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CHALLENGES FOR BUILDING ENVIRONMENTAL INFORMATION MANAGEMENT CAPACITIES: SOCIO-ECONOMIES IN TRANSITION

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Introduction.

The process of institutional change in FSU (the former Soviet Union) countries penetrates to the very roots of their social order. The governments of FSU are pushing shift from central planning to market-based economy and the whole system of economic and social institution is under reforming. Developing participatory model for democracy including free flow of relevant information and decentralization of decision making processes are the most challenging tasks to manage to internalize externalities into development schemes and accept that protecting wild life and human habitat is an essential element of life quality.

The risk of future crises can be reduced under two conditions: *first*, there must be full information about national economies in relation to management of their natural resources, and people must be willing to look at and consider that information; and *second*, once assuring that as much information is available as possible, there must be incentives to act in a sustainable manner on what is known. This is important to understand that building environmental information management capacities and environmental managerial cultures may require a variety of innovational institutional paths. Bureaucracy offers organizations a way of standardizing complex tasks and procedures. On the other hand, organizations that become too bureaucratized and have too many and complex rules, regulations, policies and procedures can be non-adaptive, self-defeating and self-devastating. Institutional issues deserve much greater attention whenever disciplines and sectors try new alternatives by breaking up strong traditional organizational frameworks.

In this paper the author argues that past police state institutional environments may have a remarkable influence in the transition process from the power and role-oriented to task organizational cultures. Since the FSU countries are in the midst of their continuing reforms, public participation in the decision making on environmental management matters depends on the success of inter-disciplinary and inter-sectoral collaborations, breaking down old rigid institutional frameworks and establishing flexible, common goal-oriented task cultures. The key issues which historically are likely to have a negative effect on Russian and Soviet organizational ability for innovations and participatory decision-making are:

(1) bureaucratic centralism and fully staffed bureaucracies; (2) the prevailing mechanistical-bureaucratic model of organization; (3) lack of capacity to distinguish private from governmental property rights; (4) corruption not an aberration but a part of administration and a way of life; (5) justice as an institutionalized part of administration; (6) identifying the bureaucracy with the

crown (party leaders, state); (7) failure to discriminate among the types of legal acts; (8) failure to discriminate among the various branches of the law; (9) laws need not make public to go into effect; (10) laws too general and judicial procedures poorly developed; (11) the main function of law to maintain order, not to enforce justice; (12) partimonic attitude of the central state bureaucracy; (13) symbiotic identification of church (ideology) and state; (14) objectivity gap between natural (technical) and social (political) education and science.

Need for a shift from the power-role to task culture.

Any form of planning other than single sectoral requires collaboration. The new wave of *multi-sectoral planning* is now seen as the only real alternative to maintain and raise life quality in all its aspects. Post-communist countries, dissatisfied with their long-term central planning system try to rebuild and reorganize (Baltic states and the Central European countries) or to adapt to new circumstances without major structural changes in their *power-role* culture (Russia, CIS). Many countries' experience show clearly that planning cannot be abandoned; the trend is likely making efforts to establish a basis for the *task* culture, a flexible organizational network to internalize environmental issues into economic development plans based on the principles of sustainable resource management.

Regardless the type of cross-sectoral (cross-disciplinary) planning: multi-sectoral; inter-sectoral; or trans-sectoral (the types from Flynn and Denning, 1982) the main point is that the task culture which is job-done and goal-oriented *requires collaboration in new ways* between people (as individuals and as carriers of organizations) who have traditionally worked in separate compartments and on purely sectoral issues.

The task culture tend not to flourish when money and people have to be rationed, or if there is very little experience gained in multiple- or interdisciplinary competence building, as this the case in all countries in economic transition. When top management in an interest group begins to feel the need to (re-)establish control over the methods results, these managers start to compete for available resources by using their political influence. When different ministries are thrown into conflicts, also individuals are going to change their psychological contract and to reveal their individual objectives. New methods will be chosen to get more influence and use the personal position as power resource. Task culture is very difficult to establish when the collective knowledge fund of the community possess mainly knowledge about promoting personal and clan interests, as it becomes extremely unstable and tends to change to a role or power culture when resources are limited and uncertainty increases. This is a real challenge to change legacies and practices of the last decades of Soviet power that stubbornly persist.

The normal administration practice in Russia has exclusively been role culture embeddied into a police-state power culture. The collective knowledge fund has been formed by separation of activities controlled by procedures for roles, job descriptions, authority definitions and communication where co-ordination at the top by a narrow band of ideologically affected senior managers is assumed the only needed personal co-ordination.

The role culture, a stereotype of bureaucracy as characterized by Handy (1993), offers security and predictability when working in a stable environment. When uncertainty increases instutional changes may occur to resist collaboration between insitutions. Message transmission from public organizations may be ignored by individualizing task-oriented roles. The perpetuation of so-called *expertization* in state administration is a tricky procedure that discourages public attention and participation and marginalizes non-establishment experts (people having common sense or

specialized knowledge but not belonging to the well-established clan). Special powers in policy- and decision making processes are accorded to those who have attained expert status, even though many opportunities to reach such positions have been object to political manipulation (REC Manual, 1994).

This not always correct, anyway, to refer to the passive attitude of ordinary people purely as 'lack of motivation'. In the Baltics public interest was at its height at the time of struggle for political independence. Afterwards it but have never ceased. Environmental problems have been actual long time enough to be rooted in the collective memory of these nations, partly because these people a fond of clean environment (these countries are not big) and partly as reflection of ideas and political developments in the geographically and ecologically neighbouring countries - Finland and Sweden. A typical citizen even if concerned with environmental management issues may be too busy to find mental and physical resources, time and money to exercise his or her rights. Many people follow discussions with an open mind and hope that these will lead to reasonable compromises. Even when learning is actively tried by citizens to change their collective patterns of thinking (for instance, in relation to trust to the government or building up respect for the judiciary), this is a time-consuming process in a society where legal and social traditions have been eroded in forty years. The majority of people do care about healthy environment and protection of ecosystems that provide the commodities and services upon which humans depend.

Re-arranging old and establishing new task culture organizations is always a complicated and socially costly task. What Bromley (1991) calls the ICE-aronym incorporating all the three types of *transaction costs* - information costs, contracting costs and enforcement costs, have to be covered by tax-payers' money. Control in task organizations is difficult, as Handy (1993) rightly notices, even if the such culture is a cross-disciplinary team culture where the outcome is said to suit for new forms of collaboration. The top management in such a culture only feels able to relax control and concentrate on right resource allocation decisions when the climate is agreeable, 'when the product is all-important and the customer always right, and when resources are available for all who can justify using them' (Handy). Information costs imply acquiring knowledge about the opportunities for exchange (participation), the nature of the items (issues) to be (ex)changed and the willingness of the participants to engage in a bargaing process. By citing the classic scholar Bromley: 'This information is not costless and lack of information can prevent certain exchanges from ever occurring'.

Survival of the traditional organizational culture as a challenge.

Diversity of the sustainable development tasks require diversified organizational structures to break sectorial and inter-nation communication boundaries. The new independent states typically have developed legislations reflecting their western counterparts in every respect. The constitional liberties in the spirit of the Bill of Rights such as freedoms to vote, to own private property, of speech and thought, assembly, from arbitrary arrest and from unreasonable search and seizure (as well as everybody's right for healthy environment) may be quaranteed in the reality only by a *democratic, justice state*.

There are certain key issues which make existing organizations still centralized in their behaviour and therefore resistant to innovations which may involve restrictions for power and control over the resources, as well as decrease power- and role-bounded certainty, or transform their masculine administrative traits. Culture of ethical decision making and the institution of *trust* which in its turn is a function of *lawlessness* that lasted in centuries are important in this respect.

Roots of centralised bureaucracy and corruption deserve attention, since these are greatly embedded in the value structure of institutions. By looking at the process of survival of police state institutions in Russia prior 1917 and after 1917, it is possible to confirm that adaptation of political organizational culture to new structures which are necessary to ensure sustainability traits in the development, may be difficult to achieve.

With a few exceptions the ideas given first (the pre-socialist characteristics, separated by a hyphen from the socialist and post-socialist characteristics) are adopted from the Pipes' solid work on the role of the state in managing Russia's society (1977).

1. Bureaucratic decentralism turned to bureaucratic centralism. The obstacles to bureaucratization were immense: the size of the country (already under Peter the I largest state in the world), the thin distribution of population, difficulties of communication and lack of money. Administration reforms did not succeed primarily for want of money.

- Obstacles standing in the way of full-scale bureaucratization were removed and the process of centralization of power and control completed. By that time the means of transport and communication to far-flung provinces were modernized and legitimate basis developed for the constitutional state property rights. The guidelines of the state organizations already worked out in details and introduced by Peter in the central parts of Russia provided excellent circumstances for the culture of centralized administration to become rooted in a short period of time.

2. From administratively understaffed to fully staffed bureaucracies. Twelve civil servants for 10,000 people was three to four times lower than in the rest of Europe at Peter the I time. The acute need for administration staff in many centuries, together with mental (unwillingness of the tsar) and physical (lack of finances and competence, undeveloped infrastructure) impossibility to introduce efficient control mechanisms created favourable conditions for bureaucracies to behave in a *notoriously arbitrary fashion*.

- Immense bureaucratic apparatus was built resembling not organic but a contrasting mechanistical-bureaucratic corporate organization model which is not well suited to new, holistic programmes requiring innovational autonomous thinking and action, flexibility, leadership capacity pursuing simultaneously decentralization and centralization, closeness to the customer (all categories of the environmental managers and users) result-orientation and organizational structures as unsophisticated as possible.

Administratively efficient control imposed by the bolsheviks was meant for the subjects of the state but the inconsiderate clan mentality among superiors at all levels has survived in many respects, in relations with grassroots and in competing for resources between state administration units.

3. Administration almost not paid in centuries. Russian governments have always been short of cash, and that which they had they preferred to spend for military purposes. The following example may be given to understand scarcity of money. The inquiry into administrative practices in Livonia ordered by Peter (which he had conquered from the Swedes whom he admired) revealed that the Swedish government had allotted as much money for governing this one province (now Estonia and the northern part of Latvia, approx. 50, 000 square kilometers), as the Russian government was spending on the whole empire (over 15 million square kilometers).

- Money was raised through expropriation in the name of socialism and allocations were made in accordance with the principles of central planning and developing a police state.

4. It would be appropriate to mention that the population in an enormous country such as Russia care about ecology and environment in other terms than communities in tightly populated European territories.

Not only an idea of inexhaustible resources and limitless opportunities was and is firmly rooted in people's minds. The ideologically-biased *weak sustainability paradigm* according to which ecosystem is regarded as not in its own right but as a collection of resources available exploitation by man, was actively pursued by the government. At the same time nature conservation was made a separate sector apart from the rest of the country's economic and social life and runned top-down by itself. Even the biggest environmental criminals could not be punished (by whom? for what?). Either industries could move to another place and restart their production or new production units could be constructed.

The short-term economic well-being of an ideology (unsustainability factor) was confronted with the long-term ecosystem well-being (sustainability factor). If institutional change towards regulations to *prevent* environmental disasters are supposed to forego the *mitigation* regulations, institutional vacuum must be filled by structures appropriate for the task of sustainable natural resource management. The state as the major environmental manager has a very important role to play.

5. Public servants supposed to feed themselves from official business ('living off the land'). The whole system of superiors required to be implicated in bribery as to create a bond of mutual responsibility. Compared to other countries in Europe where this system was dissolved during the Middle Ages, it survived well in Russia. Bribery is thus *not* a peculiar national character of Russians but rather inherent in a government lacking funds to pay for administration.

- *Before*: in the form of bribery (individually) and of centralised party action (collectively).

Now: living off a kind of oligarchic capitalism; preference for closed clan politics. 'The living off the land'-principle has been in a way a natural part not only of administration but as well of the way of life for many people. This is partly due to relatively low salaries (rural people did not receive money at all), partly due to the common, 'people's' ownership relations. Nowadays this is taken for granted that nature conservationists and scientists in Russia whose salaries are so low that they cannot depend on them to meet their basic living expenses feed themselves partly from their nature-protection business.

6. Lack of capacity to distinguish private from governmental property.

Legitimacy of denying public participation may expose big variations since it reflects cultural alignment, normative support, or consonance with relevant rules and laws. Corruption of public servants in Russia is historically *not* a departure from the prevailing form, but a regular part of administration. By feeding themselves from official business, the administrators lacked the capacity to distinguish private from governmental property. This was the crown ('father tsar') which was recognised and worshipped; an abstract, independent idea of the state was absent.

- *Still relevant*; old political and new economic elites thrive in an pro-legal shadow state. By establishing the Soviet state, the latter was identified with the Party, the counterpart of the imperial state with the imperial crown. The country's (state's) property was announced common, or communal, belonging to all soviet people. The latter was with the party and the party, in its turn, with the state. The party leader had the same functions as tsars in the Russian empire.

The state property rights just gave more or less open access to every community member and community subgroups to enjoy a part of resources by pursuing their common law rights. For many people poaching is not illegal but everybody's right to subtract from what is a common good. Stealing is neither good or bad but taking from of what is 'ours' - people's. This is exercising of the collective' property right on natural and other resources. Personal property (called individual property) consisted of the person's household items and living inventory. Private property was a hatred equivalent to the American imperialism.

The institution of the *private ownership* is not recognized by all Russian Federation governments and even where it is principally acknowledged this is practised waguely in the land privatization process. Different and diffuse institutional private ownership forms still make it extremely difficult for citizens to distinguish between legitimated property rights. This is a challenge to surrender a privilege of 'owing' nature in both abstract (what the people's state own is owned by its people) and physical meaning (common, unwritten laws to trespass, gather, fish, hunt, prepare firewood, even build). Except the right of alienation, different types of common land ownership rights were practically exercised - except two types of lands: those cultivated by collective and state farms and those under strict conservation.

Under these conditions, both rural and urban residents could enjoy relatively *open access* to natural resources without causing major damage. As long as their main needs were satisfied by heavily subsidized produce from state-owned agricultural farms, fixed wages paid, protection control efficient and, the commodity deficit a reality, owing extra money had no sense. Worsening of household and personal economies, deconcentration (not functional decentralization) of responsibility, commercialization of environmental goods and services were offspring of privatization. These are probably the most important factors shaping the management practice in recent years, being responsible for intensified subtraction from protected areas, at times legitimized by arbitrary decisions made at the local administrative level.

Therefore green organizations often have difficulties to motivate citizens to become interested in acquiring full information about a country's natural resources and to fraternize to consider that information and act accordingly. Creating openness for making information available is another question.

Actions are most often taken when disasters happen. Information about risks and dangers have not been available for the public before; informational capacities must be created not only at the governemntal but at all levels of society, - and institutionalized. Natural resources cannot be managed effectively without active involvement of the governement who mobilizes public organizations for collaboration.

7. Public servants nominally serving the crown (the party and worshipping its leaders; the state was not separated), actually concerned with their private well-being (now: serving oligarchic capitalist and private group interests of the elites).

7

8. Corruption is part of the regular system of administration, *not* aberration. The combination of self-seeking and bribery constitutes a way of life. It happened that functionaries had to bribe their own colleagues to obtain the salaries due to them.

- *Still relevant*. Corruption is neither bad or good, it is just a natural part of the organizational and individual behaviour of elite. Mafiotic bribes may hamper and ruin national and international private initiatives effectively unless the latter may count on their relationships with power circles, typically (new-)riches. Strictly protected areas can be converted to multi-use categories through the clannish 'etiquette' of rendering and re-rendering services, as well as directly selling environmental goods and services as if these were one's private property.

The bribery etiquette of *innocent incomes* (at society's, ordinary citizen's cost) and *sinful incomes* (at the crown's, 'the father's' cost, later on at the party leaders' cost) as a subtle and even gracious art may weakened but its main elements have survived. Cultural traits accepting innocent incomes and mutual change of services are alive in use among the political and new private sector production elites. The old belief 'money is better invested in bribes than in bank deposits' may also be considered relatively relevant.

9. Until 1864 judiciary reform, justice was exclusively a branch of administration; crimes perpetrated by private persons or officials were matters of no public concern.

- *Weakened but still relevant* in the Soviet period. To start new businesses and engage themselves socially people have to build up self-respect. *Self-respect and mutual trust* are based on the personal acceptance of equality and that these are the '*fundamental terms for association*' of people (Rawls, 1973). The Rawls' definition of justice as fairness is based on the ability of free and rational people owing a high degree of self-respect to join their efforts under the conditions of fair equality and opportunity.

The slogan of communist ideology was (in some countries still is) similar to the principles for justice, fairness and rightness given by this scholar. The judiciary principles and procedures in practice, however, neither provide innovative space for associations to 'regulate all further governments' nor the two principles of justice given by Rawls: *first*, the necessity of equal liberty; and *second*, the justification of social and economic inequalities to be arranged to greatest benefit of the least advantaged, are concerned. If people lack self-respect as *private* actors then institutions which are man-made do take few commitments for the results of their undertakings. Until now, the procedural side to ban environmental crimes is developed unsatisfactorily.

10. Fundamental laws affecting the system of government and the status of its citizens were not promulgated in any formal way, or done in highly casual fashion.

-*In the Soviet period*: particularly in the persecution of political dissidents, their ideas often qualified as mental disorders and the persons treated accordingly. *Now*: in the process of reforming. Misinterpreting of laws and rules, deciding and acting in arbitrary manner as signs of lawlessness are offsprings of this kind of practice.

11. Until the 1860s, jurisprudence did not recognize any distinction between laws, decrees (dekret, ukaz) and administrative ordinances (orders; prikaz).

- *Relevant*. Once approved by the sovereign (the party leader; *now*: the president in Russian Federation; Hvide Russia, Ukraine) all of the types of legal acts have nearly the same strength and value.

12. Lack of awareness of clear distinctions among the constitutional, criminal and civil branches of the law.

- *Weakened but still relevant*. For several reasons, the existing laws not always exercised in practice. People who are engaged in mafiatic movements often do feel that their activities are not illegal, just forms of organization and tools being unlike the culture of public administration. There is very little legal basis to to develop a legislature for treatment of environmental crimes and implementing the The-Polluter-Pays principle. The modes of conducting litigation and judicial proceedings need to be created - not only for the sake of the country's own capitalists but as well to protect its resources against supranational companies.

Enormous institutional change is needed as participation occurs through the whole legislation, through the laws concerning environmental protection, land use, construction, civil and penalty codes, etc. Since reforming of the legislation is extremely complicated, new institutions must be built up step by step in all spheres of social life and not tried readily imported.

Sometimes this is doubtful whether foreigners can understand the complexity of the Russian state management organizational culture. Foreign consultants may dispose incomplete environmental, economic, social and cultural information. They may become enspired by free market theories and over-rely on a standard set of market instruments and relationships. The Kazakhstans new law on environment of 1996 is stated to be worse than the previous one of 1991 (Ecostan News, 1996). A number of foreigners who assisted in the development of new legislation allowed a product which do not effect any effort to increase the participatory engagement of society.

13. Laws need not make public to go into effect; often known only to the officials charged by their execution, or laws too general and judicial procedures poorly developed.

- The 1997-98 Nikitin environmental espionage case where even his attorney has no access to the law and is not able to defend may serve as example.

- The Soviet Union had no overall law governing conservation and after the major disruption of the system the former laws needed either adjustment or replacement. Being too general, their interpretation was arbitrary and even autocratic, the follow-up and inspection were complicated and responsibilities splitted. More serious environmental crimes were seldom punished, although general provisions could exist on the responsible use of natural resources. To protect the state's interests administrative measures were applied in preference to legal acts and the public opinonin was supposed to support to enforce the government's will.

When laws are too general and punishment procedures weak, powerful (new-rich oligarchic capitalist) interest groups often (mis?)interpret unprecise laws in their business activities. They may, for instance, introduce commercial production of forest in a national park or sell hunting licences for endangered animals and birds, often to outsiders or foreigners. A local authority may decide that in order to raise the population's income some groups or all citizens of a given area are allowed to hunt, graze animals, make hay or till the soil in an area under conservation. As a

rule people whose incomes have raised are little motivated to be informed about problems and acting against environmental crimes unless a threat becomes acute.

14. According to the theory of Russian jurisprudence, the main function of law in this country was not so much to enforce justice as to maintain order.

Every personal or public initiative to engage in administrative management matters was excluded. In tsarist Russia, like Mongol khans' agents, public servants (*chinovniki*) entrusted with provincial administration functioned primarily as collectors of taxes and recruits and could not be categorized as 'public servants' at all.

- *Prior 1991: relevant. Now:* many western investors have experienced misinterpretation, quick and arbitrary reinterpretation and rewriting of laws. The main principle of 'laws are for subordinates, not for the authorities' are quite unchanged been transferred to the business culture and the natural resource management culture of organizations.

During the Soviet regime individual and collective initiatives were channeled into ideologically recognized paths and the whole system maintained the principle of putting order first. The highest priority in the country's development was always given to *economic growth and military power*. The decisions on environmental matters made by the central authorities served this purpose, leading often to mismanagement of natural resources. Later on, nature protection was developed a sector, separated from the country's economy and social life and directed by the rules of order and control.

The concepts of *development* may differ from country to country and may be controversial. The discourse of modern development in Europe started after the Second World War, when the destroyed Europe underwent a period of reconstruction by the help of Marshall aid. To-day, the concept of *sustainability* is related to the conventional development thinking. The need for better use of basic environmental resources to be produced and used acting by thinking about future generations.

The Russian model of development was an economic one. Citizens were motivated to participate in the designed future perspectives of welfare and happiness for all community members. The happy environment was *a priori* provided in the form of all necessary environmental commodities and services. The ideology concentrated solely on the quantity factors of production and the competition with western technological development. Planners of economic growth and resource allocation policies quietly assumed inexhaustibility of ever-lasting resources and stressed that because of their moral qualities, soviet people were superior over nature and had universal property rights on it. The leadership role of the party was extremely important in addressing secure livelihoods separately from protection of biodiversity. In this scheme, the scenic beauty of nature (often changed by man) reminded quite static scenic decoration as a background for frantic production activity.

A big potential for raising environmental awareness lies in international engagement. New policy initiatives represented in the Agenda 21-documents seriously challenge the view of nature as a resource to be managed for the pursuit of profit in global development. 'Critical to the implementation of Agenda 21 will be the commitment and genuine involvement of all social groups' bears a message that sustainable development remain an empty vision without the 'wholehearted understanding and support of the general population' (Implementation..., 1997). People may have become tied of steering and confused by the shaky grounds of their political

economy and beliefs. The operational aspects of sustainable development relate to changes in technology, political system, social norms, attitudes. The international community has expectations about mobilization of the public to engage itself in working out legal protection regulation acts, ecological tax reforms, integrated pesticide and waste management and public transport projects, campaigns about energy conservation, etc. This a big challenge for the governments and other organizations in transition.

15. Failure to distinguish deed from intent; police mentality. The Criminal Codes of 1845, 1927, 1960 are very similar at this point.

- Punishment for suspected crimes; guilt determined by the subjective impression of police officials. Suspicion survives; trust should be created.

16. Deeply rooted patrimonial mentality created a dualism of the police system: (1) to protect the state (the tsar and his officialdom) from its citizens; (2) to protect its citizens.

- *Relevant to the very end of the Soviet.* Arbitrary decisions without involving the public or even ministries (e.g. Ministry of Environment) is, consciously or unconsciously, based on the belief that somebody 'knows better' which decisions are right and which are wrong. This culture growing on the strong ground of conviction about superiority and may be cured only by supporting social and environmental education and dissemination of information in all possible ways.

Influence of the patrimonial culture manifests itself in ways how public participation is needed only *pro forma*, if any at all. Nature monuments, landmarks and national parks for instance, in Russian Federation Republics in the Central Asia have been transferred from the jurisdiction of ministries dealing with ecology and bioresources to state forestry committees, i.e. from a nature protection agency to and industrial commercial agency. The latter lacks both interest and conservation expertise and this change carries no public benefit; the basic opinion back these transfers are always formal and ignoring protests both from a few NGOs and scientists. Moreover, the badly informed and little motivated public (who have given open access in these new multiple-use areas) has now and then even supported these arrangements.

17. The omnipotence of the political police became the essence of the Russian monarchy. Everything was politicised and directed.

- *Relevant until it collapsed of its own weight.* Exactly as did the imperial government before, measures for reconstruction of the police state revolutionaries regarded in the beginning as emergency matter, but regularly renewed application of violence came to overshadow the order they were meant to protect. As its predecessor, a government pursuing politics isolated from the vicissitude of life and monopolized by one group and one ideology failed by the end victim to it.

-Related attitudes such as awaiting orders to act (security guaranteed best by directives), suspicion and mistrust (ideological and cultural intolerance planted into the collective memory) are alive. Mafiatic movements are able to derive profit on the remaining mistrust and fear. A typical 'framework' for the ideological treatment of the population consisted of lack of objective information, mutilation and misrepresenting of facts, methods and tools of spreading information as decided by ideologists. The majority of Russias population is poor and many people live on the limit of sustenance. The public often has difficulties to organize and understand

new flows of information, yet the more important factor is that for power-holding interest groups this is possible to acquire political support by opening nature conservation areas for public use.

18. The close, almost symbiotic identification of church and state. While the western church for a long time had no monarchy to contend with and developed strong secular interests of its own, reform movements within *orthodoxy* have generally aimed at the removal of what could become innovation rather than at trying to adapt to changing conditions. After the triumphal progress of Schism in Russia (Nikon's reforms in the 17th century) and thereafter full integration of the clergy into the state bureaucracy (completed in the late 18th century) when the boundaries of bishoprics were aligned with those of the provincial administration, Russia lost its independent church. It was merged with the state apparatus and became nothing more than a ministry of religious affairs. 'Religious public servants' received fixed government wages, promulgated the *religion (ideology) of the state* and collaborated with the police.

- The *state religion in the form of communist ideology* was instituted by that power which in 1917 succeeded the imperial as easily as the church removed and the institutional vacuum filled with secular ideology. After the immense bureaucratic apparatus was put up, similarly to the previous state religion, nature of this ideology became conservative and characterized by *absence of trust* to institutional innovation and cultural diversity. The 'state-religious' part of the Russian population believed the party's and state's role as all-embracing, all-understanding, and omnipotent thinker and actor. Subservient-to-'the crown' (acceptance of the patrimonial) attitude is unfavourable for innovations, initiatives, voluntary personal responsibilities.

The moral crisis which accompanied the collapse of the police state and its ideology led many people to join re-established and re-financed churches, others are longing back to the state of order and discipline and dislike a chance given to them re-think their engagement in the social life. This category of people would prefer the state alone to decide upon what is right for the country's economic growth, social and environmental management - management of their lives.

19. Indifference to social and political injustice and public enlightening of the absolutism and the church. The entire idea of Russian absolutism was worked out by clergymen who felt that the interests of religion and church were best served by a monarchy with unlimited power. No other branch of Christianity have defended elementary Christian values less than the church in Russia has done, thus contributing to a monstrous police state and censorship of information.

The educated (who later on, in the 1930's were compelled to leave Russia, jailed or killed) did not find the common language with the church because this was conservative and 'pronouncedly anti-intellectual' (citation from Pipes). Following the medieval Russian axiom 'all evil comes from opinions' the church showed little interest even in educating its own people. Round 1913, only 8 % of the the population of *proper* Russia could read and write.

- The Soviet government introduced compulsory schooling which for the first time removed illiteracy. Except their national literature and mother tongue training, all young people were trained by applying the same programmes and the same textbooks translated to national languages from Russian. But similarly to ideological separation technical/ natural science from the social sciences (these were politics-biased), excellent special and higher education offered by the state has been available in the narrow natural and technical fields (with guaranteed objectivity) compared to ideology-biased training in social incl. political sciences (with guaranteed non-objectivity). Technical education was suited best for economic growth and military purposes.

20. The weak sustainability (anthropo-technocentric) paradigm traits of ideology-biased organizational culture have thus survived in the form of objectivity gap between natural (technical) and social (political) education and science and overproduction of technical knowledge (engineers and natural scientists, recently economists trained in western Europe) compared to social scientists. At present the fact that the technical expertise may be applied with much less effort (cost) than the integrated approach and the lack of certain skilled professionals is an obstacle to the participation of citizens and NGO's in policy- and decisionmaking. The EIA has been much criticized for 'putting all participation eggs in the EIA basket' (cited from REC Manual, 1994) and often translated into national FSU languages as 'ecological' expertise not indicating cross-sectoral, interdisciplinary collaboration-seeking attitude.

Cooperation with Nordic countries on environmental research has revealed principal differences in attempts to ensure that environmental concerns are taken into consideration in big construction and development projects (Holm-Hansen, 1996a and b and elsewhere). While the Nordic countries focus on impacts based on multidisciplinary of land use planning issues, in CEEC countries and particularly former soviet region EIA is accepted as merely a system *measuring* the effects pertinent to environmental/ pollution control and permit procedures, resulting in reports on environmental *status* and consequences not necessarily initiating processes focusing on the sustainability of development.

All these unfavourable trends are, however, under change, with time as the limiting factor for the pace of the process. It has been argued that the three Baltic countries: Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania will break the old police state ties first (REC Manual, 1994). For them the *psychological* distinction from the past is important. While the Central Europe centrally planned economies maintained nominal independence, border controls, foreign policy, currency and trade, the Baltic states were derived from their independence and democratic rights to participate in the decision making processes. The institutional 'vacuum' created after the disruption had to be made to allow these countries a clean break with the past on an *ideological* level, reinvent and develop their constitutional basis and organizational management practices.

Conclusion.

Everyone agrees that a political and administrative system in a modern society should be capable of addressing all aspects of environmental problems in an efficient way, as well as articulating central and local interests. There is no blueprint for political and functional decentralization, no any institutional system may serve as a model, but there is institutional space for innovation and experiments. What is done by now in CEEC is more like deconcentration, i.e. recantation by the state from its responsibilities for economic and environmental decision making and acting. The latter is left to interest groups and individuals in power-role culture organizations where historically determined relationship motivation is prevailing over motivation focused on the task of healthy wild and human habitat as an essential element of the life quality.

Environmental problems are of both global and local character. Many problems should be addressed by joint efforts of many countries. To collaborate, strong national governments are needed to take responsibility for both entering and realization of international agreements. In this regard it is necessary to support national governments and their strongholds. Loosening strong state control mechanisms may, however, induce commercialization of human relations with

nature and overuse of resources. Vaguely promoted land reforms in Russian Federation have contributed not much to identify property rights on resources. The corruptive and superfluous behaviour of public servants and bureaucratic organizations is supposed to expire with strengthening of democratic institutions, to replace the police state institutions and mentality.

Building national managerial capacities have to be developed to cross-sectoral collaboration and public participation. When there is local interest involved, too strong government regulations and rules may serve to reduce or quench local initiative. Governments need to raise money for transaction costs of information, contracting and implementation of reforms. On the other side, by supporting governments in transition socio-economies there is always a risk of nurturing old value systems and power-role organizational cultures, often keeping their superficial appearances but being resistant to structural changes.

The power and role cultures *are* ossified in a degree that often yields in the resistance against required institutional change. The CEEC countries redesigned their environmental administrations in the 1980's when environment was singled out as one policy area and given its own ministry. Except some few countries, the ministries of environment deal with environmental problems *strictu sensu* using 'ecological expertise' as the main tool for EIA, and are often separated from other aspects of society and economy. Nevertheless, public participation principles have been included in the legislations and some governments have already set forth considerable efforts to reshape their organizational cultures.

The shift of values towards priorities of non-materialistic, common goals, to a sound combination of outer- and inner-directed qualities is practically possible in welfare democracies where individuals are comfortably off. For those people the principal difficulty of realizing that this is not more money that bring the desired happiness, may be overcome. Nobody chooses poverty in Russia either, but the logic that if people have all this goods then they are can choose how to use excess of their own or other tax-payers money, does not work. Motivation leading to action goes hand in hand with willingness to receive and consider information.

The real success of process planning which includes sustainable resource management issues will occur when governments themselves take up the task cultures of the new managerialism.

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