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ORGANIZATION

Public discourse, whether applied to problems within the United States or to problems of "developing" countries is apt to assume that the availability of money and physical technology will be sufficient to solve any problem. The streets of New York City can be kept clean if more money is invested in street cleaning equipment. Fertilizers, irrigation works and new seed stocks will increase agricultural production and alleviate critical food shortages in less developed countries. A redistribution of land in differently-sized parcels will revolutionize agriculture. The list could be extended to include basic industries, transport facilities and other components of a "modernized" economy.

Physical technologies in the sense of dealing with things, physical events or objects are important components of development. Such technologies may draw upon highly specialized capabilities derived from diverse bodies of knowledge. Street sweeping may involve relatively primitive tools or highly specialized mechanical devices. Fertilizers may involve the use of organic residuals or highly specialized products of chemical engineering. The development of irrigation works is likely to draw upon specialized knowledge in hydrology and hydraulic engineering. The development of new seed stocks may require access to highly specialized knowledge in genetics and the biological sciences more generally.

The focus of our attention will not be upon the technology of "things" but upon the technology of human activity and human organization.

Every development--street sweeping, production of fertilizers, irrigation works, the development of new seed stocks--has a component to it that is concerned with how the activities of people are organized in relation to one another. Accomplishing the task of sweeping streets producing fertilizers, creating and operating irrigation works, developing and distributing new seed stocks are all efforts that require the coordination of activities among large numbers of people.

We shall view these arrangements for organizing or ordering human activities as institutions. We can refer to the family, the business corporation, the government or the state as types of institutions, or we can refer to particular families, corporations, governments or states as specific cases of institutions of each type.

Our effort will be to clarify the essential structure of relationships that apply to institutions of all types and to indicate some of the variations that apply to institutions of different types. However, our focus will be upon the practical implications that are relevant to the man of action who is concerned with knowing what he is doing. As a result, we shall focus upon those who are attempting to do something which involves the activities of many other persons. We shall refer broadly to such individuals as organizers or entrepreneurs. Business entrepreneurs are only one type of organizer. In speaking of organizers we shall refer to all of those who struggle with the practical problems of how to organize the activities of the diverse individuals who become associated with the operation of diverse undertakings or enterprises. Enterprises may be organized as a family endeavour, individual proprietorship, business corporation or stock company, cooperative society, public enterprise, government agency,

political party, outlaw society or a revolutionary group. In the rare case, individuals may be concerned with the organization of a nation-state or an international organization.

To pose some of the practical problems involved in organizing human activities, we shall look at the efforts of Vladimir Ilyich Lenin. Lenin was both a practical and highly successful organizer. His enterprise was political revolution. As a successful revolutionist he was also confronted with the task of organizing a nation-state as an enterprise for translating his revolutionary objectives into reality. We shall draw upon Lenin's work to clarify some of the calculations made by a practical organizer in undertaking an unusual and successful enterprise. After considering Lenin as an organizer, we shall reflect upon some of the essential distinctions which are necessary in order to understand the elements of analysis and design that enter into his calculations. These considerations will provide us with an initial indication of what is involved in the problem of institutional analysis and design.

Lenin as Organizer

In our examination of Lenin as an organizer, we shall refer to four specific essays where he treats the practical problems of organization. "Where to Begin?" was published in May, 1901, in an early issue of the newspaper, Iskra. What Is To Be Done? was a longer pamphlet written in response to the issue raised in "Where to Begin?" In State and Revolution Lenin prepared a major statement on the problem confronting a revolutionary movement on the eve of success. Finally, Lenin addresses himself to some of the practical problems of transition

from revolution to the exercise of state authority in an essay on "Will the Bolsheviks Retain State Power?"

First, A Political Newspaper

In "Where to Begin?" Lenin stipulates the basic task of a revolutionary party as that of "establishing a strongly organized party for the purposes of winning, not only a few concessions, but the very fortress of the autocracy." (16) The "autocracy" is the enemy and the task of the revolutionary movement is to create a "fighting organization" that will be capable of mobilizing support for "the decisive battle." (18) Lenin views the problem as one of military organization in which the revolutionary "forces" consist mainly of "volunteers and rebels." (18) The autocracy is well fortified and well defended. Success depends upon having a fighting organization in being prepared for the decisive battle when the opportunity arises. The ultimate arena for a successful revolution is one where military action will be necessary to carry the contest.

How does Lenin propose to create such a fighting organization capable of storming the fortress of the autocracy? By establishing a political newspaper, Iskra.

Lenin argues that the organization of an all-Russian political newspaper dedicated to exposing the autocracy will require the solution to technical problems in the regular supply of materials for publication and the regular distribution of copies to interested readers. The solution to these technical problems of operating a revolutionary newspaper will require a network of agents which will form the skeleton for the organization of a revolutionary party. The frequency of publication and regularity in distribution is an "exact measure" (19) of the

success that a revolutionary movement has had in establishing the essential organizational structure for its activities.

Such a newspaper would also serve as an instrument in furthering the revolutionary movement by creating an extended intelligence gathering apparatus, by providing a tribunal for political discontent and protest, by serving as an instrument for organizing a more extended revolutionary movement and by providing the essential command structure or "scaffolding" (21) for the larger revolutionary movement.

Thus, the organization of a clandestine political newspaper would serve both as a prototype and as an intermediate instrumentality in the development of a revolutionary movement. Only if such an organizational apparatus is available will a revolutionary movement be prepared to take advantage of the circumstance where the autocracy falls "under the pressure of one of those spontaneous outbursts or unforeseen political complications which constantly threaten it from all sides. We must proceed along our road and steadily carry out our systematic work, and the less we rely on the unexpected, the less likely are we to be taken by surprise by a 'historical turn.'" (22-23)

The Revolutionary Apparatus

In the pamphlet, What Is To Be Done?, Lenin provides a much more extended exploration of the thesis formulated in "Where to Begin?" Issues centering upon both the program and the basic structure of activities among socialists of various persuasions were in the forefront of discussion. What Is To Be Done? is a general treatise addressed to the general issues in this debate.

Lenin reaffirms his basic thesis that the struggle is ultimately a military one that will be decided by a highly disciplined fighting organization and that the organization of a political newspaper that can maintain a well informed intelligence, regular publication schedules and regularity in distribution is the first task in establishing the organizational presence of an effective revolutionary party. In pursuing his argument, he makes a number of distinctions that reflect his analysis of organizational problems.

Lenin criticizes a tendency among contemporary socialists to rely upon spontaneity to supply the revolutionary opportunity while pre-occupying themselves with organizational efforts to improve the economic conditions of workers. He sees the primary task as a political revolutionary task of challenging the autocracy, of developing a political consciousness among workers and other oppressed elements of the population rather than organizing to gain economic advantage for workers.

The task of organizing workers into trade unions capable of ameliorating economic conditions requires recourse to patterns of organization that are inimicable to the organization of revolutionaries. Lenin contends that strikes cannot be secret and that a trade union movement must strive to establish a legal basis for making and enforcing demands.

Lenin argues that a trade union movement must be organized on the basis of a wide membership that gives primary attention to organization by trades or crafts, the organization of strike funds and the development of mutual aid societies among trade unionists. Such conditions are inimicable to the organization of revolutionaries

and thus the organization of trade unions should be carried on apart from the organization of a revolutionary political party.

The distinction between a revolutionary party and a trade union movement is reinforced by a contention that a revolutionary party cannot limit its alliances only to workers. On the basis of Marxist theory, Lenin expects workers to be oppressed and that it is a primary objective of any revolutionary group to develop "the political consciousness of the working class." But he argues that the revolutionists' ideal should not be "a trade-union secretary, but a tribune of the people, able to react to every manifestation of tyranny and oppression, no matter what stratum or class of the people it affects; he must be able to group all of these manifestations into a single picture of police violence and capitalist exploitation; he must be able to take advantage of every petty event in order to explain his socialist convictions and his [revolutionary] demands to all, in order to explain to all and everyone the world-historic significance of the struggle for the emancipation of the proletariat." (99-100) In short, the organization of revolutionaries must exist apart from but work with trade unions and all other classes of society in various "spheres of life and activity" (78) who are subject to political oppression.*

*All and sundry manifestations of police tyranny and autocratic outrage, in addition to the evils connected with the economic struggle, are equally "widely applicable" as a means of drawing in the masses. The tyranny of the Zemsky Nachalnicks, the flogging of the peasantry, the corruption of the officials, the conduct of the police toward the "common people" in the cities, the fight against the famine stricken and the suppression of the popular striving toward enlightenment and knowledge, the extortion of taxes, the persecution of religious sects, the harsh discipline of the army, the militarist conduct towards the student and the liberal intelligence--all these and a thousand other manifestations of tyranny, though not directly connected with the "economic" struggle, do they, in general, represent a less "widely applicable" method and subject for political agitation and for drawing the masses into the political struggle? The very opposite in the case. (80)

In turning to the question of what pattern of organization should prevail in a revolutionary party, Lenin characterizes the primitive methods used by some revolutionists. A group of students organize a circle. They contact workers and begin propaganda and agitational efforts. The circle recruits new members. Its sphere of activity is widened and its activities expand. They establish contact with other revolutionaries, procure literature, consider establishing a local newspaper, begin to plan demonstrations and finally commence some overt action hostile to the regime. "And usually this first action ends in immediate and wholesale arrests." (117) The secret police had penetrated the organization, maintained surveillance and was prepared for wholesale arrests at any time that suited their convenience. Such efforts in organizing revolutionary activities was likened by Lenin to peasants who march to war by snatching up clubs. Such a movement is characterized by "incredibly sporadic" (118) efforts and is incapable of establishing "continuity and coherence" in its work.

"Strict secrecy" thus becomes an essential requisite for a revolutionary organization. Mass organizations cannot hope to attain strict secrecy. A revolutionary organization must be a highly selective organization composed of a limited number of highly trained professional revolutionists rather than being broadly inclusive of all those who were opposed to the regime, Lenin insists that the party of professional revolutionaries should be all-Russian and have an extensive reach capable of mobilizing broad segments of the population. It is this organization of professional revolutionaries that provides the essential leadership for the revolutionary movement.

Lenin contends that the active participation of the masses will greatly amplified--increased tenfold--by the extent that a small number of professional revolutionaries centralize the "secret work" (140) -- essential decisions about revolutionary tactics--of the revolutionary movement. Centralization of the secret functions will give a unity to revolutionary efforts that will greatly increase the effectiveness of the movement.

Lenin emphasizes the importance of the leadership to be exercised by a selective party of professional revolutionaries. He indicates that "society" advances very many people who are "fit" (142) for revolutionary work. They are the ones who have developed a consciousness of tyranny and oppression and are prepared to fight absolutism. But these people are but a multitude of individuals--they are not a "people" (142) in the sense of being able to take collective action. They are not a people, "Because we have no leaders, no political leaders, we have no talented organizers capable of organizing extensive and at the same time uniform and harmonious work that would give employment to all forces, even the most inconsiderable." (142) A unified leadership of a few professional revolutionaries is necessary "in order to unite all of these tiny fractions into one whole, in order, in breaking up functions, to avoid breaking up the movement and in order to imbue those who carry out these minute functions with the conviction that their work is necessary and important. . . ." (143)

It is the concept of organizing the essential leadership function as a separate organization possessed of strict secrecy, specialized training, access to intelligence that make them into "an army of omniscient people," (164) extensive contacts capable of reaching

out to larger multitudes of people that Lenin emphasized in his efforts to create a vanguard of professional revolutionaries that could command a revolutionary movement. The place of leadership and the structure of command was of critical importance in Lenin's analysis.

. . . the whole of political life is an endless chain consisting of an infinite number of links. The whole art of politics lies in finding the link that is least likely to be torn out of our hands, the one that is most important at the given moment, the one that guarantees command of the whole chain, and having found it, in clinging to that link as tightly as possible.
(173-174)

Lenin was especially concerned to fashion the link that guaranteed command of the whole chain.

In the course of his discussion in What Is To Be Done? Lenin quite explicitly rejects the application of "broad principles of democracy" (152) to the organization of revolutionaries. Broad principles of democracy presume for Lenin two conditions: 1) full publicity and 2) reliance upon election in selecting leadership and in making decisions. Democracy requires full publicity in which the political arena is as open to public view as the stage in a theatre if every person is to decide for himself who to elect to office. Full publicity, the principle of election and general control by voters leads to a process of "natural selection" where each person will find "his proper place," do what he is "best fitted," and feel "the effects of his mistakes" and "prove before all the world his ability to recognize mistakes and to avoid them." (153)

But what application do these principles have for coping with Russian autocracy? In that circumstance Lenin contends that broad democracy is a "useless and harmful toy" (154). Any attempt to practice broad democracy will only facilitate the work of the secret

police. Instead, "the only serious organizational principle the active workers of our movement can accept is strict secrecy, strict selective of members and the training of professional revolutionaries" (155) to assume leadership of the revolutionary movement.

The revolutionary apparatus proposed by Lenin involved a stable organization of leaders composed of a restricted membership of professional revolutionaries organized apart from the larger multitude of individuals in the working class and in other classes of society who form the mass of the revolutionary movement. The organization of the vanguard of professional revolutionaries depends upon strict secrecy, specialized training, centralization and discipline. It provides the essential intelligence, communication and command structure for a fighting force organized in accordance with principles of a military organization.

The Old and the New

Fifteen years after having charted the structure for his enterprise of revolution, Lenin is faced with the prospects of success. Success would imply that the revolutionists had stormed the fortress of the "autocracy" and had seized state power. In the interlude between the fall of the Czar and the October Revolution, Lenin has the occasion in writing State and Revolution to reflect upon the nature of the state inherent in the "autocracy" against which he had struggled and the tasks that would confront a successful revolutionary movement in realizing a vision for a new society.

Lenin's explanation for the nature of the state capable of tyrannical conduct is derived from Marx and Engels. The state is a product of society at a certain stage of development where that society is the

subject of insoluble contradictions represented by irreconcilable class antagonisms. The state is created as an instrument of power which places itself above society and increasingly separates itself from society in order to moderate the conflict and keep order in society. Class antagonisms have their roots in private ownership of the modes of production in which the capitalist class is able to use its control of property to exploit the working class. The state is the organ of the capitalist class to maintain its domination over society. The bureaucracy, the standing army and the police are the principal instruments of state power organized for the suppression of the working class.

The institution of private property is the source of irreconcilable class conflict. The state is developed by the capitalist class as an instrument of domination over the working class. In Lenin's words, "the state crises when, where and to the extent that the class antagonisms cannot be objectively reconciled. And, conversely, the existence of the state proves that the class antagonisms are irreconcilable." (8)

Given this explanation, the task of the revolutionist is to seize power and to crush and destroy the traditional apparatus of the state. Earlier revolutions had failed because they had concerned themselves with representative institutions of republican government and had failed to break up the executive apparatus of the state as reflected in bureaucratic and military organization. According to Marx, all revolutionary efforts in France prior to the revolution of 1848 had served only to bring the executive apparatus of the state to "greater perfection instead of breaking it up." (25)

On the eve of the October Revolution, Lenin urged that a successful revolution required that the revolutionists seize state power,

crush and destroy the existing executive apparatus. A new apparatus of control would be created where the working class could exercise state power--the dictatorship of the proletariat--where the oppressed majority would now eliminate the exploiters, and undertake the reconstruction of society by expropriating private property on behalf of all working people. With the elimination of private property the basis for class structure in society will have been removed. A classless society will exist and the state will wither away. Removing the basis for irreconcilable antagonism between classes will remove the need to rely upon the instrumentality of the state to moderate conflict and maintain order in the presence of these irreconcilable antagonisms.

Lenin used this explanatory theory to establish his agenda for the consummation of the Russian Revolution and the construction of a new society. He relies upon Marx's discussion of the Paris Commune to conceptualize a new type of political instrumentality which would be a working body rather than a talking shop characteristic of parliamentary bodies. By taking on executive functions, the commune provided a substitute for the bureaucracy and a workers' militia would be a substitute for the armed forces. Thus, the parasitic structures of the bureaucracy and the military would be destroyed.

Lenin is insistent that reliance upon the model of the Paris commune does not preclude a centralized solution in the sense that the communes will voluntarily unite in efforts to transfer all "private property in railroads, factories, land, and so forth, to the entire nation, to the whole of society?" (46) National unity would be realized through centralism rather than federalism.

Apart from the structure of property rights and the traditional apparatus of state control exercised by the capitalist state, Lenin

emphasizes that capitalism had created many of the organizational prerequisites for a new society once the basic control apparatus had been transformed to one where all members of society shared in the ownership of the means of production. Capitalism had simplified the mechanisms of accounting and control and had accomplished the task of training and disciplining millions of workers so that workers were capable of assuming responsibility for the management of large scale enterprises. "All citizens" to use Lenin's words, "become employees and workers of one national state 'syndicate'." (88) "The whole society will have become one office and one factory, with equal work and equal pay." (99)

In the contest for control during the October Revolution, Lenin returns to his concept of a highly disciplined party of revolutionaries--the Bolsheviks--as performing the critical leadership functions in the forging of the new state apparatus based upon the organization of workers in councils or soviets. The 240,000 members of the Bolshevik Party provided the core for a new state apparatus that would serve the working class in overcoming the resistance of the capitalist class. Such a party together with its supporters could serve as a vanguard in establishing the dictatorship of the proletariat, lay the foundations for a classless society and the withering away of the state.

Lenin's approach to managing the affairs of state once the Bolsheviks assume state power is again stated in the most practical terms. He indicates how the power of the relatively small Bolshevik party can be increased "tenfold" by drawing workers and poor people "into the everyday work of managing the state." (25)

He shows how a typical form of state intervention--forcible eviction of a family from a house--would be conducted by a detachment of workers' militia composed of 15 people--only one of whom need be a member or active supporter of the Bolshevik party. By this illustration he indicates how individuals will relate one to another in the allocation of housing and in enforcing claims to housing.

Lenin goes on to observe:

We know that just any laborer or any cook would be incapable of taking over immediately the administration of the state. But . . . we demand an immediate break away from the prejudice that assumes that the administration of the state, the performance of the everyday work of management, can only be done by the rich or by officials picked from rich families. We demand that the teaching of the business of the state administration should be conducted by class-conscious workers and soldiers, that this should be started immediately, i.e., that steps should be started immediately to start giving instruction to all the laboring masses, all the poor. (27)

The Technology of Organization

Lenin's commentaries on the problems of organization are important for two reasons. First, he was a practical and highly successful organizer. His comments provide us with an opportunity to probe his mode of analysis in an initial consideration of some of the factors that are relevant to a technology of organization. Second, Lenin recognized that problems of organization require recourse to a carefully reasoned analysis in deciding what organizational format would be appropriate to the attainment of the objectives of a revolutionary movement. Reasoned analysis requires recourse to an explanatory theory that enables the analyst to calculate the probable consequences that will follow from the choice of alternative strategies in light of

stipulated conditions. Success can be attained only by those who are guided by an "advanced theory" (What 48)

Lenin's successes carried him through a variety of ventures where he was required to think through problems of organization at various levels of analysis. These range from the organization of a newspaper to the task of conceptualizing the basis for a new society following a successful revolution. His concern with the theoretical justification of his proposed courses of action provide us with an explanation of what he proposed to do.

As an organizer Lenin was concerned with the technical feasibility of organizational arrangements in the sense that whether or not a particular type of organization would work was an essential consideration. Will the organizational arrangement be an appropriate instrument to accomplish the basic task at hand? He was quite explicit in specifying his format for a revolutionary party to indicate the need for a highly disciplined fighting organization composed of a "few" professional revolutionaries capable of maintaining absolute secrecy, acting in response to a centralized command and mobilizing support from a much broader base of groups disaffected by the prevailing autocracy.

His prescriptions for a tight, highly disciplined, fighting organization was juxtaposed to his rejection of an organizational format that depended on the organization of trade unions as the change. A trade union movement to succeed must have a broad base of membership, be concerned with the creation of strike funds and mutual aid societies, and give special attention to trades and crafts so as to gain control over critical components in the labor market. Those elements depended upon public strategies where legality and recourse to remedies under law were essential conditions of organization.

Lenin was also critical of those who proposed to rely upon spontaneity for realizing a successful revolution. Instead he argued that only those who were prepared could exploit the opportunities that spontaneous outbreaks of protest might make available against an ineffective regime. He also argued that the strategy of terror should be used with great care so that the autocracy was not afforded an opportunity to take repressive measures which exceeded the advantage to be gained by the violent action of revolutionaries.

Lenin also quite explicitly rejected the conditions of democratic organization as being inappropriate for a revolutionary movement. Democracy presumed a publicness of discussion and deliberation. A successful revolutionary party, on the contrary, must proceed with utmost secrecy. Reliance upon democratic modes of organization were not consistent with the conditions of organization for sustaining a successful revolutionary movement. The technical feasibility of a revolutionary party required that a democratic format be rejected in formulating the organizational structure of a revolutionary party.

In defending his contention that a revolutionary party must be highly selective in its membership and yet have extended ties over the whole country, Lenin makes reference to the difficulties in establishing the economic and financial feasibility of such an effort. If a big secret apparatus were established in each city, it could not procure the resources in manpower and facilities to "pay the way." (What, 177) A highly select group of professional revolutionaries would provide the mechanism for coordinating the activities of groups throughout the country with only a fraction of the resources available to each of the revolutionary circles working in each community.

While Lenin is careful to distinguish among different organizational arrangements and to reject the trade union format, spontaneous terror and democratic modes of organization, he also insisted that the format which he recommended--secrecy, careful training, discipline, centralization of control--could be applied to diverse circumstances. This format was applicable to the organization of a political newspaper, to a revolutionary party and to a governing party wielding the power of the state.

Publishing a newspaper was a highly tangible task. The product--an illegal paper capable of being regularly published and distributed on regular schedules--was a highly tangible product which any reader could use to judge the performance of the secret revolutionary group which produced that paper. The tangibility of the product and the capacity of others to use that product as a means for evaluating the performance a secret organization established the conditions for fashioning an organizational nexus between revolutionary circles and dissident groups in diverse communities and an organizational apparatus that was capable of coordinating and unifying the efforts of the diverse groups which opposed the regime. In effect, this organizational nexus provided a basis for creating a quid pro quo relationship between the revolutionary party as performing an essential leadership intelligence and management function for various revolutionary circles and opposition groups. Together the party as the revolutionary vanguard and supporting elements in the population formed an opposition coalition against the governing regime. A political newspaper provided an essential tie which held the broader revolutionary movement together as an active coalition capable of taking coordinate and unified action.

Throughout his analysis of organizational problems confronting a revolutionary movement Lenin is explicit in recognizing that the organizational characteristics of the ruling regime in Russia, which he generally calls the "autocracy," establish the strategic risks and opportunities confronting revolutionists. The risks are created by the actions of the secret police and ruling officials in the Russian bureaucracy. The risks confronting revolutionists was how to carry on revolutionary activities while outwitting officials in the ruling regime. This challenge required careful training in the methods of the secret police. The opportunities confronting revolutionists were a consequence of the repressive measures taken by the regime to impose deprivations upon different segments of the population. The repressiveness of the existing regime provided the potential sanctions that give cohesion and discipline to the revolutionaries acting in opposition to the regime.

The particular format that Lenin chose for organizing a revolutionary party was significantly affected by characteristic patterns of behavior in the existing regime. Official reliance upon secret police as an instrument of government dictated utmost secrecy in the organization of a revolutionary party. In a sense the organizational format for a revolutionary party became a mirror image of the ruling regime which it was dedicated to destroy.

Lenin's assumption that some organizational arrangements were inappropriate and that other organizational arrangements were appropriate for tasks confronting revolutionists implies that a technology of organization exists. A technology of organization can exist when certain organizational conditions can be specified which will facilitate the

realization of certain possibilities or consequences and where other organizational conditions will foreclose realizing those possibilities or consequences.

An ability to specify relationships between conditions and consequences is the essential characteristic of any science. Characterizing relationships between conditions and consequences is equivalent to specifying cause and effect relationships. If conditions can be specified and predictions can be made regarding the consequences which will flow from those conditions then a positive form of institutional analysis is a possibility. This same connection between conditions and consequences can serve as the basis for institutional design. In that case an organizer would be concerned first with specifying the consequences which would serve as the objective or purpose of creating an organization. If the consequences can be specified and if an organizer is knowledgeable about the repertoire of different organizational conditions which will evoke predictable consequences, then an organizational format can be selected which will be appropriate to the realization of the specifiable organizational objectives. The calculation of conditions and consequences inherent in positive analysis can be used as a means-ends calculation in the design of an instrumentality that is appropriate to the objectives of a particular organizer.

These relationships between conditions and consequences and means and ends calculations should enable individuals to test their conceptions about organizational arrangements by whether patterns of relationship occur in practice. Where predicted relationships do not occur in practice, we then have the possibility of using experience with

organizational efforts to reject the explanatory power of a theory which failed to anticipate the appropriate relationships. Different explanations can be offered for the connection between conditions and consequences. Presumably the explanatory theory with the greater power of prediction provides the more useful body of knowledge for institutional analysis and design.

A critical element in Lenin's analysis was his reliance upon Marxian theory to conceptualize the basis for a new society to be created by the revolution and how that new society would harmonize relationships among people so that the autocratic apparatus of the state would wither away. This expectation was based upon the explanations provided by Marx and Engels that the property structure of private property relationships was the critical variable in the development of capitalism. Capitalists as the proprietors who controlled the private property inherent in the modes of production were able to exploit workers and concentrate their control over the productive facilities in a society to a point where the few were acquiring great wealth at the cost of impoverishing the large mass of people in a capitalist society. The institution of private property generated a fundamental class conflict between those who owned the modes of production and those who were required to labor for the profits of the capitalist class. Capitalists as the dominant class in turn used the power of the state with its military and bureaucratic apparatus to maintain their control over society.

Lenin viewed the task of a revolutionary party as seizing power, destroying the traditional apparatus of the capitalist state, expropriating private property and organizing production based upon

the transfer of property rights to the entire nation or the entire society. Changing the institution of property rights would resolve the fundamental contradiction between the capitalist class and the working class. The resolution of this fundamental contradiction would remove the need for the specialized control apparatus associated with the state and the state would wither away in the future development of a communist society.

The Marxian explanation for the development of the state posits a causal relationship between private property, class structure and class conflict. The state develops a mechanism to maintain an order by repressing class conflict. The Marxian explanation creates the expectation or predictive inference that the state will wither away when class conflict is removed by resolving the contradiction inherent in private property rights.

In light of more than 50 years experience with the efforts to create a new society following the October Revolution of 1917, do we have reason to believe that the Marxian explanation provides a valid basis for organizing reasonably accurate expectations about the probable consequences which will follow from the expropriation of private property in the Soviet Union. Has the class structure been eliminated in Soviet society? Has the state withered away?

Lenin identified the state as a specialized control apparatus to be especially identified with the existence of an official bureaucracy composed of persons occupying specialized positions, a professional police establishment and a professional military establishment existing apart from the daily activities of ordinary workers. A workers' militia afforded a mechanism for placing control over the instruments

of coercion in the hands of ordinary workers. Presumably, the continued existence of an official bureaucracy, a professional police force including secret police and a professional military establishment would serve as indicators of the continued presence of a state apparatus. Their absence would be an indication of the withering away of the state.

On the basis of these indicators we might reasonably conclude that Lenin's formulation of the task of creating a new society was based upon an unsatisfactory explanation. On the other hand, his conceptualization of the organizational arrangement for creating a revolutionary movement was highly successful in a pragmatic sense. Is there a possibility of formulating a more satisfactory explanation which would account for the developments which have transpired subsequent to the October Revolution of 1917.

As we have indicated earlier, the organizational format propounded by Lenin for a revolutionary party was essentially a mirror image of the organizational format of the autocracy which Lenin was dedicated to destroying. The Czarist regime might be characterized as a fighting organization capable of secrecy, discipline, and centralized direction. If a structure of organizational arrangements will tend to evoke consequences apart from the particular persons or social characteristics of those who act with reference to a given type of structure, then we might expect the successful Leninist party of revolutionaries to become a new autocracy following a successful revolution. Rather than the state withering away, we might expect a new autocracy to arise which would be capable of being as oppressive and tyrannical as the old autocracy.

When Lenin suggested that the 240,000 members of the Bolshevik Party provided the core for a new state apparatus capable of replacing and destroying the old state apparatus, he did so by indicating that the 150,000 land owners had formed the essentials of a ruling class capable of controlling a population of 150,000,000 after the revolution of 1905. In a sense he was suggesting that the Bolshevik Party would form the core of a new ruling class following the Revolution. The thesis that the Bolshevik Party formed a new ruling class is propounded by Milovan Djilas' The New Class. The new ruling class is presiding over a new autocracy that is as capable of oppressive and tyrannical action as the old autocracy.

The successes and failures of the Communist Party as a revolutionary party seeking to establish the basis for a new society presents an especially important challenge to students of political science. A radical revolution occurred. A new society devoid of contradictions and conflict was promised. The realized consequence was a new autocracy in place of the old. Names had changed but the essential structure of an official bureaucracy, secret police and military forces remained with much the same format as before.

Where now do we turn in attempting to formulate an explanation about the structure of organizational relationships and the consequences that might expect to follow from those structural conditions. Whether something is labelled Capitalism, Communism, Imperialism or Democracy may not be as important as being able to specify other elements in an organizational format such as secrecy, discipline, centralization and other such attributes.

Tocqueville in writing about the French Revolution long ago recognized that a radical revolution may not alter the basic organizational format in the structure of a society. If human beings are to have a capability of altering the structure of social relationships, they will need to know what organizational format or structure of organizational arrangements will tend to evoke what consequences. If people are to exercise a choice over their form of government and over the development of institutions in a society, then a political science which can indicate the consequences that are likely to be associated with specifiable structural conditions becomes an essential science for dealing with the technology of organization.

In this effort to explain the basis for human organization and the different effects that different forms of organization will have, we are attempting to lay the theoretical foundations for institutional analysis and design. A great deal can be learned from Lenin's efforts to cope with problems of organization that are appropriate for different tasks. Other individuals in other societies have coped with comparable problems. In 1788 and 1789 Alexander Hamilton and James Madison undertook an extended commentary explaining the consequences that they expected to follow as a consequence of adopting the proposed constitution for the United States of America. A large number of new independent nations in Africa and in Asia have been formed during the decades following World War II. A technology of organization appropriate to the development of these new nations is one of the critical problems of the contemporary world.

In this study of the Theoretical Foundations for Institutional Analysis and Design, we propose to draw upon extended bodies

of literature to explain the basic technology of human organization. In doing so we will explain why man is a political animal and indicate the basic conditions that apply to the architecture of social organization. Governments are critical institutions related to the basic structure of organization in a society. As a consequence special attention will be given to the problem of constitutional choice, processes of constitutional decision making, and constitutional change. Varying patterns in the organization of governments will then be examined to indicate the consequences that are likely to follow from different governmental structures.

Once the basic structural characteristics of different governmental systems has been specified, we shall then turn to problems of organization that bear upon the production and use of different types of goods and services in a society. Emphasis will be placed upon public sector organization. Finally we shall examine the relationship of structure to the choice of strategies in complex organizational arrangements.