

**THE POLITICS OF STRUCTURAL CHOICE IN A ONE-PARTY STATE:
THE CASE OF WILDLIFE POLICY IN ZAMBIA**

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Abstract:

Many scholars and practitioners see the activities of public agencies as remedies to society's collective dilemmas. Work in the new institutional economics, however, has challenged this conceptualization. Rather than view bureaucracies as solutions to collective action problems, some new institutionalists conceptualize public agencies as a means by which political winners can impose their favored distributive outcomes on the rest of society. Further, some scholars assert the structural design of public agencies can be explained by reference to their political and distributive features.

This paper employs and extends this approach. I argue that the design of public agencies can be explained by examining their designers' strategic choices under two important constraints: the designers' original share of public authority, and the pattern of political uncertainty generated by a particular system of government.

I apply this theory to the case of Zambian wildlife policy in the 1980s. Following the dramatic increase in poaching rates in Zambia in the 1970s and 1980s, individuals and interest groups attempted to create new wildlife programs that could circumvent the influence of party and government officials who, using wildlife as a resource for patronage politics, routinely thwarted attempts to strengthen conservation laws. The designers of these new programs chose structural arrangements to increase their share of public authority and to insulate their programs from political uncertainty of a one-party state, at the expense of promulgated aims such as conservation, local participation, and bureaucratic "efficiency."

The study underscores the importance of the distributive nature of public agencies, the political interests of bureaucrats, and the place of structural choice in policy analysis.

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In previous work, I demonstrated that political institutions provided incentives for Zambian politicians and civil servants to maintain a wildlife policy that advanced individuals' political and economic goals, but failed to conserve animals. The political logic of an economically crippled one-party state thwarted those individuals and groups who wanted to augment wildlife policy in Zambia ~ President Kenneth Kaunda, the Zambian National Parks and Wildlife Service (NPWS), international donors and local conservationists. This logic contributed to a dramatic increase in illegal hunting in Zambia from 1973-1982.

These pro-conservation actors employed new strategies after 1982 to circumvent the impediments presented by members of the party and government. NPWS officers created the Administrative Management Design for Game Management Areas (ADMAGE), a new program of "community-based" wildlife management primarily financed by the United States Agency for International Development (USAID). European conservationists, backed by President Kaunda, established the Luangwa Integrated Resource Development Project (LIRDPA), a new public agency supported by the Norwegian Agency for International Development (NORAD).

Both LIRDPA and ADMAGE sought to conserve wild animals by incorporating the participation of rural residents in decisions over and benefits from wildlife resources.¹ But the political institutions of the one-party state induced LIRDPA and ADMAGE's designers to construct programs far different than those necessary to implement their goal of efficient,

¹In most documents LIRDPA is referred to as a project, and ADMAGE as a policy. However, both LIRDPA and ADMAGE promoted policies and incorporated new organizational structures with which to carry out these policies.

community-based conservation.² The programs' designers worried about possible interference by Zambian politicians seeking patronage resources. They prepared for bureaucratic turf battles with other Zambian public agencies. They recognized their rivalry with each other over control of Zambia's wildlife estate. Most importantly, they understood the advantages and disadvantages posed by an alliance with President Kaunda: his favor could provide decisive support to a program's struggles to survive; his disapproval could prove fatal to a bureaucracy.

In this paper, I examine Zambia's wildlife policy from 1983-1991 by focusing on the construction of ADMADE and LIRD. I argue that the structure of both programs resulted from their designers' desire to expand their programs' resource base subject to two constraints: 1) the pattern of political uncertainty generated by Zambia's system of government, and 2) the designers' political resources, specifically their share of public authority. Rather than construct organizations to pursue their promulgated goals of conservation, local participation, or bureaucratic "efficiency," ADMADE and LIRD designers' primary objective was to create structures that secured additional resources for their programs. The political uncertainty spawned by a one-party state and the designers' control over public authority compelled them to build particular sets of structures to secure and insulate program resources.

This paper has four sections. Section one reviews the concepts provided by research on the politics of structural choice, focusing on how particular systems of government offer different constraints and incentives to the designers of public agencies. In section two, I model the choices confronting those attempting to construct a public agency under the political institutions of the African one-party state. Section three uses the insights generated by the model to examine the creation of the two new conservation programs that occurred in Zambia after 1983. It demonstrates how bureaucrats' knowledge of the Zambian political landscape and their own control over public authority greatly influenced how they structured their public agencies. As a result, ADMADE and LIRD designers made decisions over political sponsors, financing mechanisms and decision-making structures to augment their

² In contrast, R. Michael Wright writes "No goal of ADMADE is more important than community development." See his "Alleviating Poverty and Conserving Wildlife in Africa: an 'Inefficient' Model from Africa," *The Nature Conservancy*, n.d., p. 20.

resources while simultaneously insulating these resources from political uncertainty. A discussion of the implications of the politics of structural choice in the African context takes place in the concluding section. This section underscores the importance of the distributive nature of institutions and the place of structural choice in policy analysis.

1. The politics of structural choice

At the center of most analyses of bureaucracy is its presumed inefficiency. Citizens, scholars and bureaucrats have long decried the ineptitude of public agencies. Supposedly designed to create and implement policy, the labyrinthine institutions and burdensome procedures of public agencies often cripple their effective action. Early work by new institutionalists on bureaucracy focused on how the United States Congress could control public agencies.³ Subsequent research broadened the scope of investigation by dropping claims of "congressional dominance," but kept its spotlight on legislators and their desire to correct for "bureaucratic drift."⁴ Recently, scholars have focused more explicitly on the assumption that the creators of public agencies design institutions primarily to provide technically efficient public services.⁵ Instead, this new line of inquiry assumes that well-

³Barry R. Weingast, "The Congressional-Bureaucratic System: A Principal-Agent Perspective," Public Choice, 44 (1984): pp. 147-192; Matthew D. McCubbins and Thomas Schwartz, "Congressional Oversight Overlooked: Police Patrols versus Fire Alarms," American Journal of Political Science, 28 (1984): pp. 165-179; Weingast and Mark Moran, "Bureaucratic Discretion or Congressional Control: Regulatory Policymaking by the Federal Trade Commission," Journal of Political Economy, 91 (1983): pp. 765-800.

⁴Matthew D. McCubbins, Roger G. Noll and Barry R. Weingast, "Administrative Procedures as Instruments of Political Control," Journal Of Law, Economics and Organization, 3 (1987): pp. 243-277; McCubbins, Noll and Weingast, "Structure and Process, Politics and Policy: Administrative Arrangements and the Political Control of Agencies," Virginia Law Review, 75 (1989): pp. 431-482; Murray J. Horn, "The Political Economy of Public Administration," (Ph.D. dissertation, Harvard University, 1988); Horn and Kenneth A. Shepsle, "Commentary on 'Administrative Arrangements and the Political Control of Agencies,': Administrative Process and Organizational Form as Legislative Responses to Agency Costs," Virginia Law Review, 75 (1989): pp. 499-508.

⁵See Jonathan R. Macey, "Organizational Design and Political Control of Administrative Agencies," Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, 8, 1, 1992, pp. 93-110; Kenneth Shepsle, "Bureaucratic Drift, Coalitional Drift and Time Consistency: A Comment on Macey," Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, 8, 1, 1992, pp. 111-118; Matthew D. McCubbins, Roger G. Noll and Barry Weingast, "Administrative Procedures as Instruments of Political Control," Journal of Law, Economics & Organization, 3, 1987, pp.

informed politicians, interest groups and bureaucrats compete to structure public agencies in ways to achieve their own particular goals.⁶

This literature indicates that two core characteristics of poetics profoundly affect the strategies of political actors competing over the design of public agencies.⁷ First, politics is about the exercise of public authority. Public authority allows political winners to impose their preferred government structures and policy on the entire polity, often at the expense of political losers.⁸ Rather than view the supply of a public agency as a contract between interested groups seeking to remedy a collective action problem, the politics of structural choice conceptualizes public agencies as the result of groups seeking to control public authority for their own benefit.

243-247; McCubbins, Noll and Weingast, "Structure and Process, Politics and Policy: Administrative Arrangements and the Political Control of Agencies," Virginia Law review, 75, 1989, pp. 431-482.

⁶My argument follows Moe more closely than others scholars of structural choice, who generally address legislators' desire to create and control bureaucracies, often employing a principal-agent framework (see footnote 4). This chapter approaches the problem from the standpoint of bureaucrats and interest groups constructing institutions to evade such control, and thus resonates with the works such as William Niskanen, Bureaucracy and representative Government (Chicago: Aldine-Atherton, 1971) and Ronald N. Johnson and Gary D. Libecap, "Agency Growth, Salaries, and the Protected Bureaucrat," Economic Inquiry, 27, 1989, pp. 53-67.

⁷Strands of this approach appear throughout the work of the authors listed in the previous two notes. The explicit formulation of this approach is found in the work of Terry M. Moe. See Moe, "Political Institutions: The Neglected Side of the Story," Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization 6 (1990 special issue): 213-266. See also Moe, "The Politics of Structural Choice," in John E. Chubb and Paul E. Peterson, eds., Can the Government Govern? (Washington D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1989); and Moe, "The Politics of Structural Choice: Toward a Theory of Public Bureaucracy," in Oliver Williamson, ed., Organizational Theory from Chester Bernard to the Present (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990).

⁸This type of exchange is different than those characterized in much of the literature on the new economics of organization, which assumes exchange between individuals is voluntary and mutually beneficial. See for example Oliver E. Williamson, The Economic Institutions of Capitalism (New York: The Free Press, 1985); A critique of the contractarian nature of the literature can be found in Robert H. Bates, "Contra Contractarianism: Some Reflections on the New Institutionalism," Politics and Society 16, no. 2-3 (1988): 387-401.

Second, politics makes the exercise of public authority temporary. This uncertainty drives the creators of public agencies to choose institutional designs they would never select if pursuing technical efficiency alone. Since political victory allows incumbents only temporary control over public authority, they will attempt to protect their agency from their political opponents, who could gut or dismantle the agency tomorrow. The fleeting nature of political control may even motivate incumbents to insulate their agency to an extent that even their own exercise of public authority is impaired.

If politics is conceptualized as the temporary exercise of public authority, the political institutions of a particular system of government critically influences the strategies chosen by today's political winners to protect their agencies from tomorrow's uncertainty. For example, the separation-of-powers system found in the United States encourages actors to bury "their" agencies in layers of legislation. Because passing laws is difficult in this system, it makes sense for those wanting to protect their agency to formalize its mandate and activities by passing a web of detailed laws. Even if opponents happened to secure a legislative majority in the future, the U.S.'s powerful and independent president and lack of party discipline makes change laborious and uncertain. The separation-of-powers system also promotes political compromise, allowing political opponents the chance to hamstring at the outset those public agencies they dislike. The result is a highly constrained, complex and formalized American bureaucracy.⁹

The political institutions of a parliamentary system, on the other hand, offer a different set of incentives to those wishing to control public authority and shield it from political uncertainty. Parliamentary politics makes it easier to pass laws, since a party or coalition usually dominates both executive and legislative branches of government. Consequently, writing legislation to hide a public agency from its future enemies is less effective. Parties and groups would seek other strategies, such as constructing independent commissions or government corporations.¹⁰ Thus, in both the separation-of-powers and

⁹Moe, "Political Institutions," p. 238. See also James Q. Wilson's description of American bureaucracy in Bureaucracy: What Government Agencies Do and Why They Do It (New York: Basic Books, 1989).

¹⁰Moe, "Political Institutions," pp. 239-245.

parliamentary systems, bureaucratic structures can be partially explained by examining political actors* choices given the political institutions of a particular system of government.

2. **The politics of structural choice in a one-party state**

New institutionalists' insights about the politics of structural choice in industrialized democracies can be extended to other political settings. Individuals and groups seek to control the exercise of public authority in all countries, not just industrialized democracies. And democratic elections are not the only source of political uncertainty — it springs from phenomena common to all political systems, e.g. shifting alliances, fluctuating levels of political resources and changing political opportunities. This section attempts to model how individuals would construct their most-preferred government agency under a one-party state with a strong executive, the system of government so common in post-independence Africa.¹¹

At the apex of the one-party system stands the head of state and party, whose concentrated political power makes for a potent ally and formidable enemy.¹² One-party presidents generally dominate government and party institutions. They appoint important

¹¹The following section draws from more detailed analyses of the behavior of and constraints on single-party leaders. See especially Robert H. Jackson and Carl G. Rosberg, Personal Rule in Black Africa (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1982), pp. 14-80 and passim.; Patrick Chabal, ed., Political Domination in Africa (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987); Rene Lemarchand, "The State, the Parallel Economy, and the Changing Structure of Patronage Systems," in Donald Rothchild and Naomi Chazan, eds., The Precarious Balance (Boulder and London: Westview Press, 1980), pp. 149-170; Richard Sandbrook, The Politics of Africa's Economic Stagnation (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), pp. 83-110; Gwendolen M. Carter, ed., African One-Party States (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1962); and James S. Wunsch and Dele Olowu, eds., The Failure of the Centralized State (Boulder: Westview Press, 1990).

The political strength of the military, labor unions, regional organizations, ethnic groups or civil servants association may prevent their complete co-optation or annihilation, but one-party president generally possess the ability to alter significantly their membership and activities. In the case of Zambia, see Cherry Gertzel, "Dissent and authority in the Zambian one-party state," in Gertzel, Carolyn Baylies and Morris Szeftel, eds., The Dynamics of the One-Party State (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1984), pp. 100-101.

¹²The ruler of a one-party state is hereafter referred to as a president.

government and party personnel.¹³ They control most decision-making processes. And they wield unparalleled influence over choices regarding state revenue and expenditure.

Groups interested in expanding their public authority and resources under any political system must beware those actors who seek to use public agencies for their own ends. But groups operating under a one-party state have a distinctive concern: they must contend with the one-party president. At a minimum, groups must ensure that the interests of the one-party president are not threatened. Moreover, if the group wants to secure strong political or budgetary priority, they need the president's active support. The benefits of the president's patronage, however, also pose considerable costs, since his monopoly over public authority allows him to intervene capriciously in government affairs.¹⁴ Thus, a group that secures the president's backing must also worry about his future use of power, which could alter or

¹³One-party presidents use their control over job appointments to coopt elites into the one-party state. Employment within the government links individuals with state sources of goods and services. Given the dominant economic position of the state under a one-party system and the generally underdeveloped private sector, government jobs are extremely valuable. For examples from Zambia, see West, "The Politics of Hope," p. 96; James A. Scarritt, "The Analysis of Social Class, Political Participation and Public Policy in Zambia" Africa Today 3 (1983): pp. 16-17; for an example from Zaire, see D.J. Gould, "The Administration of Underdevelopment," in Guy Gran, ed., Zaire: The Political Economy of Underdevelopment (New York: Praeger, 1979), pp.87-107.

President Kaunda used his control over the state's resources to keep rival politicians or groups off-balance and incapable of establishing independent bases of economic wealth or political power. Kaunda often employed the "prodigal son" routine, dismissing promising political elites only to welcome them back later with high positions within the government or party. This strategy helped to sanction the more independent activities of individuals while keeping them tied to the patronage system. See West above and Marcia Burdette, Zambia: Between Two Worlds (Boulder: Westview Press, 1988), p. 108.

¹⁴This analysis resonates with work regarding the problem of eliciting credible commitments from sovereigns. See for example Hilton L. Root. "Tying the King's Hands: Credible Commitments and Royal Fiscal Policy During the Old Regime," Rationality and Society, 1, 2, 1989 (October), pp. 240-258; Douglass C. North, Structure and Change in Economic History (New York: W.W.Norton, 1971); North, Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), pp. 54-60; North and Barry R. Weingast, "Constitutions and Credible Commitments: The Evolution of Institutions of Public Choice in 17th Century England," Journal of Economic History, 49, 1989, pp. 803-32; Margaret Levi, Of Rule and Revenue (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1988); and Barry R. Weingast, "The Economic Role of Political Institutions," unpublished paper, September 1992.

destroy their agency.¹⁵ If they can survive without it, the potential costs of presidential intervention may make some groups shun his assistance.

Those groups needing the president's support would seek ways to limit his intervention in their agency's affairs. This could be partially accomplished by controlling the information the president receives about the agency. By regulating this flow, the group may help shape the president's preferences and choices, thereby reducing the possibility of his more capricious and damaging actions.

Unlike other systems of government, a one-party state with a strong executive makes a strategy of alliance with other domestic political actors relatively ineffective. While parliamentarians, ministers and other party and government officials could help an agency gain access to additional services and funds, the president's dominant position allows him to dismantle most of these relationships.

Because protection from domestic sources is limited, groups may seek security from international sources for their agency. A foreign patron could alleviate political uncertainty caused by the one-party president by tying his hands through bi- or multilateral agreements about the agency's structure and mandate. Aid contracts could be written to specify the agency's mandate, hiring procedures, funding mechanisms and decision-making processes.

"Parliamentarians, bureaucrats and interest groups complain about one-party presidents' proclivity to announce new projects or goals without consulting either the affected public agencies or interested groups. In almost every interview I conducted for this study, public and private officials complained about President Kaunda's penchant for declaring policy independent of consultation. Similar trends occur in other one-party states. See for example William Tordoff, "Residual Legislatures in African One-Party States," Journal of Comparative and Commonwealth Studies, 1977: p. 241.

Without countervailing political institutions, policy direction under a one-party system is vulnerable to frequent policy shifts for two reasons. First, one-party presidents use policy change as a strategy to neutralize the political or economic power of individuals and groups. See Eugenia West, "The Politics of Hope" (Ph.D. dissertation, Yale University, 1989), p. 51; Robert H. Bates and Paul Collier, "The Politics and Economics of Policy Reform in Zambia," in Robert H. Bates and Anne O. Krueger eds. Political and Economic Interactions in Economic Policy Reform (Cambridge, MA: Blackwell Publishers, 1993). Second, such unrivaled public authority allows one-party presidents to implement their own possibly shifting ideas (and those of their trusted advisors), contributing to apparently erratic policy trajectories. For example, it is well-known that many of the tenets of President Kaunda's philosophies are contradictory. See Carolyn Baylies, "The State and Class Formation in Zambia" (Ph.D. dissertation, University Of Madison-Wisconsin, 1978), pp. 873-874.

Monitoring mechanisms — such as review missions, required reports, financial audits and annual meetings between the government and donor — could be included in the agreement to keep the agency protected from the president and other domestic politicians aspiring to use it for their own goals.

By gaining international support, a group also succeeds in linking the president's reputation to their agency. The president's acceptance of an agreement with a donor confers some international significance to their bureaucracy. Failure to perform the actions agreed upon may damage his credibility and thus threaten his access to other forms of international aid.

Groups seek to augment and insulate their public agencies under any system of government; a one-party state forces them to consider specific mechanisms to limit the capricious inclinations of a powerful president as well.

3. Conservationists and the search for new wildlife programs in the Second Republic

Individuals and groups interested in conserving Zambian wildlife had little success in changing policy or programs from 1973-1982. President Kaunda, the National Parks and Wildlife Service, international and local conservationists could not overcome the incentives generated by the Zambia's political and economic institutions for party and government members to oppose conservation measures. The institutional environment changed, however, with an influx of ideas and financing from international sources.¹⁶

Using these new resources, two pro-conservation groups emerged within Zambia. Both groups attempted to create programs they most preferred. Both groups sought the resources necessary to extend their own authority over Zambia's wildlife estate. And both

¹⁶Zambia had a long history of involvement with ideas and funding from the international arena, the degree of international interest reached new heights in the 1980s. The public outcry at the slaughter of African wildlife in the 1970s led to the creation of a number of new international conservation organizations and increased revenues for those already established. Additionally, bilateral foreign aid began to target conservation projects. Consequently, both public and private conservationists in the 1980s could tap into more money from more sources than in the previous two decades. NORAD, USAID and the WWF would provide decisive revenue to the cause of Zambian conservationists. See John McCormick, Reclaiming Paradise (Bloomington and Indiana: Indiana University Press, 1989); John C. Pierce, Mary Ann E. Steger, Brent S. Steel, and Nicholas P. Lovrich, Citizens, Political Communication, and Interest Groups (Westport, Connecticut: Praeger, 1992); and David Adamson, Defending the World (London: I.B. Tauris & Co., 1990).

groups had to contend with the political uncertainty generated by Zambia's one-party state. Their fear of Kaunda's possible interventions drove them to choose some parallel strategies of insulation. But their strategies — and resultant agency structures — diverged because they possessed different levels of public authority at the outset.

a. The emergence of two conservation factions

In the late 1970s and early 1980s Dale Lewis, an American researcher, found that human activity — farming, bush burning, legal and illegal hunting — had significantly altered the movements and foraging habits of elephants in the Lupande Game Management Area of the Luangwa Valley.¹⁷ Lewis's studies brought him into daily contact with villagers and traditional authorities.

It became clear to Lewis that rural residents paid the costs of conservation policies without receiving much benefit. The abundance and variety of wildlife in national parks and game management areas favored tourists and licensed hunters; wild animals did little to augment legally the daily living standards of the villagers.¹⁸ Motivated by his observations,

¹⁷The South Lupande Game Management Area is part of the Luangwa catchment region, containing the most varied and dense populations of wildlife in Zambia. It lies to the east of the Luangwa river and is sparsely populated. Besides the few local residents employed by safari hunters and the NPWS, most residents engage in subsistence farming, hunting and fishing.

Most of Zambia's wildlife tourism business occurs in the Luangwa Valley, and specifically in the vicinity of the Lupande Game Management Area. It is also considered one of the best areas for safari hunting. This region is also the best protected wildlife sanctuary, due to its distance from city centers, the efforts of NPWS and the prevalence of tourists and safari hunters.

¹⁸In Lewis's research zone, less than 1% of family income resulted from legitimate forms of wildlife utilization. See for example S.L. Atkins, "The Socio-Economic Aspects of the Lupande Game Management Area" in D.B. Dalai-Clayton, ed., Proceedings of the Lupande Development Workshop (Lusaka: Government Printer, 1984), p. 52.

Others in the international conservation community had come to similar conclusions. Many wildlife managers found that preservationism, the style of conservation that excluded the use of any of the natural resources within a protected area, was not an effective policy. Locals who did not perceive gains from conservation programs flouted laws by gathering firewood, fishing or hunting in protected areas. Additionally, wildlife departments in developing countries, like Zambia, found the management costs for preservation strategies unmanageably burdensome. To mitigate local residents' illegal activities and to augment the finances of wildlife departments, wildlife managers had begun to espouse theories of wildlife management grounded on local participation. This concept held that locals should be included in the decision-making over and benefits from wildlife resources. By providing

and his conflicts with a local chief, Lewis, with the help of NPWS and the non-governmental organization Save the Rhino Trust, arranged for a conference of wildlife managers, conservationists, government officials and donors to discuss the problems regarding resource use in the Lupande Game Management Area. The Lupande Development Workshop convened on 18 September 1983 to develop strategies to combat the increasing depletion of natural resources in both the Lupande area and Zambia's other protected zones. Participants of the Lupande Development Workshop represented precisely those groups whose conservation interests had been stymied by members of the Party and government in the preceding decade.¹⁹

The Lupande Development Workshop's proceedings, resolutions and aftermath would change the face of Zambian conservation policy for the next decade. Participants agreed that Zambia needed a new program of wildlife conservation. They agreed that a project should be established to develop the Luangwa catchment area as a model for the efficient management and utilization of wildlife.²⁰ They agreed that both domestic and international

some degree of property rights over wildlife to locals residents, conservationists thought that they could induce individuals to stop unsustainable resource use and help wildlife departments to monitor illegal activities. Interview with Richard Bell, Chipata, Zambia, 15 June 1991. See also R. Norman Owen-Smith, ed., Management of Large Mammals in African Conservation Areas (Pretoria: Haum Educational Publishers, 1983); the various chapters found in David Anderson and Richard Grove, eds., Conservation in Africa: People Policies and Practice (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987); Stuart A. Marks, The Imperial Lion: The Human Dimensions of Wildlife Management in Central Africa (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1984); and David Western, "Amboseli National Park: Human Values and the Conservation of a Savanna Ecosystem," in J.A. McNeely and K.R. Miller, eds., National Parks, Conservation and Development: the Role of Protected Areas in Sustaining Society: Proceedings of the World Congress on National Parks (Bati, Indonesian (Smithsonian Washington DC: Smithsonian Institution Press, 1984).

¹⁹Of the 38 individuals on the official participants list, 9 were officers of the NPWS and another 20 belonged to government departments most concerned with conservation and whose budgets had also deteriorated tremendously after the 1973 copper shock, e.g. the Department of Agriculture and the Department of Forestry. Seven members of various private conservation groups attended the workshop. Despite the intended goal of including the voice of local villagers in the proceedings, Chief Malama was the only local Zambian at the proceedings. Fifteen participants were European. See Proceedings, pp. vii-viii.

²⁰The Luangwa catchment covers almost 20% of Zambia's land surface and includes 5 national parks and 7 game management areas.

funds were necessary to support the proposed research and more effective anti-poaching efforts. And they agreed the project should also include "people of the Luangwa Valley GMAs" in the "development and management of the catchment's natural resources."²¹

But participants strongly disagreed over the proposed project's design. Two different factions within this pro-conservation lobby emerged. One group, led by Europeans from international development agencies and the Zambian conservation community, favored a large-scale project that incorporated the management of all natural resources. They argued that the contingent nature of villagers' resource use required an integrated resource development project (IRDP). With complete control over all natural resources in a particular geographic area, these conservationists believed their IRDP could mitigate some of the political meddling caused by politicians and bureaucrats search for patronage resources. Many in this group also privately expressed their long-standing desire to create a structure free from the influence of NPWS, an agency they considered lacking in integrity and capacity.

Another group, led by Lewis and NPWS officers, expressed apprehension about such an institutional design.²² They voiced concern about how the IRDP might replace their legislative authority over wildlife. They believed NPWS could provide the expertise needed by any wildlife conservation scheme. And they wondered how such a large program could

²¹"Resolutions Passed at the Lupande Development Workshop," in Proceedings, p. 99. Participants also agreed to the formation of an Interim Planning Group to prepare programs and budgets to support the project, and the need for an independent review to explore the feasibility of a policy that featured an integrated resource approach, and to insure that no single department or ministry dominated the design-making stage.

²²Lewis chose to work closely with the National Parks and Wildlife Service from the start of his research efforts in Zambia. He befriended many of the junior officers (and became an officer himself). He collaborated with them to publish academic papers. He worked actively to secure grants for research activities that included NPWS. He brought the latest concepts of the international wildlife management community to the attention of NPWS. And he publicly supported NPWS's constitutional mandate as the protector and manager of wildlife resources in Zambia.

It is difficult to distinguish between the ideas of Lewis and others of the NPWS directorate. NPWS officers and Lewis purposefully give each other credit to enhance the perception that the NPWS is a unified, Zambian agency. While Lewis clearly did not dictate decisions, most NPWS officers interviewed agree that he was crucial to many NPWS's policy changes, especially ADMADE. While I often use "NPWS" in the text, Lewis's instrumental role in NPWS decision-making cannot be underestimated.

effectively include the needs of the local resource-user, supposedly the goal of any new policy. Other government officials sided with NPWS's concerns. While all departments generally favored the benefits of donor-funded development schemes, they remained wary about the roles that their respective agencies might play in such a structure.

b. The National Parks and Wildlife Service:

re-establishing and extending authority through ADMADE

Lewis and NPWS officers understood the threat posed by the European bloc and their proposed IRDP. Without an effective counterstroke, NPWS stood to be replaced as the manager of wildlife resources in the Luangwa Valley. Worse, given President Kaunda's early support for the IRDP concept and his own deep distrust of NPWS, the department feared they could be removed as Zambia's principal wildlife manager throughout the rest of the country if the IRDP proved successful.²³ Lewis and the NPWS responded by creating their own pilot conservation program that aimed to increase their control over wildlife resources, while simultaneously shielding these efforts from political interference.

NPWS possessed a resource that critically influenced its strategies: it already enjoyed a share of public authority. The department had a legislative mandate to manage Zambia's wildlife estate. Further, it controlled an organization that, while weak, still existed nationwide. These assets allowed NPWS to develop and implement a new program under its own auspices, without forming alliances with other public agencies or politicians, which might foster future intervention or takeover. These assets also marginally reduced politicians' ability to intervene in NPWS's affairs, since they would incur transaction costs if he decided to change the department's policy or structure. NPWS's share of public authority allowed it to construct a new program that, at least in its infancy, was relatively insulated from political meddling. Most importantly, these assets allowed NPWS to pursue its program without direct dependence on President Kaunda.

NPWS's initial actions: a pilot project

As a first response to the disconcerting support that many of the workshop's participants gave to a large scale project, NPWS speeded up plans to establish their own pilot

²³President Kaunda said he "doubted some of the cheaters at NPWS." Interview with President Kenneth Kaunda, Lusaka, 18 August 1992.

wildlife management project in the Luangwa Valley.²⁴ NPWS's design emphasized three organizational goals for the pilot project. First, it sought to increase the department's revenue and shield it from governmental control. Second, it sought to increase the number of NPWS staff, without depending on other departments if possible. And third, it sought to create popular support for the project. Throughout the process of designing the new project, NPWS avoided involving Kaunda.²⁵

NPWS needed revenue to establish their program. To this end, it successfully persuaded the Ministry of Tourism (NPWS's parent ministry) to declare the lower Lupande game management area as a safari hunting concession under the pilot project's control. The department also convinced the Ministry to implement a new tax on safari companies.²⁶ Before, safari companies paid two fees to engage in the hunting business: a fee (in dollars) for the hunting rights to a particular area and a game management area permit (in kwacha), both amounts accruing to the central government. Despite these taxes, many NPWS officers maintained that safari companies paid relatively little when compared with the amount of profits that could be earned during the hunting season. Lewis, in particular, thought that the companies would be willing to pay more for the hunting rights to an area as popular as Lupande. He also knew that it would be difficult to appropriate any share of the extant fees on safari hunting that the central government currently received. To provide the project with financing while staying clear of political fights that could cause intervention, Lewis suggested

²⁴NPWS asserted that the pilot project, called the Lupande Development Project, was designed to solve the land use conflicts between humans and wildlife, to develop greater responsibility for the local management of natural resources and to demonstrate the sustainable use of natural resources. See Lupande News and Views No. 1 (September 1985).

²⁵Interview with Dale Lewis, ADMADE Technical Advisor, Nyamaluma Camp, Zambia, 28 June 1991.

²⁶Safari hunting clients themselves paid five types of fees: fees for the various animals hunted, a basic safari license fee, a standard fee for exporting trophies and a tax on each trophy exported.

an entirely new safari concession fee.²⁷ The NPWS soon established the new fee at a rate of \$2000 for each 14 day safari.

It was one thing for NPWS to gain new sources of revenue; it was another to insulate the newly-acquired funds from politicians and bureaucrats, who were ever-hungry for patronage resources. The financial freedom desired by NPWS for their pilot project was greatly facilitated by the department's extant Wildlife Revolving Conservation Fund (hereafter the Fund). Because of the mounting fiscal problems confronting the government budget in the 1980s, the party and its government had decided to allow public agencies to create revolving funds in the hope that some agencies could operate on the revenue they earned. While such revolving funds actually did little to reduce the demands that agencies placed on the central government for funds, they did allow the agencies great financial latitude.²⁸ Revolving fund managers rarely submitted the annual reports required by the Ministry of Finance, so little was known about the revenues or expenditures of these revolving funds.²⁹

NPWS, which had acquired its own revolving fund in January 1983, began to use it more intensely in for their pilot project: all the new safari fees were paid directly to the

²⁷Significantly, NPWS did not have to rely on Kaunda or other public agencies for these changes, so neither the transfer of the concession area nor the new tax required NPWS to fight other government officials. The Minister of Tourism had the authority to declare these actions unilaterally.

²⁸Under Cap. 600, government agencies capable of supporting themselves had been able to apply for their own "working funds" since 1969. The government wanted such funds to allow agencies, especially those related to the mining industry, to procure quickly needed inputs from their own revenues without having to go through the Ministry of Finance. Interview with B. Nair, Director of Internal Accounts, Ministry of Finance, Lusaka, 1 April 1991.

²⁹Ibid. Mr. Nair believes that, due to a lack of oversight, many of these revolving fund administrators became wealthier.

Fund. This allowed the department flexibility and speed for its expenditures.³⁰ It also helped shield the project and its revenue from oversight.

NPWS's second goal was to use the pilot project to increase their staff in the field, thereby increasing the department's control over Zambia's wildlife estate. Before the pilot project, NPWS faced two constraints to hiring employees: a legal limit to their department's numbers and the lack of money necessary to pay new personnel. NPWS came up with a clever solution to these problems. The department successfully convinced their minister to designate Classified Employees as wildlife officers.³¹ Classified Employees could be paid a fraction of the wages of a regular civil servant and could be fired for non-performance. This permitted NPWS to hire a highly motivated and relatively inexpensive force of local residents as wildlife scouts for the pilot program. This tactic also engaged the local community with the tangible benefit of employment.³²

NPWS's final goal was to gain grassroots support for the pilot project. Such support would both reduce the department's implementation costs and reduce the likelihood of any political attempt to cancel the project. Delivering tangible benefits to locals was also one of the policy changes advocated by NPWS and others at the Lupande Workshop. Consequently, NPWS worked hard at gaining grassroots support for their program.³³ In addition to hiring locals as scouts, NPWS established a cropping station to provide employment and meat for local residents and revenue, and gave the local community 50% of the profits the station earned from the sale of meat, skin and tusks.³⁴ NPWS gave the community 40% of the

³⁰Ibid. Also see Wright, "Alleviating Poverty," p. 14; A.N. Mwenya, D.M. Lewis and G.B. Kaweche, ADMADE: Policy Background and Future (Republic of Zambia, [1990]), p. 4. See also Nair interview. The government seeded the Wildlife Conservation Revolving Fund with a grant of 418,618 kwacha in 1984. LIRDPA would use the WCRF to deposit its earnings until it gained its own revolving fund in 1987.

³¹Wright, "Alleviating Poverty," p. 14.

³²Ibid., p. 15.

³³Interview with Lewis.

³⁴Although the local Kunda ethnic group do not prefer to eat hippo meat, it was still cropped because its products could be sold elsewhere, and the number of hippo in the area could well withstand a significant amount of offtake.

revenues it collected from the new safari concession fee.³⁵ NPWS expedited the grading of the major road in the area, hiring local villagers as day laborers to complete the task. To win the support of the area's elite, NPWS consulted with the local chief about which individuals should be selected as village scouts.

The NPWS hailed its pilot project as a great success, claiming that in addition to the revenue and jobs it produced, poaching rates had declined 90% in the project's area over three years, local residents could buy game meat legally from the cropping station and the motivation of village scouts exceeded that of regular NPWS staff.³⁶ Additionally, a NPWS survey of villagers' attitudes toward wildlife found with "convincing certainty" that individuals within the pilot project area had a more protective sense of wildlife than those outside of it.³⁷ Critics of the program questioned many of these claims.³⁸

³⁵In 1986 NPWS collected 134,444.41 Zambian kwacha (ZK) in safari concession fees, of which the community's share was ZK 53,777.76. Using a nominal exchange rate of 7.5 kwacha to the US dollar, the amounts represent approximately \$18,000 and \$7200 respectively. See A.N. Mwenya, G.B.Kaweche and D.M. Lewis, Administrative Design for Game Management Areas (ADMAGE) (Chilanga, Zambia: National Parks and Wildlife Service, [January 1988]), p. 6. The exchange rate used here is the average of the nominal figures presented for the four quarters of 1986. See Doris Jansen, Trade, Exchange rate, and Agricultural Pricing Policies in Zambia, (Washington D.C.: World Bank, 1988), Table 6, p. 21. Because these are nominal figures, and the value of the kwacha was overvalued by the Zambian government, the amounts above overestimate the value of the ADMAGE revenues.

³⁶NPWS claims the pilot project produced over \$35,000 in gross revenues and provided 21 full-time and 37 part-time jobs. See National Parks and Wildlife Service/Lupande Development Project "Zambian Wildlands and Human Needs Newsletter," (Nyamaluma Camp, number 1, May 1988); Mwenya et. al. "Administrative Management," pp. 5-6.

³⁷Mwenya et. al. ADMAGE. p. 4.

³⁸ Lewis based the rate of poaching decline on the decline in the number of fresh carcasses of rhino and elephant found in the project area. Critics indict this methodology on several grounds. The incentives and skills of the village scout/NPWS patrols' counting may produce low counts. Poachers could have hid carcasses. And the use of the fresh carcass technique does not take into account baseline populations or possible animal migration.

Even NPWS later questioned the impact of the project's benefits on local attitudes. "Overwhelming evidence supported the conclusion that the more positive attitudes toward wildlife conservation found among residents in the Lupande Project area was (sic) at least partially due to the significant economic benefits from wildlife available to the local community." (Emphasis added.) From NPWS/LDP "Zambian Wildlands and Human Needs Newsletter," (Nyamaluma Camp, number 1, May 1988): p. 2.

But the design of the pilot project clearly allowed NPWS to achieve its organizational goals. It had expanded and insulated its revenue base. It had retained its predominance in decisions over wildlife in the area. It had extended its authority in the field through the village scout program. And it had gained a measure of support from the local elite who had benefited most from the project's goods.³⁹ Importantly, the department had attained these goals without relying on President Kaunda or other politicians.

Establishing a nation-wide program

Increasingly worried about the progress of their rivals' IRDP implementation, NPWS quickly adopted the pilot program's basic design for a nationwide program in 1987, calling it the Administrative Management Design for Game Management Areas (ADMADE). ADMADE maintained the department's core strategy of augmenting its resources and insulating them from political manipulation. This strategy is clearly evident in NPWS's choices regarding ADMADE's decision-making and revenue structures. To achieve even greater protection from the possible predations of Kaunda, other political actors and the IRDP, NPWS secured an international sponsor — the United States Agency for International Development (USAID).

i. ADMADE's decision-making and revenue sharing structures

NPWS designed ADMADE to keep all significant decisions about the program under their control. Overall responsibility for ADMADE's design and implementation was in the hands of the ADMADE Directorate, which included only senior officers from NPWS. Beneath this body, ADMADE established wildlife management units in certain areas of the country.⁴⁰ The NPWS appointed one of its own staff as a "unit leader" to direct the implementation of ADMADE policy in each unit.

³⁹The project, like many development projects, gave access to decision-making powers and material benefits to the chief and his followers. The project had no provision to include non-elites in decision-making structures.

⁴⁰NPWS originally selected units on the criterion that their safari concession fees would cover the costs of ADMADE programs. Thus, some units' boundaries coincided with areas already marked as hunting blocks. However, most units followed established GMA borders, apparently to reduce possible administrative confusion. See NPWS/LDP "Wildlands and Human Needs Newsletter," p. 3. However, neither the ability of areas to support safari hunting nor their potential for effective wildlife management correlate with GMA boundaries.

For each unit capable of supporting its own wildlife management, ADMADE established a Wildlife Management Authority. The district governor chaired the Authority, and the district executive secretary served as vice-chairman. Members included the area's wildlife warden, member of Parliament, unit leader, chiefs and ward chairman. The Authority also allowed the managing directors of safari companies to become members if their business operations had a commercial interest in the unit's area.⁴¹ Every Authority, in turn, contained a Wildlife Management Sub-authority for each chiefdom in the unit. The local chief chaired this body, whose members included village headmen, the unit leader, ward chairman, teachers and a district council representative.

NPWS had a two-fold strategy for membership on the Authority and Sub-authority. First, NPWS wanted to use these bodies to garner support for ADMADE at the local level. NPWS officers believed if ADMADE could secure the favor of chiefs, headmen, ward chairmen and teachers, their program could be implemented with less hostility from the local community and thus lower the department's enforcement costs. In the best case, local demand for ADMADE would also help thwart any political threats made toward the program.⁴² Second, NPWS specifically chose to include certain regional political actors within ADMADE's structure to enhance the department's access to government goods and services.⁴³

The choice to include politicians within the ADMADE structure did not come easily to NPWS officers; they greatly feared the political meddling that could result from such a tactic. In an effort to retain complete control over the program, the NPWS had originally planned to place its own wildlife wardens as chairmen of the Authority. But the Ministry of Tourism's permanent secretary advised NPWS to ask district governors to chair the Authority both to protect the program from local politicians seeking to hijack it, and to use the

⁴¹Mwenya et. al. ADMADE, p. 6.

⁴²Interview with Lewis, 28 June 1991.

⁴³Mwenya et. al., ADMADE, p. 6.

governors' influence to expedite central government services.⁴⁴ NPWS eventually agreed to this tactic.

While acknowledging the utility of having local politicians on the ADMADE Authorities and Sub-authorities, NPWS sought to curtail any political interference by establishing terms of reference that severely circumscribed these groups' powers. The Authority could only advise on decisions already taken by NPWS staff regarding access to wildlife resources, i.e. hunting quotas and hunting licenses. Additionally, ADMADE policy required the Authority and the Sub-authority to help NPWS fulfill its mandate of protecting Zambia's wildlife estate. The Authority should "monitor both illegal and illegal off-takes of wildlife, "prepare a workplan for the unit's wildlife management program" and "enforce the National Parks and Wildlife Act., Cap. 316, and other relevant Acts through the office of that unit's leader." Among other things, the Sub-authority should "monitor and solve wildlife management problems on the level of the chiefdom" and "facilitate the implementation of any programs, plans projects, etc. approved by the authority."⁴⁵ In sum, the NPWS allocation of decision-making powers to non-departmental people was slight; the

⁴⁴Lewis interview; see also NPWS/LDP "Wildlands and Human Needs Newsletter," no. 1 (May 1988): p. 4.

⁴⁵Mwenya et. al., ADMADE, pp. 6-7. The full terms of reference for the WMA were:

- monitor both illegal and illegal off-takes of wildlife resources;
- initiate projects for improved wildlife management
- approve allocation of sustained-yield quotas of wildlife as recommended by NPWS for various forms of use: safari hunting, export and restocking, culling, resident hunting, etc.;
- liaise with the Director, NPWS, on the issuance of hunting licenses;
- ensure that 40 percent of the revenue generated from the exploitation of wildlife resources is committed to the management costs of wildlife resources within the unit;
- ensure that 35 percent of the revenue earned is used by local village communities from whose area such revenues were generated'
- prepare a workplan for the unit's wildlife management program and local community improvement on an annual basis;
- enforce the National Parks and Wildlife Act, Cap.316, and other relevant Acts through the office of that unit's unit leader;
- furnish the Director of NPWS records of its meetings;
- encourage applied management research and solicit outside expertise where needed;
- act as a planning body for formulating new wildlife policies and appropriate management activities;
- implement policy concerning wildlife management for its unit, and;
- manage self-help schemes by appointed communities.

department remained in firm control over the substance and implementation of the ADMADE policy.

NPWS's formula to distribute ADMADE revenues also kept the department's control and interests paramount. In the original allocation, NPWS gave itself 40% of ADMADE revenues to meet its management costs in each unit. The local community received 35% for development projects. NPWS also awarded itself 15% of ADMADE revenues to run Zambia's national parks, even though ADMADE funds came predominantly from hunting in game management areas. NPWS gave the remaining 10% to the Zambia National Tourist Board for the promotion of tourism.⁴⁶ The department changed the beneficiaries over time, increasing NPWS's allotment. In 1990, they applied 15% to the NPWS to defray its overall costs of administering ADMADE.⁴⁷ By 1991, they retained the 10% portion as well, to support the costs they incurred for managing national parks.⁴⁸

ii. **ADMADE and international** sponsors

Despite its growing success at creating and protecting new sources of revenue and decision-making, NPWS officers realized they needed greater funding to establish ADMADE as a strong, countrywide program. They also knew that any increase in revenue would increase the potential for political interference. Partial funding from the World Wildlife Fund allowed ADMADE to be instituted in six (out of 32) game management areas in 1988.⁴⁹ The new safari hunting concession fee they had established was lucrative, but would fall short of the funds the department believed necessary to beat back the threat posed by the European conservationists, who had already received the enthusiastic backing of

⁴⁶Mwenya et. al. "Administrative Management," p. 13.

⁴⁷NPWS/LDP "Wildlands and Human Needs Newsletter," no. 6 (August 1990): p. 2.

⁴⁸NPWS/LDP "Wildlands and Human Needs Newsletter," no. 9 (September 1991): p. 1.

⁴⁹WWF gave ADMADE \$124,000 for the purchase of two vehicles and the construction of unit headquarters for in two GMAs. Additional funding was also provided by IJSAID and a US citizen who had befriended Dale Lewis. See NPWS/LDP "Zambian Wildlands and Human Needs Newsletter," (Nyamaluma Camp, number 1, May 1988): p. 4.

President Kaunda for their IRDP and were currently discussing funding with the Norwegian Agency for International Development NORAD.⁵⁰

Working through connections that Lewis had cultivated with United States embassy personnel, NPWS achieved some of the financial security it had sought: a three million dollar grant from USAID. The money firmly established ADMADE as an important conservation program in Zambia.

The U.S. support was more than just a financial boon for ADMADE; NPWS officers and Lewis purposefully used the international agreement to protect the independence of ADMADE's decision-making, personnel and financial institutions from domestic political intervention. First, the project grant agreement between Zambia and the U.S. acceded to ADMADE's established decision-making structures. The document's description of the membership and powers of the Authority and Sub-authority mirror ADMADE's prior policy documents.⁵¹ The ADMADE directorate, whose name changed to the ADMADE Coordinating Committee, remained composed of only NPWS officers.⁵² Second, the Zambian government agreed to augment "substantially" the number of NPWS staff to reduce poaching.⁵³ In addition, the government committed to assigning ADMADE a land use planning officer, a senior natural resource economist, a senior wildlife ranching ecologist, an accountant, a senior wildlife warden and "any other professional or technical personnel as may be required under the Project." To support the "continuation and growth" of ADMADE, the Zambian government also agreed to absorb these positions into their permanent civil service.⁵⁴

⁵⁰ *Ibid.* In 1988, revenue from the 14 ADMADE units was US \$391,250. Safari hunting concession fees accounted for well over 90% of the total.

⁵¹ Republic of Zambia, "Project Grant Agreement between the Republic of Zambia and the United States of America for Natural Resources Management," 1990. (Mimeographed.) Annex I, p 3.

⁵² Although the grant allowed for a project officer from the WWF to supervise ADMADE, NPWS had a say in the individual selected.

⁵³ *Ibid.*, p. 4.

⁵⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 5.

Third, the agreement produced additional revenue for ADMADE and protected it from political interference. USAID's money allowed ADMADE to expand to nine GMAs, considerably enlarging the area over which NPWS could exert effective authority.⁵⁵ The Zambian government acceded to contribute "all other resources required to carry out the Project effectively and in a timely manner."⁵⁶ In addition, Zambia agreed to transfer 50% of the revenues earned from hunting licenses and trophy fees to the Wildlife Conservation Revolving Fund to help cover the management costs in ADMADE GMAs; to begin to tax tour operators and give the levies to the Fund; and to allow ADMADE to retain the portion of income it had been giving to the Zambian National Tourist Board. And, since ADMADE depended primarily on revenues derived from the safari business, USAID obliged the Zambian government to maintain at least the current level of recreational safari hunting in the country.⁵⁷

To ensure the future integrity of ADMADE, USAID and Zambia agreed on the need to establish an evaluation program as part of the project. Such evaluations would include the project's success in attaining its objectives, identification of problem areas or project constraints and assessment of the overall development impact of ADMADE, helping to reduce the possibility of ongoing intervention by domestic political actors.⁵⁸

USAID money breathed new life into the financially-strapped department. But NPWS used the sponsorship to protect their program as well. The USAID agreement tied the Zambian government to the institutions designed by NPWS officers, which had been constructed to extend NPWS authority and insulate the ADMADE program from domestic intervention. The agreement also backed ADMADE's institutional arrangements with the threat of international retaliation.

⁵⁵USAID gave \$1.1 million to ADMADE through WWF and \$1.8 million to ADMADE for capital expenditure. USAID kept \$100,000 for future evaluation expenses and discretionary funds. The final agreement was not signed until 16 January 1990. Interview with Jim Harmon, USAID Zambia, Lusaka, 15 February 91.

⁵⁶ "Project Grant Agreement," p. 2.

⁵⁷In fact, the Zambian government agreed to make these changes before the disbursement of any USAID funds. See "Project Grant Agreement," p. 3.

⁵⁸*Ibid.*, p. 4.

c. Conservationists, Kaunda and the birth of LIRDP

Crafting institutions and seeking political patronage

Following the 1983 Lupande Workshop, the European-led group pursued to its desire to create an IRDP in the Luangwa Valley. While facing the same set of political institutions as NPWS, this group, however, confronted a different task in setting up their program. They were not government officials. They did not currently run a Zambian public agency. They had no staff. And they controlled no funds. These factors forced the group to choose different tactics in their efforts to gain control over Zambia's wildlife estate while contending with the political uncertainty of the Zambian one-party government. Most importantly, it pushed them into an alliance with President Kaunda.

i. LIRDP's original design

Following the Lupande Workshop's proposals, the National Commission for Development Planning (NCDP) submitted a funding request to the NORAD on 17 July 1984 for a feasibility study for an integrated resource development project on the Luangwa Valley.⁵⁹ NORAD and NCDP selected two consultants for the study: Thor Larsen (NORAD) and Fidelis Lungu (NPWS).⁶⁰

Larsen and Lungu's recommendations for their new pilot conservation program — the Luangwa Integrated Resource Development Project (LIRDP) — followed closely two preferences of the European-led conservationist bloc of the Lupande Workshop.⁶¹ First,

⁵⁹The National Commission for Development Planning (NCDP) is the Zambian agency responsible for overseeing all inter-ministerial development projects in the country.

⁶⁰Larsen, a Norwegian wildlife biologist, did not possess primary expertise in either Africa or development projects; his most well-known work dealt with polar bears. To overcome his lack of knowledge, Larsen relied a great deal on the knowledge and opinions of the European conservationist community in Zambia. Lungu, although employed as a NPWS biologist, had always felt excluded from the department's inner circle of decision-makers. Lungu was ambitious, knew the Zambian political environment well and had experience working with international conservation organizations. Interviews with Mike Faddy, Save the Rhino Trust and Chinzombo Safari Lodge, Lusaka, 21 March 1991; Monica Ngoma, former senior economist, Land and Natural Resource Unit, National Commission for Development Planning, Lusaka, 10 October 1991; and Fidelis Lungu, former co-director LIRDP, Chipata, Zambia, 28 May 1991.

⁶¹ Another NORAD consultant, Trond Vedeld, helped Larsen and Lungu from 13 June to 10 July 1985. ADMADE's Dale Lewis claims that Larsen rewrote the terms of reference to

Larsen and Lungu supported the multi-sectoral IRDP approach.⁶² Like the European conservationists, they believed such an all-encompassing institution could best manage the contingent nature of resource use, despite the general trend in the development community to move away from large-scale projects, and despite their own lack of experience with development projects of this size.⁶³

Second, both Larsen and Lungu distrusted NPWS. Their proposed LIRDP virtually eliminated the NPWS's authority over the most important wildlife areas in the country. Larsen and Lungu suggested that LIRDP gain control of the South Luangwa National Park, the "jewel of the NPWS crown," and the Lupande Game Management Area, home to some of the better hunting blocs in Zambia.⁶⁴ NPWS stood to lose not only the revenues from

further his own vision of the Lupande area project. Interview with Lewis, 28 June 1991.

It can be claimed that the European bloc had a third preference in their approach to conservation which also influenced Larsen and Lungu. Despite rhetoric to the contrary, Larsen and Lungu mirrored some of the European conservationists' misgivings about devolving any real authority over wildlife resources to local Africans. The consultants' report devoted less than two of their report's over ninety pages discussing the role of local Zambians within LIRDP. Larsen and Lungu avoided making any concrete recommendations about the role of locals, leaving for the future LIRDP administrators to "determine how these ideas and principles can best be put into life under the LIRDP." See their "Preparation Report" p. 85.

⁶²While LIRDP sought to manage the full range of natural resources, wildlife clearly remained the means and the ends of most of LIRDP's proposed activities. Wildlife tourism and hunting would generate the majority of LIRDP's funds, and policies to strengthen wildlife management dominated LIRDP's planned activities. Thor Larsen, Fideiis B. Lungu and Trond Vedeld, "Preparation Report on the Luangwa Integrated Resource Development Project (LIRDP), Chipata, September 1985. (Mimeographed.)

Some NCDP and NORAD officials believed LIRDP's focus on wildlife reflected the professional background of the Larsen and Lungu, and cynically remarked that some of the project's activities, such as the women's program, "were merely window-dressing designed to get the sponsorship of foreign donors for a big wildlife project."

⁶³Interview with Arne Lonning, NORAD, Lusaka, 10 September 1991. This was Larsen's first experience with a development project. Further, had Larsen and Lungu reviewed current development literature — which normally appears in NORAD project proposals — they would have revealed that experts were beginning to reject IRDPs in favor of supporting key institutions at the local level and locally-sustainable projects.

⁶⁴Interview with Richard Bell, co-director LIRDP, Chipata, Zambia, 28 May 1991.

the sale of these areas to safari operators, but the transfer of authority would also seriously damage the department's prestige as the de jure protector of Zambia's wildlife.⁶⁵

Larsen and Lungu espoused a design for LIRDP that would enhance its insulation from political intervention. They proposed the LIRDP assume authority over all land-use and resource management projects in the proposed area, including control over all aspects of wildlife management that the NPWS currently exercised, such as determining hunting quotas, controlling harvesting, distributing meat and patrolling for poachers. The consultants thought that LIRDP administrators should be included in all government decision-making regarding the project area. Further, the consultants recommended that LIRDP administration gain supervisory powers over all ministry staff seconded to the project.

To enhance LIRDP's financial freedom, the consultants advocated that the project be given its own revolving fund mechanism. All revenues from project activities would be put into this fund, including game license fees, safari license fees, national parks entrance fees and revenues generated from the sale of confiscated trophies (such as ivory and rhino horn). Larsen and Lungu's proposed giving the LIRDP administrators complete control of this fund, so that they could authorize necessary expenditures without having to run the gauntlet of central government agencies for permission. Larsen and Lungu's financial structures would significantly reduce government oversight of LIRDP expenditures and receipts.

Further insulating LIRDP was Larsen and Lungu's plan to confer strong powers to LIRDP's two directors. The co-directors would be responsible only to a Steering Committee.⁶⁶ Although the co-directors could be advised by members of the NPWS, the University of Zambia, the Wildlife Conservation Society of Zambia, six chiefs, four

⁶⁵Revealingly, most of Larsen and Lungu's discussion of NPWS in their "Preparation Report" occurs only in the context of which staff and resources the department should bequeath to the new LIRDP program.

⁶⁶At this time, Larsen and Lungu suggested that the committee's membership be "open to all organizations (Government Ministries, District Councils, Chiefs, etc.) which might be affected by the Project or have a legitimate interest in it." See their "Preparation Report," p. 61. Besides chiefs, rural residents were not mentioned.

chairman of the local UNEP wards and "other relevant agencies," the co-directors ultimately had the power to choose which activities to fund and which individuals would staff them.⁶⁷

In total, Larsen and Lungu's recommendations reflected both the preferences of the European conservationists bloc and the political institutions of Zambia's one-party state. Decisions would emanate from the top of a hierarchically-organized, independent government agency that was unaffiliated with NPWS. LIRDP administration would have authority over the projects and staff of other government agencies in its area, and control their own revolving fund.⁶⁸ And while rural residents would benefit from the program, they were still removed from any meaningful decision-making power over wildlife resources, and remained subject to the exclusionary impact of Cap. 316, whose provisions LIRDP planned to enforce more diligently.

ii. LIRDP's need for Kaunda

Lungu and the European conservationists knew their proposal for a vast new bureaucracy would not fare well if left to the normal political process. Conservation was unpopular. The government was nearly bankrupt. And extant government agencies would resent LIRDP's attempts to usurp their legal mandates and staff. Only one Zambian politician could provide the political backing necessary for LIRDP to appropriate these resources: President Kaunda.

Larsen and Lungu used the influence of the Eastern Province Member of UNIP's Central Committee and the leverage of Larsen's affiliation with NORAD to press for a private audience with Kaunda. During their discussions, the consultants also suggested that

⁶⁷Larsen and Lungu proposed seven organizational sub-units under the co-directors's authority (extension/development, operation and logistics, anti-poaching, information/education, women's program, research/management and cooperatives) but thought it best to allow the future co-directors to design the activities and structures of these sub-units in more detail. *Ibid.*, pp. 64-65.

⁶⁸Despite LIRDP's goal of self-sufficiency, and its desire to expropriate all wildlife-related revenues in the project area, the consultants estimated that the project would still require \$25 million in external funds over the first five years before it became self-sufficient. See Larsen and Lungu, "Preparation Report" p. 67. In comparison, the Ministry of Health's expenditures for the entire country was about \$ 23 million in 1986.

the President assume the chairmanship of LIRDP's Steering Committee. Kaunda enthusiastically accepted.⁶⁹

Kaunda had several reasons to support LIRDP. Of course, one reason was that the President was a conservationist who had been frustrated in his previous efforts to preserve Zambia's wildlife. Groups and individuals from the international community had criticized his conservation record, and LIRDP provided a means to answer his critics. But LIRDP served other ends as well. LIRDP would channel funds, development projects and employment to the Eastern Province, long known as a UNIP stronghold. Further, LIRDP could deliver these benefits without generating the criticism about Kaunda playing regional favorites: after all, the Luangwa Valley area was chosen because of its spectacular wildlife, and the monies would come from international donors, not government coffers. The program's core area, the Mambwe sub-district, happened to be the home of his wife's family; his son Wezi would win the area's parliamentary seat in 1988. Supporting the LIRDP allowed Kaunda to meet conservation and political goals with little cost.

LIRDP began to benefit immediately from the patronage of the most powerful politician in Zambia. Unlike most development projects under the NDCP, Larsen and Lungu's used Kaunda's backing to avoid presenting their proposals for scrutiny, and LERDP's Phase I began without any NDCP review.⁷⁰ Kaunda intervened directly to hire LIRDP's co-directors, writing to Malawian President Hastings Banda to release Dr. Richard Bell from service as a consultant to the Malawian wildlife department. Kaunda also wrote a letter to the Ministry of Finance on 7 May 1986, formally initiating LIRDP and appointing

⁶⁹Richard Bell and Fidelis Lungu tell a less political tale about Larsen and Lungu's meeting with Kaunda. They assert that during the president's annual visit to the presidential lodge in the Luangwa Valley, Kaunda had heard of the report being prepared by Larsen and Lungu, and had "demanded" that they journey to his lodge to present their findings. Their ensuing discussion supposedly moved Kaunda deeply; he declared LIRDP to be the "answer to my prayers" and insisted on being the chair of the Steering Committee. Interviews with Bell and Lungu, 28 May 1991.

⁷⁰Interview with Gilson Kaweche, former NPWS Chief Research Officer, Chilanga, Zambia, 10 October 1991. Kaweche avers that NCDP questioned the procedures that LIRDP followed.

Bell and Lungu as its co-directors.⁷¹ And Kaunda began personal appeals to the Prime Minister of Norway for funding.⁷²

Bell and Lungu used Kaunda's backing to build an organization insulated from other government agencies. Following LIRDPA's official start under the supervision of the NCDP's permanent secretary, the co-directors concentrated on developing the organizational structure, work programs and funding proposals of LIRDPA from late 1985 to early 1986. Some permanent secretaries, worried about the threat of LIRDPA's future powers, encouraged the co-directors to discuss LIRDPA with salient government departments, NGOs and local communities.⁷³

Bell and Lungu realized that government agencies would fear LIRDPA's possible usurpation of their authority.⁷⁴ The co-directors' first progress report attempted to mollify some officials' initial worry about their spheres of influence. Explicitly stating that LIRDPA "should not be regraded as a 'special project' with special privileges," the report asserts that while LIRDPA may be a "novel" organization, it will develop to be a "mainstream component of the Zambian Government."⁷⁵ The proposed structure of LIRDPA at this time appeared to place the project squarely under the authority of existing government and party officials. The Steering Committee, whose mandate was to give general policy guidance to LIRDPA,

⁷¹Ibid. NCDP Permanent Secretary Alamakuni told Chief Wildlife Research Officer Gilson Kaweche that the positions should have been advertised.

⁷²On 7 May 1986, President Kaunda formally initiated LIRDPA in his letter to the Ministry of Finance which outlined the principal features of the program, including LIRDPA's control of the South Luangwa National Park and Lupande Game Management Areas, responsibility for all programs concerning natural resource study and use in the project area, right to a revolving fund mechanism and management by two co-directors. See R.H.V. Bell and F.B. Lungu, "The Luangwa Integrated Resource Development Project, Progress of Phase I and Proposals for Phase n," 11 August 1986, pp. VHI-IX. (Mimeographed.)

⁷³The ministries were Finance, National Commission for Development Planning, Lands and Natural Resources, Tourism, Agriculture and Water Management, Decentralization, Cabinet Office and Personnel Division and Cooperatives.

⁷⁴Interviews with Bell and Lungu, 28 May 1991.

⁷⁵Bell and Lungu, "LIRDPA, Progress of Phase I and Proposals for Phase II." p.11. See also "The Luangwa Integrated resource Development Project, The Phase Two Programme," LIRDPA Project document No. 4, November, 1987, p. 14. (Mimeographed.)

included members of both the UNIP Central Committee and ministries in whose sectors or provinces LIRDP intended to operate; President Kaunda remained the chairman. Permanent secretaries formed an Executive Committee (formerly the Advisory Council), responsible for the implementation of policy. The Director-General of the NCDP chaired the Executive Committee.⁷⁶

Despite these proposed assurances, Bell and Lungu still advanced a design that emphasized LIRDP's plan to appropriate the staff, resources and public authority of other government agencies, and to insulate LIRDP insulation from political and financial intervention. They recommended that all district-level government officers in their program area be seconded to LIRDP. They reiterated the need for a revolving fund under the day-to-day control of the co-directors.⁷⁷ And they asked the government to draft legislation to give LIRDP the legal status of an independent, self-managing Authority.

Permanent secretaries immediately objected to Bell and Lungu's proposal for the secondment of their district-level officers to LIRDP. Bell and Lungu retreated, and tried to construct another way to maintain access to the government personnel which they needed to run their program.⁷⁸ Eventually, Bell and Lungu suggested the formation of technical subcommittees to the Executive Committee. These technical subcommittees, composed of both departmental and LIRDP staff, would develop and supervise the work programs of the sectoral department staffs in the project area, with funding coming through LIRDP.⁷⁹

⁷⁶President Kaunda also chaired the NCDP.

⁷⁷Bell realized that decentralized programs often failed for lack of independent sources of revenue, and cited the poor success of Zambia's decentralization plans in the early 1980s for proof (Decentralisation Act of 1980, Act No. 15 of 1980). He claims the decentralization effort floundered because while responsible for implementing policies and delivering services to the district level, district councils were not given any powers to raise revenues. See "The Luangwa Integrated Resource Development Project, A Presentation to the National Assembly," December 1990, p. 2. (Mimeographed.)

⁷⁸LIRDP, "The Phase 2 Programme," p. 56.

⁷⁹Bell and Lungu's final proposal slated subcommittees for agriculture, women's program, forestry, fisheries, works and supply, water development and wildlife management. The chairman of each technical subcommittee would be the highest ranking departmental officer of the province.

departmental staff would "remain responsible to their parent departments, which transmit to them the decisions of the technical sub-committees."⁸⁰

The co-directors presented the progress of Phase I, which included their design for LIRD, to a meeting of government officials and donors at Chichele Lodge in the Luangwa Valley in June 1987. While not attending personally, Kaunda's long shadow was still apparent: the permanent secretaries present eventually agreed to Bell and Lungu's revised LIRD structure.⁸¹

Despite the presence of officials from the aid agencies of the United States, Sweden and Norway at the meeting, major donor funding had not been secured by its end. To demonstrate his strong support for LIRD, President Kaunda summoned all of the meeting's participants to his residence at Kasaba Bay on Lake Tanganyika for discussions — with the government picking up the tab for all transportation, meals and accommodation. Government officials present for the Kasaba Bay meetings believed Kaunda intended to demonstrate to donors that LIRD was worth funding since it had his personal backing.⁸² Donors did make stronger commitments to fund LIRD as a result of Kaunda's intervention: in October 1988, NORAD agreed to grant LIRD \$12.3 million over its first five years.

fii. Seeking insulation through NORAD

Like NPWS, Bell and Lungu used their affiliation with an international sponsor for more than just revenue. While benefiting from Kaunda's patronage, they also feared it. One of their strategies to reduce the President's possible intervention was to invite him to chair the LIRD Steering Committee, a relatively powerless position that would allow the co-directors both to monitor Kaunda's positions and to influence him to favor their goals. But the President could still squash the dreams of Bell, Lungu and the European conservationists for an entirely independent conservation agency operating in the Luangwa Valley.

Consequently, the co-directors structured the agreement with NORAD to limit the possibility of political — especially Kaunda's — capricious intervention. The agreement

⁸⁰LIRD⁸⁰ "The Phase 2 Programme," p. 16.

⁸¹Many of these same permanent secretaries would recommend the dismantling of LIRD's institutions after Kaunda's electoral loss in 1991.

⁸²Interview with M. Ngoma, 10 October 1991.

stipulates LIRDPA's institutional design as the outcome of the Chichele lodge meeting, and confirms the responsibilities and membership of the Steering Committee, the Advisory Committee and the Technical Subcommittees, thus locking Kaunda, as well as other politicians, into certain well-defined roles.⁸³ The document also requires an annual meeting between NCDP, NORAD and LIRDPA and sets forth a minimum agenda, including discussions about on-going activities, and guidelines for the coming year's activities, work plans and budgets. Such reviews would help the co-directors keep LIRDPA on their preferred course, since their informational advantage could help be used to sway NORAD and government officials. Norway also expected Zambia to "ensure that revenue from the Project are transferred to the LIRDPA revolving Fund for investments and daily running of the Project," to "bear all expenses that may be required over and above the Grant for successful implementation of the Project," and to "promptly inform Norway of any condition which interferes with or threatens to interfere with the successful implementation of the Project."⁸⁴

The co-directors hoped that their agreement with Norway would help mitigate Kaunda's possible intervention. They had placed Kaunda in a largely ceremonial position within the LIRDPA hierarchy. They had secured a revenue base distinct from the Zambian government and Kaunda's direct control. They had agreed to annual meetings with NORAD which would help prevent Kaunda from hijacking the program's activities. And they had successfully linked President Kaunda's personal reputation with the survival of institutions they had designed.

4. Conclusion

During the 1970s and early 1980s, international concern over poaching in Africa reached an all-time high. President Kaunda was as sensitive to international criticism of Zambia's record of protecting wildlife as he was sympathetic to its conservation. He knew how little money his government, still in a downward economic spiral, could afford to give to wildlife management. He also knew that few Zambians shared his preference for

⁸³See the Republic of Zambia, "Agreement between The Government of the Kingdom and the Government of the Republic of Zambia Regarding the integrated resource development of the Luangwa Valley in Zambia," October 1988. (Mimeograph.) This "Agreement" refers to the LIRDPA "The Phase 2 Programme" as the referent document.

⁸⁴*Ibid.*, p. 4.

conservation. Of all sectors, international support for domestic public agencies dealing with wildlife conservation would be the most welcomed by Kaunda.

Two groups of conservationists in Zambia capitalized on these circumstances to design new, competing conservation programs. Both groups sought to expand their control over wildlife. Both understood the credible threat a one-party president posed to their plans. And both tried to put their resources out of his reach.

One tactic the programs shared was to gain the backing of an international donor. Agreements with Norway and the United States helped LIRDP and ADMADE to secure funding and decision-making structures without which the programs would remain highly vulnerable to President Kaunda and other Zambian politicians.

But given different share of public authority, ADMADE and LIRDP made dissimilar choices about Kaunda's personal support. NPWS already enjoyed a legislative mandate as protector and administrator of Zambia's wildlife. By keeping ADMADE within their department, NPWS did not need political heavyweights to establish their program. LIRDP, however, posed a danger to established ministries, and had no legal right to exist. To carve out a bureaucratic space for themselves, LIRDP supporters needed Kaunda's clout, despite the risks posed by the president's involvement. Indeed, such affiliation with Kaunda would inflict a mortal blow to LIRDP in the future.

This paper focused directly on how supporters of public agencies make choices that reflect the distribution of power in political systems. Many studies of bureaucracy, while acknowledging how the political arena might undermine public agencies, normally fail to include politics as a fundamental explanation for the structure of bureaucracies. Scholars and practitioners generally criticize the corrupting influence of politics on bureaucratic activity, and, while implicitly hoping for the elimination of politics, forward bureaucratic solutions (more communication, better planning, better training, etc.) to cure bureaucracy's ills.⁸⁵

⁸⁵See for example Harold Seidman and Robert Gilmour Politics, Position, and Power: From the Positive to the Regulatory State 4th ed. (Oxford University Press, 1986); and Frederick C. Mosher Democracy and the Public Service 3rd ed. (Oxford University Press, 1982). For an example of this approach in the area of natural resource policymaking, see William Ascher and Robert Healy Natural Resource Policymaking in Developing Countries (Durham and London: Duke University Press, 1990), pp. 11, 159-190. Terry Moe points out that these authors, understanding the influence of politics on bureaucratic structure, still hope for public agencies to serve some "national interest." See Moe, "The

This paper showed that politics is more than one of many constraints on effective bureaucratic activity. Politics structures bureaucracy before it has had the chance to design or implement its programmatic goals. The politics of structural choice, therefore, emerges as a powerful approach to understanding the content and implementation of public policy.

This paper also established that the politics of structural choice is as important to explanations of political institutions in a developing country with a one-party government as it is in industrial democracies. Political uncertainty stems from a variety of sources, not just democratic elections. By examining the origins of political uncertainty in a one-party state, this paper was able to anticipate the strategies that interest groups use to protect their public agencies from political intervention.

Finally, this paper demonstrated that commonly-held assumptions emanating from the new institutional economics must be reconsidered. New institutionalists frequently locate the origin of institutions in their consequences, i.e. institutions emerge to solve social dilemmas that economic markets themselves cannot overcome. In this view, ADMADE and LIRDP could be considered solutions to the social dilemma of illegal hunting in Zambia. But what exact features would a dilemma-solving institution incorporate? And when will it emerge? Essentially functionalist, the institution-as-remedy approach of many new institutionalists cannot predict the structure of their dilemma-resolving arrangement, since an infinite number of solutions are possible.⁸⁶ Additionally, these new institutionalists fail to explain why or how actors overcome the collective action problem embedded in the construction of any institution. This paper, in contrast, moved the study of institutions back to the level of individual incentives, and demonstrated that some institutional arrangements pursued by individuals and groups can be explained by examining the nature of public authority and political uncertainty.

Politics of Bureaucratic Structure," pp. 267-68.

⁸⁶See Robert H. Bates, "Contra Contractarianism: Some Reflections on the New Institutionalism," Politics and Society 16 2 (1988):387-401; and Stephen Krasner, "Global Communications and National Power: Life on the Pareto Frontier," World Politics 43 (1991): 336-366.