

**Cross-border livestock Trade and Small Arms and Conflict in
Pastoral Areas of the Horn of Africa: Case Study from Southern
Ethiopia and Northern Kenya**

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I. Introduction

The pastoral and agro-pastoral communities of the Horn of Africa are found in the Ethiopian lowlands, Eritrea, the whole of Somalia, the northern and eastern parts of Kenya and the Shelia plains of the Sudan, on the peripheries of Tanzania and Uganda. High rainfall variability, recurrent droughts, harsh climatic and environmental conditions are characteristic of these areas and act as constraints to development in this part of the continent. Recurrent conflict is another factor that has severely constrained the sustainability of pastoralism as a means of livelihood (Ahmed 2002). Pastoralists in this region keep a significant part of the livestock wealth. For example, in Ethiopia, 30-40% of the country's livestock is found in pastoral and agro-pastoral areas (Coppock 1994). In Djibouti and Somalia, the total livestock wealth comes from these areas. In addition, livestock originating from the pastoral and agro-pastoral areas of these countries has substantial contribution to the foreign exchange earnings.

Traditionally, conflicts have been endemic to pastoral and agro-pastoral areas of horn Africa. The conflicts have been between different ethnic pastoral groups, as well as within ethnic groups. The majority of the conflicts have been over access to pastoral resources (grasslands, water and livestock). Most of these conflicts have been going on over a long period of time, with very little attention paid to resolving them. Even today, most such conflicts go unnoticed and unreported – unless large-scale killing and damages take place and the state intervenes militarily.

Domestic disputes over pastoral resources have, in some cases, had spill over effects on neighbouring countries since often the same ethnic group lives in more than one country. The literature on conflicts in horn of Africa has focused mainly on the analysis of the causes of inter and intra-state or secessionist ethnic conflicts and very little on pastoral conflicts. Inadequate or poor understanding of pastoral conflicts in the sub-region has led to a situation where there are no mechanisms for dealing with this challenge. Hence, understanding the nature of conflicts and identifying available conflict mitigation and resolution mechanisms can thus have important policy implications for peace building in the horn of Africa.

The purpose of the paper is to review the literature to indicate what we have learned about the nature of the conflict with a view to draw policy implications for peace building. The study will provide further evidence from the fieldwork in pastoral areas.

The magnitude of the problem is presented in the first section, which summarizes facts about pastoral conflicts in the Horn of Africa. Space precludes any effort to describe these conflicts in detail. Instead, specific facts abstracted from the complexity of conflicts will be presented. The next section attempts to integrating pieces of evidence on incidences of conflict in Northern Kenya and Interspatial and Interoperable Livestock market and price Integration across Southern Ethiopia view to draw policy implications for peace building. Since the research remains at a preliminary stage, the final section consists of suggestions for further research and some tentative policy implications for peace building.

II. Facts: A Pattern of Conflict

The literature on pastoralists in Eastern Africa, though abounding with references to conflicts between pastoral groups with similar or different ethnic backgrounds fails to provide serious analyses of these conflicts. The conflict between the Massai and their neighbours is a case in point, as are the intermittent conflicts in North-western Kenya between the Marakwet and the Pokot on the one hand, and the Pokot and Karamajong on the other (Bujra 2000). Akilu, et. al. (2000) also observed intra-ethnic conflict between the Gari Maro and Degodi Ethiopian Somalis over the control of the Dawa river valley. Similarly, intra-ethnic conflicts among Afar clans arising from scarcity of pastoral resources and erosion of traditional ties of cooperation have been observed (Kassa 2000). Resource based conflict among the Afars have already escalated into destructive conflict as is corroborated by Kassa (2000) who reports that the conflict among Afar clans that occurred in 1989 in the Middle Awash valley resulted in the deaths of 28 people. Disputes between these pastoral groups ended up in large scale inter-tribal fighting resulting in a large area of the Alledoghi plain becoming pastoral "nomad's land" (Ali 1994; Gebre 1999 and Ame 2001).

Early ethnographers argued that competition over access to pastoral resources is unavoidable but not necessarily destructive. Scarcity induced competition for grazing and water caused by overpopulation or adverse climatic changes are factors mentioned as causing conflict. For instance, cattle raiding was viewed as a communal response to natural calamities (Ocan 1995; MacCabe 1990; Bassi 1997; Coppock 1994; Helland 1996) or as a means of increasing one's wealth stock as insurance against unfrozen calamities. Some argue that armed conflicts generally followed predictable patterns and were soon followed by pressures for truce and reconciliation. Killing was relatively contained partly because of the limited availability of weapons and partly because payment of compensation to aggrieved parties could be expensive in terms of livestock.

The literature on conflicts in East Africa has focused on the analysis of the causes of inter and intra-state or secessionist ethnic conflicts and little is known about the nature of these conflicts. More recently, several researchers have attempted to understand the dynamics of these conflicts, as well as actual conditions on the ground in cases of conflict. Many claim that pastoral conflict in East Africa is increasing, that the adverse outcomes of conflict are now much worse than before, that conflicts have become much more intense, and that this is largely due to the widespread availability of small arms and commercialisation of raiding. In spite of plausible arguments made about the relationship between conflict and availability of small arms and commercialization of raiding, there is as yet no consensus that the mechanisms of this connection directly cause conflicts.

'Cattle rustling has metamorphosed from a cultural artefact conducted as a show of warrior-zeal amongst warrior age groups into some form of primitive accumulation where warrior gangs are mobilized, trained and armed with modern warfare equipment'. This statement by Muhereza (1999) is a typical description of the nature of present day conflict in pastoral areas of Eastern Africa.

Some writers describe the transformation of conflict in the light of the integration of pastoral communities in the market economy. They argue that 'raiding has become an income generating activity rather than a means for augmenting social status or fulfilling cultural roles. Knowing that raided cattle are valuable commercial assets in a money economy and that they may never be recovered, pastoralists are forced to guard their remaining stock closely. Attempts at raiding are met with strong resistance, often ending in massive destruction of property and loss of life (Juma 2000). Bujra (2000) largely concurs with Juma and adds that there is highly organised and extensive cattle stealing by one pastoral group from another (often led by outsiders), with automatic weapons often being used. This is because cattle have acquired considerable value due to the great demand for meat in urban areas and also for export purposes. This is particularly the case in the Horn of Africa and in East Africa in general.

Juma (2000) and Osamba (2001) argue that the integration of pastoralists in the market economy has eroded traditional institutions of conflict mediation and resolution, hence resulting in the escalation of conflicts. Historically, raided animals have remained within the same region; this implying that stolen animals could be recovered. However, as meat exports to regions outside of Africa have expanded, raiding has taken on another dimension. The export of animals outside of the continent has created a network of businesses that offer ready markets for raided animals beyond the confines of the raids. Once raided, animals are driven across borders and sold in markets beyond the reach of pastoralists. Under such circumstances, traditional rescue efforts and negotiation mechanisms are useless (Juma 2000). Others argue that although the indigenous mechanisms are eroded from time to time it is not useless. It has been argued that indigenous mechanisms is time tested and effective to handle conflicts that arise in the Horn region. Therefore, these indigenous mechanisms for the prevention and resolution of conflict will continue to operate parallel with modern government structures as they have been doing for years. Thus, it would be better if governments in the Horn of Africa officially recognize, revitalize and empower these mechanisms and use them as alternative for conflict prevention, mitigation, and resolution, Abebe 2001; Aredo and Ame (2001b). The research project will analyse in what context are traditional conflict resolution methods are important.

Commercialisation of cattle has enabled non-herders to profit from livestock raiding. It has also enabled herders themselves to raid independently as the actual availability of land or labour for livestock management has declined and come to exclude reciprocity. Since with livestock both property/exchange and social relations overlap, changes in patterns of ownership affect inter- and intra-ethnic relations, as well as values associated with sociality (Baxter and Hogg 1990). The progressive introduction of the market as an integrative process of the economy and new links between the commercialization of cattle, weapons and

labour created within this process, enable the transformation of livestock capital into military strength which can then be used to further increase livestock capital in a cumulative process (Belshaw 1999).

However, a recent collection of studies, focusing on pastoral livelihoods during cycles of drought takes an opposing view and offers important insights for the analysis of pastoral conflict. Cattle rustling is linked with weak or deteriorating market conditions among pastoralists, particularly with the evolution of trans-border trade and exportation. Food consumption in pastoral areas is based on a combination of locally produced livestock and purchased non-livestock products. During the dry season, pastoralists shift their diet from livestock produce to purchased food grains, paid for through animal sales. At that time of the year, livestock markets are characterized by an over supply of animals in poor conditions depressing livestock prices, while increased demand for food grains drives grain prices higher. These market dynamics significantly decrease pastoralists' purchasing power (Tegegne et. al. 1999, Ame et. al. 2004). Poor market access is also attributed to lack of official state recognition of cross-border trade often exacerbating market risk and discouraging spatial arbitrage. Unfavourable terms of trade between livestock and non-livestock products may also jeopardize the coping strategies of pastoralists, often contributing to social tensions (Aredo and Ame 2001a; Tegegne et. al. 1999).

Drought conditions can trigger and escalate conflicts over scarce resources. During severe shortage of rainfall in pastoral areas, the groups residing in the area try to spread over more land, while at the same time, neighboring groups increasingly do the same. Stiles (1992) noted in normal years, the Pokot only use about three-quarter of their territory to avoid the risk of violent conflicts and banditry from the neighboring Karamajong groups. However, in drought years, they run the risk and rely quite heavily on the contested areas. Similarly, during drought year of 2000, conflict over pastoral resources escalated between Borana and Digodi and Garri and caused the death of at least 140 people and thousands displaced (Aredo and Ame 2001a).

Cattle rustling is linked with weak or deteriorating market condition for pastoralists, particularly concerning trans-border trade and exportation. Empirical results using high-frequency (daily) data from Marsabit, Moyale, and Nairobi collected by GTZ-MDP indicates that price and basis risk (price differentials between market locations), as represented by coefficients of variation, are very high (Barrett et al. 1998). This suggests prices in spatially separated locations along the transect may not be well integrated. The consequences of loosely integrated markets or segmented markets are typically increased price risk and allocative inefficiency since the aggregate market does not smooth local shocks. Fafchamps (1998) also suggests that if markets are not spatially integrated that wealthy persons will “. . . take speculative positions during droughts, thereby compounding pasture degradation.” Similarly in Southern Ethiopia Thus, the question of whether spatial markets in the study area are integrated needs to be addressed at the outset of our study.

Most literature on pastoral areas of east Africa positively associate the phenomena drought and conflict. According to Tulmin(1988) movement of herds in search of fodder, a pattern followed seasonally in normal times is amplified in years of drought This indicates that traditional drought reserves (such as distant pastures and 'no-man's land) are being

increasingly compromised during drought years. During severe shortage of rainfall in pastoral areas, the groups residing in the area try to spread over more land, while at the same time, neighboring groups increasingly do the same. Stiles (1992) noted in normal years, the Pokot only use about three-quarter of their territory to avoid the risk of violent conflicts and banditry from the neighboring Karamajong groups. However, in drought years, they run the risk and rely quite heavily on the contested areas

Most observed conflicts occurred during drought years indicating the probability of occurrence of conflict is high during long and short dry seasons. Empirical study by Coppock (1993) in Southern Ethiopia showed that herd dispersion an early response to the first failure of the long rains in April 1983 was to shift allocation of cattle from a ratio of 71:29 for home-based and satellite herds, respectively, to a ratio of 34:66 within seven months. Many of the satellite herds (consisting of hardly immatures, dry cows and males) moved to drought-reserve areas at the periphery of the central plateau during the first year. This indicates that traditional drought reserves are being increasingly compromised during drought years. The discussion with different Booran households confirmed that during severe drought, the movement of livestock of livestock herds could be far extended outside their customary territory to the west and north west, which often results in violent enter-ethnic conflict with the Somalis.

Analysis of incidences of conflicts indicated that most observed conflicts occurred during drought years with the exception of 1997 incident indicating the probability of occurrence of conflict is high during long and short dry seasons. However, it is not necessarily true that drought induced scarcity induce conflict. For instance, the conflict over wallenso Laman between Degodia and Borana occurred at the end of main rainy season. Discussion with key informant of both communities indicate that the lack of proper water management at Wallenso laman ponds is the major triggering factor (Abdurahman et. Al. 2004).

Pastoralists are faced by two main processes during drought that adversely affect their capacity to support themselves, effectively raising the minimum herd numbers required to support the household. Firstly, they face a fall in levels of productivity from their herds following losses in their livestock capital from higher mortality rates, low or zero rates of calving, reduced production of milk and weight-loss in animals that reduces their sale-value. These factors by themselves would make the pastoral enterprise and household less able to provide for its needs. However, in addition to reduced levels of productivity within the livestock sector, pastoralists are also usually faced during drought with changes in the terms of trade that adversely affect the purchasing power represented by their herds.

Nyukuri (1997) asserts that conflict further exacerbates the ongoing process of economic differentiation between pastoral communities. He observes that in West Pokot livestock market prices drop as food shortages and increased prices of essential goods force pastoralists to sell animals. The market supply of animals is also increased by the threat of rustling. Herders prefer selling their livestock at disadvantageous prices rather than risk to losing them in raids. Nyukuri (1997) reports that during the clashes that arose around the 1992 elections in West Pokot, the price of a mature bull dropped by 60 percent or more. However, meat prices dropped in the areas affected by clashes or heavy raiding, but not in distant

markets. Ocan (1994) notes that herder sales of livestock in response to threats of raids are very convenient for livestock traders who may take advantage of distress sales in conflict areas and make huge profits by taking the animals to distant markets where prices are higher.

Inter-group interactions are determined by the ready availability of small arms that lead to escalation of conflict also in pastoral areas. After independence, neighboring countries of Kenya, Ethiopia, Somalia, Sudan and Uganda were shaken by political unrest and internal conflicts. As a result, light weapons and ammunition became massively available to cross border pastoral communities. Automatic weapons can be seen as a new means of capital accumulation contributing to the ongoing process of economic differentiation between pastoralists. The question is how does the combination of commercialization of livestock raiding and access to small arms enable those who are in a position of control at both levels to secure access to not only animals but to the whole range of pastoral resources (labour, livestock, land and water), thereby further aggravating inequality among pastoral groups and escalating conflict? In partial response to this question, it may be useful to investigate the links between raiding and regional markets.

Traditionally, the pastoralists practiced cattle rustling using spears and bows, but now the weapon of choice used is the AK-47. The relative ease of acquisition and low cost of these illegal guns enable the pastoral communities to guarantee a sustained market. The East African weekly newspaper estimates that there are between 150,000 and 200,000 firearms in the Karamoja region of Uganda alone. While the exact number of small arms in the hands of pastoral communities is difficult to access, it is clear that the threat posed by them is enormous (Mkutu www.saferworld.co.uk/).

An important recurring pattern of these conflicts among pastoral communities is that they are repeatedly interwoven with other conflicts especially those of armed opposition groups fighting the governments in eastern Africa.

Sometimes such conflicts over resources amongst pastoral communities develop into armed opposition groups fighting against a state army. To take the most glaring example, in Ethiopia the pastoralist conflicts with other ethnic groups over land in the Awash valley caused by the resettlement of highlanders resulted in creation of the Afar Liberation Front. Ali (1996) described the situation as follows " ...the disapproval of the government action was expressed in ethnic rebellion which culminated in the burning of the Tendaho plantations and the killing of many non-Afars. The closure of the Addis- Assab highway as a result of this uprising had serious implication on the country's economy. The Junta reacted to this incident very harshly and began what Shehim (1985) called the 'Afar genocide'. Assayta, the capital of the Awssa Sultan was devastated and many innocent Afar were indiscriminately murdered.

The Somalis also suffered repression and human right abuses under the Ethiopian regimes, including the aerial bombardment during the Derg regime. This repression stimulated the formation of a number of opposition groups, including the Western Somali Liberation Front and the Ogaden National Liberation Front.

14. Historically, there has long been tension in Darfur over land and grazing rights between the mostly nomadic groups and farmers from the DarFur, Massaleet and Zagawa ethnic groups. Pastoral mobility, the main adaptive mechanism, is very complex in this area and involves short distance migration between elevated areas (rainy season grazing) and the toich floodplains during the dry season. The Dinka have relatively longer distances to cover to the areas of Baher Al Arab and Baher El Ghazal. This often brings them into conflict with the Baggara of South Kordofan and Darfur over dry-season grazing resources. The government often arm one group against another, this leading further escalation of conflicts

In 1992-92, Kenya experienced recurrent conflict in the rift valley. The rift valley province dispute is largely related to the right to manage, use and benefit from land and natural resources. Land disputes can be traced back to the rapidly changing tenurial system, including the on-going adjudication, demarcation, individualization and privatization of land, especially of traditional common property and Trust Land. The conflict took place between the settlers (Kikuyu, Luo and Kamba) and indigenous pastoralists (Massai and Kalenjin). The conflict took place in the process of a move from one party to multi-party system. The government and opposition parties were reported to have exacerbated the deep-rooted conflict over control of resources.

According to Oyugi (2000), the inhabitants of the Rift Valley region became the target of "revenge" by the Kalenjin Maasai Turkana Samburu Association (KAMATUSA) the coalition that controlled political power at the time. Expecting at the time to be humiliated at the forth-coming elections, the KAMATUSA group in the Kenya African National Union (KANU) got together and decided that those ethnic groups that were betraying them should be taught a lesson. The lesson in question involved their expulsion from especially the "Kalenjin-Massai lands" in the Rift Valley. Such an expulsion would also rid the province of anti-KANU, anti-Moi voters; thereby denying the opposition critical votes needed to attain the 25% requirement. The ethnic ideology was at once invoked and politicized in order to mobilize the KAMATUSA group throughout the Rift Valley to evict the settlers "from their ancestral land".

The inaccessibility of the cross border pastoral areas has turned them a refuge for a number of armed opposition groups such as Oromo Liberation Front and Ogaden National Liberation Front in Ethiopia, Southern Sudan People Liberation Army in Sudan and Lord Resistance Army in Uganda. Armed opposition groups form another level of conflicts in pastoral areas. Many of these armed groups are struggling for a fair share of economic resources and political representation.

In countries with organized rebel movements, raids on pastoralists' to obtain arms and food often occur. The pastoralists in their turn had to acquire arms to defend themselves. The economic benefits of acquiring guns are also more attractive now than in the past (Bujra 2000; Abdurahman et. al. 2004). Increasing demand for automatic weapons induces a continuous flow of livestock out of the pastoral economy and exacerbates conflict. It is therefore important to investigate how this process has affected different areas, at differing times and degrees of intensity, continuously changing the balance of power between neighboring groups.

East African countries have large ethnic groups living in similar ecologies and sharing similar livelihood systems, trans-clan and trans-boundary trade networks and trans-boundary migratory patterns. This is, for example, the case with the Boran Oromo who can be found in both Ethiopia and Kenya, the Somalis found in Ethiopia, Djibouti and Kenya the Afars in Ethiopia, Eritrea and Djibouti. As a result of all this, the prevalence of conflict on one side of the border has often had spill over effects on neighbouring countries resulting in large-scale displacement and large numbers of refugees.

Occasionally, such conflicts have been enmeshed with major confrontations and escalated out of control. For instance, the conflict between the Boran and Gerri over pastoral resources was woven with the inter-state Ethio-Somalia wars of the 1970s and 1980s. In the 1990s, this conflict was linked to the intra-state Oromo-Somali regional boundary conflict (Basi 1997; Helland 1999; Ame et. al. 2004). The Isaq-Ogaden (Markakis 1993) conflicts over pastoral resources were similarly woven into the perennial inter-state conflict between Ethiopia and Somalia. The traditional Baqqaqa-Dinka conflict was also usually linked with the civil war between Northern and Southern Sudan (Mohamed Salih 1987). Ahmed (2001) cites case study of the Rufa's al Hoi of the Blue Nile as testimony of how pastoral societies are engulfed in a bitter struggle with government and liberation fronts, as well as among themselves. The conflict among the Karamajong pastoral groups was also woven into the National Resistance Movement (NRM) and Obote II government in Uganda (Muhereza 1999). It is thus important to investigate how conflicts sparked in one country quickly spread and develop linkages, first, within the country and second across borders into neighbouring countries and how these linkages are related to external/foreign actors who further deepen the conflict.

Widespread conflict in the arid and semi-arid zones of Eastern Africa has often overlapped with extreme food insecurity and pastoral areas remain among the least developed parts of the sub-region. Infrastructure in these areas is poorly developed, with vast tracts having no roads, schools, health facilities or telecommunication services. Levels of absolute poverty are high and most pastoralists are forced to survive on external food aid for several months every year.

Many argue that conflict in pastoral areas needs to be seen against the background of land alienation and mass displacement of pastoral populations. Since resource tenure is an important source of conflict. Salih (2001) associates increased levels of poverty among pastoralists in Eastern Africa with highly centralized political and economic governance in the hands of politically powerful elites. The great power and authority wielded by these elites have often led to misuse and shift of resources from the local population to the state or private interests. Widespread rural conflicts have often resulted from changes in land legislation often contradicting customary laws and has been reflected in confiscation of large tracts of pastureland for ranching in Uganda (Muhereza 2001) and Kenya (Bujra 2000) and for large-scale farming and game reserves in Ethiopia (Ali 1994; Ame 2003).

The evolution of these conflicts should perhaps be analyzed in light of the ongoing, complex process of political liberalization that has taken place since the early 1990s. African researchers have tended to give greater attention to "politically" fuelled hostilities between different ethnic groups in pastoral areas. In Kenya, the ethnic conflicts of the 1990s were

associated with ethnic politicisation (Oyugi 2001). Oyugi maintains that there is evidence to suggest that where ethnic conflict has emerged in Africa, there have always been political machinations behind. He goes on to argue that politicisation of ethnicity often takes place in a situation characterized by an inequitable structure of access to resources and power. Such a structure gives rise to the emergence of the “in group” and the “out group”, with the latter trying to break the structure of inequality as the former responds by building barriers to access that ensure the continuation of its privileged position. At the centre of this scenario are the elites who, feeling excluded or threatened with exclusion, begin to invoke ethnic ideology in the hope of establishing a “reliable” support base often for purely personal and/or elite interests.

Oyugi’s thesis should however be qualified. As Bujra (2000) argues while it is undeniable that the drive for political elites to control the state and its institutions for furthering their own interests and accumulating wealth (i.e. rent seeking), this is far from the deterministic factor explaining all African conflicts. Hussein Jemma (2001) agrees with this observation of Bujra's when he states that individual leaders may have their own motives for engaging in popular struggle for freedom and equality. But it would be unfair to claim that political leaders always strive for their personal benefits and are unquestionably followed by the people. To assume the possibility of elite manipulation in organizing and mobilizing the people is one thing, but this does not mean that popular causes and movements are necessarily linked to personal or elite privileges. Elite manipulation, where it exists, could influence the intensity and magnitude of an ethnic conflict, but it cannot be a cause of the conflict itself (Hussein 2001).

GAPS IN THE LITERATURE

Most scholarship on the relationship between cattle raiding, small arms and intensity of conflict suffers from one or more of the following shortcomings: (1) Many studies tie at least one or a combination of several factors - political, economic, institutions, market access, spread of small arms' to the escalation of conflicts. Some analysts hold contradictory views about mechanisms that link livestock trade and small arms, such contradiction leading to conflicting policy recommendations; (2) Since there is no systematic (cross country/temporal) study of the conflict phenomenon, the few studies that exist capture the dynamics of pastoral conflict at only a specific point in time; (3) perhaps one of the most important deficiencies in the conflict literature is that the discussion of conflict resolution mechanisms is completely sidestepped, the literature rarely suggesting or recommending strategies or policies for managing and resolving conflicts.

Pastoral and agro-pastoral areas of East Africa are too large and diverse in terms of geography, historical and other specificities for generalized statements to explain the dynamics of conflicts in all pastoral communities of the region. Pastoral communities in East Africa differ in terms of market access across borders, supply and demand of small arms, socio-economic situation, climate, natural resources, infrastructure and effectiveness of indigenous conflict mitigation and resolution mechanisms. As a result, the relative weights of each of these factors in explaining the escalation of conflict, as well as its impact, vary from one country to another.

It is thus important to undertake country case studies within a comparative framework to bring out not only the structural similarities and differences in pastoral conflicts in different countries, but also to find out the extent of interconnections across borders. In-depth studies of this kind, within a comparative framework, are likely to offer deeper insights and understanding of the specificities of conflicts, as well as their interconnections at sub-regional and international levels. Moreover, in-depth research on the nature of conflicts and conflict mitigation and resolution mechanisms among pastoralists in Eastern Africa can have positive implications for policy, formulation and implementation in support of regional integration and stability.

The literature review above would demonstrate the need for governments to change their strategies and policies vis-à-vis the Pastoralist communities to: -

- (a) Facilitate better access to both internal and external markets;
- (b) adopt a strategy of intensifying development in these Pastoralist marginalized areas;
- (c) Enhance national and regional efforts to control small arms;
- (d) Harmonize the customary laws with the statutory laws.

III. Case Study of Cross-border livestock trade and conflict in southern Ethiopia and Northern Kenya

Southern Pastoral communities of Ethiopia are closely interlined with national and international markets which involve the international division of labor and the exchange of raw materials and manufactured goods. The geographical location, and facilitation of trans-boundary family ties along the international borders, the areas serve both the internal and external markets. The area is economically tied to a trade network linking the region to gulf states, where camels are exported. The proceeds from live animals are used to purchase manufactured good and food commodities. Cattle and small ruminants are also taken across the border to Kenya. Markets are loosely attached to the markets of the highlands except Negelle(Ame 2004a).

Cross-border livestock trade is also common for animals are sold to Kenyan merchants who cross Ethiopian borders to buy and drive cattle to Northern Kenya¹. Absence of livestock market has affected the livelihood of the community of the district. The economic benefits of pastoralists from sell of their animals are minimal and if available the markets are non attractive (low prices) or far that need two-three days travel on foot leading to loss of body conditions and animals do not cost much after their arrival to the market.

¹ There is no reliable information regarding the amount of cross border livestock flow from Ethiopia to its neighbors. Different studies indicate different estimates of livestock trade to the neighboring countries. Estimate by Gebeselseie et al (1998) show that the volume of livestock trade from Ethiopia at 260000 cattle and 1.2 million sheep and goat. Teka et al (1999) estimate show that about 35-50 thousand cattle, more than 100000 sheep and gat and b=about 10000 camels were sold to cross border market.

Kenya, North Eastern Province

Wajir district is one of the four districts in Kenya's North Eastern Province. It borders Somalia to the North East and Ethiopia to the North. It also borders Moyale, Marsabit, Garissa, Mandera and Isiolo districts of Kenya. It is the second largest district and one of the sparsely populated districts in Kenya.

The rainfall is erratic and unreliable and an average of 200mm per annum is received. The erratic rainfall makes the district vulnerable to drought and drought related diseases. The vegetation is mostly scrub bush land with acacia trees. As a result of the environmental conditions, more than 80% of the population is Nomadic Pastoralist.

Livestock trade is an important economic enterprise for most pastoral societies in northern Kenya. The area was recognized as a home to products, which had a high demand in other parts of the world as early as the seventh century. The establishment of the link between northern Kenya-southern Ethiopia region and trading centers along Somalia's coastline provided an enormous impetus for the development of regional trade patterns and routes. The phenomenal increase in cattle exports from southern Ethiopia and northern Kenya to Nairobi, Kenya is indicative of the expanding trade in the region.

Many ethnic groups, such as the Boran, Burji, Gabra, and Somali live and work together in northern Kenya, often engaging in various economic activities. Livestock trade is one of the major economic pursuits that draw people together in a complicated network of relationships. Boran and Burji are the major ethnic groups in northern Kenya who engage in livestock trade. The Boraan are predominantly herders and 'bush' traders at the lower end of the market chain, while the Burji are urban-based livestock traders and livestock transporters at higher levels of the market.

Livestock trade

Integrating pieces of evidence on incidences of conflict in Northern Kenya and Interspatial and Interoperable Livestock market and price Integration/Segmentation.

Two Major Livestock Routes:

1. Filtu-Dollo-(Suftu)- Mandhera
2. Negelle, Dubluk and Moyale (See chart 1 for details)

Analysis of livestock trade routes indicates that livestock marketing follows a three-tier system with primary, intermediate and terminal markets. These markets allow the marketable animals pass from the pastoralists to small traders and on to large traders and/or butchers. In the primary/bush market pastoralist congregate to exchange livestock for herding and slaughter purposes. If it is nearer to the border market traders who purchase for external market also frequent them. Intermediate markets are relatively larger and located along stock routes usually coincide with district centers. Pastoralists purchasing for breeding stock, butchers for local slaughter and traders for onward market attend them. While terminal markets are attended by all kinds purchasers. They are the largest markets for the pastoral areas (Gebremariam, 1993; (Tegegne, et.al. 1999, Ame 2004a).

GTZ/BLPDP and MOA study quoted in Tegegne, et.al. 1999 indicated that Moyale and Mandhera are the two largest recipients that constitute 70-80 percent of live animals sold in these two markets originate from Ethiopia.

There is marked variation in the monthly supply of livestock in the area. The volume of offer is dependent on the availability of pasture and water. The variability of rainfall causes fluctuations both in pastoralists' willingness to sell and in traders' ability to move themselves and livestock in and out of pastoral areas. Pastoralists are reluctant to sell their animals during the wet period when pastures rejuvenate and the animals return to milk production. It appears that expectation of prolonged dry spell and outbreak of disease account for more increase in supply. The study made by Mengiste (1998) found out that the off take rates for livestock during the drought was estimated to be about twofold the off take rate of a normal year. The incremental off take rate during the drought for each species was 50 per cent of cattle, 52 per cent for sheep, 70 per cent for goats, 11 per cent for camels, and 11 per cent for equines. In addition to this, the number of households involved in selling different livestock species drought year increased about threefold or by 75 per cent. According to the householders interviewed most of them (89%) sold their livestock to neighboring farmers and/or small traders, 10 per cent to large home markets or traders, and only 1 per cent of them sold to the outside markets. The major market centers include Dubuluk, Yavelo, Mega, Harobake and Eliwayou. Those interviewed claimed that these markets were too remote from the center or to purchase food items and other goods (Mengiste, 1998).

In terms of exports, it might be interesting to highlight the preferred types of livestock. Since female animals are generally kept with the stocks in order to maintain reproduction rates and milk production, the majority of animals sold for export, mainly to Saudi Arabia, are males. The special breed, the male "Somali black head" or fat-tailed sheep" is the favorite, followed by male goats, male cattle and young male camels are said to have, at the age of four, five years, a particularly "tasty meat" and are very much appreciated. Religious practices, for insurance at the end of the Islamic fasting month Ramadan and for Id AL Adha during the Haji, the Mecca pilgrimage season, favored the traditional home-slaughtering of animals, thus actually pushing the demand for live animals imports (Tegegne, et.al. 1999).

Livestock trade

Market Integration

The purpose of testing market integration is to determine appropriate intervention of price stabilization. In spatially integrated markets, price movements are transmitted across markets and commodities. Therefore, price stabilization measures, when needed, at one central market, is sufficient. The simplest techniques (linear association using correlation) is used.

Studies indicate mixed results about the effectiveness of cross border market options. Studies made by the author shows that shoats and camel prices are significantly integrated to cross-border markets in Kenya (Mandhera)(see table 1).

Insecurity is one of the major risks that livestock traders face. Insecurity manifests itself in several forms – ethnic conflicts, highway robbery, business rivalry, and localized insecurity. In the Ethiopia/Kenyan borderland is crucial because it connects prime cattle

production areas of southern Ethiopia to the region's largest market, Nairobi, Kenya. The severity of certain trading constraints, including insecurity during certain periods has forced several Ethiopian and Kenyan traders to abandon cross-border commerce. Similarly (Nyukuri 1997) observes that in West Pokot the market supply of animals is also increased by the threat of rustling. Herders prefer selling their livestock at disadvantageous prices rather than risk to losing them in raids. Nyukuri (1997) reports that during the clashes that arose around the 1992 elections in West Pokot, the price of a mature bull dropped by 60 percent or more. However, meat prices dropped in the areas affected by clashes or heavy raiding, but not in distant markets. Ocan (1994) notes that herder sales of livestock in response to threats of raids are very convenient for livestock traders who may take advantage of distress sales in conflict areas and make huge profits by taking the animals to distant markets where prices are higher.

While correlation results between Filtu cattle and Dollo Addo prices show weak market correlation. Similarly, recent study by (Tegegne, et.al.1999) found out that prices between (Dubluk and Negelle) and Moyale are not associated.

Table 1. Correlation results

Cattle					
Markets	Mandhera	Dollo	Negelle	Dublik	Moyale
Filtu	0.20	0.08	0.31	0.36	0.10
Dollo	0.84		0.11	0.16	0.02
Mandhera					
Negelle				0.22	0.37
Sheep male					
Markets	Mandhera	Dollo	Negelle	Dublik	Moyale
Filtu	0.35	0.23	0.34	-0.33	0.62
Dollo	0.83				
Mandhera					
Negelle				0.14	0.26
Dublik					0.22
Goat male					
Markets	Mandhera	Dollo	Negelle	Dublik	Moyale
Filtu	0.24	0.09	0.62	-0.28	0.56
Dollo	0.90		0.26	0.21	-0.37
Mandhera					
Negelle	-0.04			-0.17	0.51
Dublik	-0.32				-0.08
Camel					
Markets	Mandhera	Dollo			
Filtu	0.47	0.43			
Dollo	0.92				

Source: Ame (2004a)

The pastoralists also face high price volatility of their products.

Coefficients of variation were calculated for different markets and livestock types to analyze the over all degree of price risk experienced by herders as shown in Table 2. The evidence is mixed for two major trek routes identified in the area: Filtu-Dollo-(Suftu) Mandhera and Negelle-Dubluk and Moyale. In each of the two routes looked at here, the Dollo-Mandhera market price has tended to fluctuate more than that of Dubluk- Moyale. Camel prices have a higher coefficient of variation than other livestock price since almost exclusively camel is for the exports/border markets. While Filtu prices appearing to be slightly more volatile due to inaccessibility of the area. Interestingly, the least volatile is the market price of Moyale. The coefficients of variation for border market of Dollo shows that sheep and goat prices are move volatile in markets located near the border. Similar computations for all livestock prices in Negelle, Dubluk and Moyale markets found out high price volatility (also see (Tegegne, et, al.1999).

Table 2. Price volatility and risk

Markets	Cattle male			Sheep male			Goat male			Camel		
	Mean	STDV	CV	Mean	S.D.	CV	Mean	S.D.	CV	Mean	S.D.	CV
Filtu	427	89	0.21	70	23	0.34	72	27	0.37	532	312	0.59
Dollo	457	128	0.28	75	18	0.25	84	18	0.22	864	191	0.22
Mandera	528	101	0.19	82	18	0.21	88	21	0.24	966	229	0.24
Negelle	283	36	0.13	87	10	0.11	65	9	0.14			
Dubluck	552	116	0.21	65	5	0.08	92	6	0.06			
Moyale	526	69	0.13	121	17	0.14	143	21	0.15			

Source: Ame 2004a

The average monthly price differential between Filtu and Mandhera is high for camel and cattle.

Livestock trade

Market Integration

Livestock terms of trade

Food security is based on the combination of livestock products and purchased non-pastoral products. During the dry season, pastoralists shift their diet from livestock to purchased food grain, paid for by animal sales. At that time of the year, livestock markets are characterized by a high supply of animals in poor condition, while increased demand drives food grain prices higher. These market dynamics significantly decrease pastoralists' purchasing power (Tegegne et, al 1999, Dejene and Abdurahman, 2000b).


One of the most important type of price index is the livestock/food grain "terms of trade" (TOT) which compares livestock head prices and market food prices. The ratio is a measure of food purchasing power in livestock producing areas, that is, a measure of current food

prices with respect to current income. The terms of trade between an average male cattle the most commonly sold animal and maize was estimated. The terms of trade increased from its low level in 1992 until 1997 (when compared to that of 1996 which was regarded as normal year due to adequate rain at that time and largely where bumper harvest was recorded in most parts of the country). After the El Niño effect of 1997-98, the trend has shown a consistent decline. The overall decline during (1997-2000) years was more 60 percent. For instance, the amount of maize that could be purchased from the sale of an average ox has fallen from 1096 kgs in 1996 to 595 kgs in 2000. Both the livestock and maize prices declined but there was a sharp decline in livestock price (50%). While by early 2000 an average ox was for Br 541 where as it would have fetched up to Br 1092 during 1996. Low livestock prices resulted from high supply and low demand, particularly in the 1999-2000 drought year attributed to the ban of livestock import from the region by Gulf States. Moreover, the discrepancies between livestock and grains are even greater during the conflict times, like where food prices can increase dramatically in months when transports and trade is disrupted.

Livestock trade

Market Integration

Livestock terms of trade
 Dubluk Market Analysis



1. The analysis of livestock prices indicate that the monthly market price is characterized by high variability.

- a. Increased frequency of conflicts in slows down trade due to increased risks of stock losses in transit caused by banditry Empirical results using high-frequency (daily) data from Marsabit, Moyale, and Nairobi collected by GTZ-MDP supports this findings (Barrett et al. 1998). This suggests prices in spatially separated locations along the transect may not be well integrated. The consequences of loosely integrated markets or segmented markets are typically increased price risk and allocative inefficiency since the aggregate market does not smooth local shocks.
- b. Increased market supply of livestock
- c. Livestock price declines
- d. If markets are not spatially integrated that wealthy persons will take speculative positions during conflicts

Other factors:

- a. Unreliable and irregular price information coupled with lack of official recognition by the state of cross border trade that exacerbates market risk and discourages spatial arbitrage.
- e. Poor infrastructure, veterinary services and others explain the lack of conducive policies to encourage official cross-border livestock export. These limitations slowed down trade as well as increased transaction costs and uncertainties to trade.

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