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**MULTIPARTY DEMOCRACY AND WILDLIFE:
RULES, ANIMALS AND PATRONAGE IN ZAMBIA, 1964-1972**

By

Clark Gibson

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MULTIPARTY DEMOCRACY AND WILDLIFE:
RULES, ANIMALS AND PATRONAGE IN ZAMBIA, 1964-1972

Contrary to promises made by future President Kenneth Kaunda and other Zambian nationalists during Zambia's independence movement, the government of the ruling United National Independence Party did not revoke the much-despised wildlife policy they inherited from their British predecessors. In fact, immediately after independence (October 1964) Kaunda began to make radio broadcasts and public speeches about the need to protect wild animals as an integral part of Zambian history.¹ His government waited four years before submitting a new wildlife bill to the National Assembly, and the resultant National Parks and Wildlife Act followed closely the proscriptions of the colonial ordinances while conferring even more authority over wildlife to the central government. By the end of 1971 the UNIP government had declared eight statutory instruments which detailed the laws regarding trophies, hunting license requirements, protected animals and legal methods of hunting.² That same year President Kaunda signed an order that created thirty-two game management areas, and his Minister of Lands and Natural Resources introduced a motion into the National Assembly to declare a system of eighteen national parks within Zambia.³ Like their colonial predecessors, the new government's administrators shunted aside calls for granting locals access to wildlife.

In this paper, I explain why the UNIP government failed to follow its own pre-independence calls for giving Zambians citizens greater access to wildlife resources. More importantly, I explain how UNIP survived this widely unpopular stance in a multiparty system with a universal franchise. I argue that the structure of Zambia's political institutions created incentives for the ruling party to ignore the electorate's desire for greater hunting. First, President Kaunda, who held considerable power over party policy, favored a strong conservation policy. Second, electoral and party rules did not reward those parliamentarians who represented their constituents' call for greater access to wild animals. Rather, the rules

punished members of UNIP - the dominant party -- for opposing Kaunda and UNIP's Central Committee. Thus, MPs followed President Kaunda's preference for strong wildlife conservation and did not represent voters' desires. Third, by establishing government control over the wildlife sector through the National Parks and Wildlife Act, UNIP used wildlife to reward its followers. The UNIP government distributed jobs, game meat and trophies to supporters, and only selectively enforced the Act's provisions. These benefits mitigated some of UNIP's political costs for establishing the colonially-inspired wildlife policy.

This paper has five sections. In section one, I present a brief overview of the structure and change of colonial wildlife policy. The British Protectorate of Northern Rhodesia passed a series of game ordinances that gradually removed local Africans' legal access to most wild animals. The vast majority of Africans felt oppressed by these conservation measures and tried to circumvent them. African nationalists used this popular discontent with colonial wildlife restrictions to foment resentment against the settler regime. To understand the institutional context of Zambia's First Republic, I describe its political institutions and policymaking processes in section two. Institutions in this period favored strict party discipline and did not reward parliamentarians for representing the interests of their constituents. The rules also allowed President Kaunda strong influence over policymaking. In section three, I examine how the First Republic's political institutions shaped the structure of competition over wildlife policy. I use the debate over the National Assembly debate over the 1968 National Parks and Wildlife Bill as a partial test to the hypotheses presented in the paper, demonstrating how party and electoral rules influenced parliamentary behavior. I explain how UNIP gained political advantages from the unpopular wildlife bill in section four: establishing centralized control over wildlife resources gave the party a valuable resource to distribute to its supporters in the form of employment, hunting and trophy licenses, and the weak enforcement of laws. I conclude this paper by discussing some of the theoretical ramifications of this paper's arguments. The political institutions of the First Republic mattered to the form and content of wildlife policy. Electoral and party rules distributed wildlife's benefits in such a way to allow for the establishment of an unpopular policy. If, however, the rules change to produce a significantly different pattern of benefits, we would expect wildlife policy to change as well.

A Short History of Wildlife Policy in Zambia

Gaining control over wildlife was central to the plans of Northern Rhodesia's colonial administrators. The British South Africa Company sought to dominate the lucrative ivory trade in the late 19th and early 20th centuries. To prevent widespread hunting, the BSAC administrators passed laws that restricted African ownership of firearms, established a few game reserves and set up minimal game regulations.⁴ As the age of explorers and adventurers passed, and the new era of settlers began, wildlife policies also changed. Fanners demanded that the governments of the BSAC and the later Northern Rhodesian Protectorate establish measures to control the tse tse fly (which caused trypanosomiasis -- sleeping sickness - in both humans and cattle) and wildlife's damage to crops and stock.⁵ Sportsmen and conservationists called on colonial administrations to protect certain species of wild animal and create more extensive game reserves. The Legislative Council of Northern Rhodesia responded to these interests by adopting the 1925 Game Ordinance, creating game licenses and protected areas that limited on both European and African hunting.⁶

Although elephant control officers had been operating in the Protectorate since the early 1930s, the central government's limited funds precluded the founding of a separate agency to execute the provision of the Game Ordinance until 1942, when the Department of Game and Tsetse Control began operations.⁷ The new director of the Department apparently supported of African access to wildlife, stating that "in a country where vast rural areas carry small populations, the wildlife in one shape or other is a main economic force just as much as the soil or the water supply." But the initial terms of reference for the department followed closely the demands of European settler population. The department's priorities were the control and preservation of game, with "the main theme being protection of cultivated land and help in the control of animal diseases." The department would preserve game only in "suitable areas with particular reference to the benefit and enjoyment of the public - the function of national parks." Furthermore the department would pursue the eradication of tsetse fly, which required that game reserves be located far from cattle and agricultural interests. The department also sought to control African hunting, for the "rationalisation of game-meat supplies...for what are, sociologically speaking, still hunting communities."⁸

The Legislative Council of Northern Rhodesia, the Governor and the civil servants of the Game Department made various marginal changes to wildlife policy over the next twenty years: the Fauna Conservation Ordinance (Chapter 241 of the Laws of Northern Rhodesia) provides an example of the powers the central government had assumed over wildlife by the early 1960s.⁹ The Governor could declare game reserves, game management areas or controlled hunting areas, or withdraw such recognition. The Minister could authorize individuals to hunt even in contravention to promulgated hunting regulations, and could revoke any license without reason. The Director of the Game Department could prohibit or control the number, species and gender of animals that could be hunted through an elaborate system of licenses that had evolved since the first BSAC game laws. The Ordinance also outlawed various methods of hunting, including the use of pitfalls, snares, poisons, bush fires, automatic weapons, spears and nets. All trade in game meat was prohibited, except for the barter of a legally procured animal between Africans in the same area, or as designated by the Minister. Trophies, too, could be processed and exchanged only with government permission. The Ordinance issued even stricter rules regarding the acquisition and trade of ivory and rhinoceros horn.¹⁰

The colonial government also designated vast tracts of land as protected areas. By 1959, 43% of Northern Rhodesia came under some restriction: the Kafue National Park (no hunting except by special license) covered 8,650 square miles; game reserves (no hunting except by special license) occupied another 10,080 miles; controlled hunting areas (hunting of game animals by license) accounted for an additional 105,530 square miles.¹¹ The government moved entire villages in order to create some protected areas.¹²

Africans chafed at these laws. Africans continued to kill protected species. They fished and hunted in game reserves.¹³ They also set bush fires, and used snares, dogs, pits and spears.¹⁴ Africans also used the conservation laws to their advantage. Under the legal provisions that allowed the killing of "crop raiders," they planted gardens directly on well-known hippopotamus trails, and called in control officers whenever an elephant got near village gardens, knowing that the meat from such kills was distributed locally.¹⁵ And Africans vigorously opposed any expansion of protected areas.¹⁶

Conflict between Game Department staff and rural residents was continuous and sometimes lethal.¹⁷ Arrests, fines, prison terms and Department attempts to "educate" residents about the benefits of conservation did little to stop Africans' use of wildlife resources.¹⁸ Some colonial officers took the side of the local African and tried to protect local residents access to wild animals.¹⁹ Even some members of the Game Department realized the incentives that lay behind African hunting: "To him (the African), game has only two aspects: a much-needed meat supply, and a foe to his crops. If he does not kill, the next man will, so he kills as much as he can whenever he can."²⁰ Nevertheless, the Department pushed for additional staff and protected areas, believing that Africans "must learn that there is no longer 'plenty more round the corner'; somebody else has already been there, and if he destroys all that is left in his own area there will soon be none left to him at all."²¹

Wildlife conservation policies became an important issue that local politicians throughout Northern Rhodesia used to incite opposition to colonial rule.²² The restrictions placed on hunting bred contempt for colonial administration. In some of the more remote areas of Northern Rhodesia, the arrests made by wildlife officers were the only direct contact that locals had with government. African nationalists understood the costs imposed by wildlife policy and exploited them in the drive for Zambia's independence. In Eastern Province, political advancement became associated with the removal "of all sorts of irksome restrictions, so that the day of independence is seen by the villager as the day on which he will enjoy complete freedom to hunt."²³ In Luapula Province, activists organized large scale protests against fish guards trying to enforce net regulations.²⁴ In Copperbelt Province, entrepreneurs continued to defy laws against the sale of game meat by shipping truckloads of lechwe, buffalo and impala meat to sell to miners in urban areas.²⁵ In Southern and Central Provinces, local activists used "two things calculated to stir up the Ba-Ila: questions affecting land and hunting rights. By unfortunate coincidence, new and severe measures for protecting red Lechwe coincided the impact of external politics and provides the disaffected with a first class grievance to exploit."²⁶ Additionally, local politicians from all over the Protectorate condemned the taking of land for the creation of game reserves.²⁷

National level politicians also denounced the colonial government's wildlife policy. Future president Kenneth Kaunda "enthusiastically encouraged" Africans to kill any wild

animal they desired, and to resist - by force if necessary — their arrest if caught hunting by officials.²⁸ He called European restrictions on African hunting a legal and cultural absurdity.²⁹ Leaders of both UNIP and ANC made speeches with similar themes.³⁰ By the time of the 1964 elections, political activists had led Zambians to believe that independence would them the right to hunt without restriction. In the months that followed, however, wildlife policy did not change. The incentives generated by the political institutions of the First Republic and Kenneth Kaunda's preference for conservation conspired against such hopes.

Zambia's Multiparty First Republic

During the Zambia's First Republic, President Kaunda exerted a strong influence over government policy. His influence derived both from the specific powers conferred to the chief executive by Zambia's independence constitution, and the period's particular constellation of electoral and party rules.

Political Institutions

In January 1964, Zambia experienced its first election with universal suffrage. UNIP dominated the polling for the new multiparty, Westminster-style parliamentary system that included an executive president. UNIP garnered 69.6 percent of the popular vote, securing fifty-five of the sixty-five main roll seats in the National Assembly; its main opposition, the ANC, mustered only 30.5 percent of the vote and 10 seats.³¹ This result bore witness to UNIP's superior organization, which had established a country-wide presence for 1964 elections. But UNIP's organizational effort also contained contradictions: UNIP aspired to be both a mass party that espoused democracy, and a centralized party based on strict discipline.³²

UNIP's Central Committee was most important administrative organ of the party. According to the party's 1967 constitution, the Central Committee had the right to formulate and implement policy, to exercise disciplinary control over party officials at all levels, and to propose a list of candidates to replace its own membership. The Committee could also call sessions of the National Council (which could determine party policy and review decisions

made by the Central Committee, but whose numerous members made it unwieldy) and the General Conference (the largest executive body of the party with hundreds of delegates representing all of Zambia's regions who could review policy, elect central committee members, and amend the party constitution). Importantly, the Central Committee selected candidates for both parliament and local government offices, which would then be forwarded to the Secretary General of the party — Kaunda — for approval.³³

In reality, the process was reversed: Kaunda selected candidates and the Central Committee gave the list their approval. (The National Council eventually gave Kaunda the formal authority to choose candidates in 1968.) The process started with party officials from the provinces submitting lists of suitable candidates. An individual could also apply personally to the president. The qualities most often rewarded with nomination were loyalty and length of service to the party.³⁴

The ANC, on the other hand, was not a mass organization. It had no paid officials at the local level. Almost all of the party's power was vested in the person of Harry Nkumbula, and successive ANC constitutions merely formalized this fact.³⁵ Nkumbula appointed all national, provincial and district officials. He also appointed the majority of the members to ANC's National Assembly, which had the power to expel people from the party. It is not surprising therefore, that Nkumbula exerted a strong influence on the choices over parliamentary candidates. While the ANC constitution did not specify any formal process for choosing candidates, generally those party members interested would write a letter of application to ANC party headquarters, where they were shortlisted and interviewed. As with UNIP, loyalty to the party was the most important criterion of candidate selection.³⁶

Despite the disparity of methods and organization, the institutions of both parties engendered strong party discipline.³⁷ UNIP and ANC considered their constituencies not as areas represented by individual MPs, but as party property.³⁸ A change in electoral rules reinforced the already strong incentives for party discipline: after 1966, any MP who changed parties immediately forfeited their National Assembly seat and had to contest a by-election to retain it.³⁹ An MP's electoral chances after crossing the floor were not good: all of the first seven MPs who changed parties after the rule change lost their subsequent by-elections, and the practice diminished thereafter.⁴⁰

One casualty of party rules was the representation of constituency interests. Since constituency service did not get candidates on the ballot, most parliamentarians did not strengthen their ties to the electorate. MPs rarely visited their constituencies. Although most were "local men," they often had little or no political base in the area. (It was not until 1972 that the idea of establishing an office in their own constituency became acceptable to MPs, the result of prompting by the UNIP executive and the new electoral rules under the one-party state.)

Electoral rules further undermined MPs' incentives to serve constituents' interests, and made political stands on particular issues unimportant. Given that only one candidate per party could stand for election in each constituency, and that parties had strong geographic identities; the electorate confronted a choice over parties, rather than individuals.⁴¹ As a result, while electoral surprises occasionally occurred, most seats were not marginal.⁴² Nowhere was the strength of party label more starkly illustrated than when Mr. Hugh Mitchley, a European who had previously belonged to an all-white party before independence, affiliated with the ANC and won in the 1968 election in the Gwembe North constituency, an ANC stronghold. Constituency service and position-taking on issues, therefore, did not generate significant electoral gains to candidates; party label alone generally determined the outcome of the vote.⁴³ Thus, rather than press their demands on their parliamentarians, constituents chose easier and more effective means like entreating local party and government officials in their area.⁴⁴

Policymaking in the First Republic

Although Kaunda did not possess as many formal powers during the multiparty First Republic as he would in the one-party Second Republic (see C. Gibson, 1994), Zambia's independence constitutions granted its chief executive broad powers. Kaunda used this authority to press forward his preferred policies. If he felt strongly about an issue, and most other senior party and government officials (especially in the Central Committee and Cabinet) did not vehemently object, Kaunda's policy preferences were likely to be introduced as government-sponsored bills to the National Assembly.⁴⁵

UNIP frontbenchers and backbenchers were reluctant to criticize government policy. They had the opportunity to discuss bills in UNIP parliamentary caucuses held before each session.⁴⁶ They did not need to persuade opposition members on the merits of a bill since UNDP held an overwhelming majority of seats. And their political futures depended on the favor of Kaunda and the Central Committee, who wanted MPs to toe the party line in public. Thus, if pressing for one's constituency meant questioning government, such a tactic was risky, even for ministers: those who did often failed to get renominated as candidates.⁴⁷ Unquestioned loyalty rather than parliamentary participation paved the way to higher office.

Even if members chose to champion their constituents' interests, voters were unlikely to hear about it. Media coverage of parliamentary proceedings was nearly non-existent. The percentage of constituents with access to radio or newspapers at this time was low. Constrained by the control that the party executive exerted over nominations, and electorally unrewarded by a political strategy that pressed for constituents' needs, most UNIP members only reluctantly spoke in the National Assembly.⁴⁸ So pervasive was this tendency that, ironically, even President Kaunda decried the lack of parliamentary debate.⁴⁹ Constituents' widespread loathing of wildlife laws, therefore, did not translate into parliamentary action to change the policy inherited from the colonial period.

The disorganization of the ANC, together with the institutional incentives described above, led to little formal opposition and the lack of any coherent set of policy alternatives.⁵⁰ Since the ANC's electoral strategy reflected more of a desire to hold on to their few seats rather than to woo UNIP members or voters, ANC MPs ~ when they debated at all — mostly attacked UNIP positions, in largely inflammatory language. With few funds, weak party organization and no full time officials, rumor was one of the few political weapons the ANC possessed.⁵¹ Even these highly colored attacks likely had little effect on public opinion.⁵²

The Politics of Wildlife in the First Republic Structure of Competition over Wildlife Policy

Few Zambians besides Kaunda favored conservation during this time. Despite Game Department goals, the safari hunting and tourism industries had not yet begun to earn significant amounts of revenue. Game cropping schemes had not convinced many politicians

or rural residents about the value of protecting wild animals to "rationalize" meat supplies.⁵³ The traditional supporters of conservation, European farmers, did not have many members in government; neither could they offer either the ANC or UNIP a significant block of voters.

The parliamentary debate over the 1968 National Parks and Wildlife Bill offers a partial test to the political logic of wildlife policy during this period in Zambia. Given the party and electoral rules of the First Republic, we would expect UNIP members not to speak out against the bill, even though its provisions were widely unpopular with most Zambians. MPs received no electoral advantage from presenting their constituents' preferences, and could lose their seats by criticizing the government. We would also expect little opposition from ANC members, since assailing the ruling party did not generally reach the ears of the electorate. If ANC members did choose to speak against the bill, we would expect their criticisms to be in the form of attacks without policy alternatives. European MPs, however, would likely speak in support of the wildlife bill: not only were they more likely to support conservation as individuals, but their election from the reserved roll meant that they represented a European electorate as well.

The 1968 National Parks and Wildlife Bill

The UNIP government introduced the National Parks and Wildlife Bill in 1968, and its contents reflected President Kaunda's strong personal preference for wildlife conservation and his strong role as policymaker within the country. In laying out the bill's contents, Sikota Wina (Minister of Local Government and Acting Minister of Natural Resources) described a wildlife policy strikingly similar to that of the colonial period. Like the concerns of the Northern Rhodesian government, Wina asserted that overall goal of the UNIP government was the "preservation of our national heritage" while having wildlife conservation "pay its own way."⁵⁴ Government expected to manage wild animals according to the latest methods (hence the changing of the label "game" to "wildlife"), it also hoped to induce more tourism and foreign exchange.⁵⁵

Minister Wina expressed awareness of the "negative outlook" possessed by most Zambians toward wildlife policy. His government intended to foster a "positive approach" through the "correct management and utilisation" of natural assets. The new bill allowed for

rural inhabitants to hunt. It abolished and reduced the size of certain protected areas and reclassified them as "open" to hunting. It eliminated former provisions for private game areas used by European farmers to protect their lands from outside hunters.⁵⁶ And it established a district license, sold by local authorities who would be allowed to keep the revenue.⁵⁷

In the vast majority of ways, however, the new bill closely resembled the old game ordinances. It retained a system of licenses, hunting methods and protected areas that excluded most Zambians from hunting. Ownership of all animals was vested in the President, on behalf of the citizenry. To support the "Government's declared policy of protecting its fauna from the depredations of law breakers and poachers," penalties for offenses against the new bill were "considerably more severe" than under the colonial laws.⁵⁸ The minister asserted that Zambians "of all age groups" needed to be "educated" to "appreciate the facts and principles" of wildlife management.⁵⁹ Echoing the intense feelings of colonial game officers, Wina ended his presentation of the bill by saying that "the only people who will oppose this Bill are the poachers."⁶⁰

Besides Wina, the only overt supporters of the bill were Europeans.⁶¹ Elected on the reserve roll, and reflecting the general tendency among Europeans to support wildlife conservation, these members extolled the new bill's virtues. Mr. Mitchley (Midlands) claimed the bill, among other things, would "protect the finest game parks in Africa," allow people areas where "they could get away from it all," and "earn foreign revenue." None of the European members discussed the distributive bias the bill had against rural Zambians. On the contrary, Mr. Burnside (Zambezi) was "delighted" to hear that the government was training "zealous" scouts that "examined the meat being cooked in the pots" of rural dwellers.⁶²

The only parliamentarian to speak out against the 1968 wildlife bill was Harry Nkumbula, leader of the ANC. Nkumbula used inflammatory language in his opposition to the bill, attempting to disparage UNIP before the 1968 general elections, which would take place in six weeks. Nkumbula criticized the amount of protected land in Zambia, reserving special ire for the lands of the Kafue National Park, which abutted the heart his party's stronghold in the Southern Province.⁶³ He doubted the wildlife tourism would ever amount

to much in Zambia. He regaled the National Assembly with stories about game guards harassing innocent citizens. He drew the politics of race into the debate by calling those who supported the bill "honorable English squires."⁶⁴ Finally, Nkumbula linked the wildlife bill directly with the upcoming election. He said that citizens in the rural areas sang songs with lyrics like:

When the general election comes, we shall see who we shall vote for...the ruling party, which is UNIP, is protecting animals more than they protect human beings. Therefore, on the polling day we shall vote for those people who protect human beings. And those who protect animal life shall ask animals to vote for them.⁶⁵

The European members and several government ministers assailed Nkumbula's performance, claiming he was "dragging red herrings" and the shadow of elections into a debate about a bill that "has no political connotation whatsoever."⁶⁶ After telling Nkumbula to quit "preaching from his anhill," UNIP members passed the bill easily.

In subsequent legislation, the UNIP government fleshed out their wildlife policy with statutory instruments that regulated hunting licenses and fees (Statutory Instrument No.2 of 1971), hunting methods (Statutory Instrument No.4 of 1971), game animals (No.5 of 1971) and human activity in national parks (No.9 of 1972). With the approval of parliament, President Kaunda declared 17 new national parks in 1972 (No.44 of 1972). In a speech that would have caused an uproar among Zambian nationalists in the pre-independence period, Solomon Kalulu, Minister of Lands and Natural Resources, told the National Assembly that he would allow his game guards "to shoot at people who may be there in the country poaching."⁶⁷

The debate surrounding the National Parks and Wildlife Bill largely conforms to our expectations about parliamentary behavior, and illustrates how UNIP could afford to pass legislation that was widely disliked. Because of party and electoral rules, party loyalty rather than an appreciative constituency determined parliamentarians' political careers. Thus, despite the bill's continuation of a system that legally excluded most Zambians from using wild animals, UNIP's backbenchers did not utter a word during the wildlife debate, and government ministers supported the line taken by Kaunda. The ANC's resistance, as

manifested in Nkumbula's attempt to point out the bill's negative impact on the common Zambian, had little effect on the legislation's fate.

Predictably, wildlife — like most local issues — did not feature prominently in the candidates' speeches in the run-up to the 1968 parliamentary and presidential elections.⁶⁸ Electoral rules also did not penalize parties for the positions they took on particular issues. Zambians voted for the party they thought would bring them the most overall benefits, not particular policy positions. Consequently, Zambians were unlikely to switch their allegiance to an opposition party like the ANC even though they detested constraints on their access and use of wildlife.

Distributive Uses of Wildlife Policy

Despite the general lack of enthusiasm within the electorate for a conservation policy based on the colonial code, such a centralized, exclusionary system provided the ruling party control over valuable goods. The National Parks and Wildlife Bill of 1968 continued the colonial legacy of locating legal authority over Zambia's wildlife estate within the agencies of the central government. By claiming this authority, UNIP was then free to use it with discrimination, rewarding its followers with employment, licenses and access to wild animals. Indeed, conflict between the civil servants of the Game Department and UNIP politicians illustrates that the government understood the value of wildlife as a distributable benefit.

Employment

Buttressed by increasing revenues from copper, Zambia's most important export, the well-funded UNIP government increased its spending six-fold from 1964 to 1971.⁶⁹ UNIP focused its investment on expanding government services, diversifying the economy away from copper and boosting employment opportunities.⁷⁰ Enlarging the civil service would not only address each of these goals, but also meet, in part, UNIP's promises of rapid development and higher standards of living. Thus, government jobs became a principal means to distribute political largesse after independence. In 1964 the civil service establishment was 22,561; by 1969 it reached 51,497 and was still growing.⁷¹

Although UNIP secured political support through its employment policies, the government's rapid expansion of the civil service also confronted significant obstacles, not the least of which was finding qualified personnel. European settler rule in Northern Rhodesia had failed to train significant numbers of Africans: while Zambia had a more solid financial base than many other countries on the continent at independence, it faced one of the smallest pools of citizens qualified to implement government policies.⁷² As late as February 1964, Zambians held only thirty-eight of 848 administrative and professional positions. At independence, less than .5 percent of the country's 3.5 million inhabitants had completed primary school.⁷³ The issue, then, was how UNIP could employ relatively unskilled citizens within government.

The Department of Game and Fisheries provided one answer. Given its largest amount of funding ever, the Department, like other government agencies, expanded staff numbers quickly.⁷⁴ At the time of independence, 265 "subordinate" Zambian staff supported the approximately two dozen European "incumbents" who held professional and clerical positions.⁷⁵ In the year following independence (1965), the Department increased its subordinate staff by 38 percent; and the next year (1966) by additional 32 percent. The Department did not just allow more Zambians to be hired, but was able to employ those Zambians the UNIP government had the most difficult time placing: the undereducated.⁷⁶ To perform as a game scout, an individual did not need a great deal of formal education. After recruitment, candidates received basic training at a government camp, and were then deployed. It was precisely in these less-skilled positions that the major growth of Department positions occurred. In 1964, 253 of the 265 Zambians employed as subordinate staff were employed as game guards, game scouts and vermin hunters. When the Department swelled to 367 subordinate staff in 1965, 356 held these low-skill positions. The pattern endured through 1967 (492 guards out of 509 subordinate staff) when total appointments levelled off. Not only did the Department allow the UNIP government to distribute jobs, but it focused on expanding the number of jobs that required the least qualifications.⁷⁷

One former wildlife officer remembers only one policy guiding the Department at that time: to hire as many people as possible.⁷⁸ In addition to the regular civil service posts, the

Department also hired hundreds of day laborers in capital projects such as clearing and maintaining roads, and building staff houses and firebreaks. The number of Zambians hired at higher levels increased as well, filling the positions abandoned by Europeans as the agency "Zambianized." Even with their aggressive employment policy, the Department experienced a "flood of applications."⁷⁹

Ministerial Powers Over Wildlife

Along with creating jobs for followers, UNIP's wildlife policy also gave the minister in charge of wildlife — and thus, Kaunda and UNIP — significant powers over both the benefits and costs of wildlife. Initially, however, the wildlife officers who drafted the bill did not give the minister, a political appointee, certain crucial prerogatives. Instead, they had conferred this authority to their director of the wildlife department, a civil servant.

In the original National Parks and Wildlife Bill presented to the National Assembly, the minister could, *inter alia*, regulate all activities in national parks, add or subtract to the list of protected species, prescribe the terms and conditions of hunting licenses and limit the use of specified weapons or methods of hunting. Of great significance was the minister's ability to issue special licenses to individuals, allowing them to shoot any animal anywhere, without regard to the quotas or protected status given to certain species by the wildlife department (Sec. 59). The minister used this power to supply UNIP party functions held in the rural areas with game meat, to give certain chiefs licenses to hunt elephant, and to furnish other cabinet members with special licenses.⁸⁰

But the three wildlife department officers who drafted the bill did not bequeath all of the most critical powers over wildlife to the minister. In the form originally presented to the National Assembly, the bill designated the Director of the wildlife department, and not the minister, as the highest authority regarding appeals related to license refusals, suspensions or cancellations (sec.66,71); trophy dealer's permits (sec.98); the export of game meat or trophies, including ivory and rhino horn (sec. 122); the disposal of confiscated items, including trophies, firearms or vehicles (sec. 145); and appeals to such forfeited items (sec. 145). Control over these provision was valuable: friends or supporters could be given the right to deal in animal trophies; those who had been arrested could have their cases

dismissed upon appeal. Enemies, alternatively, could have their appeal refused, and have their goods confiscated.

The UNIP government recognized what the wildlife officers' draft had accomplished, and set out to revise the original bill. Through Act No. 65 of 1970, the UNIP government amended the National Parks and Wildlife Act, firmly establishing the superiority of the minister over civil servants concerning access to the most valuable aspects of wildlife resources.⁸¹ In his statement about the amendment, the Minister of Lands and Natural Resources Solomon Kalulu admitted that the original bill did not stipulate that "in all instances" the director of the wildlife department was "subject to the directions of the Minister." Kalulu wanted "to make it abundantly clear that the Minister has the final say."⁸²

One of the bill's drafters lamented the reversion of these powers back to the minister.⁸³ He believed that politicians should not be allowed the authority to intervene in these important matters, since their motivations lay in pleasing their political supporters, and not in the professional management of wild animals. Civil servants, on the other hand, would be less likely to use their control over wildlife as a resource for patronage. If he could, the drafter would switch these provisions back to the purview of the director of the wildlife department.⁸⁴

Enforcement of Wildlife Laws

The UNIP government confronted a dilemma when it adopted Kaunda's preferences for a centralized wildlife policy: how could it tell Zambians not to hunt after having labelled wildlife conservation an oppressive colonial scheme that only benefitted Europeans?⁸⁵ We have seen that such a policy had little bearing on a parliamentarian's electoral chances. But the overall image of UNIP would not be enhanced with the electorate if the Game Department aggressively enforced wildlife laws with its newly enlarged force of scouts.

The evidence suggests that the Department did not. The UNIP government was reluctant to assign a high priority to the enforcement of game regulations, fearing local opposition.⁸⁶ During this period very few scouts made more than one arrest per year - a very low rate of detection given the amount of illegal hunting - and the Department did not receive instructions from any government or party officials to augment enforcement in the

field.⁸⁷ Given the amount of illegal hunting that transpired in the countryside, this level of detection is extremely low. Responding to these efforts, poaching rates increased dramatically in the period immediately following independence. Zambians seemed to be unmoved by arguments that wildlife protection was now for their country and future African generations: there was "little evidence of any abatement in poaching activity throughout the Republic;" Rather, poaching was increasing at an "embarrassingly accelerated rate."⁸⁸ In 1968, the Department received "reports from all Commands" that "the ordinary people of Zambia do not appear to regard poaching as a serious crime, and are not deterred from the pursuit of this past-time by the punishment that they receive when they are caught and prosecuted."⁸⁹

The UNEP government paid low, if any, political costs for the weak enforcement of wildlife regulations. Domestically, most Zambians enjoyed the fruits of low enforcement levels. Internationally, conservation organizations had not yet gained the influence with the media to call attention to the feeble implementation of Zambia's wildlife. Besides, the great wave of poaching that would wash across the continent did not start until the early 1970s. In the 1960s by contrast, almost no wild animal confronted imminent extinction in Zambia -- there were "plenty of animals back then."⁹⁰

Kaunda's Principal-Agent Problem

Part of the weak enforcement stemmed from a disjuncture between the preferences of President Kaunda and other UNIP officials, a situation that can be investigated using principal-agent theory. Principal-agent theory analyzes the process by which a principal contracts with an agent to act to produce an outcome desired by the principal.⁹¹ Many relationships common to society reflect this situation: lawyer/client, broker/investor, doctor/patient or, in the most general form, employer/employee. After agreeing to the contract however there is no guarantee that the agent will choose to pursue the principal's interest or pursue them efficiently. On the contrary, the agent will pursue her own goals, unless the contract imposes some type of incentive structure so as to make it in her interest to pursue the principal's interests. The principal's task is to design a structure that creates this convergence of interests. The difficulty of constructing such a contract is that the

information about the agent's effort is difficult to obtain. The agent may put effort into those tasks that only appear as if she is fulfilling the contract (moral hazard). Consequently, the principal needs to write a contract with provisions for monitoring as well as inducing the agent to reveal information about her behavior. The best contract would overcome this informational asymmetry and conflict of interest by concocting incentives that encourage the agent to act as if she were the principal in every possible situation.

Mechanisms such as time-clocks, output quotas and profit sharing, however, do not completely eliminate the information and motivation gap.⁹² Recent scholarship regarding principal-agent theory indicates that monitoring and sanctioning do not completely resolve the contracting problem resulting from dissimilar preferences.⁹³ Where more than one agent is involved in the production of a good, it becomes exceedingly difficult to measure an individual's contribution to total output. While it is theoretically possible to devise schemes to induce agents to perform, such schemes are prohibitively costly and do not lead to the maximization of total profit.⁹⁴

Principal-agent problems between a policymaker and an implementing bureaucracy can take two forms: shirking and slippage. Shirking refers to the noncompliance resulting from the conflict of goals described above. Slippage refers to institutionally induced problems, i.e. even when bureaucratic agents and policymaking principals share the same policy preferences, institutional arrangements within their bureaucracy may militate against choosing this most desired policy.⁹⁵ The challenge for the policymaker/principal is to design decision-making rules within the bureaucracy so as to mitigate the problems of agency.

While Kaunda may have favored strict enforcement, he relied on others to implement his preferences. As in any principal-agent situation, slippage occurred. Moreover, since the government and party officials upon which he relied would had little reason to antagonize the electorate unnecessarily with vigorous enforcement, individuals would be likely to shirk as well. With hundreds of officials and staff scattered across the country responsible for the implementation of wildlife measures, it was next to impossible for Kaunda to monitor effectively his agents' actions.

Furthermore, Kaunda himself had reasons for not monitoring the implementation of wildlife policy more closely. First, he may have been unaware or unalarmed by the level of

poaching during the 1960s. Although the department reported some increase in illegal hunting, little international scrutiny of his wildlife policy existed. In fact, during this period Kaunda basked in the glow of the international recognition he received from establishing one of the largest systems of national parks in the world.⁹⁶ Second, Kaunda had other important concerns that crowded his political agenda at this time, such as the pace of development, the infighting among members of the party's executive, the diversification of Zambia's economy away from the mining sector and their relationship with the Ian Smith's regime in Rhodesia. Without any domestic or international watchdog groups raising alarm, and other pressing concerns, Kaunda had less immediate motivation to invest political capital into monitoring the implementation his wildlife policy. But as wide as the gap between his preferences and that of other officials was at this time, it would grow vastly wider during the 1970s as the value of non-compliance increased.

Conclusion

President Kenneth Kaunda has been a consistent conservationist since becoming Zambia's president.⁹⁷ Over the years, he has told countless visitors about his own experiences with wildlife. In one story, Kaunda describes his home village where, as a youth, he enjoyed the large trees and scores of animals that surrounded it. His father would often hunt duiker (a small antelope) "for the pot," without thought of the long-term consequences. But when Kaunda returned to the area years later, the president found the place "in ruins." The trees had been destroyed. No animals were left — not even the flocks of guinea fowl which had been so common before. Shocked by the environmental ruin, Kaunda was more convinced than ever of the need for strong wildlife conservation measures in Zambia.⁹⁸

In his first term as president, Kaunda translated this and other experiences into one of the most comprehensive wildlife conservation policies on the African continent. The 1968 National Parks and Wildlife Bill included far-reaching regulations on all aspects of the hunting and trading of wildlife, and allowed for the establishment of a far-flung network of protected areas.

This paper highlighted how the political institutions of Zambia's First Republic allowed Kaunda and his party to pass such an unpopular measure with little political cost. Given UNIP's majority, and the rules that fostered party discipline for parliamentarians and party identification for the electorate, UNIP faced little observable opposition to the wildlife bill, despite the popular resistance to such restrictive measures that had been so prominent during the pre-independence era.

This paper also demonstrated that, despite the lack of much overt opposition, the 1968 Wildlife Bill was far from having "no political connotation whatsoever." Establishing extensive government control over the wildlife sector allowed UNIP to use such authority with discrimination. Wildlife resources became another source of goods that an incumbent party could distribute. UNIP filled hundreds of jobs that it had created through the Department of Game and Fisheries, dispensed countless special licenses dispensed by the minister and the selectively enforced wildlife laws. The political use of wildlife resources would intensify in Zambia's one-party Second Republic as the relative value of wildlife products increased along with the need for sources of patronage.

Finally, this paper presented evidence for the theory of institutional change that features distribution, rather than collective benefits (Knight, 1992). The political fight between civil servants and politicians over the control of wildlife policy, and its use to reward followers, illustrate that UNIP officials regarded the distributive benefits of wildlife policy as primary, not the collective good of conservation. UNIP's distribution of wildlife policy's benefits can be seen as a strategy of making side payments to those individuals who lost under the new wildlife policy, and whose opposition UNIP did not want to incur. Further, the institutional context of the 1964-1972 period provided sets of incentives that influenced politicians' choices over wildlife policy. Under the electoral and party rules of the First Republic, Kaunda was able to establish his most preferred policy. Parliamentarians, on the other hand, could not afford to support openly their constituents' desire to hunt and trade wild animals. The rules also protected UNIP candidates from electoral defeat, since party label, not position-taking on issues, motivated voter choice.

1. Department of Game and Fisheries, Annual Report, 1964 (Lusaka; Government Printer, 1965); Marks, Imperial Lion, 106.
2. See Statutory Instruments Nos. 1-5, 80, 88 of 1971 (amendments to the National Parks and Wildlife Act of 1971).
3. The text of Minister Kalulu's speech to the National Assembly may be found in Appendix A of the National Parks and Wildlife Department, Annual Report for the Year 1971, (Lusaka: Government Printer, 1972).
4. *Ibid.* Establishing control over African ownership of guns and powder also reduced the possibility of armed uprisings.
5. The earliest European attempts to conserve natural resources in Africa were stimulated by fears of ecological disaster, and certain conservation laws regarding flora were established as early as the 1820s in the Cape Colony. In the 1840s, reports received from India and the Cape Colony underlined growing problems in soil erosion and deforestation. Restrictions on hunting followed soon after, the result of a massive increase in the killing of the larger mammals for food and profit. In 1858, the Cape Colony initiated the protection of elephant and buffalo in certain areas. It was not until the 1886 Cape Act for the Preservation of Game that a more systematic approach to attempt game legislation in Africa. See Richard Grove, "Early Themes in African Conservation: the Cape in the Nineteenth Century," in David Anderson and Richard Grove, eds., Conservation in Africa: People, Policies and Practice (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987). Due to the rapid decrease in wildlife populations from the pressures of hunting and a rinderpest epidemic, and the growing lobbying efforts by conservation groups in London, the Commissioner of British Central Africa extended the Act to include all the other areas operated by the British South Africa Company, including Northern Rhodesia, in 1891. The BSAC issued modifications to the Act later in the decade, then consolidated and amended the regulations in 1899 and 1906. In 1899 the Mweru Marsh Game Reserve was created in Northern Rhodesia, and a reserve for giraffe was founded in the Luangwa Valley in 1902. See John Ford, The Role of Trypanosomiasis in African Ecology. London: Oxford University Press, 1971). Marks, Imperial Lion, 66, 106; John M Mackenzie, "Chivalry, Social Darwinism and Ritualised Killing: the Hunting Ethos in Central Africa up to 1914," in Grove and Anderson, Conservation in Africa.
6. See the debate of the Legislative Council concerning this ordinance in Legislative Council Debates: Second Session of the First Council, May 15th - May 30th, 1925 (Livingstone, Northern Rhodesia: Government Printers, 1925), 154-158.
7. T.G.C. Vaughan-Jones, A Short Survey of the Aims and Functions of the Department of Game and Tsetse Control (Lusaka: Government Printer, 1948), 4. But Vaughan-Jones elsewhere states the department was "constituted with effect from 1st January, 1940." See his Game and Tsetse Control Department: Progress report to 31st December, 1943 (mimeo: n.d.): 1.
8. Vaughan-Jones, 1948, 4.
9. Game conservation was also part of two other ordinances: the Game Ordinance (Capital Law 106) provided separate legislation for national parks; the Victoria Falls Ordinance (Capital Law 252) provided for conservation in the Victoria Falls Trust Area.
10. Northern Rhodesia, Fauna Conservation. Chapter 241 of the Laws. 1964 Edition (Lusaka, Zambia: Government Printer, 1964).
11. The crucial difference between national parks and game management areas is that the latter could be gazetted or degazetted by the Governor alone; national parks needed action by a legislature.

12. Mwelwa C. Musambachime, "Colonialism and the Environment in Zambia, 1890-1964," in Samuel N. Chipungu, ed., Guardians in Their Time: Experiences of Zambians Under Colonial Rule, 1890-1964 (London: Macmillan, 1992); Leroy Vail, "Ecology and History: the Example of Eastern Africa," Journal of Southern African Studies 3 (1977): 129-155.
13. See the letter regarding fishing rights in the Luangwa Valley Game Reserve from the Senior Ranger W.E. Poles to the Provincial Game Officer, Northern Province, 10 January 1955, (National Archives of Zambia); also the exchange of letters between the Provincial Commissioner (Northern Province), Director of Game and Tsetse Control, Senior Agricultural Officer and District Commissioner (Mpika) regarding locals' concern about the Luangwa Valley Game Reserve boundaries in 1943, dated 7 January, 15 January, 23 January, 12 July, 29 September, 13 October, 16 October, 23 October, 31 October, and 24 November (National Archives of Zambia).
14. See W.E. Poles, A Report on a Tour in the Luangwa (Southern) Game Reserve and the Areas of Native Settlement Closely Adjacent Thereto, (Mpika, Northern Rhodesia: Game and Tsetse Control Department, 1947), 20.
15. Interview with Norman Carr, former officer of the Department of Game and Tsetse Control, Kapani Lodge, Mfuwe, Zambia, 10 August 1991.
16. Some chiefs during this period did attempt to get their lands designated as controlled areas. See Northern Rhodesia Game and Tsetse Control Department, Annual Report, (Livingstone: Government Printer, 1944). Later, Game Department officials would realize that the chiefs were more interested in getting the share of revenues they received from the sale of hunting licenses than conservation when their chiefdoms were designated as controlled areas. "That even Native Authorities have little conscience in these matters was well instanced" by the situation disclosed by District Commissioner, Lundazi, and the Police in that district. An illicit ivory and gun-running trade had been built up, in which nine of the local Chiefs "were personally responsible." *Idem*, 1947, 9.
- An intense debate occurred in the early to mid-1950s between the Provincial Commissioners (Northern and Eastern Provinces) and officers in the Game Department regarding the boundaries of and African fishing rights in the Luangwa Game Reserve reveals the politically sensitive nature of the size of protected areas; and, especially, the issue of relocating villages out of these lands. The Provincial Commissioners tended to be sympathetic to Africans land and fishing needs; the Game Department officers tended to see Africans as destroyers of wildlife. See the following correspondence: District Commissioner (Mpika District) to Provincial Commissioner (Northern) (12 May 1952); Prov. Commissioner (Northern) to the District Commissioner (Mpika) (19 May 1952); Prov. Game Officer (Northern) to Game Ranger (Mpika) (25 January 1954); Game Ranger to Prov. Game Officer (15 March 1954); Prov. Game Officer to Prov. Commissioner (Northern) (22 December 1954); Director to Prov. Commissioner (Eastern) (5 January 1955); Senior Ranger to Prov. Commissioner (Northern) (10 January 1955); Prov. Commissioner (Northern) to Prov. Commissioner (Eastern) (14 January 1955); Prov. Commissioner (Eastern) to Director (29 January 1955); Director of Game to Prov. Commissioner (14 February 1955); Prov. Commissioner (Northern) to Director of Game and Tsetse Control Department (4 May 1955); (National Archives of Zambia).
17. See the Game Department's Annual Reports descriptions of how its staff died over the course of the years.
18. See the Game Department's Annual Reports from 1950-1970 for the many schemes used to "educate" rural Africans about conservation. See also the recommendations of Dr. Frasier Darling in Darling, Wildlife in an African Territory: a Study Made for the Game and Tsetse Control Department of Northern Rhodesia (London: Oxford University Press, 1960), 34.
19. See, for example, the letter from Senior Ranger W.E. Poles to the Provincial Game Officer, 10 January 1955 (National Archives of Zambia).

20. Department of Game and Tsetse Control, Annual Report (Lusaka: Government Printer, 1947), 9.
21. Department of Game and Tsetse Control, Annual Report (Lusaka: Government Printer, 1946), 7.
22. Other regulatory policies used by African nationalists included agriculture and soil measures. See Thomas Rasmussen, "The Popular Basis of Anti-Colonial Protest," in William Tordoff, ed., Politics in Zambia (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1974).
23. Government of Northern Rhodesia, Annual Report of African Affairs: Port Jameson District (Lusaka: Government Printer, 1960).
24. Robert H. Bates, Rural Responses to Industrialization (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1976), 87.
25. Interview with Richard Bell, co-director Luangwa Integrated Rural Development Programme, Chipata, Zambia, 28 May 1991.
26. Government of Northern Rhodesia, Annual Report on African Affairs: Namwala District (Lusaka: Government Printer, 1957); see also idem., Annual Report - Southern Province (Lusaka: Government Printer, 1957), 80.
27. See for example Rasmussen, "The Popular Basis," 51-53; L.H. Gann, A History of Northern Rhodesia: Early Days to 1953 (London: Chatto and Windus, 1964), 306-307. For an example of how local politicians even transformed land surveys into political issues, see also Southern Province - Annual Report 1957, 76.
28. Marks, Imperial Lion, 105.
29. Interview with President Kenneth Kaunda, Lusaka, Zambia, 18 August 1992.
30. Ibid. Also interview with W. Astle, former officer, Department of Game and Fisheries, Lusaka, Zambia 24 July 1992; interview with P.S.M. Berry, former officer, Department of Game and Fisheries, Mfuwe, Zambia, 2 August 1992.
31. Members were elected in single district, plurality voting. The 1964 elections also included ten reserve roll seats for Europeans in the new 75-member post-independence National Assembly. The National Progress Party won all these seats in 1964. The reserve roll seats were eliminated before the 1968 general elections. See Robert Molteno and Ian Scott, "The 1968 General Election and the Political System," in Tordoff, Politics in Zambia.
32. William Tordoff and Ian Scott, "Political Parties: Structure and Policies," in Tordoff, Politics in Zambia, 112.
33. United National Independence Party, 1967 Constitution (Lusaka: mimeo, 1967), 168.
34. Molteno and Scott, "1968 General Election," 171-175.
35. Tordoff and Scott, "Political Parties," 134.
36. Molteno and Scott, "1968 General Election," 164.
37. Ibid., 176; see also William Tordoff and Robert Molteno, "Parliament," in Tordoff, ed., Politics in Zambia, 204-205.

38. Molteno and Scott, "1968 General Election," 177.
39. Constitution Act No. 2 of 1966. This paralleled a law passed earlier in Kenya. See Molteno and Scott, "Parliament," 205.
40. Ibid.
41. The ANC's strength came from the Southern Province, and from the western part of Central Province; UNIP was popular in most other areas. Some members of UNIP, believing that the interest of the Lozis in the Western Province were not being adequately met by UNIP, broke away to form United Party in 1966. The UP was banned after its followers clashed with UNIP supporters in August 1968. Thereafter, the UP threw its weight behind the ANC, and delivered 8 of the 11 Western Province seats to the opposition. This result, defying as it did the efforts of UNIP to create a one-party state through the ballot box, precipitated Kaunda's declaration of the one-party Second Republic in 1972. See Molteno and Scott, "1968 General Election."
42. Tordoff and Scott, "Political Parties," 141-154.
43. Ibid., 193.
44. Sometimes local chiefs mediated conflict and helped to represent individuals before government agencies. Constituents did not generally write or visit their MPs. Ibid., 214.
45. Tordoff and Molteno, "Government and Administration," 244-252.
46. Tordoff and Molteno, "Parliament," 236-237.
47. Ibid., 211.
48. Ibid.
49. Ibid., 238.
50. Molteno and Scott, "1968 General Election," 176.
51. Tordoff and Scott, "Political Parties," 135-148.
52. Tordoff and Molteno, "Parliament," 234.
53. Marks, Imperial Lion, 113-117.
54. Republic of Zambia, Debates of the First Session of the National Assembly - 30 October 1968, 571-594.
55. The economic viability of wildlife conservation had been promoted by the colonial Game Department since the early 1940s. See Department of Game and Tsetse Control, Annual Reports (Lusaka: Government Printer, various years).
56. The 1962 Game Ordinance provided for three types of protected areas, game reserves (which could be declared by the Governor), controlled hunting areas and private hunting areas. Essentially, the new bill changed the name of reserves to national parks, and required the approval of both the President and the National Assembly to create or change them. The new bill also combined private and controlled areas into game management areas. Hunting was only permitted in the game management areas, not in national parks.

57. Republic of Zambia, Debates of the First Session. 573-575.
58. *Ibid.*, 575. Under the old game ordinances, the maximum penalty for an infraction was 600 kwacha, nine months in jail, or both. The new bill proposed a maximum sentence of 2500K and/or five years in prison: killing a protected species would reap a 3000K and/or seven year sentence.
59. *Ibid.*, 573.
60. *Ibid.*, 576.
61. The Europeans were Mitchley, Farmer, Burney and Burnside,
62. Republic of Zambia, Debates of the First Session, 586.
- 63. *Ibid.*, 580.**
64. *Ibid.*, 584.
65. *Ibid.*, 583.
66. *Ibid.*, 586-587.
67. Republic of Zambia, Debates of the Second Session of the Second National Assembly. 7th January - 25th March 1970. 550-551.
68. Molteno and Scott, "1968 General Election," 187, 193.
69. William Tordoff and Robert Molteno, "Government and Administration," in Tordoff, Politics in Zambia. 243.
70. Republic of Zambia, First National Development Plan. 1966-70 (Lusaka: Government Printer, 1966).
71. Republic of Zambia, Annual Estimates of Revenue and Expenditure (Lusaka: Government Printer, various years).
72. Republic of Zambia, Manpower Report: a Report and Statistical Handbook on Manpower, Education, Training and Zambianization, 1965-66 (Lusaka: Government Printer, 1967).
73. William Tordoff and Robert Molteno, "Introduction," in Tordoff, Politics in Zambia. 11.
74. Department of Game and Fisheries, Annual Report, 1965 (Lusaka: Government Printer, 1966), 26. By 1966, the Department felt "most gratified" by its place in the First National Development Plan, whose provisions outlined "ambitious development throughout the game estate." *Idem.*, Annual Report, 1966. 25.
75. The figures presented in this section can be found in the Department of Game and Fisheries, Annual Reports (Lusaka: Government Printer, various years). The numbers presented refer only to the staff employed in the game division of the department, and do not include fisheries personnel.
76. The Department also felt the competition between different government agencies over skilled candidates, particularly for senior posts. Lack of fluency in English was one major obstacle to its hiring plans. Department of Game and Fisheries, Annual Report, 1966 (Lusaka: Government Printer, 1967).

77. The Department also became consumed with the building of houses for these junior level appointments. See Department of Game and Fisheries, Annual Reports (Lusaka: Government Printer, 1965-1970).
78. Interview with W. Astle, former officer of the Department of Game and Fisheries, 12 August 1992.
79. Department of Game and Fisheries, Annual Report, 1966 (Lusaka: Government Printer, 1967).
80. Interview with Francis X. Nkhoma, 17 July 1992, Lusaka. The wildlife department admits to helping in this endeavor. See Department of Game and Fisheries, Annual Report, 1967 (Lusaka: Government Printer, 1968). Ministers of the colonial administration had very similar powers and also distributed them for political and personal reasons. See Northern Rhodesia, Fauna Conservation, Chapter 241 of the Laws, 1964 Edition (Lusaka: Government Printer, 1964), sections 4 and 18.
81. Although passed in 1968, the National Parks and Wildlife Act did not become law until 1 January 1971 due to these amendments.
82. Republic of Zambia, National Assembly Debates, 9 December 1970 (Lusaka: Government Printer, 1971), 75-76.
83. Interview with P.S.M. Berry, former officer of the Department of Game and Fisheries, Chinzombo Safari Lodge, Mfuwe, Zambia, 22 June 1991.
84. The value of the minister's extensive control over wildlife resources would grow with the value of wildlife products and the safari hunting business. Over the next three decades observers would note how individuals would lobby the minister for special licenses, trophy export permits; and rights to hunting areas. Ministers offices were often seen stuffed with crates of alcoholic beverages and foodstuffs, inciting rumors about illegal deals between ministers and business owners interested in wildlife. Ministers themselves were sometimes at the center of investigations regarding the export of ivory and rhino horn.
85. Tordoff and Molteno, "Introduction," 15.
86. Rasmussen, "Popular Basis," 58.
87. Department of Wildlife, Fisheries and National Parks, Annual Report, 1970 (Lusaka: Government Printer, 1972), 13.
88. Department of Game and Fisheries, Annual Report (Lusaka: Government Printer, 1966), 9, 41. See the similar comments made in subsequent Annual Reports.
89. Department of Game and Fisheries, Annual Report, 1968 (Lusaka: Government Printer, 1970), 43.
90. Interview with Norman Carr.
91. See Michael Jenson and William Meckling, "The Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure," in Louis Putterman, ed., The Economic Nature of the Firm (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1986). See also Terry Moe, "The New Economics of Organization" American Journal of Political Science 28 (1984): 739-77.
92. Armen Alchian and Harold Demsetz, "Production, Information Costs and Economic Organization," in Putterman, The Economic Nature of the Firm. 111-34.

93. Gary Miller, Managerial Dilemmas: The Political Economy of Hierarchy (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992).

94. Bengt Holstrom, "Moral Hazard in Teams," Bell Journal of Economics 13 (1982): 324-40.

95. Matthew McCubbins and Talbot Page, "A Theory of Congressional Delegation," in McCubbins and Terry Sullivan, eds., Congress, Structure and Policy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987): 409-425. See also Randall Calvert, Mark Moran and Barry Weingast, "Congressional Influence over Policy Making" and Matthew McCubbins and Thomas Schwartz, "Congressional Oversight Overlooked: Police Patrols Versus Fire Alarms," in the same volume.

96. Interview with President Kaunda.

97. Some observers claim that expatriates in Zambia's game department influenced the president's *volte face* on wildlife policy. See Marks, Imperial Lion, 106. Supposedly, Kaunda went to the Luangwa Valley soon after becoming the country's new president. While in the Valley, game officer Johnny Ace took Kaunda on personal tours of the wildlife areas, convincing Kaunda that protection was indeed necessary. Kaunda claims that while he had a "great deal of respect for Mr. Ace," Kaunda did not need to be persuaded to continue a policy of wildlife conservation since he had always been a conservationist at heart. Kaunda himself claims that his original call for open hunting was strategic: He had used the British wildlife conservation policy as a "weapon" against the colonial regime. But, having always understood the importance of wildlife conservation, Kaunda told his followers immediately after independence to "undo what they had done" and reverse their opposition to wildlife conservation policy. Interview with President Kaunda.

98. *Ibid.*