Cadastral Politics:

the Making of Community Forestry

in Mozambique and Zimbabwe[1]

by

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High hopes have obscured thorny problems in community forestry. Also known as community based resource management, the policy (or policies) is fast becoming a blueprint for Southern Africa's flora and fauna. In the 1990s, Murphree's (1991) vision of 'communities as institutions for resource management' took Zimbabwe by storm. The celebrated CAMPFIRE program has applied that vision to much of the country's natural resources, and proponents have spread the gospel outside Zimbabwe's borders.[2] Their message: local people, their government, and private enterprises should manage a given natural resource jointly. Such 'co-management,' of course, represents a significant departure from the earlier 'Yellowstone model' of conservation. No longer, it is hoped, will governments expel and exclude people from forests.   Now, local, governmental, and commercial 'stakeholders' should share a landscape in a mutually beneficial and sustainable fashion. As one advocacy group counsels, they should 'find consensus in diversity' (Poffenberger and Selin, 1998). But who is the local community and who are the stakeholders?[3] Both categories imply a congruence of interest between disparate actors, such as, widows and patriarchs, smallholders and state technocrats, or all of the above and multinational corporations.[4] In many programs of community forestry, local government and other strong parties have already captured benefits intended for weaker ones.[5]

This paper addresses a related problematic: shared landscapes – the idea that communities, states, and private companies would want to or be capable of making joint decisions with regard to forests and other natural resources. Optimistic indeed - but policy-makers argue that the 'right incentives' will persuade even hardened adversaries to come to the table. A park buffer zone, for instance, could reduce unauthorized tree

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[2] CAMPFIRE stands for the 'Communal Areas Management Programme for Indigenous Resources'. Adams and McShane (1992) and Bonner (1993) have praised CAMPFIRE to the broadest audience of conservation-minded Europeans and North Americans.

[3] Brosius et al. (1998), Forbes (1996), Li (1996) and Peters (1996) pose this question in variety of settings.

[4] To complicate matters further, 'smallholders' is merely a shorthand for people involved in agriculture, migrant labor, and trading, often over a wide geographical base.

[5] Ribot (1996, 1999) and, with regard to CAMFPFIRE, Murombedzi (1992), Campbell et al. (2000), and Murphree himself (1997: 22-3) describe local and national governments' capture of benefits and control. Within communities, as Madzudzo (1996: 4) finds, dominate ethnic groups (Ndebele and Kalanga) have managed to disenfranchise marganalised people entirely (San). Shroeder (1999) suggests that some policies of community forestry do not even intend, first and foremost, to benefit local people. He argues

felling by giving a local people a stake in the tourism trade. Thus, conservationists, farmers, tourism operators, and tourists find reasons for cooperation and sharing. Southern Africa, however, may present stronger reasons for these parties *not* to share a forest. The region is a cauldron for land-grabbing and resource theft, precisely the opposite of sharing. In Zimbabwe, in particular, such struggles pervade political life. In the 1890s, white settlers alienated the bulk of the fertile plateau and mountainous regions between the Limpopo and Zambezi Rivers. They established the Rhodesian cadaster, a map of property that reflected the injustice and violence of conquest. The cadastral map has changed little since. African smallholders grow in number within the fixed land base of native reserves. Worse still, national parks have periodically bitten off chunks of those reserves and expelled the residents. Parks and the private estates have defeated armed and peaceful efforts at land reform.

In these ways, Zimbabwe's rural politics have become cadastral. They center on the measurement, demarcation, and control of land. Smallholders fight with each other over access to land, and, at another level, the state, corporations, and the leaders of smallholder communities contest the division of territory. Economic ambition and historical grievances are denominated in hectares. Land stirs the emotions more than does any other political debate ([ref] – Moyo??) . How can such a nation of evictees, squatters, and land barons – among whom exclusion is the governing principle – now share a landscape? Does today's policy of community forestry stand a chance under these inhospitable conditions?

It *may* stand a chance and particularly if it can learn from efforts in a neighboring part of Mozambique. In west-central Mozambique, cadastral politics are blossoming now, during rather than long before the age of community forestry. Why this delayed onset? From the 1890s onward, white settlers mostly avoided this area in favor of the territory that became Zimbabwe. Africans retained control of the land. The colonial state did establish a handful of national parks and protected areas, but no state has succeeded in evicting the inhabitants (with the partial exception of Mozambique's flagship park, Gorongoza). An eleven-year anti-colonial guerrilla war (1964-1975) and a longer post-

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that, by design, the Gambian-German Forestry Project shifted the costs of environmental management from the cash-strapped central government onto rural people.

independence war (1979-1992) confined conservationists and agricultural investors alike to the cities. Conflict raged, but it did not address the demarcation of land. In the mid-1990s, however, whites began trickling into west-central Mozambique. Largely Afrikaners from South Africa, they wish to invest in timber, sport-hunting and eco-tourism.   A loose concession system has permitted many to grabbed land.[6] Indeed, in the mid-1990s, it appeared as if Rhodesia-style homesteaders would roll over this frontier. Yet, a Mozambican variant of community forestry – devised in reaction to land-grabbing – may have helped stop them in their tracks. The approach is simple: establish the inalienable rights of local people to their land prior to any efforts to share the landscape. This type of 'community mapping' seeks to create a cadaster, but one that protects and enfranchises smallholder farmers. Whereas community forestry in Zimbabwe locks smallholders into a state of dispossession, the policy in Mozambique, at least in some places, seeks above all to prevent dispossession . This paper will compare a community forestry project in Mozambique with its twin, 30 km away, just inside eastern Zimbabwe. The ethnography provides clues for a new approach to forestry policy – one that would take cadastral politics seriously and perhaps try to influence them.

Frontiers and forest policy

        Southern African cadasters have developed along colonial, often Afrikaner fronteirs. From the original Cape Town settlement of 1652, Afrikaners expanded northward in fits and starts. The Great Trek took them to Orange Free State (in the center of current South Africa) in the 1820s. In 1890s, many departed again for the Rhodesia, particularly its eastern highlands (the concern of this paper). In the 1990s, in a movement once called the Second Great Trek, Afrikaners are colonizing remote parts of Mozambique, Zambia, and even Congo-Brazzaville.[7]   Each step of the way, these settlers – in common with later arrivals from Britain, Portugal, and Europe generally – have imposed a common view of the landscape: prosperity and development based on surveyed zones of exclusive ownership. (cf. Kain and Baigent, 1992 Cronon (1983: *passim*, 71)[]??) In the 19th century, Afrikaner homesteaders mapped quadrilinear farms

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[6] The work of Eliseu, Nhachungue, and Myers (1998) on Manica and Tete Provinces is the most systematic indictment of the concession system. See also Brouwer (1998) and Massinga (1996).

[7] See, for example, "Afrikaners on a second Great Trek," The Economist, 30 August 1997, p. 30.

each side of which corresponded to an hour's horse ride (Christopher, 1971: 2; 1974: 213). They permitted Africans to remain as tenant farmers. In eastern Zimbabwe, subsequent land-owners tossed smallholders off the estates altogether. Timber and tea corporations converted the landscape to intensive silviculture and tea plantations. Finally, national parks and protected areas, which pepper eastern the highlands, adopted a similar logic of expulsion and strict territorial control.[8] By 1980, smallholders held % [quote Moyo and or Palmer??] of the land area of Zimbabwe, and a much smaller proportion in the enduring 'white highlands' of the east. Thus, colonial settlement, commercial forestry, and conservation jointly closed the frontier

For African smallholders, this process entailed not only material theft but a cultural sea change as well. 19th century occupants north of the Limpopo valued and used land, but they did not divide it into bounded, exclusive zones. Instead, they allowed people, their crops, and their livestock to derive benefits from the same area. In Southern Zimbabwe, for example, grazers ran cattle over vast distances, seeking dry season, wet season and famine grasses with the agreement of local cultivators (Scoones 1992). At a political level, as well, empires and smaller chiefdoms did not strive to partition territory as the modern state system does.[9] As in Thongchai's (1994) description of 19th-century southeast Asia, zonal, fuzzy borders or overlapping areas of sovereignty lay between the cores of major polities. Or, there were gaps, what Kopytoff (1987) calls 'interstitial frontiers'. In 1887, King Lobengula of the Ndebele wrote to King Khama of the Batswana (now in Botswana), 'In olden times … we never spoke about boundary lines …It is only now they [the British] talk about boundaries'.[10] Closer to the study area, an oral account does refer to pre-colonial boundaries – but of a different sort:

… people … were sent by Paramount chief Mutema. They performed their rituals in the night while naked and possessed and where they sat down became the boundary of the village.[11]

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[8] Although, as Ranger (1999) documents, the national park authorities opted for total exclusion only after decades of debate over the relationship between nature and African culture.

[9] Although as Ruggie ([ref??]) writes, the state is less and less of a container??

[10] Lobengula to Khama, Parliamentary Papers, C.5237, LIX, 1887. I am grateful to Terence Ranger (1999: 42) for this reference.

Today's cadastral maps – of unbroken lines and measurable areas - were a long way off. Instead of staking their rule on land-holding, Mutema, Lobengula, and Khama wielded power through 'rights in persons' (Kopytoff and Miers, 1977: 7). Male lineage heads accumulated subjects through marriage, procreation, and various forms of economic dependence shading into slavery. These people lived in a village around the patriarch, labored in his fields, and produced a surplus with which he could attract orphans and destitutes to further enlarge his following [cite Beach, *Neighbors*]. The pre-colonial political economy, in short, hardly cared about zones of exclusive ownership or bounding the land. The frontier lay open.

Case studies of similarly open frontiers helped launch the movement towards community forestry. In the 1980s, social scientists documented practices of joint use, otherwise known, as common property regimes. Participants in these regimes treat natural resources and each other characteristic ways. 'Resources'" according to Bruce and Fortmann (1988: 2-3), 'can be utilized by more than one person either simultaneously or sequentially' (cf. Ostrom, 1990). One person may hunt in a given hectare while a second grazes cattle, a third tends to trees, and a fourth fallows the land in preparation for inter-planting. Rather than controlling territory *per se*, such people share a landscape. They imagine it as a series of overlapping but separable resources: wildlife, grasses, crops, and – in the double meaning of 'forest' – trees and land. Regarding the ways people treat each other, common property relies upon what McCay and Acheson (1987: 9) call the '"web of use rights" (Thompson, 1975) underlying the moral economy of human communities'. As in England before the Enclosure Acts, such people adhere to a Thompsonian 'moral economy' that restrains exploitation and unbridled accumulation. Of course, many moral economies conceal inequality and resentment significant enough to sabotage collective action (Moore??, [year: p]). Nonetheless, the give-and-take of an open frontier provides the best hope for shared landscapes and community forestry.

Policy-makers and advocates, however, frequently extend community forestry beyond its logical sites. They apply the approach of shared landscapes even to places in the grip of enclosures, cadastral politics, and violence. Managers of buffer zones around

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[11] (Vijfhuizen 1998: 176) – [get Shona original??]. – mention refs to beacons in Don journals published by Beach.

national parks, for example, now frequently reach out to the precisely people originally displaced by the park. According to one expert, such 'local resource users' 'must be assured of active participation in creating management policies' for the buffer zone (Brown, 1990: 10).[12] Yet, these exiles frequently seek to 'participate' in management at a wider scale, that is, to manage the park itself – complete with trees and animals. If denied that aspiration, why should they want to share with outsiders – often allied to the original evictors - their remaining natural resources? In other words, a resource-rich state would appear to ask resource-poor people to share what little they have left. At best, this dispossessed will gain nothing. At worst, community forestry will let the thieves back into the house to finish the job. [cite Colchester??]

In Zimbabwe, the worst has happened or will happen eventually. In the mid-1990s, two district governments in Matabeleland planned to clear the Gwampa Valley of smallholders and stock it with big game. The valley would then serve the double purpose of producing CAMPFIRE revenue and protecting an adjoining forest reserve from encroachment (Alexander and McGregor, 1996). In other parts of Zimbabwe, corporate parties to co-management have pushed for eviction. From a business standpoint, they almost <u>have</u> to do so. Overlapping rights are risky: in comparison with full ownership, cooperation is less predictable, less financially secure, and reduces each partner's control over quality? How can a sport-hunting firm, for example, guarantee its clients the experience of game-rich 'wild Africa' as long as it allows Africans to graze and plough up hunting areas (cf. Adams and McShane, 1992: 3ff)? In the Zambezi Valley, CAMPFIRE has ultimately erected game fences between hunting grounds and cultivated land.[13] Fences delimit smallholders' planting and grazing now and for the future. Even if a fence encloses a large enough area for smallholders' current needs, it is an eviction

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[12] Neumann (1997: 575) describes precisely this kind of arrangement as 'a tremendous territorial expansion of state power'. In other words, community forestry allows <u>government</u> to participate in rural areas. For example, as Hill (1996) argues, CAMPFIRE allows the state to <u>tax</u> rural Zimbabweans.

[13] Matzke and Nabane (1996: 77-9) document this outcome in Masoka, a Zambezi Valley community considered one of CAMPFIRE's best successes. They interpret the fence positively as protecting crops from the depradations of wildlife. Dzingirai (1996: 27) indicates a variation on this theme: the Binga Rural District Council 'would prohibit human settlement in safari hunting areas'. Such covert eviction, nonetheless, are backed by force. The Zimbabwe Department of National Parks and Widlife Management, in conjuction with army, carry out armed anti-poaching patrols of the Zambezi Valley, including the safari hunting areas. Smallholders in these areas run a considerable risk of mistaken apprehension. As Duffy writes ([??]), the authorities have shot more than one herder, only to ask questions later.

time bomb: a growing population (growing in the Zambezi Valley largely through in-migration) will one-day want to break out. Fences also rupture the notion of over-lapping rights. Spatially segregated, agriculture, hunting, and forestry each lay claim to <u>terra firma.</u>   In sum, the compromise of shared landscapes frequently collapses because no one – neither past evictees nor evictors - is willing to share. Cadastral politics reproduce themselves.

If cadastral politics can unravel community forestry, they can also make such programs more robust. The Zimbabwe and Mozambique case studies represent these two outcomes. Vhimba, an Ndau-speaking settlement along Zimbabwe's eastern border, has suffered some of the most extreme land alienation of that country's history (Map 1). Vhimba's people now live packed into a tiny reservation. In the mid-1990s, an NGO linked to the CAMPFIRE program tried to enhance the profitability of that reservation through eco-tourism. The strategy was flawed from the beginning. Decades before, Vhimba's leadership had staked its claim on regaining the lost lands. CAMPFIRE did not respond to this felt need. Worse still, as the program evolved in Vhimba, it became clear that eco-tourism itself required that further land be removed from agricultural production. Outraged, local leadership sabotaged CAMPFIRE. In nearby Gogoi, Mozambique (Map 1), such an upset may still take place, but, thus far, community forestry and cadastral politics have interacted very differently. In the mid-1990s, South African timber firms rediscovered central Mozambique. Meanwhile, NGOs and the provincial government devised a program of community forestry that would guarantee smallholders' rights against the timber firms. In theory, Gogoi people should then dictate the terms of any joint activities they might undertake with outsiders. This type of community forestry aimed to help smallholders succeed in the emergent cadastral politics. Vhimba's version of community forestry, by contrast, promoted a longstanding cadastral politics prejudiced against smallholders. In both cases, forest management has proved to be a question of boundaries and hectares – sharing with a hard edge.

<u>Vhimba, Zimbabwe</u>

Vhimba's first forest policies capitalized on the earlier white seizure of the landscape. In 1893, a pioneer column of Afrikaners reached what are now the

Chimanimani and Chipinge Districts of eastern Zimbabwe. Dunbar Moodie, the organizer of that and subsequent treks, drew the region's first cadaster and partitioned the landscape into 2500-acre farms (Map 2). Fortunately, he spared two fertile valleys, advised that they might lie across the as yet undemarcated colonial border.[14] This forbearance – amidst otherwise unbridled land-grabbing – left the British colonial administration some room to maneuver.[15] In 1896, it gazetted the Rusitu and Haroni Valleys – which meet at Vhimba - as the Ngorima Native Reserve (Map 3). This tribal reservation[16] bore the name of local chief, even though his home and most of his subjects now lay on white estates. These newly minted 'tenants' had two options: stay on the estates, where they had to pay high rents in labor, or migrate to the reserve, where they could farm relatively unencumbered. Many opted to stay put. In the 1950s, however, forestry finally dislodged them. By that time, the Afrikaners and their descendants were going bankrupt and selling out. Border Timbers Ltd. and the parastatal Forestry Commission bought their land and, over the next two decades, blanketed it with exotics, chiefly eucalyptus and pine. There was no longer space or need for tenant farming. Once stuffed into the reserve, Ngorima's people received a further blow from the conservationists. In 1965, the Haroni Valley, which happened to contain one of Zimbabwe's few moist, high-canopy forests, was annexed to the Chimanimani National Park (Map 4). Eight years later, the government gazetted as botanical reserves two equivalent forests sacred to Vhimba people (Map 4). Thus, corporations and the state systematically destroyed the indigenous vegetation surrounding the native reservation and while taking from natives the forests that <u>they</u> had protected.[17]

Vhimba's leadership reacted to this tree-centered land-grabbing by learning cadastral politics. Between 1893 and the 1950s, Chief Ngorima and his deputies, known as 'headmen',[18] gradually shifted their activities from managing people to managing land (Hughes,1999: 94-99). The British colonial government partly assisted them in this

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[14] A.H. Duncan, British South Africa Company to G.B.D. Moodie, 20 October 1892; cited in Olivier (1957: 150).

[15] Cite Palmer p. 256?? On extent of land alienation in Melsetter

[16] I will use the term 'reservation' to encompass local terminology ranging from 'reserve' to 'tribal trust land' to (currently) 'communal area'.

[17] Hughes (1999: 74ff) discusses this history at length.

[18] For both Vhimba and Gogoi, I use the British colonial term 'headmen', although it masks a host of ambiguities in Ndau terminology and official rhetoric.

transition. After what had been an exceedingly violent period, Pax Britannica cut off the supply of refugees, orphans, and destitutes that had constituted chiefly retinues. The administration also repressed rights-in-persons directly, particularly the frequent bondage of sons-in-law to their fathers-in-law. The Native Marriages Ordinance of 1901 required that patriarchs accept a cash-based bridewealth, in lieu of services, and burgeoning migrant labor markets allowed young men to earn sufficient cash. As junior men bought their way out of obligations, senior men lost their tradition form of power. Yet, land alienation and the question of resettling evictees raised the possibility of a new form of power, cadastral politics. Vhimba's headmen embraced this opportunity. They took charge of allocating fields in the reservations and have done so ever since.

In the course of the 20th century, this responsibility grew all the more important. The evictions of the 1950s packed people into the reservations, placing a premium on land allocation and on the adjudication of disputes. In effect, headmen reaped the rewards of politically induced population density.[19] In the late 1960s and 1970s, the administration formally recognized headmen as land managers and mapped their jurisdictional 'wards' within the Ngorima reservation.[20] Headmen embraced their role rather more enthusiastically than the government wished: they refined land allocation, as a device for exceeding the wards. and regaining lost lands. The 1970s war of liberation emboldened headmen to retake some of the lost lands. With guerrillas' blessing, headmen in Vhimba settled people within the Chimanimani National Park and an adjoining estate.   At Independence in 1980, however, the government of the guerillas reneged on its promises and ejected the 'squatters'. Vhimba's three headmen fought on. In the late 1980s and early 1990s, they injected another round of squatters – this time largely war refugees from Mozambique – into the disputed territories (Hughes 1999: 123ff). By the same token, they also refused to remove inhabitants of the two botanical

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[19] Between 1962 and 1969, the population of Ngorima Tribal Trust Land shot up at least 60% (far above the natural rate of increase) to reach a density of 40-50 persons per square km. By 1982, the density had reached the range of 80-120 persons per square km, making this reservation among the most densely populated rural areas in Zimbabwe. (The ranges derive from government national maps based on census data: "Rhodesia African population density," 1969, including as an inset, "African rural population percentage change, 1962-69;" and "Zimbabwe rural population density," 1982.

[20] Ngorima Personnel (PER) file (in Chimanimani District Administrator's office), map, 14 August 1976. Alexander (1993: pp?) provides a full description of this "traditionalist" period in Rhodesian rural administration.

reserves, arguing that the Parks Department had widened the boundaries arbitrarily.[21] The triumvirate of headmen was beating the state at its own cadastral game.

Fearful of conflict, outside agencies acted to undermine headmen.[22] In 1993 and 1994, they created two institutions designed to take power from Vhimba's extant leadership and promote more harmonious political relations. First, the Ministry of Local Government amalgamated administrative structures in Chimanimani District to form the rural district council. Known as the 'local land authority', Council grabbed both land and the authority to manage land.[23] In 1994, it cleared seven families from an area close to the Haroni-Rusitu junction and established its 'cooperative' banana plantation there.[24] Additionally, in the same period, Council drafted conservation by-laws arrogating to itself the power to 'specify which inhabitants may cultivate in any cultivation area' and to 'reserve [degraded land] against human occupation'.[25] Local government clothed itself in headmen's robes. Within Vhimba, a NGO linked to CAMPFIRE promoted the second new institution. In 1995, it organized elections for the Vhimba Area Development Committee. The populace chose four officers, two of whom took the lead for the next four years: Chair Ruben Zuze, a former guerrilla arrested in 1994 for squatting, and Secretary Elias Nyamunda, Vhimba's most literate person. These men and their colleagues tasked themselves with the 'sound management of the area's natural resources for the benefit of the community'.[26] More specifically, external backers pushed the committee to start an eco-tourism business. Along the lines of CAMPFIRE's logic, the community's income from such sustainable use of the national park would discourage

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[21] The contention may very well be true. In the 1970s, Guerrilla activity prevented the Parks Department from surveying the Rusitu Botanical Reserve and marking its boundaries permanently on the landscape. A resurvey in 1994 included land as within the botanical reserve was cultivated and had been cultivated for a generation. In this sense, the botanical reserve encroached upon people rather than vice-versa (Hughes, 1996).

[22] Two previous, nation-wide efforts had already failed. In the 1980s, elsewhere in Chimanimani District, chiefs and headmen had allocated land in government-supported resettlement areas (Alexander, 1993: 249-82). Likewise, nearly everywhere in Zimbabwe, chiefs and headmen exercised veto power over the decisions of state-sponsored village development committees ([refs] – Alexander, Herbst, or Drinkwater??)

[23] Zimbabweans tend to refer to their 'council' without the article.

[24] It is unclear whether Council committeed fraud in its 1993 proposal to the European Community Microprojects Fund. The Vhimba residents listed as 'cooperative owners' [check quote??] on the proposal simply became wage workers, paid less than the stipulated agricultural minimum wage.

[25] Chimanimani Rural District Council, 'Gazetting of Chimanimani Rural District Council (Land Use and Conservation By Laws) Draft (1994).'

[26] 'Vhimba Area Development Committee Constitution,' p. 2 [date].

them from cutting and cultivating there. In short, a win-win situation would diffuse the cadastral dispute headmen had been waging.

Yet, the prospect of tourism pushed three of Vhimba's territorial alarm buttons: whites were involved, the Rural District Council was involved, and tourism would and did raise issues of land allocation. First, tThe tourists were white, and so were the tour operators. Their interest in opening Vhimba to tourism recalled the long history of land alienation. In at least one respect, the connection was real and current: the Chipinge Wildlife Society, a group of tour operators, bird watchers and estate owners, had previously transported National Park scouts to Vhimba deliberately so that they could enforce the boundary of the Rusitu Botanical Reserve. Such cooperation, of course, helped protect the tour operators' source of revenue, their stake in the cadaster.   Second, Council's banana plantation had earned it the reputation of a land-grabber. Now, its 'CAMPFIRE officer' was to promote tourism in scenic parts of the district's native reservations. This new interest raised the question: would Council manipulate tourism – in the way it had the banana 'cooperative' – in order to seize land from smallholders? Vhimba's committee decided to take no such chances: if the Committee undertook tourism, then the Committee would run it.[27] Third and finally, tourism was a cauldron of cadastral politics because it certainly did require land. Although their interest lay in trees, tourists would need a tract for chalets and/or camping. They would use the forest in both senses. No one knew how much land was at stake, or where, but already in early 1995, 'certain members of the committee felt that this project was meant to grab land from them…'[28]

In spite of these fears, the committee actually occupied a middle ground between some male elders opposed to tourism and the organisations promoting it. Headmen, who were included ex officio on the committee, insisted that the committee settle outstanding turf battles before engaging in any tourist venture. At the initial 'participatory rural appraisal' in mid-1994, 'The development of tourism under CAMPFIRE was debated. There is interest in this, but not before outstanding grievances have been resolved with

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[27] Zvidzai Chidhakwa, Project Officer for Vhimba, "Report on the look-and-learn tour to Uzumba-Maramba-Pfungwe's Sunungukai Camp by the Vhimba Area Development Committee," January 1995, p. 8.
[28] Ibid, p. 4.

National Parks'.[29] Nyamunda felt this popular pressure keenly. 'In the introduction of the CAMPFIRE', he opined in the minute book, 'the community is not satisfied if [convinced that] the CAMPFIRE is worth living for. We are in trouble on the displacement of people from their stands [homesteads] and their fields'.[30] The grievance with the Rural District Council was equally pressing and equally disruptive of the work of Nyamunda and the Committee. Headman Tiyekiye, who was already implicated in the banana plantation, wanted to settle that issue prior to any development projects. When the committee considered an irrigation scheme, it found that 'The people of Tiyekiye's village … prefer boundary issues to water'.[31] The NGO was well aware of Vhimba's preferences. Nonetheless, in early 1995, with the committee's assent and that of Council, the NGO submitted a proposal for funding to the CAMPFIRE Association.[32] When, a year later, the committee lost its authority over the grinding mill, the NGO urged it to prepare to implement the CAMPFIRE proposal. Ultimately, the committee never decided for or against tourism. Events dictated its course of action.

In late 1996, a British investor made a tourist facility in Vhimba, for the first time, a real possibility. Henry Oberlander[33] had worked in banking in Hong Kong. Tiring of this frenzied life, he decided to establish an 'adventure company' in Chimanimani. He joined forces with Collin Walker, a Zimbabwean white raised on an estate in Nyanga District and associated with the Heaven Lodge in Chimanimani town. The two of them hoped to bring back-packers from 'Heaven' to Vhimba via steep trails in the Haroni Valley. Once in Vhimba, the tourists would raft on the Rusitu, hike in the national park, mountain bike on the road, and visit smallholders. In contrast to Zimbabwe's luxury hotels and safaris, Oberlander and Walker imagined a simpler eco-tourism embedded in the local community. In order to realize this dream, however, the two entrepreneurs first needed to satisfy the Chimanimani Rural District Council. In late 1996, Oberlander explained his vision to a Council meeting. Impressed, Council agreed to grant him a business license contingent upon his payment of the standard application fee of Z$50. In

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[29] 'A participatory rural appraisal exercise in Mutemanerangu Village, Vhimba Ward, Chimanimani District, Zimbabwe, 23-30 July 1994', Harare: Southern Alliance for Indigenous Resources, p. 8.
[30] VADC, Minutes, personal note of Elias Nyamunda, 6 April 1995.
[31] VADC, Minutes of Community Meeting, 4 October 1995, p. 2.
[32] Often assumed to be an NGO, the CAMPFIRE Association is a membership body of rural district councils that gained the authority to disburse funds (whose source is USAID).

effect, Council torpedoed the NGO's proposal that the Vhimba Area Development Committee conduct the same enterprise in the same area. Later asked in public to account for his authorization of two competing ventures, Council's chief executive officer responded, 'It's a question of survival of the fittest – dog eat dog'.[34] Oberlander's dog, though, had a cadastral bite.

Council's deal with Oberlander raised troubling cadastral questions. Did a business license confer rights in land? In late 1996, Oberlander told me it did. Specifically, he claimed to be negotiating with Council for the purchase of a small patch of secondary woodland next to the 'Corner Store' (given that name because of its proximity to the 90-degree bend in the Zimbabwe-Mozambique border; see Map 4). The store had passed though a variety of owners before falling into the hands of Council. Now, it served as the storage shed for equipment used in the adjacent banana plantation. Associated in this way with Council's primal sin, the store was a remarkably poor choice of location for a business in need of Vhimba's support. To make matters worse, Council proceeded to act as a land allocator. Authorities within or outside Council had led Oberlander to believe that the land next to the store lay within a 'business centre', an area over which Council supposedly had full authority. On this assumption, he decided to pursue access to the area through Council and only later to introduce himself to Vhimba's headmen, the Committee, and other residents. This delay spawned rumors and greatly undercut local support. By March 1997, when Oberlander and Walker held their first meeting in Vhimba, the audience already suspected them of being white land-grabbers.

That encounter gave Vhimba residents further reason to interpret tourism as a territorial claim. Oberlander hoped to win the Committee's agreement to a profit-sharing venture. Then, he planned to invite provincial government planners to 'peg' the edges of the campsite. Zuze, who knew that land and boundaries were at stake, would meet with Oberlander and Walker only in the presence of a headman. To do otherwise would expose him and the Committee to charges of allocating land and of selling-out. Finally, Tiyekiye appeared and the meeting – almost a dialogue of the deaf - began as follows:

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[33] Henry Oberlander and Collin Walker (see below) are pseudonyms.
[34] My minutes of Haroni/Vhimba Consultative Group Meeting, 19 February 1997.

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Oberlander: We have always wanted to work closely with the people of Vhimba … Tourism should be to the benefit of all concerned. Our tourism can be low-impact in a holistic sense, on people, mountains, resources, etc.

Tiyekiye: How does this relate to CAMPFIRE? Which site have they pegged with Council? ….

Zuze: We are the people of the area who have conserved this area. We want equal shares of the project .

Man A: They [Oberlander and Walker] have been looking after [for] the place all along – how they spend the money is up to them…

Zuze: Where is the place Oberlander wants to put the camp?

Oberlander: The area close to the corner store.

Man A: Who showed the place?

Oberlander: Chimanimani Rural District Council.

Man B: You have done well to come here to tell us what you want. We will tell you now what we want. Council has no right to establish a place.

Walker: The corner store was attractive because of the picturesque nature of village life. It is pointless to displace people because people from elsewhere [tourists] want to see how people live here.

Man A: Not right for Council to point to a place. Council does not know the area.[35]

By the end of the discussion, smallholders were angrier with Council then they were afraid of the two whites. Council, it seemed, was evicting people again – and ironically doing so under the banner of 'village life'. 'Where will we farm now', asked one farmer, '[across the border] in Chief Mafussi's area?'[36]

    The particular grievance of that meeting and of a subsequent one centered as much on the fact of eviction as on its manner: Council was acting as a headman. In the normal course of events, Tiyekiye and other headmen wielded the particular responsibility of 'showing a place' to all newcomers. In the mid-1990s, of course, they had used that role to particular effect in reclaiming parts of Chimanimani National Park and of the Hayfield B estate. Now Council was usurping their power. The $50 fee Oberlander admitted to having paid council seemed to prove this trespass. It fell well within the range of huku prestations given by newcomers to headmen in return for land

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[35] I took the official minutes of this meeting (held on 4 March 1997), translating to English those remarks made in Shona.
[36] "*Tinongorima papi? KwaMafussi?*" (Addendum to my minutes of 4 March 1997 minutes).

allocation. Worse still, Council had done a bad job of allocating land. Because it did not 'know the area', it had given to Oberlander fallow fields technically owned by C. In a second meeting, held one month after the first, C. protested. The business centre, he argued extended east from the corner store, not west to his field. Furthermore, Tiyekiye's father had assured C's father of this boundary; so Council must be mistaken. In relation to Oberlander, this <u>mis</u>-allocation of land engendered both sympathy and resentment. "You were shown a place that is not yours," said one smallholder to Oberlander <u>in absentia</u>, 'Council is insulting him'.[37] Perhaps more prevalent was the fear that, as one farmer put it, 'He will take our land from us'.[38] Council's blunder left Oberlander no means with which to clear his name.

Difficult to falsify, the suspicion of land-grabbing arose from two oddly territorial interpretations of the facts in Oberlander's case. First, Vhimba people understood the granting of a business license as land allocation. Oberlander appeared as a newcomer, someone from outside Vhimba who wanted to establish himself there. Since the wave of evictions and in-migration in the 1950s, outsiders had inserted themselves into Vhimba by only one means: requesting and receiving land from the headmen in whose land they wished to live. Oberlander wished to construct his 'homestead' in Tiyekiye's area, but he had spoken and even exchanged money with Council. In effect, he and Council had usurped Tiyekiye's power of land allocation and taken the land. The second misunderstanding created boundaries where there were none. Legally, the 'business centre' was merely a store. Unlike Vhimba's official business center seven kilometers to the west, the store had never been surveyed and appeared on government maps as simply 'store'. Issues of boundaries, moreover, appeared natural to smallholders and, it is likely, to a good many of the councilors themselves. All the players except Oberlander were thoroughly prepared to ignite and fight a turf battle over tourism.

In the event, Oberlander salvaged his proposal only by surrendering his piece of land. Under siege at the March meeting, he declared his preference for collaboration with the 'CAMPFIRE tourism project'. He, thus, averted an unpopular 'dog-eat-dog' competition – in which he was sure to triumph – and in the process managed to trade his

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[37] "*Makaratidziwa nzimbo isiri yenyu ...* Council *iri kumukanganisa.*" (Vhimba, 21 April 1997).
[38] "*Anozotitorera nyika yedu*" (Vhimba, 26 July 1997).

site for a better one. The NGO and the Vhimba committee had selected for their proposed campsite a viewpoint overlooking the Haroni River. Far from the disturbances of the store and banana plantation, the committee's site offered the picturesque setting attractive to tourists from Heaven Lodge. A transfer to this location, moreover, would exonerate Oberlander from charges of land-grabbing. Other people had allocated the site for tourism more than a year before he first came to Vhimba. He was merely accepting the committee's allocation in a way visible to all, not engaging with Council in a territorial subterfuge. Council and the NGO encouraged this merger. A month later, in May 1997, the committee decided to cooperate with Oberlander conditional upon an agreement on profit-sharing. Oberlander had definitely gambled in ceding his official parcel, but the chances for success seemed good.

Unknown to Oberlander, however, Headman Tiyekiye had reached the point of reasserting his authority over land in a dramatic fashion. Council, the banana plantation, and his own actions had forced him into a corner. Having become the foreman of the plantation, he allegedly embezzled from it. Upon his arrest in May 1997, he referred to his territorial rights to excuse the crime: 'Who is the owner of the field?' a Vhimba man quoted him as having asked rhetorically.[39] The question put Council in an awkward position. If Council had negotiated for the land fairly with Tiyekiye - as it's officers insisted - then Tiyekiye's retained the headman's prerogative of adjudicating the dispute between Council and Vhimba residents and, even, of reallocating a portion of the field.[40] Council would have to acknowledge Tiyekiye's right to 'redistribute' proceeds from the plantation. If, on the other hand, Council owned the plantation free and clear, then it owed nothing to Tiyekiye. By prosecuting him, Council would admit fault to having stolen land. The case languished while Tiyekiye and Council's detractors stewed. In this context, neither this nor other headmen were disposed to support the entry of someone whom Council had helped to circumvent their authority over land. Informally, Tiyekiey lobby against the joint venture with Oberlander and helped push the Committee into a

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[39] "*Muridzi wemunda ndiani?*" (Vhimba, 20 May 1997).
[40] The facts of the original installation and of the missing funds are still murky. Regarding the former, the most likely scenario is that Council sought Tiyekiye's 'permission' (but in a context where he was required to give it) for a 'cooperative' of Vhimba residents (that ultimately was a parastatal company).

dramatic about-face. In June, the Committee declared publicly, "Death before partnership!"[41] The joint venture was over before it had begun.

By the middle of 1997, when I left Vhimba, both the committee and development were crippled. The CAMPFIRE Association did intend to fund a community-run tourism project in Vhimba independent of Oberlander. Zuze and Nyamunda still met and, with other officers, constituted the committee. Yet, headmen had transferred the locus of power to behind the scenes, to rumour-mongering and alliance building. There, especially among elder men, suspicion and loyalty centered on claims to land and efforts to regain the lost lands. The Rural District Council and the Parks Department, of course, enflamed these grievances by repeatedly taking land from Vhimba smallholders. These politics diverted and strangled development in 1997. Unless land alienators return their booty – or, at least, refrain from grabbing more – territorial imperatives may well continue to overwhelm community forestry in Vhimba.

Gogoi, Mozambique

In Gogoi, community forestry has engages with cadastral politics in quite a different fashion. Prior to proposals for co-management, the notion of land-grabbing was hardly known. Although Gogoi lies only 30 km from Vhimba onequally fertile land, streams of white settlement avoided it. The early Afrikaners and later Portuguese demurred at Mozambique'ss insecure system of property leases and inadequate road network.[42] In the 1960s, a Pretoria-based firm, Continental Timbers, did cut trees and establish a sawmill in Gogoi. [43] [44] Yet, upon independence in 1975, Mozambique's socialist government nationalised and terminated its operations. Needless to say, the ensuing war kept all investors at bay. In this 'white highlands' manqué, Africans stayed on the land. Without the squeeze of evictions, population density remained a fraction of that in Vhimba,[45] and debates on land allocation, land alienation, and boundaries simply

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[41] As recalled by Henry Oberlander (pseudonym) (Chimanimani, 2 July 1997).

[42] For a more detailed recounting, see Hughes (1999a: 46ff).

[43] Interview with Jaime Athoguia, Moçambique Florestal S.A.R.L., Beira, 25 January 1999. See also H. Pinto (1961: pp?)

[44] The Company has gone by different many names in Mozambique at different times: Florestas e Serração do Muda in the 1960s and early 1970s and Companhia de Madeiras de Moçambique in the 1990s. For the sake of simplicity, I use the English name of the parent company throughout.

[45] [figures from Weber 1971 and INE 1997 (email guy or await results posted to web 4/4/00)

did not emerge. Instead, local politics centered on the alienation of labour. In contrast with Rhodesia, the Portuguese administration allowed the pre-colonial custom of bride-service to continue.[46] Meanwhile, it expanded this base of rights-in-persons into a total system of forced labor. From the 1890s, the administration used ruling lineages to recruit forced labor. Chief Gogoi and other chiefs sent their sons, sons-in-law, and eventually all able-bodied men for long, arduous stints on distant plantations (cf. Vail, 1976; das Neves, 1998; Newitt, 1995: 368ff). Chiefship came to focus on the use and abuse of braços, literally human arms. Although officially abolished in 1961, forced labor reappeared during the war. Gogoi, thus, entered peacetime as a polity obsessed with labor and innocent of cadastral politics.

By the mid-late 1990s, however, two foreign influences were simultaneously politicising territory in Gogoi. Continental Timbers had returned with a vision of settler silviculture; meanwhile, a community forestry project set out to establish Gogoi's first property map and write the South Africans out of it. In 1995, Continental Timbers acquired an annual cutting license for indigenous trees in and around Gogoi. In their own minds, these whites were reclaiming the vast tract they had previously logged – this time, with bolder designs. The regional director, an Afrikaner and son of the owner, spoke of planting eucalyptus. Additionally, his on-site sawmill manager, a Zimbabwean-born white and conservationist, dreamed of planting tea and, elsewhere in the parcel, setting aside a hunting reserve. All three activities would displace Chief Gogoi and his people. How could Continental Timbers justify this transformation of Gogoi's social and ecological landscape? As the sawmill manger assured me, 'The chief is the chief. I am the mayor here. This is my land!'[47] Continental Timbers had to be stopped, but Chief Gogoi and his people could hardly do so alone. Here arose the rationale for the second foreign intervention into Gogoi: a project in community forestry and mapping. By themselves, Gogoi people lacked both the conceptual and political tools to negotiate with or repel the next wave of white colonists. Community forestry could help train them to understand, fight, and perhaps even win territorial struggles. [to patronizing??]

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[46] For recollections of subjects' servitude to chiefs in the environs of Gogoi, see Mhlanga (1948) and Spannaus (1961: 633)
[47] Inteviews with Continental employees (whose names I withhold), Espungabera, 28 April 1997; Gogoi, 6 May 1997.

Launched in 1997, the project drew ideas from a number of existing programs in co-management in Mozambique. Three years before, the community of Bawa, in the Zambezi Valley had reached an accord with a sport-hunting company (Hirschoff, 1997-8; Koch, 1998; add [Wilson 1997??]). Slightly to the north of Gogoi, the government's National Directorate of Forestry and Wildlife had declared the Chimanimani Transfrontier Conservation Area. This and two equivalent efforts elsewhere in Mozambique drew inspiration from CAMPFIRE – and funds from the World Bank.[48] Government "facilitators," South African capitalists, and international "experts" on community forestry (including myself) were bearing down on Mozambique's rural people. In Gogoi itself, an Italian NGO, whose activities were previously limited to literacy, decided to jump on the bandwagon. CIES, or the Centre Information and Education for Development, imagined that smallholders could establish small sawmills. Perhaps they could also became part-owners of the South Africans' undertaking. Yet, no one had informed either Gogoi people or CONTINENTAL TIMBERS of this exciting, possibly hare-brained idea. No one had prepared that community or those in the transfrontier conservation areas to negotiate with private firms or with the government. In particular, no one had prepared them to negotiate from a position of strength.

The mapping exercise aimed to do exactly this – with all the optimism of inexperience. Under Mozambique's new Land Law, smallholders could protect themselves from expropriation – and gain a veto power over outside investment - by documenting their residence on the land. The first field team, therefore, undertook what has been called "counter-mapping" or "geomatics" (Peluso, 1995; Poole, 1995). I directed that team, and we set out to generate maps that the government of Mozambique would recognize. Residents of Gogoi would draw their land on the ground or on paper. Then, using a geographic positioning system, we would compile a standard 1:50,000-scale map to be presented to government by Gogoi representatives. Ultimately, the project accomplished what it set out to do. It also accomplished an unexpected transformation: the "territorialization" (Vandergeest and Peluso, 1995) of Chief Gogoi's polity. Chief Gogoi, his headmen, and others involved in the project came, in fits and starts, to understand the value of turf and means by which to hold onto it. This new

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[48] [Mention Bawa]

awareness may have helped the leadership weather a difficult transition – the end of forced labor – and reestablish its rule on a new footing. Gogoi's leaders are learning to play the game of cadastral politics known so well in Vhimba. Unlike community forestry in Vhimba, however, this project intended to strengthen, rather than weaken, their hand. Still, Gogoi's headmen and other residents did not catch on right away. In the course of the project, they misconstrued its main issue in ways characteristic of their non-territorial politics: first, as labor, second as trees and third as sacred forests.

The project first and unavoidably addressed the need for local staff. To Gogoi residents, we, therefore, fell into the well-known category of labor recruiters. Upon arrival in Gogoi, we had informed the chief that we would hire a guide, a cook, and a guard and asked for his recommendations. He chose a son as our guide, and that son together with our team found a cook and guard, confirming our selection with Chief Gogoi himself. Without intending to, we thus recapitulated the age-old hiring practice of the Portuguese administration: in a certain, formal sense, we recruited our labor through the chief. Of course, our project was not demanding *forced* labor. Yet, the distinction regarding the nature of the labor seemed less important than the form of its procurement. During the war, Frelimo had press-ganged rural men. The Renamo rebels, on the hand, had shown greater cultural tact by demanding that chiefs furnish them with porters.[49] Frelimo, who did not recognize chiefship, had simple press-ganged rural men. Our project had won local approval by unwittingly – and only symbolically - reaffirming the chief's rights-in-people. Coincidentally, the sawmill had also stumbled upon this good fortune. In their case, the chief had called a popular meeting to announce that whites were offering employment – news disseminated more bluntly as, "The sawmill wants people."[50] So far we were running neck-in-neck with Continental Timbers.

The project, nonetheless, moved rapidly to issues besides labor and distinguished itself from the sawmill. Again, however, the project and Gogoi's people rode on different tracks. The opening meeting, held at Chief Gogoi's compound, turned the attention of the roughly 150 on-lookers to natural resources and their ownership. Ana Paula Reis, the provincial head of forestry and wildlife, declared, "We [the government]

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[49] For accounts of Renamo's (Mozambican National Resistance) administration in various parts of Mozambique, see Alexander (1994), Geffray (year??), and Wilson (1992).
[50] *"Serasawe inoda vandu."*

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are not the owners of the land. You who live here are."[51] Oddly, the remainder of her
speech and the public reaction to it focussed on trees. Interrupting Reis, one man asked
for clarification: does this talk of community-managed forests mean that he may demand
payment for the cutting of trees in the vicinity of his fields and homestead? The audience
grew excited at the prospect of charging whites by the log. Reis and the other
government and NGO officials intended that people should benefit from sustainable
commercial use of the forest, but they expected that people would do so as a community
rather than individually. Responding the question of tree sales, Benjamin Gemo,
provincial head of Geography and Cadaster, admonished, "The tree belongs to the
community. It does not belong to João [the equivalent of Joe Blow or Joe Bloggs]."[52]
People did not or did not want to understand.

In part, they missed Gemo's point because his notion of "community" was foreign
to them. Gemo was referring to a community of place. He assumed that proximity and
residence within geographical limits gave Gogoi people a common identity and interest.
Logically, that interest should include the management of the community's common
landscape. Gogoi residents differed with Gemo's notion of community in two senses.
First, their community was the *polity* of Chief Gogoi's subjects. In other words, they did
not identify, first and foremost, with a geographical community of place. They were
members of the collectivity circumscribed by leaders' jurisdiction over people. Given
this kind of community, Gogoi residents –differing with Gemo in the second sense – did
not associate the resources and activities in and around one's field with Chief Gogoi.
Trees and their products were not normally the chief's business; so what could cutting
them have to do with the "community" led by him?

The project answered that question by concentrating on religious matters rather
than on the economics of natural resources. Before the first public meeting, the chief had
expressed fears that whites would cut in sacred forests.[53] As he and his headmen
explained, the loggers of the 1960s and early 1970s had done precisely that and,

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[51] *"Os donos da terra não somos nós. São vocês que vivem aqui."* (Notes of meeting in Gogoi, 29 April
1997).

[52] *"A árvore é da comunidade. Não é do João."* (Notes of meeting in Gogoi, 29 April 1997).

[53] These forests –*tyisa*: they cause fear. People associate them not so much with who lives there
(although some are inhabited by spirits of the pre-colonial era) but rather by what strange, seemingly
supernatural phenomena occur there, such as, constant rain, strange noises, strange winds, etc.

consequently, caused many forests to cease to be sacred. Chiefs and headmen - the organizers or perfomers of –*pira* propitiating ceremonies - resented this disenchantment profoundly. Their involvement made sacred forests an issue of the Gogoi polity or, as Gemo had gropingly insisted, a "community" concern. Our team, therefore, introduced the project as a means for change such that, "… the company [CONTINENTAL TIMBERS] will be required to obey your wishes. It will not be permitted to cut in sacred forests or to cut sacred trees or trees that you use …"[54] People appreciated this objective immediately. In meetings at chief Gogoi's homestead and at those of his three headmen, men discussed these forests volubly. Ignoring our additional interest in areas used fuelwood, hunting, etc, Gogoi people, sketched maps on the ground, in the dirt, or on loose pieces of paper that showed almost nothing but sacred zones (see Map 5).

Although a step in the "right direction," these maps of sacred forests were not fully territorial. I had expected – and I had told the rest of the team to expect – that sacred forests would be zones of a number of hectares' size within clear boundaries. Nyakwawa, the forest I knew from Vhimba, had been expansive. Although sometimes in a flexible fashion, Vhimba people had demarcated this and other forests using the Rusitu and Haroni Rivers and smaller streams. To my surprise, only one of 12 sacred forests in Gogoi corresponded to this model. That forest, Mabombe contains 250 hectares of woodland lying between the Nzuwe stream, a dry stream, and the Sitatonga ridge. Two of the remaining smaller forests cover at least one hectare. More typically, nine of the "forests" are not forests at all. They are stands of trees or even one tree often next to streams or pools. Five *mupanga-panga* (<u>Milletia stuhlmannii</u>) trees, for example, sprouted from the grave of Mangwenje; so the hallowed ground bears his name. Finally, single *muvava* (<u>Khaya nyasica</u>) trees constitute the two smallest sites, considered sacred simply because ceremonies are performed there. (One such tree is marked on Map 5). The team collected one set of coordinates for each of these nine sites and added them as dots to our "cadastral" version of the locally drawn sketch maps. Thus, halfway through the project, we had produced an official representation of Gogoi's "territory" that showed three bounded forests and nine points (Map 6).

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[54] "… company *yacho ichafanira kuteera zvido zvenyu. Haichabvumirwi kutema makwasha akakosha kana mimbuti yakakosha kana mimbuti inoshandiswa nemi"* (Notes of meeting in Gogoi, 29 April 1997).

Our interlocutors left us equally unsatisfied on the question of boundaries. On a sketch map where we expected sharp limits, Gogoi encircled his country with a broken, indeterminate frontier. Headmen Hlengana, the only one of Gogoi's three headmen who was able to draw a map at all, likewise left a large gap to the north (Map 5). In response to further prodding, Gogoi and Hlengana named various streams and dry-stream beds that would close their circles. Yet, the streams did not connect, they did not flow in the directions indicated, and, given the topography, they could not possibly form an unbroken chain. Gogoi, at last, told us that he did know his northern boundary and we must go there to ask Headman Matsikiti. Yet, Matsikiti also confessed bafflement. Only the families actually living on the frontier, he said, knew precisely where it was. In the meantime, we had also followed the chain of command upward to the government *chefe de posto* (the lowest level functionary) and district administrator. They had referred as back downwards. The knowledge about boundaries, the *chefe de posto* told us, "is there, in the field." [55] Ultimately, the "field" meant, quite literally, the cultivated fields of Gogoi's far-flung subjects. Thus, as far as the leadership was concerned, people – or the remotest hinterland of members of Gogoi's polity – delimited that polity spatially.

This kind of fuzzy frontier came about because settlement preceded demarcation. Gogoi's polity formed and developed according to the pattern of fission and secession common elsewhere in East and Southern Africa. At the turn of the century, Gogoi split from Mafussi and went south. Subsequent Gogoi title-holders prevented secession only by allowing their younger brothers to leave the *dzimbahwe* (the central, capital part of the chiefdom) and assume authority as headmen in the outlying areas. As Kopytoff (1987) writes, this kind of fragmentation slowly populates the "interstitial frontiers" between chiefly seats. In colonial Mozambique those frontiers did not need to be primarily territorial. Since obligations of forced labor defined the Gogoi polity, Gogoi's chiefdom ended where his ability to compel labor ended. The degree of demarcation, therefore, varied with population density. In Gogoi's heartland, where settlement is much denser, headmen probably agreed on borders in order to avoid overlapping claims to labor. Their sketch maps for the project often placed streams between headmen's areas or between

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[55] *"Está lá, no campo"* (Interview with Francisco Zianja, Chefe de Posto, Dacata, Mossurize District, 7 July 1997).

them and the *dzimbahwe* (Map #5, upper right corner). As a result of dense settlement, frontiers had become solid and physical. In the sparsely populated hinterland, on the other hand, physical demarcation was not necessary. Until 1997, the outermost extent of headmen's areas and of Gogoi's chiefdom remained a matter for conjecture.

Frontiers of this kind do not help a chief wage territorial battles. In the worst case, the people holding the frontier go elsewhere, causing territory to shrink. Wartime exodus had already affected all of Gogoi's area and probably deepened the leadership's doubt regarding its northern fringe. Now, that lack of specificity threatened to undermine the first cadastral effort to establish and defend Gogoi's land. Gogoi would have been in a much better position if his boundaries had existed prior to or independent of settlement. In Vhimba, for example, Headmen Tiyekiye knew that the Chisengu River was his northern limit. To claim the territory thus encircled, he settled squatters in the uninhabited stretch between his legal border and his desired border (Map 4). Of course, Tiyekiye exploited his unchecked authority to settle Mozambicans where he wished. Neither Gogoi nor his headmen wielded this kind of authority over land allocation to anyone. Therefore, a history of forced labor rendered Gogoi's leaders doubly disadvantaged in counter-demarcation: their outermost borders were mere frontiers, and they lacked the means to deploy settlers as strategic boundary beacons. The second difficulty was insurmountable in the short term. The mapping project, however, could help Gogoi to remedy his inadequate frontiers and make them cadastral.

This advantage of physical borders over human frontiers gradually became clear to Gogoi in our discussions over the western delimitation of his land. Here, Chief Mukuyana had taken a huge lobe of Gogoi's area in the 1960s. Gogoi and his elders described this theft as a damaging loss of subjects and, consequently, of tribute in tax and labor. Makuyana had expropriated some of Gogoi's power over people. Now, as other counter-mapping projects have found [refs?], the local elite used mapping to rekindle a simmering dispute [refer to paper by Hodgson and Shroeder as well as other ones critical of cmty mapping]. Seeking to grab land back from Makuyana, Chief Gogoi and his elders sketched the Mbisarutsva Hills[56] as their western limit. This upland, however, did not join up with the Chicambue River, Gogoi's limit to the northwest. Questioned on the

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[56] Serra Bissaluteza on the standard 1:50,000 sheet #892.

exact location of the boundary, Gogoi again said that the people living in and around Mbisarutsva knew, but, he said, they were too distant to visit. Faced with these difficulties and beginning to understand the importance of clear borders, Chief Gogoi simply relinquished his claim against Makuyana. On his sketch, he moved the border roughly 12 km. eastward to the Muchenedzi River, where it eventually appeared on the project's official, cadastral maps. He, thus, traded a vague and shifting frontier of settlement to line that could be written down and, therefore, enforced against CONTINENTAL TIMBERS and other resources users.

Yet, Gogoi's maps were not yet serviceable. As they stood, they could, in fact, make matters worse for Gogoi residents. Although the borders had hardened, the interior – the territory itself – was an empty shell. The sketch showed only one large forest, two small ones, and nine points. In other words, it showed Gogoi's land as a nearly vacant lot that inhabitants could presumably share. In particular, the map implied that CONTINENTAL TIMBERS could plant large tracts to eucalyptus without inconveniencing local smallholders. Fortunately and rather suddenly, their leadership perceived this dangerous loophole. In a flash of territorial insight, they perceived that their sketches risked selling the non-sacred parts of the landscape. To close this loophole, the mapping project changed course. Expanding beyond the male leadership of Gogoi, we worked with groups of men and women to generate matrices of resource use. Using stones and drawings, smallholders made correlating charts showing the usable (sometimes saleable) plants and animals that they obtained with land types (Hughes and McDermott 1997: Appendix pp. 15-21). They, thus, demonstrated the necessity of fields, mountains, wetlands, primary forest, and a number of secondary forest types for local livelihood. This information, submitted to the government along with the maps, filled Gogoi's vacant lot with actual and potential commercial and subsistence zones, all reserved for the people of Gogoi. Just as important, at least some Gogoi residents knew the value of their work. Rehearsing the presentation of the maps and matrices to the provincial government, sons and brothers of Chief Gogoi and his headmen declared, "We will not sell the land!"[57]

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[57] *"Hatitengesi nyika!"* (Gogoi, 9 July 1997).

Will they possibly *share* the land, or will cadastral politics overwhelm prospects for community forestry again? In fact, Gogoi's people have continued to share their resources with the sawmill. Under annual cutting licenses, Continental Timbers has maintained its extraction of indigenous trees. It has neither harmed sacred areas [cross check this] nor planted exotic trees. When I ran into one of the employees in 1999, he still spoke of eucalyptus planting, but only as distant, uncertain 'dream'.[58] Community mapping may or may not account for his dampened expectations. Just as likely, the company was starting to succumb to the transport delays and isolation from markets that defeated earlier white entrepreneurs. By contrast, the Italian NGO was planning to push ahead. Between 1997 and 1999, it had mapped another four chieftaincies, all close to Gogoi. Now, it hoped to broker profit-sharing agreements between these polities and Continental Timbers and/or other timber or tourism firms. This fruition of community forestry would be encounter numerous obstacles. Gogoi's people lacked any body capable of accounting for revenue from logging or other concerns. Nonetheless, having mapped their land, these people were potentially in a much better position to create such a body and negotiate with loggers. In theory, their maps gave them a veto power over commercial activities in Gogoi forests. They might be able to expel Continental Timbers or another firm that did not respect their wishes. Again in theory, Gogoi people could wielded leverage sufficient to determine the precise terms of sharing the landscape. Soon, they may learn whether they can do so *in fact*. If they can, they will have played the game of cadastral politics and won.

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Cadastral politics, then, can either promote or disable projects in community forestry. In Vhimba, headmen identified eco-tourism as a land-grabbing and, therefore, sabotaged it. The leadership of Gogoi has claimed land and now holds a stronger position vis-à-vis outside firms. At their inception, of course, the two projects conceived of cadastral politics quite differently. Backers of eco-tourism viewed squatting as an obstacle to both nature conservation and harmonious political relations. This assessment

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[58] Chipinge, 31 July 1999.

was correct, but the NGO drew the wrong lesson. It tried and failed to supplant Vhimba's champions in century-old boundary disputes. Instead, those headmen subverted community forestry. Gogoi's project tied community forestry to cadastral issues in an entirely different – and more successful - fashion. The design of the project postulated that Gogoi people could only control the sharing of the landscape if they possessed rights to it first. The project encouraged cadastral politics. It demarcated boundaries, linked trees inseparably to territory, and empowered local leaders over both. Yet community forestry has not advanced in Gogoi any more than it has in Vhimba. As of 1999, Gogoi people, the state, and private firms had not even begun to discuss a means of sharing the landscape. Perhaps they never will do so. At the very least, though, Gogoi people are likely to remain on the land and in control of the forest in both senses. In the face of colonizers, the maps give Chief Gogoi more political weight than Chief Ngorima possessed one hundred or even fifty years ago. White settlers, timber firms, and a national park cleared Ngorima's people off most of their landscape. Chief Gogoi's people will probably not be so easily moved.

Neither will the leadership be easily moved. Community forestry has helped Chief Gogoi and his elders bridge the transition to territorial politics and keep power – an outcome many NGOs would hardly support. Reformers view chiefs as patriarchs and gerontocrats. Mamdani (1996) calls them "decentralized despots," artifacts of colonial indirect rule rather than of genuine African "traditions." Notwithstanding positions at odds with Mamdani (e.g Comaroff, 1978), certainly the practice whereby headmen allocate land to other men reduces women to invisible, junior partners (cf. Cheater, 1990). Why should community forestry entrench such a clique? Perhaps it should not do so in most areas, but, on Southern African frontiers of white expansion, the male clique serves a wider purpose. In Vhimba and in Gogoi, chiefs and women share the same objective of maintaining access to land and natural resources. No sector of smallholder society benefits from evictions, and female-headed households – sometimes last in the pecking order – may lose more land than others. In eastern Zimbabwe, moreover, chiefly lineages have proven to be consistent defenders of the lost lands. Guerrillas have an even stronger record. If community forestry is to forestall more enclosures, programs should

support either or both of these parties – more likely the former.[59] If on the other hand, programs intend to justify or promote the enclosures, they would logically undermine chiefs, headmen, and similar leaders. Again, however, they will not be easily moved.

These lessons point towards a strain of community forestry suited to cadastral politics and frontier situations. Such programs would follow a Hippocratic Oath to do no harm - to do nothing to deprive smallholders of farmland, pasture, and other natural resources. Vhimba's eco-tourism project and other CAMPFIRE schemes have neglected this principle and sometimes violated it egregiously. As a result of CAMPFIRE, white-owned sport-hunting firms now operate in numerous native reservations. Inventions, such as, game fences and Vhimba's "business centre" threaten to excise parts of the reservations without compensation. Thus, a community forestry that merely upheld the Hippocratic Oath would represent an improvement in Zimbabwe. A more ambitious community forestry of the frontier would plunge into high-stakes cadastral politics. Programs would target those areas where smallholders were losing land and seek to defend them. In Southeast Asia and the Americas, NGOs and governments have often intervened in precisely this way to protect ethnic minorities (or indigenous peoples) (McDermott, 1999; E. Pinto, 1996 [more refs]). They are, in effect, demarcating native reserves to temper the extractive activities of oil, timber, minerals, and other corporations. Sharing the landscape is secondary. Of utmost importance, smallholders must secure a territorial base for their sustenance. Policy-makers in Mozambique *may* take this option. They can try to prevent the Zimbabwe-style colonization and conversion of the hinterland. Otherwise, plantations and parks may once again win the game of cadastral politics.

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[59] The latter possibility, though, is not unprecedented, given the tremendous donor support for the South African and Namibian liberation movements in the 1980s.

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