration of the forestry could go on to influence the game management but in competition with a environment official.

We can see a continuation of the situation before the MIK- program. In the municipalities where the game committee had been close connected to the forestry sector this situation continued(four municipalities). In the municipalities where the game committee had an relatively autonomous position versus the forestry sector the game committee was related to a municipal environment official.

We can divide the municipalities in what extent the conflict concerning the outfield areas have representatives or are organized in to the committee.

Figur nr. Relasjoner til interesseorganisasjoner og til andre forvaltningsorganer av utmarksområdene i kommunen.

Utmarkslag, UML og Hovedutvalg for reiseliv, næring og miljø, RNM, som er har markert innslag av representanter fra landbruk og eller reiselivsnæringen	Viltnemda koblet direkte til Fjellstyret, F, og landbruksnemd, L,	Viltnemda er hovedutvalg for miljø- og naturressurser, H eller underutvalg under hovedutvalg som ikke er knyttet til turist eller landbruksnæringen, U
Eidfjord UML Nore og Uvdal UML Ulvik UML Hol NRM Ål NRM	Dovre L Engerdal F	Lom H Rendalen H Odde U

In five municipalities other committees are more important for the game management than the game committee. The committee have a risk to be and are in fact an outsider. The leader of the committee in Eidfjord sit in other committees and acts more like a representant for the other committees than an lawyer for the game committee.

In five municipality, the MIK-municipalities and Engerdal have organized the game management together with the economic interests in a new committee.

In Engerdal the game committee have been related to the state common because the committee had been a part of the municipal political committee which also is the head of, Fjellstyre, for the common.

The committee have competence to make decisions about outfield management including inland fishery management, game-management and recreation. The committee should both work for a rational economic use of the common which is 85% of the land area in the commune and work for the environmental interest both in the common and in the rest of the commune.

In Dovre the game management are related to several small proprietors because the game management was taken over by the agricultural political committee in the municipality.

In Odda the old state game committee continue its work as a sub-committee under the environment committee. The environment committee works mainly with pollution and the game committee relate its work mainly to the head of the state common in the municipality.

The recruitment to the game management committee.

25 of 59 members, 42.4%, was property owners. Businessmen and property owners was 52.5% of all the members. We find a significant difference between the municipalities:

1) In Dovre the committee for agriculture had responsibility for game management. The committee had 7 members who all where property owners.

2) In municipalities with state committees have 63 % of the members from property owners and businessmen.

3) The main political committee for nature-resource management in Rendalen, Lom and Engerdal hade a much more broader social recruitment and the state committees.

The political status of the committee in the commune.

Figur nr. Status til medlemmene av utvalgene etter kommunenes deltakelse i MIK-programmet.

	sentrale politikere med høy i kommunen	Politikere med en viss status i kommunen	politikere med liten status i kommunen
MIK	Rendalen	Lom Dovre Engerdal Odda	Ål
IKKE-MIK	Eidfjord	Nore og Uvdal	Ulvik Hol

There are a significant difference between the six MIK-municipalities and the four others with regard to the political status of the committee responsible for the game management.

In two municipalities, Rendalen and Eidfjord the committee have a high status. In Rendalen the committee have a high status because the management of moose is a very important task in this commune. Members of the committee also are members in other important political committees in the municipality.

The same situation in Eidfjord where the chairman of the game committee are elected to the municipality council, the control committee for the national park Hardangervidda and as leader of a municipal committee to promote economic activities in the outfield, utmarksutvalget.

The relations between the status of the members and their recruitment to the committee.

Figur nr. Politisk status for utvalgene i de seks kommunene.

	sentrale politikere med høy i kommunen	Politikere med en viss status i kommunen	politikere med liten status i kommunen
Rekruttert på grunn av interesse for jakt	Eidfjord	Odda Nore og Uvdal Engerdal	Ulvik Hol Ål
Rekruttert på grunn av geografisk representasjon			Ål
Representasjon fra ulike sektorer i kommunen	Rendalen	Lom	
Representasjon av grunneiere	Eidfjord	Dovre Engerdal, Ål De statlige viltnevdene	

In all the old state committees in the period before 1988, in the four state committees (Ulvik, Eidfjord, Hol and Nore og Uvdal) and in the two game committees (Odda and Ål) where recruited because of their interest of and experience with practical game management.

In the MIK-municipality Rendalen and the reform municipality Engerdal central the members in the old game management committee was recruited to the political committee for the environment together with representatives from different political sector in the municipality.

In Lom the municipal committee for recreation was their base for the new main committee for the environment in the municipality. In Dovre no representant of the old game management committee was members of the committee for agriculture which had the responsibility for the game management.

The establishment of the political committee for the environment did mobilize the members of the old game management committee against the municipal leaders.

Do the game committees behave like an advocate for the game interests and do they support local economic interests?

Figur. Profilering til utvalgene i de ti kommunene.

advokat for vilt- interessene	både og	støtter lokale nærings- interesser
Lom Rendalen Odda Ulvik Hol	Engerdal Ål	Dovre Eidfjord Nore og Uvdal

Almost 50% of the committees want to be a lawyer for the game-interests. The committees in Odda, Lom and Rendalen have both influence and are less willing to do compromise than the other committees.

In Dovre, Eidfjord and Nore og Uvdal the committee want to support local economic interests even if they have a conflict with the game-interests.

In Dovre representatives from the agricultural interests are the committee and in Nore and Uvdal several of the members are farmers who have income from to rent out cottages.

In Eidfjord the members of the committee did not find any contradiction between the economic interests and the aim of the game management. At the same time the committee have been positive to several constructing projects that the environmental authorities have strongly opposed because of the negative effect for the habitat of the game.

In the four municipalities where the secretary are a local official in the forestry sector, Ål,

Hol, Nore og Uvdal og Dovre the members did not find any conflict with the forestry sector. But at the same time there were several conflicts if not big conflicts.

In Lom, Rendalen and Engerdal where the committee not had a secretary from the forestry sector the members and the secretary of the committee admitted big conflict with the forestry. The forestry is more important in the Rendalen and Engerdal than the other eight municipalities. But in all the ten municipalities there a certain amount or plans to introduce mountain forestry including the building of new roads. The members of the committees in Lom, Rendalen and Engerdal admitted that this was a problem.

In Engerdal the members was worried that it was their task to make decision that could promote forestry in the mountain region. They did not like the situation and want to divide the board of the common and the committee for game management.

But they meant it was perhaps more easy to communicate with one big proprietor, the forestry sector, than many small proprietors.

The committees ability to get influence for the game interests in area-planning and regulation plans.

The first table is a summary of the situation in the years before 1988. The next is a summary of the situation in 1989/90.

Figur nr. De statlige viltneemdenes deltakelse og innflytelse i kommuneplansarbeidet før 1988 etter advokatrolle eller støtte til lokale næringsinteresser.

	aktiv i plan- prosessen hadde innflytelse	aktiv i plan- prosessen hadde liten innflytelse	lite aktiv i planprosessen og liten innflytelse
advokat for viltinteressene	Rendalen Odda	Dovre Hol Ulvik	Lom Engerdal
støttet lokale nærings- interesser		(Dovre ?)	Ål Eidfjord Nore og Uvdal (Engerdal ?)

Figur nr. De statlige viltneemdenes deltakelse og innflytelse i kommuneplansarbeidet i 1989 og 1990 etter advokatrolle eller støtte til lokale næringsinteresser.

	aktiv i plan- prosessen hadde innflytelse	aktiv i plan- prosessen hadde liten innflytelse	lite aktiv i planprosessen og liten innflytelse
advokat for viltinteressene	Rendalen MIK Odda MIK Lom MIK	Ulvik Hol	Engerdal*** Ål ** MIK
støttet lokale nærings- interesser	Dovre * MIK	(Ulvik)	Eidfjord Nore og Uvdal (Ål **) MIK

In the period before 1988 only two game committees, in Rendalen and Odda, was both active and had influence over the making and decision process in area-and regulation planning in the municipality. These two committees had a role as lawyers for the game interests.

In Rendalen the hunting and management of moose have been an important in long time. To be elected to the game- committee gave status. The committee had confidence and was active to oppose activities, specially the forestry, in the central habitat-areas of the moose

In Odda the committee was dominated by the workers from the big factory in the commune and not by farmers. The municipality and the committee was strongly influenced by the politics and culture of the labor movement. An important part of this culture is to secure the non proprietors right to hunt and fish.

The other eight committees had little influence over the plans on their municipalities.

The general impression picture drawn by the Ministry of environment that the state committees for game management in the municipalities seems to be a reasonable description of the situation in a majority of the municipalities.

But the question is if the members of the committees wanted to act as advocates for the game-interest or want to support local economic interest. The situation seems to change in the period from 1988 to 1990 during the MIK-program.

In the four MIK-municipalities the committees had been active and had influence in the planning process.

No one of the state game committee seems to have influence in the planning process.

In Dovre the committee have been active in the planning processes and had influence but the committee have supported the agricultural interest not the game interest.

Figur. Sammenhengen mellom økning i aktivitetsnivå og gjennomslag og organisasjonsmodell.

	økt	samme	mindre
Hovedutvalg for miljø	3		
komm.viltnevd underutv. for hovedutvalg for miljø.	2		
statlig viltnevd		4	
Annet hovedutvalg Landbruksutv.			1

The data from the ten municipalities show clearly that it is in the MIK-municipalities where a main political committee for environment and resource management including game management or in the municipalities that had kept the old game committee as a sub committee which are the most active and have most influence concerning both area-plans for the municipality and part of the municipality. This is also the situation for regulations-plans. The main reason for this is the work of the municipal environment official.

In two municipalities the state committee have been active but have had little influence mainly because they are political isolated in the municipality.

Three of the state committee have been not very active and had little influence.

In one municipality the game management was taken over by the agricultural committee that was active and had influence. But the committee did promote the agricultural interest and not the game interests.

Preliminary discussion.

Most of the state game committee before 1988 were rather passive after 1988. and several were passive after that period. We can relate this to the three perspectives, cognitive conflict, resource mobilization and culture we introduced in the second chapter.

1) One interpretation is that the members of the committees had experience with pressure from organized actors in the commune that want permission to start with activities which results in a conflict with the game interest. The members want not to politicize the case because they do not want to provoke the others. It seems to be relevant to analyze several of the decision making process in planning process from the view that the members of the game committee want to avoid trouble. "One solution" to this problem is to deny the existence of conflict between economic interests and game interests.

2) The committees in three municipalities, Eidsfjord, Nore og Uvdal and Dovre were against the communalization of the game management they supported the economic interests in the community and did not find this situation problematic. This type of action can be regarded as economic instrumentality or as action conform with the norms in the community. Norms that oppose the norms of the environmental authorities.

3) We can also introduce the third interpretation: In Ål, Lom, Rendalen og Engerdal where the game interest got more influence in the planning process. The members were satisfied that the environmental official was efficient and had influence in the planning process in the municipality. But especially the old members of the game-committee and many of the new members were worried about the situation. Therefore they wanted to have change back to the old model, a state committee for game management.

A common expression from the members was that they were negative to the fact that politicians from the municipality should make decisions concerning the game. The argument was that the politicians have little practical experience and had more interest in other policy fields. The members used the same arguments against closer relation between the game committee and the forestry sector and the technical sector in the municipality.

It seems that one reason for this kind of action is that the members regarded that their group and they as persons had the responsibility of the game management was a very important task. The committee had been very stable and was a part of a local hunting culture. The member of the game committee had status in their lifeworld. The practical work with game management was an important part of the reproduction of the lifeworld in spite of that the committee could have little influence in the local politics.

References.

Almås, Reidar(1985): Bygdesosiologi, Oslo 1985.

Arnesen, Tor: Grønne fotefar i blå sektor? Om teknisk etat of kommunal nature- of miljøforvaltning. En undersøkelse av kommuner i Mjøsområdet, Agderfylkene of Finnmark. Østlandsforskning 1991.

Barikmo, Jon (1989): Status for den lokale viltforvaltning i Sør-Trøndelag. Rapport 5. Fylkesmannen i Sør-Trøndelag, Miljøvern-avdelingen.

Bråten, Stein(1981): Modeller av menneske og samfunn. Bro mellom teori og erfaring fra sosiologi og sosialpsykologi. Oslo, Universitetsforlaget.

Cohen, Michael, James G. March and Johan P. Olsen (1972):

"A Garbage Can Model of Organizational Choice" i Administrative Science Quarterly 17.

Dahl Jacobsen, Knut: (1964) Teknisk hjelp og politisk struktur. Universitetsforlaget.

Direktoratet for Naturforvaltning (1989):Forskningsprogram Skogøkologi og flersidig skogbruk. Rapport nr. 5 - 1989.

Direktoratet for Naturforvaltning(1990): Forvaltning av hjortevilt. Rundskriv nr. 3/90. Landøkologisk avdeling VILT-3.

Festinger, A (1957): A Theory of Cognitive Dissonans, Standford Univ. Press.

Germeten, Gunnar (1966):Mål og midler i arbeidet med friluftsliv og naturvern. Kommunal og Arbeidsdepartementet, Oslo 1966.

Giddens, A. 1991: Modernity and Self-Identity. Polity Press. Cambridge.

Gundersen, Frode (1988): Vitenskap, naturforvaltning of politikk. En studie av relasjonene mellom naturvitenskapelige forskningsmiljøer, offentlig forvaltning of frivillige naturvernorganisasjoner i Norge fram til 1965. Magisteroppgave, Institutt for Sosiologi Universitetet i Oslo høsten 1988.

Gundersen, Frode: Den politiske behandlingen av vilt- of friluftinteressene i kommunene. Arbeidsnotat Institutt for statsvitenskap, Universitetet i Oslo 1991.

Gundersen, Frode: Framveksten av offentlig miljøvernadministrasjon på fylkes of kommunaplan i Norge. Arbeidsnotat Institutt for økonomi of samfunnsfag NLH-Ås. 1994

Gundersen, Frode, Per Kristen Mydske of Asmund Taarud: Miljøpakker:

Evaluering av en ekstraordinær innsats innenfor geografisk avgrensede områder for å redusere miljøproblemer of bedre menneskers trivsel of velferd. Institutt for statsvitenskap, Universitetet i Oslo 1994.

Hagen, Yngvar(1971): "Om begrepene vilt og viltstell" i Vilt og Vitstell, utgitt av Viltstyret og Statens viltundersøkelser.

Hallèn, Arvid: Kommunal iverksetting av av statleg politikk. Om måloppnåelse of statleg standardisering i Mjøsaksjonen. NIBR-rapport 1981:17.

Hoel, Einar(1974): Overføring av Distriktsplanavdelingen. Hovedoppgave i statsvitenskap høsten 1974, Universitetet i Oslo.

Huse Sigmund, "Naturvern of friluftsliv i planleggingen", NNF nytt nr. 1984.

Jaktloven av 14. desember 1951 med kommentarer ved Carsten Lütken og Knut Rom. Oslo 1953.

Jansen, Alf-Inge: Reform of resultater. Evaluering av forsøksprogramet Miljøvern i kommunene. NORAS 1991.

Jansen, Alf-Inge: Makt of miljø. En studie av miljøvernet som politisk sektor. Universitetsforlaget 1989.

Krafft, Arne (1968): "Viltstell i Norge". Foredrag holdt av representanter fra Statens viltundersøkelser, Vollebakk, under den Nordiske Viltbiologikongress i oslo 24.-26.oktober 1968.

Kyvig, s: "Fylkesmannes rolle" i Baldersheim et al.: Lokalmakt of sentralstyring. Olso 1979

Katz, E., Lazarsfeld, P. E.: "Personal Influence", N.Y. The Free Press 1964.

Lazarsfeld, P.F., Berelson, B, Gaudet,H.: "The Peoples Choice". N.Y., Columbia Univ. Press 1968.

Leikvam, Gunnar og Jan Gunnar Gleditsch (1988) Utmarksforvaltning på kommunenivå. En vurdering av aktuelle modeller og konsekvenser ved gjennomføring av dem. Hovedoppgave NLH 1988.

March, James G. and Johan P. Olsen (1984): "The New Institutionalisme: Organizational Factors in Political Life". The American Political Science Review, vol 78, 734-749.

March, James G. and Johan P. Olsen(1989) Rediscovering Institutions. The Free press Meyer, J. and B. Rowan. (1977). Institutionalised Organizations. American Journal of Sociology 83: 340-363.

Mydske, Per Kristian of Frode Gundersen: statlig styring of lokal tilpasning. Gjennomføring av miljøvern i kommunene. Institutt for statsvitenskap Universitetet i Oslo 1991.

Norges Bondelag(1947): Framlegg til Lov om viltstellet, jakt og fangst Innstilling frå Jaktlovutvalet til Norges Bondelag. Eige forlag.

Næss Petter (1984): "Naturvern og friluftsliv i den kommunale oversiktsplanlegginga". i Naturvern- og friluftstinteressenes plass innan offentlig oversiktsplanlegging . Norsk naturforvalter-forening 28. og 29. mai 1984.

Olsen, Johan P.(1988): Statsstyre og institusjonsutforming. Oslo: Universitetsforlaget.

O'Riordan, T.(1981) Environmentalism, London
Selznick, P 1949. TVA and the Grass Roots. Berkley: University of California Press.

Steihaug, Sverre: Opprettelsen av miljøvern-avdelingen under Fylkesmannen. En case-studie av omorganiseringprosessen vedrørende funksjonsfordelingen og administrasjonsordningene innen Miljøverndepartementets myndighetsområde på fylkesnivå. Hovedoppgave ved institutt for Statsvitenskap i Oslo, høsten 1984.

Strand, Torodd (1977): samordning som administrasjonsproblem. Tidsskrift for samfunnsforskning 1977 bd 18 193-213.

Strand, Torodd (1985): Utkant of sentrum i det norske styringsverket, Universitetsforlaget 1985.

Miljøverndepartementet (1985) Friluftsliv. En utredning fra Miljøverndepartementet, mars 1985.

Norsk Naturforvalterforening (1984): Naturvern-of friluftst-interessenes plass innan offentlig oversiktsplanlegging. Referat frå seminar på Rønningen Folkehøgskole Kjelsås, Oslo 28. of 29. mai 1984.

Ressursutvalget i 1971. Innstilling nr. 2 10. mars 1971.

NOU 1974:53 Hovedkomiteen for reformer i lokalforvaltningen.Mål og retningslinjer for reformer i lokalforvaltningen.

NOU 1976: 17.Hovedkomiteen for reformer i lokalforvaltningen. Den lokale statsforvaltningen

NOU 1976: Hovedkomiteen for reformer i lokalforvaltningen.47

Miljøvernpolitikken, funksjonsfordeling og administrasjonsordninger.

NOU 1980:23 Naturvern i Norge.

St. meld nr. 31(1974-75) Om mål og retningslinjer for reformer i lokalforvaltningen.

St.meld nr. 25(1977-78) Om regional planlegging og forvaltning av naturressursene.

St.meld. nr. 40 (1978-79) Den lokale statsforvaltning.

St.meld. nr. 23 (1979-80) Funksjonsfordeling og administrasjonsordninger innen Miljøverndepartementets myndighetsområde.

St.meld nr. 68 (1980-81) Vern av norsk nature.

St. meld nr. 40 1986-87 "Om friluftsliv".

Fylkesmannen i Buskerud, Miljøvern-avdelingen.(1986): Inngrep og forstyrrelser i

Buskeruds vilreinområder. Rapport nr. 1 - 1986.

Miljøverndepartementet(1975): Om oppgaver og arbeidsdeling i arbeidet med friluftslivet.

Miljøverndepartementet(1985) "Friluftsliv. En utredning fra Miljøverndepartementet", mars 1985.

Miljøverndepartementet: Naturvern og friluftsliv i generalplanen. Veileder T-585 fra Miljøverndepartementet.