COMMUNITY FORESTRY IN THE PHILIPPINES: PARADOXES AND PERSPECTIVES IN DEVELOPMENT PRACTICE[1]

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Abstract

The last two decades witnessed the emergence of community forestry as a major government strategy to promote sustainable development in the Philippine uplands. At the central policy level, it has evolved to embody three core development objectives — democratization of resources access, poverty alleviation, and the sustainability of the forest resources. These objectives closely parallel the political, economic and resource sustainability intentions inherent in the concept of Ecologically Sustainable Development (ESD).

At the project level, a variety of techniques and approaches are designed and employed by development institutions to realize the three core objectives. These include various types of resource access instruments, appraisal and participatory planning techniques, and the approach to incorporate social factors into the concept of sustained-yield management, to name a few.

Notwithstanding these developments, case studies of selected government-sponsored community forestry projects indicate that the three core objectives are far from being realized. The attempt to democratize forest resource access through the use of access instruments has benefited the local elite and reinforced the government's jurisdiction over these resources. Similarly, the use of appraisal and 'participatory' planning techniques has homogenized views of the local community and advanced a centrally determined agenda in forest management that has worked against the alleviation of poverty. Moreover, forest degradation has continued, despite the emphasis of community forestry on sustaining forest resources.

Three perspectives are offered to help explain the above paradoxes: (1) the unfavorable socio-political contexts by which the different techniques and approaches are being employed; (2) poor application of these techniques; and (3) the instrumentalist nature associated with their use that reinforces the characteristics of homogeneity, technocracy, and centralism which are inclined to produce paradoxical outcomes.

Considering the dual problems on poverty and environmental degradation in the Philippine uplands, however, the gloomy prognosis for community forestry does not suggest that it should be abandoned. Through a responsive mode of practice, there is room to move to improve the outcomes of the three central objectives.

INTRODUCTION

The inability of the state-cum-corporate forestry approach to benefit the rural poor or address the increasing rate of deforestation in the tropics contributed to a major shift in the direction of forest management in these areas in favor of a *people-oriented* approach. Generally termed *community forestry*[3], this approach has lately been

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[3] Other related terms found in the literature include social forestry, people-oriented forestry and forestry for local

regarded as a new forestry paradigm (Gilmour and Fisher, 1991). The Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) of the United Nations defined community forestry "as any situation which intimately involves local people in forestry activities" (FAO 1978:1). It has been claimed to influence the nature of forestry activities more profoundly than any other development in the forestry profession (Arnold, 1991).

Community forestry, as currently implemented by forestry agencies in most developing countries, has been shaped by international development fashion and by the specific political and historical contexts in these areas. It has incorporated many of the ideas from mainstream development thinking; the most recent of which is the concept of sustainable development (Pulhin, 1996). In the Philippines, *community-based forest management or CBFM*, has been recently adopted as "the national strategy to achieve sustainable forestry and social justice" (E.O. 263: Section 1). CBFM has the avowed core objectives of democratizing forest resource access, improving socio-economic welfare of upland communities, and promoting the sustainability of the forest resources. These core objectives closely parallel the political, economic, and resource sustainability intentions inherent in the concept of Ecologically Sustainable Development (ESD).

In this paper, I briefly present the historical development of the policy and practice of CBFM in the Philippines including the current status of its implementation at the national level. Using selected case studies of government-initiated community forestry projects, I then examined what is happening on the ground and attempted to offer explanations why the three core objectives are yet far from being realized at the local level. Finally, I suggested the need for a more responsive practice in community forestry to increase the potential of achieving its three core objectives.

THE EVOLUTION OF COMMUNITY FORESTRY

The first forest policy on community forestry in the Philippines was formulated in 1916 through the promulgation of Act 2557, otherwise known as the Administrative Code (Kirchhoff, 1993). Said Code provided, among others, for the establishment of communal forests to insure that the people having rights therein will get continued supply of forest products for their domestic use. However, until recently, policies on the commercial utilization of the country's timber resources consistently favored the wealthy and politically more influential concessionaires under the so-called timber license agreements (TLAs). Such policies contributed to the socio-economic and political marginalization of the rural population, but also to the continuous onslaught of the country's forest resources (Broad and Cavanagh, 1993, Kummer, 1990, Porter and Ganapin, 1988, Vitug, 1993).

Sustained efforts to incorporate the concept of community forestry in the country's forest policy occurred in the last three decades as expressed in the various government programs and projects initiated during this period. Following Rebugio and Chiong-Javier's classification (1995), the evolution of community forestry during this time can be loosely divided into three categories. First is the *pioneering period* from 1971 to 1980. This term saw the adoption of three major people-oriented forestry programs, namely, the Forest Occupancy Management (FOM), Family Approach to Reforestation (FAR), and the Communal Tree Farming (CTF). In general, these programs centered on the involvement of the local people in the reforestation activities. People were seen more as labor-provider rather than partners in forest conservation and development. Considering the volatile political situation during this time, community forestry was also seen as a form of counterinsurgency measure to maintain political stability and order in the countryside (Porter and Ganapin, 1988). However, it was during this period that the forestry sector started to realize that the problem of deforestation is not merely technical but also socio-political in nature.

The second era is the *integration and consolidation* from 1981 to 1989. This period marked the adoption of two main people-oriented forestry programs, namely, the Integrated Social Forestry Program (ISFP) and the Community Forestry Program (CFP). ISFP consolidated the three earlier programs, while recognizing the vested rights of the forest occupants through the provision of a 25-year tenurial security. On the other hand, CFP extended the coverage of community forestry to natural forests allowing participating upland communities to commercially utilize forest resources subject to appropriate social and technical preparation. From merely

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community development. In this paper, the term community forestry and community-based forest management or CBFM is used interchangeably.

laborers in reforestation activities, local people were increasingly recognized as the *de facto* resource mangers, hence, partners in forest development and conservation.

There are indications that the counterinsurgency intent of community forestry may have been sustained until the end of the second period (Pulhin, 1996). Despite this, the period saw the growing recognition that upland poverty alleviation, social justice and equity in resource distribution, and forest sustainability, can be simultaneously achieved through community forestry. During this time, the Ford Foundation-funded Upland Development Program was also established following the framework of people-centered, learning process approach, and participatory project implementation. Increasing concern to promote participatory approach to development has also led to the development of various appraisal and planning methodologies and techniques such as community profiling techniques, Rapid Rural Systems Appraisal (RRA), Socio-Economic Development Planning, Community Resource Management and Development Planning and others. These approaches/techniques are continuously being refined even at the present period.

The third period from 1990 to the present, is the *expansion and institutionalization* period. This term is characterized by the growth of community forestry to include various land use types not originally included in the first two periods. In particular, community forestry coverage included degraded watershed areas and practically all types of forests where there are Indigenous Cultural Communities. The era is also marked by increasing support from the international funding agencies such as the Asian Development Bank, World Bank, Japan's Overseas Economic Cooperation fund, United States Assistance for International Development, and other multilateral and bilateral donors. Efforts to provide tenurial security during this period led to the evolution of varied types of tenure instruments. Moreover, attempts to alleviate upland poverty while ensuring the sustainability of the forest resources induced the development of diverse types of income generating technologies for the uplands.

Various forms of institutional arrangements also continue to evolve in the present period. From a purely government-implemented projects in the 1970s, the practice of community forestry has increasingly involved upland communities in forest management. This is made possible through the formation of People's Organizations with the assistance from other sectors such as the non government organizations (NGOs), local government units (LGUs), the academe, and other organizations.

Recently, the different programs and projects that emerged in the last two periods were "integrated and unified" into one umbrella program, otherwise known as the *Community-Based Forest Management Program* (CBFMP) through Executive Order (E.O.) No. 263 issued on July 1995 and its Implementing Rules and Regulations, DENR Administrative Order No. 96-29 issued on October 1996. E.O. 263 adopted CBFM as the national strategy for sustainable forestry and social equity thereby institutionalizing the practice of community forestry in the country.

The institutionalization of CBFM is seen as the main government strategy towards the restructuring of the once corporate-controlled timber industry. Timber Licensee Agreements (TLAs) used to control one third of the country's total land area of 30 million hectares from 1971 to 1977. With the shift in the government's forest management approach in favor of CBFM starting in the late 1980s, TLA areas gradually declined to the present 1.4 million hectares through the cancellation of erring licensees and non-renewal of the expired ones. The 1997 DENR Strategic Action Plan for CBFM envisioned that 9 million hectares of forest lands – mostly under the existing and potential open access areas – will be placed under community management by the year 2008.[4] This constitutes around 58 percent of the country's total forest land area. On the other hand, only 0.5 million hectares are expected to be allocated for industrial tree plantations and other purposes.

To summarize, the development of CBFM in the Philippines during the three periods points to the following trends:

[4] The DENR records indicate that in addition to the 3.62 M ha CBFM areas in 1997, there were a total of 6.59 M ha of "existing and potential open access areas" in the country from expired/yet to expire, suspended, or cancelled government contracts with the private sector, such as TLAs, Pasture Lease Agreements, and Industrial Forest Management Agreements, which are available for CBFM.

- intensifying efforts towards the democratization of forest access and benefits through the issuance of various types of tenurial instruments;
- increasing involvement of upland communities in the management of the local forest resources through the use of various participatory techniques and procedures;
- incorporation of key principles of ESD such as social equity, poverty alleviation and sustainable resource use in the design and implementation of community forestry projects;
- increasing emphasis on decentralization and local governance in forest management through the involvement of POs, NGOs, and LGUs;
- spreading interest and support from the different funding institutions; and
- expanding coverage and institutionalization

STATUS OF IMPLEMENTATION

DAO No. 96-29, "integrates and unifies" a total of ten people-oriented forestry programs and projects of the government under a general umbrella program known as the Community-Based Forest Management Program or CBFMP. These are: the Integrated Social Forestry Program (ISFP), Upland Development Program (UDP), Forest Land Management Program (FLMP), Community Forestry Program (CFP), Low Income Upland Communities Project (LIUCP), Regional Resources Management Project (RRMP), Integrated Rainforest Management Project (IRMP), Forest Sector Project (FSP), Coastal Environment Program (CEP), and Recognition of Ancestral Domains/Claims. As an integrated and unified program, CBFMP embodies the three core development objectives pursued by the earlier people-oriented forestry programs/projects, namely, resource democratization, people's participation towards poverty alleviation, and the sustainability of the forest resources. These objectives closely parallel the political, economic and resource sustainability intentions inherent in the concept of Ecologically Sustainable Development (ESD) currently promoted at the global level.[5]

At the operational level, the three central objectives are being pursued through the development and employment of different techniques and approaches designed to implement community forestry projects. Among the more important techniques and approaches include the different resource access instruments, the use of different participatory techniques like rapid rural appraisal (RRA), and the incorporation of social factors in the concept of sustained-yield forest management (Table 1). For the purpose of this paper, I shall call these 'techniques and approaches' as 'instruments of practice'.

Table 1. Some techniques/approaches employed to achieve the core objectives of community forestry

Core Development Objectives	**Instruments of Practice**
Resource democratization	Resource access instruments
Poverty alleviation	Appraisal and planning techniques (e.g., RRA, SEDP)
Forest sustainability	Incorporation of social factors in the concept of sustained-yield forestry

The most recent available information from the Central DENR Office shows that as of June 30, 1999, there are 4,074 CBFM projects covering a total area of 5,040,341.66 ha distributed in the 15 administrative regions of the country (Table 2). Of the total area, 3,926,267.39 or 77.90% are covered with various forms of tenure instruments. In terms of geographic distribution, Region 11 has the most number of projects (793 projects) while Region 4b has the biggest share of the area (934,098.50 ha). On the other hand, the Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao (ARRM) has the least number of projects (50 projects) and the smallest area coverage (17,577.25 ha).

Gleaned from these figures, it appears that CBFMP has made a significant headway in terms of reversing forest

[5] See for instance, *Our Common Future* (1987) and the *Earth Summit Agenda 21* (1992)

access from the state-cum-corporate mode of forest management to a more "people-oriented" management, in favor of local communities. Such an accomplishment, also seems to pair well, when compared with the DENR target of allocating 9 million hectares of forest lands to local communities by the year 2008. The ultimate indicator, however, whether community forestry is living to the expectations of its advocates rests on its ability to achieve the three core objectives at the local level. This is examined in the following section.

Table 2. Community-Based Forest Management Area by Region (as of June 30, 1999)

Region	Sites	Area (ha)	Tenured Area (ha)
ARMM	50	17,577.25	14,119.25
CAR	426	717,783.53	650,792.33
1	208	70,691.33	58,596.02
2	111	611,341.69	554,707.14
3	221	159,640.88	148,348.27
4a	116	113,601.93	78,191.40
4b	142	934,098.50	606,026.52
5	215	191,224.63	160,466.33
6	324	121,059.34	61,087.05
7	316	68,611.64	37,202.39
8	208	94,271.74	56,937.71
9	229	277,558.92	125,500.33
10	283	374,631.50	237,344.44
11	793	681,484.40	666,096.79
12	100	82,589.42	71,687.78
13	332	524,174.96	399,163.64
TOTAL	**4,074**	**5,040,341.66**	**3,926,267.39**

Source: DENR Central Office

COMMUNITY FORESTRY IN PRACTICE: EXAMINING FOUR CASES

I selected three government-initiated community forestry projects to examine the relationship between the current conventional practice of community forestry and the initial outcomes towards the achievement of the three core objectives. I purposively chose these projects to provide a view of the history, differing techniques, and approaches used in community forestry as well as their development and refinements. I then examined the relationship between the use of the different techniques and approaches – resource access instruments, Rapid Rural Systems Appraisal and Socio-Economic Development Planning and the incorporation of social factors in the concept of sustained-yield forest management – and improved outcomes towards the achievement of social equity, poverty alleviation, and forest sustainability. Table 3 presents a general profile of the four case study projects.

Democratizing Resource Access

Recent socio-political and environmental changes in the Philippines have led to a new approach in forest management that emphasizes the democratization of resource access. This approach is implemented mainly through the government's issuance of *resource access agreements* or *permits* to upland communities involved in community-based forestry programs and projects. The idea behind democratizing forest resource access tends to support the major arguments of the growing number of environmental groups in the Philippines. For most of these groups, the country's environmental crisis is "more than anything else, an equity issue" (Magno, 1993:8). Some advocates of the people-centred development agenda in the country also assert that "democratising control of resources is the key to sustainable development" (Broad and Cavanagh, 1993:138).

Since 1982, DENR has developed and issued at least five different types of resource access instruments under its major community forestry programs and projects. Earlier, the social forestry component of the Central Visayas Regional Project (CVRP-1-SF) in coordination with the DENR had also developed its own resource access instrument called Community Timber Utilization Permit (CTUP). In this section, the I examined the outcome of the issuance of two types of resource access instruments in achieving the objective of democratizing access to forest resources.

Case 1: Community Timber Utilization Permit: Central Visayas Regional Project -I- Social Forestry Component

The Central Visayas Regional Project I or CVRP-I was the first major foreign-assisted multi-sectoral regional development project in the Philippines. It was financed by a World Bank loan of US$25.65 million and a counterpart fund from the Philippine Government of US$9.8 million. Social Forestry (CVRP-I-SF) was one of the major technical components of CVRP-I. The two other components included upland agriculture and nearshore fisheries.

The aim of CVRP-1-SF was to provide local communities with access to and benefits from the available forest resources as an incentive to sustainable forest management. This was to be pursued through the application of Forest Stand Improvement (FSI) in the available 8,000 ha

Table 3. Profile of case study projects.

CHARACTERISTICS	COMMUNITY FORESTRY PROJECT			
	CVRP-I (Social Forestry)	**LIUCP***	**Presentacion CFP**	**Claveria CFP**
1. General Description				
a. Location	Ayungon and Bindoy, Negros Oriental (Region 7)	Mindoro Oriental and Occidental (Region 4)	Presentacion, Camarines Sur (Region 5)	Claveria, Misamis Oriental (Region 10)
b. Total project area	17,363 ha	9,000 ha	1,282 ha	1,500 ha
c. Total project cost	55 million pesos (Actual cost)		15.14 million pesos	2.33 million pesos
d. Source of fund	World Bank	Asian Development Bank	Asian Development Bank	USAID, NGO's counterpart
e. Year established	1984	1990	1990	1992
f. Year of termination	1992	1998	1996	1995
g. Major project intervention	Provision of resource access, community based reforestation, forest utilisation, agroforestry, infrastructure, and institutional strengthening	Community organising and co-operative development, resource access and resource management, agroforestry, livelihood and reforestation, infrastructure and social services, and project mgt. and institution building	Community organising, timber stand improvement, assisted natural regeneration, contract reforestation and agroforestry	Community organising, agroforestry, inland fishpond, animal dispersal, forest protection
2. Bio-physical				
a. Vegetative cover	About 40% logged-over area, 25% reforested area, and the remaining 35% open and cultivated areas and patches of old growth	About 90% grassland, cultivated and fallow area, and 10%, second growth forest	About 60% logged-over area, 20% brushland and cogonal land, and 20% culti-vated area	About 60% logged over area, 15% mossy forest, 15% cultivated and open areas and 10% burned area
b. Slope category/ elevation	Moderate to steep slope with dominant slope ranging from 18-40% (6,000 ha) and 40% and above 12,300 ha)	75% sloping to rolling (8-30%) and the rest mostly level to gently sloping (0-8%)	About 70% undulating to rolling (20-40%) and the rest hilly to mountainous (50% and above). 300 to 1500 m a. s. l.	Elevation ranges from 1,100 to 2,200 m a.s.l.
c. Climatic type	Type 3, relatively dry from November to April and wet during the rest of	Type 1, two pronounced seasons: dry season from	Type 2, no pronounced dry season with maximum	Type 4, rainfall more or less evenly distributed with low rainfall in

	COMMUNITY FORESTRY PROJECT			
	the month	November to April , wet during the rest of the year.	rainfall from November to February	February and March
CHARACTERISTICS	**CVRP-I (Social Forestry)**	**LIUCP***	**Presentacion CFP**	**Claveria CFP**
d. Average annual rainfall	1,645 mm. at sea level and 2,140 in the mountains	2,000 mm. at sea level and 2,250 in the mountains		
e. Soil	Generally formed from volcanic ejecta mostly clay to clay loam and 4.6-6.2 ph.			Varies from sandy to clay loam with an average of 6 ph.
Socio-economic a. Number of participants	1421	250	262	56
b. Average family size	7	10	6	6
c. Major source of livelihood	farming (hillside and flat land), hired labour, forest products gathering	*kaingin* making, forest products gathering	upland farming/ *kaingin* making, forest product gathering, fishing and hired labour	upland farming/ *kaingin* making, forest product gathering, tomato production
d. Farm size per household	Generally ranges from less than 1 to 9 ha, average 3 ha.		Generally ranges from 1 to 8 ha, average 2 ha.	
e. Extent of land claims in project site	Roughly 50% claimed through tax declaration, inheritance, certificate of stewardship contract, and personal stake through occupancy	Roughly 60 to 70 % of the whole project area are claimed Mangyan tribe as their ancestral lands.	About 70% claimed through tax declaration, inheritance, and personal stake through occupancy	About 15% claimed through tax declaration, inheritance and personal stake through occupancy
f. Type of ethnic groupings	Generally Visayans, native to the area.	Mangyans (Indigenous Cultural Community or ICC)	Generally Bicolanos (migrants)	Higaonons (ICC) and Visayan migrants

*Except for project location, all other descriptions refer to Kabilyan Watershed, Bulalacao Mindoro Oriental, since this is the focus of the case study.

Sources: Various Project Documents

of logged-over areas within the 17,000 ha project site. FSI involves the cutting of overcrowded young tress, and defective and deformed trees, along with the removal of undesirable brush and vines in logged-over forests. It was traditionally seen as a silvicultural rather than an economic activity; hence, trees cut down during this operation were normally left in the forest to decompose.

Proponents of the CVRP-1-SF modified the traditional FSI practice by advocating the commercial utilisation of timber from FSI operations through the issuance of Community Timber Utilization Permit (CTUP) to

participating Forest Stewardship Organizations (FOSAs). This strategy was expected to promote the growth of the healthy residual trees by removing competing vegetation and increase rural income through the sale of hand-sawn lumber, firewood and other forest products.

CTUP offered some prospects of promoting equity in access to forest resources and improving the lot of the local forest occupants. It was the first permit issued by the Philippine government which gave forest occupants the opportunity to legally derive income from the utilisation of forest trees. Although timber utilisation was limited to dead trees, wood extracted from the operation was still of commercial value. Moreover, CTUPs were seen by CVRP staff and consultants as a potential vehicle for forest protection and rehabilitation. Part of the proceeds from timber extraction were to be allocated by the different FOSAs to protect and manage the remaining forest and to rehabilitate the open and grassland areas within their respective boundaries (Yao, 1992.).

When CTUPs were issued, most of the FOSAs were not equipped to undertake labour-intensive timber utilisation. Few FOSA members were interested in handsawing timber, since most of them were farmers by occupation. In order to facilitate timber exploitation, outside sawyers had to be hired to train FOSA members. The situation led to a proliferation of outside sawyers who ended up pocketing more money than FOSA members who were unfamiliar with the job. In the case of Yasoma FOSA for instance, only 25 pairs of the estimated 100 pairs of sawyers were FOSA members. Ten pairs were non-members, but lived in the same locality, while the remaining 65 pairs came from other municipalities.

Most of the sawyers suffered a 'hand-to-mouth existence'. They needed cash to provide for their families while they were working in the mountains. However, FOSAs did not have the initial capital to support the cash requirements of the sawyers. To meet their needs, FOSA Presidents usually came to an arrangement with buyers or businessmen who advanced some money for a specified volume of lumber. As a result, the buyers were able to control the prices of lumber.

Within the FOSAs, benefits from timber extraction mostly accrued to the officials who controlled CTUP operations and marketing. Some FOSA officials received P0.20 for every bd ft of lumber sawn from outside sawyers. This served as a payment to enable them to work in the FOSA. In addition, some Presidents who handled the marketing also received as much as P0.50 per bd ft of lumber as a bribe for selling (including 'fresh lumber' cut from live trees) to a favored buyer. On top of these bribes, all FOSA officers received an honorarium for every bd ft of lumber sold.

Due to the fact that most FOSA Presidents controlled the marketing of lumber, the Presidency became a much coveted position. Businessmen supported their own candidates to ensure that they would have a monopoly in purchasing lumber produced by the FOSA. Vote buying had became so rampant that certain businessmen paid as much as P150 per vote in support of their candidates. This was accordingly three times higher compared to the 1985 national Presidential election where people received only P50 per vote. Pocketing of the FOSA's share (P1.00 per bd ft) by officials was also common in the project area. Still none could equal that of the Yasoma FOSA. Its members filed suit against their President for failing to account for P1.3 million which was missing (Yao, 1992).

The high demand for quality lumber led to the cutting of live trees. In Yasoma FOSA for instance, a *barangay* official estimated that more than 50 percent of the more than 5,000 m^3 lumber extracted from the area came from live trees. In group discussions conducted with FOSA members, it was revealed that in order to circumvent CTUP policy, which allowed only the utilisation of dead trees, live trees were treated with chemicals to destroy their root systems. Two investigations conducted by the BFD Regional Office in July and September 1987 confirmed the cutting of live trees (Yao, 1992). The second investigation also revealed that some BFD and CVRP field personnel had tolerated illegal cuttings and facilitated the shipment of fresh lumber. In January 1988, the DENR Secretary sent an inter-agency team to assess the project. Their report confirmed the illegal activities in the area and served as the basis for the cancellation of all CTUPs on August of the same year.

The cancellation of the CTUPs left some FOSA members in a sudden economic depression — especially the hillside farmers who had abandoned their farms to concentrate on timber utilisation (CVRP, n.d.:19). Most of them had to continue with the activity, this time illegally, to eke out a living. In the absence of other livelihood sources, the local people continued to encroach on the forested areas to make *kaingins*. The combined effects of

illegal cutting and *kaingin* making continue to contribute to forest depletion in the area —especially since CVRP's termination in December 1992.

Overall, the businessmen/buyers benefited most. A simple computation made for one bd ft of timber sold at the conservative price of P6.50 revealed the following sharing of benefits: P2.00 for hauler and sawyers; P1.00 for FOSA share; P1.50-P2.00 for transporting costs; and P1.50-P2.00 as the buyer's profit. This means that of the estimated total value of timber harvested by all 18 FOSAs, amounting to P34.6 million, about 28 per cent (P9.3 million) went to around 20 businessmen, while only P13.4 million or 39 per cent was earned by roughly 500 sawyers and haulers.

Even the plan to use a part of the proceeds from timber utilisation to finance reforestation activities was hardly realised. Few FOSAs allotted part of their share for reforestation, while only one of the 21 FOSAs continued to undertake forest protection and maintenance of planted seedlings. Group discussion with the this FOSA members revealed that this is primarily to the watershed value of the adjacent forest. About 300 ha of irrigated farms rely on the Malicon watershed for water supply.

Official evaluations, project reports, World Bank Aide Memoirs, and personal assessments by project implementors, FOSA members, and observers, offered varied answers to the question of why CTUP had failed to achieve the socio-economic and environmental objectives of its designers. These answers, however, can be generally categorised under 'poor practice', that is, CTUP was applied at the wrong time in an appropriate manner.

An inter-agency evaluation team commissioned by the DENR Secretary in January 1988 pointed out that one of the reasons for failure was the inappropriate use of CTUP as the 'project's entry point' (Inter-agency Evaluation Team, 1988:8). The team concluded that FOSA members were unprepared for CTUP operations since they did not receive any training on forest conservation from either the CVRP or BFD. This conclusion was supported by some local DENR personnel and former CVRP staff whom I interviewed on the CTUP issue. For a number of them, agroforestry would have been a more appropriate entry point for the project. They believed that CTUP should have been set up only after the local people had been fully trained so as to understand the importance of forest conservation. They also argued that better results could have been achieved had CTUP operations been piloted first in a few FOSAs.

In addition to poor practice, however, the historical and political context in which the CTUP was applied also contributed to its paradoxical effects. The most obvious expression of this was the involvement of some BFD and CVRP personnel in facilitating a shipment of fresh lumber (Yao, 1992). A number of BFD personnel formerly assigned to the project site were said to be included in the monthly payroll of some businessmen in exchange for a variety of illicit favours including underscaling of timber and allowing the transport of fresh lumber. Such behaviour has an historical precedence. During the logging years of the 1960s and 1970s, it was common knowledge that BFD personnel made huge amounts of money from colluding with TLA holders. As a result of the cancellation of all TLAs in Negros Oriental in 1979 they lost this additional source of income. CTUP operations allowed them to regain this additional source of income although at a reduced amount.

A less overt expression of politics was the attempt of some CVRP staff to influence the then Barangay Captain of Bamban in the formation of five FOSAs. As attested by the Barangay Captain himself, the CVRP staff requested him to form the FOSAs having failed to 'recruit' *barangay* members to join the project because of the latter's bad experiences with previous government projects. As a consequence, the CVRP staff failed to check the illicit activities of the Barangay Captain during the CTUP operations because they 'already owed him a favor'. At the FOSA level, politics took the form of FOSA leaders controlling the operations, colluding with buyers or outside sawyers, or running away with the CTUP money.

In a broader political context, CTUP issuance had its counterinsurgency dimension. The influx of migrants to the project site during the collapse of the sugar industry in the early 1980s was an indication of the fragility of the socio-economic and political situation on the whole Negros island. The failure of the sugar industry is related to the broader Philippine political economy – a subject not covered in this paper. Suffice it to say that the collapse, coupled with the highly skewed land distribution in Negros island, called for major government intervention to prevent the CPP/NPA takeover in the area. This implies that as far as the Marcos administration and the World

Bank were concerned, the immediate objective of the project was to stabilise the political situation in the area. If in the process of project implementation, the official objectives could be attained, so much the better.

The failure of CTUP, however, is not only associated with politics and poor practice. In the next case, I examine the Presentacion CFP to show that the tendency to produce paradoxical effects is inherent in the use of resource access instrument.

Case 2: Community Forest Management Agreement (CFMA): Presentacion CFP

The Presentacion project was the first to be established in the country under the Community Forestry Program (CFP). This program intended to 'place a system of institutional ownership or stewardship' over fragmented residual forests that are located mostly in former logging areas (Guiang, 1991:41). In Presentacion project site, this involved a 1,863 ha logged over area to be placed under the management of the local People's Organization through the issuance of Community Forest Management Agreement. Advocates of community forestry believed that CFMAs facilitate the 'returning of the forest to the people' and help to arrest poverty and forest depletion in CFP areas such as Presentacion (Dugan, 1989; Guiang, 1991). It is a improvement of the CTUP in the sense that it allows for the commercial utilization of timber by the local communities for a period of 25 years renewable for another 25 years.

Despite noble objectives, CFMA issuance may ignore the fact that most of the forest areas are claimed or occupied by upland cultivators. Based on a nationwide comprehensive study conducted by Cruz, Zosa-Feranil, and Goze (1986), it was estimated that there are now around 11 million people occupying forest lands (Cruz *et al.,* 1992). The majority of these people are farming in these areas (World Bank, 1989). In Presentacion, and probably in most upland areas, addressing the claimant issue with regard to forest lands is crucial to the implementation of community forestry projects. The complexity of this issue is expressed in the 1991 Accomplishment Report of the non-government organization (Pag-Bicol Foundation Incorporated) assisting the local PO, BREDCI:

> The project has identified a total of 98 families with claims within the CFP site. When their claims were laid out in the CFP project map, one can say that the whole area looks like a subdivision ... They [claimants] refused the inclusion of their claimed lots in the areas to be developed as contract reforestation, timber stand improvement, assisted natural regeneration, and agroforestry (otherwise know as the pump-priming activities). This led to project implementation delays and strained community relations between BREDCI members and the claimants. In many instances, threats of physical harm and heated confrontations occurred between the regular members and the claimants (Pag-Bicol, 1991; clarification added in parentheses).

A census of the claimants done in 1993 showed that there were a total of 105 families with claims within 268 ha 'old project contracts' signed by Pag-Bicol in 1990. Of these families, only 33 (31 per cent) were BREDCI members, while 72 (69 per cent) were non-members. In addition, an undetermined number of families claimed a significant part of the new 1,000 ha CFP contract signed on 13 December 1991. An interview with some PO officials revealed that only about 400 ha of the 1,000 ha 'new contract' were not claimed. However, a project document (Pag-Bicol and BREDCI, 1993) shows that there were a total of 140 families claiming 840 ha within the 1,863 ha project area. This represents 13 per cent of the 805 families in the four project *barangays.*

Different groups view the claimant issue from various perspectives. Local DENR officials maintain that the lands being claimed are 'public lands', hence 'cannot be subject to individual ownership and titling' (Pag-Bicol, 1991:6). This implies that the claimants have no right to resist the various project activities on their lots. On the other hand, the claimants, especially the non-BREDCI members, believe they have ownership rights to their claimed lands. They argue they have already invested much time, money and effort in buying and/or developing their lots, decades before the entry of CFP (Pag-Bicol, 1991). In an interview with a group of claimants, one of them proudly showed a 'Deed of Absolute Sale'. The document is properly notarized by a lawyer involving a 10 hectare claimed area which he purchased in 1974.

The views of some NGO staff and PO officials and members regarding the claimant issue seem to support the DENR's 'public land' argument. Part of the reason appears to relate to their commitment to get the different forestry activities done on the site including the claimed areas. Pag-Bicol is a main signatory with DENR and BREDCI in the two project contracts involving the different pump-priming activities. Both Pag-Bicol and BREDCI are accountable to DENR in ensuring that these activities are implemented and the physical targets for them are being met. On the other hand, most BREDCI members earn additional income from these activities. They are also the future recipients of the CFMA.

The issuance of CFMA to BREDCI have serious negative repercussions in the absence of a more acceptable and beneficial arrangement with the claimants — especially since most of them derive their main source of living from their claimed areas. BREDCI's bias towards planting forest trees in these areas to satisfy DENR's requirements clashes with the claimants' need to plant food crops for their subsistence. The current technology of intercropping trees with food crops (agroforestry) does not appear promising under the local circumstances, partly because of the prescribed close spacing of forest trees (2-3m by 3m) under contract reforestation. The main reason, however, is the prohibition of the prevailing practice of burning *kaingin* areas during site preparation since it might also destroy the planted tree. More than the land's present economic value, however, some of the claimants, regard their claimed areas as the only inheritance they can leave to their children. Others have also established some form of emotional attachment to their lands, since these have sustained both them and their parents and will continue to provide for their children and grandchildren.

Prior to the introduction of the project in 1990, people had control over their claimed areas and the crops that they produced. Claimants within the forest zone could freely undertake *kaingin* making and plant whatever crops they required without any interference from the government. Some of them even paid tax to the municipal government, adding legitimacy to their claims. Individual claims were also recognised and respected by their neighbours and the whole community — even in the absence of supporting papers as evidence of 'ownership'. Claimants had the 'right' to exclude others from encroaching onto their 'possession'. This right drew its legitimacy from local tradition rather than from the government legal system: that all lands of public domain are owned by the State.

The local people's 'free access' to the remaining forest resources also provided them a sense of 'control' over these resources. Almost 100 households were engaged in illegal timber cutting and timber business before the project started in 1990. Some of them were full time, while others engaged in these activities only during lean months when food was scarce. For some of the local people, timber resources served, according to Chambers, Saxena, and Shah (1990:19), as "savings banks and cashable assets" — particularly to the poorer sector of the community. Timber cutting was an important source of cash, especially in times of emergency such as sickness or death in the family, or even in meeting social obligations such as weddings and *barangay fiestas.* While legal control over forest resources rested with the DENR, the local people were also in control in a practical sense, since they could access these resources whenever they were in need. This form of access was, of course, illegal as far as DENR's regulations were concerned. According to one BREDCI officer, local people also managed to 'control' the DENR officials — who occasionally visited the area — by feeding them good food and giving them some cash.

The use of CFMA as a resource access instrument assists the government's 'territorial reach' into the claimed areas of the project. It also regulates the local people's 'free access' to timber resources in the remaining second-growth forest. CFMA is a legal contract to entered between the DENR and BREDCI concerning the management and development of the 1,863 ha project area. It entitles the BREDCI members to certain forest benefits in exchange for their compliance with regard to government-defined forest management and development responsibilities. CFMA is therefore a form of instrumental contract aimed at a specific performance or result. It does not change the classification of the project area — the land remains legally owned by the State. Instead, the contract formalises the role of the local people and holds them accountable for the management and development of the area in exchange for the right to commercially utilise existing forest resources following the principles of sustained-yield management. Thus, CFMA offers the local people in Presentacion CFP a form of regulated freedom in their access to forest land and the resources therein.

Contrary to the common belief that CFMA would promote the 'returning of the forest to the people', local people found that it had reinforced the DENR's jurisdiction over forest land and resources in the area. With the

implementation of the project, most of the claimed areas were subject to the different forestry activities. These areas are now planted to trees and no longer suitable for *kaingin*. It should be made clear, however, that CFMA does not nullify the claimants' 'rights' to their lands. Instead, the claimants were forced to forfeit their control over the type of crops they planted in these areas because planted tress had started to close their canopies which meant that cash crops could no longer be grown.

In the same manner, the local people's free access to forest resources was curtailed if not totally controlled. One of the conditions for the issuance of CFMA is that BREDCI must demonstrate that it is capable of protecting the remaining forest resources in the project area. Thus, BREDCI and Pag-Bicol, with some assistance from DENR, jointly conduct forest protection activities. Their efforts have significantly minimised illegal activities in the area. Pag-Bicol noted in its 1991 Annual Report that the incidence of illegal activities in the project area was reduced by 80 per cent during the first year of implementation. Similarly, *kaingin* making was minimised. However, in the absence of more sustainable livelihood, this was done at the expense of meeting the basic socioeconomic needs of those involved in these destructive activities. As an old man emotionally told us during an interview:

> What will the government do to us? We are prohibited from timber sawing. We are also prohibited from *kaingin* making. We are waiting for work under the project but it only comes in a trickle. Even the wages are delayed. If we did not work as hired laborers on other people's farm, our families would not survive.

As tension increases in the project area so do varying forms of resistance, for example, the visible type such as claimants directly confronting the BREDCI and Pag-Bicol's attempt to incorporate their farm lands in the several pump-priming activities. However, there are also hidden forms of resistance. In the past, about 2,000 saplings and pole size *Acacia mangium* were mysteriously cut in the reforestation site. Some cut saplings were even hauled to near a foot trail — allegedly to draw attention to what had been done. Most of the community believed it had been done by the family of an illegal timber cutter whose squared lumber had been confiscated by BREDCI officers a month earlier. In an interview with the BREDCI President, however, he disclosed that it had probably been done by some claimants who did not want their land planted with forest trees.

Poverty Alleviation and Community Forestry

Poverty studies in the Philippines indicate that people in the uplands are among the "poorest of the poor" (Sajise, 1985; Porter and Ganapin, 1988). Some scholars argue that unless upland poverty is alleviated, environmental problems — particularly forest degradation — will continue to worsen (FDC, 1985; Bautista, 1990; Revilla, 1990, 1991; Cruz *et al*., 1992). Community forestry interventions are seen by the government and the funding institutions as an important strategy in alleviating upland poverty.

Concerns regarding poverty have contributed to the emergence of various project appraisal and planning techniques which aim to better understand and address the situation of the poor. Of the different appraisal and participatory planning techniques, Rapid Rural Appraisal (RRA) and techniques, such as the use of Socio-Economic Development Planning (SEDP), have recently gained more prominence. These techniques are normally employed through the assistance of contracted NGOs in most government-initiated community forestry projects.

Case 1: Identifying the Community: RRA and the Claveria CFP

One of the major tasks of the Soil and Water Conservation Foundation (SWCF) as the assisting NGO for the Claveria Community Forestry Project is to conduct RRA. As specified in its terms of reference, the SWCF is to analyze the socioeconomic and biophysical situation in the project area as a basis for initiating specific project intervention activities. The RRA results will complement forest resource data and are intended to provide the basis for the preparation of a Community Resource Management and Development Plan or CRMDP (DENR, 1993). Implementation of this plan, in turn, is expected to help address the prevailing poverty in the project site.

RRA was the first major activity conducted by SWCF field staff — two months after it commenced project operations in July 1992. The RRA was conducted in the project *barangay* — Barangay Mat-i — which

constitutes about 600 households. The SWCF's Community Organizer, who had undergone a 12-day RRA training, coordinated the activity. Three other project staff and five local residents assisted in the actual work. None of them had received training in RRA except for a one-day briefing on the subject conducted by the Community Organizer. A manual entitled *Rapid Rural Systems Appraisal (RRSA): Diagnostic and Design Tool for Upland Development* (Sajise *et. al.*, n.d.), designed by Filipino researchers, served as a major reference in conducting the activity.

The limited experience and skills of the SWCF staff in conducting RRA resulted in their heavy reliance on structured interviews — the very method that RRA had sought to avoid and improve on. The 39-page RRA report has 37 tables, 36 of which were drawn from structured interviews. Except for two tables on forest-product collection and utilization, and two on land use and tenure, the tables mostly contain the standard demographic and socioeconomic information typical of socioeconomic surveys. Some of this information appears to be of little use in the formulation of CRMDP. Ironically, the more relevant information for planning purposes was left out during the RRA. This included information on the different groups dependent on the forest for livelihood, the claimants and illegal cutters in the area, those who had access rights and control over the local forest resources, and other information.

Following the instruction from the RRA manual, the SWCF staff randomly chose 120 respondents (20 per cent sample) from a total of 600 households in the entire Barangay Mat-i. While the approach itself is statistically sound, its usefulness in community forestry, particularly in the Mat-i case, is questionable. The result was the 36 tables mentioned above which aggregated the local people into the typical researcher's categories (e.g. sex, civil status, religion, etc.) expressed in terms of frequencies and percentages. This aggregation simplified the otherwise complex social realities within the project site, and obscured the existence of different groups and interests in relation to local forest resources. As will be elaborated below, recognition of these groups and interests is crucial in advancing the poverty alleviation objective.

The major limitation in the conduct of RRA can be better appreciated by considering the results of the network analysis of problems within the area. This analysis is considered as one of the most important outputs from RRA and the major basis for determining specific poverty alleviation strategies to be introduced by the project. The resulting network analysis showed that the main problem in the area is 'low family income'. Five primary causes are identified: improper farming practices, high production costs, no reliable market outlets, inadequate capital and poor farming systems. These are the result of alleged secondary causes (such as lack of technical assistance in the case of poor farming systems).

Obviously, it was difficult (and probably useless in this case) to come up with a single network analysis to represent the entire *barangay* of 600 households. The use of structured interviews, the random selection of 120 respondents, and the type of analysis (aggregation through frequency counts and percentages), have all contributed to the homogenization of the entire Barangay Mat-i into people with 'low family income'. Essentially, the development of network analysis had indirectly shaped the constitution of the 'community'. The 'community' was shaped to constitute all the 600 households of the entire *barangay* characterized by low family income rather than groups of people with diverse socioeconomic and political characteristics and interests.

In reality, Barangay Mat-i is much more complex and heterogeneous compared to the simplified picture presented in the RRA result. It constitutes different individuals and groups whose interests are linked to the local forest resources. I was able to identify at least six of such groups whose members directly benefit from the local forest resources, although there may certainly be more. These groups derived assorted benefits from, and had varying degrees of dependence on, these resources. Specifically, they include 15 occupant cultivators all belonging to local Higaonon tribe, 28 non-occupant claimants, undetermined number of illegal timber cutters and rattan gatherers, 2 local buyers of illegally cut timber, a rattan concessionaire and his local representative, and 11 local small-scale rattan manufacturers. Of the six groups, the 15 occupant cultivators are the only fully dependent on the forest as source of livelihood.

The identification of the different groupings is crucial to the formulation of CRMDP and the targeting of the poor

as the primary project beneficiaries. For instance, the inability to take into account the heterogeneity of groupings and the diverse needs is likely to perpetuate the timber bias in forest management — that is, it is to likely serve the interests of better-off groups such as the businessmen. Moreover, questions of who should be involved in formulating the CRMDP, whose needs should be given priority, which group should be responsible for implementation, and how the benefits are to be shared equitably, are better addressed in possession of the above information.

Poor households, like the majority of Higaonons, are much more dependent on products from the forests (and other types of common) than better-off households (Jodha, 1986). With the homogenization of the whole Barangay Mat-i into one category (i.e., people of low income), the full dependence of most Higaonons on local forest resources was de-emphasised. Consequently, the importance of targeting them to become the main resource managers as well as the main project beneficiaries has not been fully appreciated by the SWCF staff.

While not discounting the impressive performance of the SWCF staff in implementing the different project activities, it should be noted, that there are problems arising from the categorisation of the whole Mat-i as comprising families with low incomes. This means that the different livelihood activities are available for anyone who wishes to benefit from the project. Whether they are the poorest Higaonon fully dependent on the forest or a relatively better off migrants seems to be immaterial. All the project participants including those who are better off, can enjoy the same project benefits.

The representation of the local people as a homogeneous community, goes deeper than merely than the poor conduct of RRA. The tendency to homogenize is inherently associated with the use of RRA — although poor practice has evidently reinforced this disposition. For instance, interview results from the 120 'randomly chosen respondents' had to be tabulated and analyzed if they were to serve as a basis for the project 'entry point' and inputs in the formulation of CRMDP. Consequently, people were represented as mathematical categories, which allowed their lumping together into a single category, e.g. people of 'low family income'. In the process, the heterogeneity of local groups and the diversity of their forest-related needs were generalized.

The development of network analysis as an output of RRA has deeper implications. It transformed the 'community' into a network of problems, and their causes, in a hierarchical form (primary, secondary and tertiary, etc.). Based on these problems and causes, suggested solutions were jointly identified by the SWCF staff and the 91 respondents during the RRA validation. These solutions were to serve as input in defining the different project interventions. However, the network analysis does not identify the people affected by these problems nor those who are part of the causes. Thus, the beneficiaries of the suggested solutions remained the homogeneous community, which in this case, is anybody from among the 600 households in Barangay Mat-i. An important observation by Peluso (1992:242) directly applies to the Claveria CFP and the rest of community forestry projects in the Philippines:

> The real issue in social forestry, after all, is not whether the people are involved — people will always be involved — the issue is which people are involved, how, and why.

Indeed, the homogenization of the local community in Claveria may have contributed to the involvement of the 'wrong people' in the project implementation particularly in the commercial utilization of timber resource. During my recent visit to the area, I learned that the resource use permit of the local PO had been cancelled due to illicit activities of some of its Officers in an attempt to capture all the benefits from timber extraction. This was done at the expense of the local tribal group, Higaonons, who are mainly dependent on the forest for survival but are powerless to negotiate for their interests and welfare.

Case 2: Planning with the People? The LIUCP

The Low Income Upland Communities Project (LIUCP) is quite typical of rural development projects in the 1980s. Its proponents support the idea that the participation of local people is fundamental to ensure the project's success and sustainability. This is explicit in the project appraisal document:

> Upland community participation in planning its own socioeconomic development, ...,

> is considered absolutely essential for sustainable achievement of the Project's objectives. (ADB, 1989:25)

The preparation of SEDPs is central to local people's participation. As stipulated in the ADB Appraisal Report, SEDPs are to be developed in the targeted communities within six months after the fielding of the NGOs' Community Organizers (ADB, 1989). Theoretically, the preparation of SEDPs was meant to support the 'learning process approach' to development which the LIUCP management claimed to adopt (LIUCP, 1991). Under the approach, the intended beneficiaries themselves were to analyze their local situation, prepare their own SEDPs, implement and evaluate the outcome of these plans, and learn in the process. Starting initially from one Site Management Unit (SMU) in each of the six watershed areas, project implementation would be gradually expanded to other sites as more experience and knowledge were gained from the initial site. The expansion sites would undergo the same learning cycle by drawing on the experiences and information gained from the initial sites. The whole learning process was to be catalyzed by the contracted NGOs with assistance from PPMO staff.

The project designers assumed that the exercise would bring tangible benefits to the local people. Since local people had to prepare their own SEDPs, it was anticipated that these would reflect their common aspirations and needs (LIUCP, 1991) which would then, hopefully, be addressed with support from the project resources. The learning process was also seen by the project proponents to be transformative (Dalton *et al.*, 1989). As local people learned to analyze their own situation, to plan and do something to improve it, it was expected that they would become increasingly in charge of their own development process.

In practice, I discovered the idea of participatory planning through the putting together of a SEDP is a form of 'bounded participation' (Porter, Allen, and Thompson, 1991:131). As cited in the 1990 Annual Report, the planning exercise was conducted 'within the framework of LIUCP' (LIUCP, 1991:1). In other words, SEDPs had to conform to the pre-defined components of the LIUCP if they were to be implemented using the project's resources. With the project components intact and officially agreed to, one could only hope that these would fit the needs of the local people. The facilitating NGOs therefore were left with the task of trying to match these needs with the pre-defined project components in order to determine which activities could beneficially be carried out under the project. The experience of the PAFID, the contracted NGO for the Kabilyan Watershed in Mindoro Oriental, illustrates this.

In 1990, PAFID assisted a local-situation analysis in the Kabilyan Watershed area as part of the SEDP preparation. The participating Hanunoo Mangyans identified six major problems that they wanted to be addressed in the SEDP preparation. PAFID matched these needs to the existing LIUCP's components to determine which could be addressed under the project, and possibly, using PAFID's own resources. The identified solutions under the LIUCP components served as the major basis in preparing the SEDP.

As experienced by PAFID and the local people, bounded participatory planning — particularly the use of SEDP — has locked them into an agenda determined by the LIUCP. The pre-defined project components led PAFID and the local people to prepare SEDP within the boundaries of these components. Alternative solutions to community problems outside the project concerns were simply ruled out, while SEDP strategies were narrowed down to those officially endorsed by the project. For instance, it should be noted that, strictly speaking, reforestation does not directly address any of the six identified problems. Yet because reforestation is a major LIUCP component, PAFID had to adopt it as one of the project strategies to be implemented through the SEDPs. This experience was not unique to Kabilyan watershed. The LIUCP National Project Office (NPO) itself admitted that some of the SEDPs 'were even tailor-made to the Project' (LIUCP, 1993:11).

The NPO argued that the relevance of SEDP to local people's needs largely depended on the quality of NGO assistance at the community level (LIUCP, 1993:2). It asserted that was, since the important decisions in the SEDPs (i.e., on which activities to undertake, and where, when, how and by whom) were made by the people themselves, the people had the flexibility to 'push their own agenda' (LIUCP, 1993:11). In essence, the NGOs and their perceived lack of support were to blame for the SEDPs that were not responsive to the local people's needs.

It is possible that the quality of assistance of some NGOs may truly be poor. However, this is not the main

reason why SEDPs are 'tailor-made to the project'. Two related explanations are more plausible. First is the enclosures set by the officially approved project components and their pre-set targets. LIUCP's general targets for each component, and its corresponding budget, had been finalized as early as at the appraisal stage in the ADB's project cycle. These targets were officially approved during project negotiations and served as ADB's basis for monitoring and evaluation. To ensure their attainment, they have to be reflected in the SEDPs through the assistance of the contracted NGOs. Indeed, one of the required outputs in the SEDP preparation was to come up with a 'more realistic' target which could be implemented within the time frame of the project. Consequently, the project came up with two types of physical targets. One was the pre-set target under the officially approved projects components or the 'target based on design'; the other was the SEDP-target developed in each of the watershed areas. Basically the two types of targets were the same except for the normally low values in the SEDPs. In reality, genuine participatory planning through SEDP formulation was not feasible within the project framework. The local people would not have been able to push for their agenda when a pre-set target for each component had been officially affirmed and was being pursued through the SEDP.

The second explanation relates to the legitimizing role of SEDP as a tool for participatory planning. Despite the project enclosures, SEDP preparation provides the local people with a sense of freedom to plan for their socioeconomic development. This sense of freedom subdues the urge for local resistance and provides legitimacy to the officially sanctioned project components. As the NGOs and the local people accept these as legitimate, alternative solutions to identified local problems are obscured. Consequently, the options for solving these problems are narrowed down to those offered within the framework of the project. Indeed, the NGOs and the local communities adopted the project components during the initial project implementation hoping they could address the local needs. It was only after having experienced some problems associated with their implementation that they saw the limitations of these components.

The two explanations suggest that SEDP, like most planning tools, is not politically neutral. It promotes an instrumental approach to project intervention. It tends to legitimize centrally determined agendas and imperatives — in this case, pushing for the implementation of officially identified project components. This does not mean that the use of SEDP was responsible for all the major problems in the LIUCP implementation. As indicated above, the use of participatory techniques such as SEDP, is an improvement on the conventional top-down approach to development. In some cases, as in Kabilyan Watershed, it has some positive results.

During preparation of the SEDP, the Mangyans in Kabilyan Watershed pointed out that their greatest problem was the presence of pasture leases on their ancestral lands. Since addressing land tenure was part of the LIUCP, PAFID gave precedence to this during the SEDP implementation. By mobilizing the Mangyans and lobbying at the DENR Central Office in Manila, five pasture leases were cancelled within the first three years of project implementation. These areas covering a total of about 3,000 ha were awarded to five Mangyan Associations through the issuance of CFSAs.

The 'type' of participation advanced by SEDP, however, was confined to the time, space and intentions allocated by the DENR and ADB. Thus, despite the positive outcomes, the use of SEDP had generally contributed to paradoxical effects, which appeared to have outweighed the positive results.

LIUCP offers the potential to alleviate poverty in the uplands of Mindoro while simultaneously addressing the environmental concerns of the government. Two of the five major project components directly address the problem of poverty: 1) agroforestry, reforestation and livelihood; and 2) infrastructure and social services. The expected benefits in terms of employment and income were impressive. The 15,000 ha agroforestry intensification was expected to create about 17,000 man-days per annum of "additional employment on a sustainable basis" (ADB, 1989:32). It was also anticipated that farm income of farmers would increase from 200 to 289 per cent over a 5-to 7-year period. On the other hand, the reforestation target of 15,000 ha was predicted to create 1.7 million man-days of employment. An additional 800,000 man-days per annum were also expected from labor-based infrastructure development. Also project estimates showed that each family beneficiary would earn an average of P3,000 or P1,500 per year through their involvement in the contract reforestation and infrastructure development, respectively.

The anticipated economic benefits, however, was never realized. In their Joint Statement addressed to the DENR Secretary, the disgruntled NGOs noted that LIUCP is not responding to the basic needs of the Mangyans. They

asserted that limited funds are available for livelihood activities, that delayed project activities disrupted the traditional phase of the Mangyan lifestyle to the detriment of their livelihood, and that 'pre-set targets unduly influenced the articulation of the people's needs to be embodied in the Socio-Economic Development Plans' (LIUCP NGOs, 1993:2). They also contended that the target-orientation characteristic of the project smothered the indigenous decision-making and the farming techniques of the Mangyans.

By November 1993, five of the six contracted NGOs had begun to terminate their contracts with the DENR mainly due to dissatisfaction from the project outcomes. On the other hand, the LIUCP staff from the national and provincial offices had started work according to 'the new scope' of the project (but maintaining the bounded participatory approach to accomplish its targets), based on the recommendations from the ADB Mission. Yet the Mangyans' livelihood appears to be more uncertain than ever. This uncertainty is reflected in a quote from PAFID's (1993:5-6) termination letter to the DENR Secretary:

> Enhancing the livelihood on a long-term basis requires more time and in-depth involvement and planning than is allowed under the LIUCP Program. This is much more important than the short-term employment on road construction and reforestation project.

It should be noted, however, that the concern of PAFID and the other NGOs for the livelihood of the Mangyans transcends the economic opportunities being offered by the project. It relates to the whole lifestyle of the Mangyans, of which livelihood is only a part. As learned by the NGOs, endorsing the financially-driven LIUCP components through the SEDP may increase the Mangyans' income but it will have deleterious effect on their lifestyle. Again, this is partly captured in PAFID's (1993:5) termination letter:

> We generally observe that the project is now creating an adverse effect on the value systems of the Mangyans. Most of the local people who are interested in the continuation of the LIUCP are more interested in personal financial benefit than in permanent improvement of resources. With this change in values, the goals of the project are compromised. Worse, the egalitarian social structures are being adversely affected.

Sustaining the Forest Resources

Sustainability of forest resources is the major goal in forest management. A central concept in forestry science, sustained-yield forestry deals with the management of forest resources in perpetuity. It involves the application of "scientifically-based rules for balancing harvest with growth" (Lee, 1984: 93) to provide a continuous supply of forest resources through time. The concept of sustained-yield forestry was originally developed to maintain stable timber supplies. It was later broadened to include other outputs from the forests (Clawson and Sedjo, 1984).

More recently, there have been attempts to incorporate the social factors in the application of various sustained-yield principles and techniques particularly in the implementation of community forestry projects. In this section, I explored the nature of sustained-yield approaches as forest management tool, and their tendency to produce contradictory effects by analyzing the case presented earlier, the Presentacion CFP.

The Case of Presentacion CFP

Statistics on the Presentacion CFP's forest cover, number of claimants, and estimated number of illegal cutters, collectively reflect the status of its forest resources. As presented in the earlier discussion, only 55 per cent (1,030 ha) of the total 1,863 ha project area has good forest cover. The remaining 45 per cent (833 ha) is brushland, grassland, and cultivated areas. A total of 140 cultivators and claimants – mostly involved in *kaingin-making* or shifting cultivator, have a stake in 46 per cent (850 ha) of the total project area (Pag-Bicol and BREDCI, 1993). Before the implementation of the project in 1990, BREDCI Officers estimated that close to 100 households (roughly 10 per cent of the four project barangays) were engaged in illegal cutting and/or timber business within the project site. Indeed, these figures indicate that the forest resources are under intense

exploitation pressure.

To sustain local forest resources, different forest renewal activities were introduced by the project, namely, agroforestry, reforestation, assisted natural regeneration, timber stand improvement, rattan plantation, and forest protection. In addition, community timber utilisation was to be undertaken after the DENR's issuance of CFMA and once the Community Resources Management and Development Plan has been approved. Accordingly, the plan shall "specify how the (forest) resources shall be managed and developed to meet the identified needs and problems of the community while ensuring the sustainability of these resources" (DENR, 1993:10). In other words, the 'social factor' is claimed to be built-in in the idea of sustainability.

Implementation of the forest renewal and sustainable harvesting was to be carried out by the local forestry cooperative, BREDCI, with assistance from Pag-Bicol. During the course of the project implementation, BREDCI officers and members were to be prepared organisationally and technically for their eventual management of the local forest resources. This was to be done by the assisting NGO, the Pag-Bicol Foundation, Incorporated.

As far as the government is concerned, the whole Presentacion CFP site is classified as public land. The prescribed forest renewal activities were therefore based on biophysical characteristics, such as the nature of existing vegetation and slope, rather than on socio-economic criteria such as the presence or absence of claimants. Thus, timber stand improvement, assisted natural regeneration, and rattan plantation establishment, were the prescribed interventions for the second-growth forest. On the other hand, reforestation, agroforestry, and natural regeneration, are for brushlands and grasslands. All of these intervention activities were meant to improve the productivity of the forest or rehabilitate the denuded areas. They were part of the approach to sustain the forest resources in the area by augmenting the remaining second-growth forest.

From a purely technical forestry point of view, the different project interventions appeared to suit the biophysical characteristics of the project area. The different physical interventions were designed to match the existing vegetative cover. What was problematic though was the appropriateness of these interventions in promoting forest sustainability in the light of conflicting interests about the use of the land. As mentioned above, a significant portion of the area especially within the brushland and grassland category had been claimed and converted to *kaingins* The same area was subjected to reforestation and assisted natural regeneration. Similarly, some portions of the claimed residual forest were also subjected to other project interventions.

Obviously, the project was biased towards timber production. Of the total physical target of 948 ha, about 81 per cent (771 ha) was for timber production; only the 142 ha (15 per cent) rattan plantation and 35 ha (about 4 per cent) agroforestry plots were not allocated to this purpose. Considering the dwindling timber resources of the Philippines, one is inclined to favour the timber bias of the project on the grounds that the site is a logged over area. However, since land claims in the project area "look like "subdivisions" when laid out on a map (Pag-Bicol, 1991:4), the argument may be socially unsound and likely to work against the sustainability objective. The local people, particularly the claimants, viewed sustainability apart from the issue of timber production. They were more concerned about the sustainability of their farms that were threatened by the introduction of various forest renewal activities. Some claimants who were interviewed, foresaw that life would be a lot harder if their areas were planted to trees.

Pag-Bicol facilitated a series of discussions with the claimants in the different project *barangays* to gain their support for the project. The local DENR officials and BREDCI members were also present on these occasions. In these dialogues, some claimants requested that DENR officials exclude their areas from the project site. They proposed an adjustment of the project boundary on the upper slopes of the mountain so that only a few *kaingins* would be covered by the project. Others also requested that DENR reclassify their areas as agricultural land so that they could apply for land titles.

In the five dialogues conducted, DENR officials maintained that claimed areas were officially classified as public lands, and therefore could not be subject to individual ownership and titling. However, recognising the complexity of the issue, they suggested that Pag-Bicol staff and BREDCI officers might resolve the conflict through a continuing process of "peaceful dialogue" (Pag-Bicol, 1991:6) with the claimants. Since claimed areas are 'legally public' the claimants have little alternative except to negotiate for the use of these lands. On the

other hand, since Pag-Bicol and BREDCI had contracts with the DENR to implement various technical interventions, they had to assert the public status of these lands so as to be able to demand them for their use.

Claimants responded in various ways to the situation. Some joined the project so that they could take part in the various activities to earn some cash. However, this meant that they had to allow at least part of their lands to be subjected to project interventions. Few claimants managed to confront BREDCI members directly and to resist the incorporation of their area into the project. Majority however, submitted their lands for the project purposes for fear that the DENR might put them in prison if they resisted. As one claimant explained briefly during an interview:

> Most of us are afraid to talk during the dialogue because we are illiterate. We might talk about the wrong thing and be imprisoned for doing so.

In some instances, BREDCI officials and the claimants attempted to settle the land conflict by negotiating arrangements for sharing of future produce from the land. In Barangay Maangas, claimants requested a 30 per cent share from the produce of their land which had been developed under the project. This sharing arrangement was accepted by BREDCI to placate the claimants in the hope that they would allow immediate reforestation in the area since the seedlings had already reached their planting stage (Pag-Bicol, 1991). In some cases, however, because of lack of space to implement the different activities, the President of BREDCI admitted that they had had to reforest claimed areas without the prior knowledge of the claimants.

Most of the claimants interviewed generally complained that they were worse off now compared with before the project had been introduced. Common reasons cited were: the absence or limited planting space, the project's prohibition of *kaingin*, and the limited alternative sources of livelihood available. As the canopy of the planted trees closed, the sustainability of the claimants' farms — their main source of livelihood — became increasingly threatened. This, in turn, posed a threat to forest sustainability, since the local people resisted the different project interventions that threatened their livelihood. As mentioned in the earlier section, the cutting of 2,000 saplings and pole size *Acacia mangium* was interpreted by some as a form of resistance by some claimants whose lands were planted to forest trees. Moreover, there is no assurance that cultivated areas planted to forest trees will not be converted back to *kaingin* after these trees have been harvested. Considering the high demand for farm lands and the limited alternative sources of livelihood, *kaingin* areas are likely to expand and encroach heavily into the remaining second-growth forest.

Another major strategy that the project adopted is to promote sustainable harvesting of the existing timber resource and the plantation forest established through reforestation. This strategy is one of the main objectives of CFP. It is to be pursued following the principles of sustained-yield forest management. Under the proposed sustainable approach to timber harvesting, annual harvest is to be regulated through an annual allowable cut (AAC). Wallace explains the concept of AAC in a clear and concise manner:

> AACs are calculated from the residual forest area and tree sizes. They are based on 35-year cutting cycles, and designed to provide for sustained production of trees greater than 60 cm diameter. Each year, all of the volume of 70 cm diameter trees and half of the volume of 60 cm trees are allowed to be cut (Wallace, 1993:2).

In the resource inventory conducted by BREDCI and Pag-Bicol, 532 ha of the 888 ha residual forest have been determined as 'operable area' (i.e., area available for timber production). The rest either lacked sufficient timber stock or were within the 50 per cent slope logging restriction set by DENR. The DENR-developed, AAC formula prescribed a 35-year cutting cycle for second-growth dipterocarp forests all over the country. Using this formula, only a total of 15.2 ha of the 532 ha operable area can be subjected to annual harvesting.

Based on AAC computations made by Pag-Bicol and BREDCI, the annual harvest from the 15.2 ha cutting areas ranges from 408 m^3 in year one to 714.4 m^3 at the end of the 25-year planning period. This is equivalent to an average harvestable volume of 27 m^3/ha in the first year, to 47 m^3/ha in the 25th year. Judging from these figures, the productivity of the forest appears to be relatively low considering that some parts of the area had been logged more than 20 years ago. Normally, a second-growth forest of the same age in other parts of the country can easily produce a harvestable volume of 60 m^3/ha (DENR, 1992). One possible explanation for the

low productivity is the continuous timber extraction by the local illegal cutters after the last logging operation finished. In other words, it is highly probable that the same area has been repeatedly logged, contributing to its poor timber stock.

There is also the possibility of loss of the second-growth forest, considering its small operable area and the strong pressure to convert it to agricultural land. At the start of the third cyclic cut (36th year), the population in the four project *barangays* would have doubled to about 9,550 assuming the current rate of increase of 2 per cent. Even if only 30 per cent of the projected 1,155 additional families will need farm lands, and assuming that the present average farm size of 2.85 ha is sufficient to support a family of four, further 987 ha will be necessary to support these families. This is almost twice the size of the current operable area, and more than the entire size of the second-growth forest (888 ha). Most of the lands outside the second-growth and mossy forest have been privatised or claimed. In the absence of a viable alternative means of livelihood, it is, therefore, highly probable that a significant part, if not the whole, of the operable area could be converted to agricultural farms even before the third cyclic cut started.

The various technical interventions in Presentacion CFP have attempted to address the physical limits of the forest resources in the area in order to achieve their sustainability. Forest renewal activities were conducted to augment the existing forest resources, either through improving their productivity or renewing what had been depleted. On the other hand, the use of AAC was meant to apply the principles of sustained-yield by regulating the annual timber harvest to a certain volume which the natural capital could sustain. The use of these scientific techniques and approaches, however, has promoted a "tunnelling of vision" (Scott, 1993). It has brought about a focus on the physical or timber production aspect of sustainability while marginalizing the social dimension.

Goodland *et al*. (1991:492) noted that forest sustainability has several components apart from timber production. These include the sustainability of forest-dwelling peoples and others dependent on the forest for their source of livelihood. The use of forestry approaches in Presentacion CFP emphasized the timber production component of forest sustainability. However, it has also obscured the social component by marginalizing the interests of the claimants whose main source of livelihood has been threatened by these interventions.

The application of the different approaches also contributed to the ruling out of local alternatives. DENR rejected the proposal to move the project boundary upward, not only because claimed areas are classified as public lands but also because there are no other places to apply these techniques. It should be noted, however, that while the proposal seemed to be unpopular, it could well be a more realistic approach to manage the situation. Granting the request of the claimants would mean the permanent conversion of the claimed areas into agricultural lands. Still, it could have been used by DENR and BREDCI as a condition for the claimants to no longer expand their claimed areas into the second-growth forest. This may have had more long-term positive implications for forest sustainability.

Similarly, the use of the different forestry techniques has narrowed the options of the claimants in negotiating the use of the claimed areas. Their options were confined to those that allow for the application of these techniques. This meant that they either permitted BREDCI to use part of or their entire land for purposes of the project, or negotiated for a share in the future produce of the land. They could of course resist the inclusion of their area in the project but had to face the risk of being confronted by the BREDCI members and the DENR officials.

The use of the different forestry techniques has also limited the flexibility of the Pag-Bicol as facilitator in the peaceful dialogue between BREDCI and the claimants. Instead of serving as a neutral party, Pag-Bicol was forced to take the side of BREDCI and, by extension, the government, to advocate for the application of the officially-sanctioned approaches in the claimed areas. That Pag-Bicol's contract with DENR was to assist in the application of these techniques left the NGO no alternative but to encourage claimants to support the project by allowing the inclusion of their areas.

On the other hand, the application of sustained-yield principles has equity implications. As mentioned earlier, sustained-yield forestry is associated with commercial orientation in forest management. Indeed a draft CRMDP, formulated by Pag-Bicol and BREDCI, projected that the average annual revenue from the second-growth forest is about P1.8 million for a 25-year planning period. However, as the AAC and projected revenue take center stage in forest management, the interests of the land-dependent claimants — especially those who are not

members of BREDCI — are likely to be forgotten. Moreover, as the timber becomes highly commercialized, the domestic-wood needs of the poorer sector are also threatened. BREDCI set the market price of lumber at P18/bd ft — this is hardly affordable for the poor. As the poor are deprived from access to forest benefits, they are likely to carry out illegal cutting, which in turn, is likely to work against the realization of forest sustainability.

Explaining the Paradox: Distillations from the Cases

Table 4 summarizes the outcomes of the four community forestry projects just examined that employed different instruments of practice. As can be gleaned from the table, there is no distinct relationship between the employment of the different instruments and improved outcomes towards the desired aims. Instead, what appeared to be evident were a number of paradoxical effects that had worked against the realization of the three core objectives. Instead of enhancing the farmers' control over forest lands and resources, the use of resource access instruments had benefited local elite and reinforced the government's jurisdiction over these resources. In the same manner, project appraisal and planning techniques — designed to better understand the needs of the local people — had contributed to the continuance of the deprived conditions of the upland poor. Moreover, forest degradation is likely to continue despite the emphasis of community forestry on sustaining forest resources.

Table 4. Outcomes of community forestry projects using different instruments of practice

Core Development Objective	**Community Forestry Project**	**Instrument of Practice**	**Outcome**
Resource democratization	• CVRP-1-SF • Presentacion CFP	• Community Timber Utilization Permit • Community Forest Management Agreement	• Benefited local elite • Reinforced government's jurisdiction over forest resources
Poverty alleviation	• Claveria CFP • LIUCP	• Rapid Rural Appraisal • Socio-Economic Development Planning	• Homogenized views of local communities • Advanced centrally determined agenda that worked against poverty alleviation
Forest sustainability	• Presentacion CFP	• Forest renewal and sustainable harvesting technologies that attempts to incorporate social factors	• Marginalized social and political dimensions that worked against forest sustainability

Reasons for the paradoxical effects have been discussed earlier but need some elaboration. As can be distilled from the discussion of the different cases, three perspectives are offered to explain the unintended outcomes of the different instruments of practice: 1) unfavorable socio-political context; 2) characteristics of practice; and 3) the instrumentalist nature of community forestry techniques. For better appreciation, I discuss in this section the general relevance of these perspectives in understanding contemporary issues in community forestry, rather than repeating what has already been mentioned in the previous case analyses. In doing so, I also briefly traced their intellectual roots, assess their values in explaining community forestry paradoxes, and discuss their respective limitations in understanding contemporary practice.

The first perspective relates to the unfavorable socio-political and historical context of community forestry in the Philippines. This perspective could be labeled the 'political economy perspective'. It has a long intellectual tradition in political analysis of Philippine development problems (see for instance, Abueva, 1972). In the 1980s, political economy analysis gained prominence in the field of Philippine forestry and is now a popular argument

used in this sector.[6] The recent celebrated book by Broad and Cavanagh (1993), *Plundering Paradise: The Struggle for the Environment in the Philippines*, captures the central theme of this argument. The authors suggest that the inability to achieve the three core objectives is to be found in the country's economically-driven development strategy. This is in turn rooted in the colonial economic history of the Philippines. The national development strategy has resulted in a near monopoly over forest resources being granted to a few individuals and firms and has disadvantaged local people. The outcome has been the 'plundering of the country's forest paradise' (Broad and Cavanagh, 1993).

The negative impacts of the national development strategy were felt keenly during the Marcos administration, particularly from the 1970s to the mid-1980s (Hawes, 1987). However, some political economy analysts suggest that the power structure which was created during this period continues to dominate and frustrate genuine efforts for reform. Development interventions — even those designed specifically to assist the poor — with the best of intentions, are seized by the elite for their own advantage. Proponents of the political economy perspective assert that the three core objectives can only be achieved within the context of an 'alternative sustainable development model'. This model emphasizes the institutions of civil society — a total departure from the traditional market-oriented or state-centered development approaches. Progressive thinkers, mostly from the NGO sector and big environmental coalitions such as the Green Forum, also advocate this development model.

However, the political economy perspective has certain limitations. First, it encourages a structurally or historically determined explanation. It explains local situation in terms of a global structural or historical interpretation. It does not account for the peculiarities of practice, nor for the diversity of local situations. Secondly, it tends to close off possible solutions. For example, it fails to give credit to recent progressive policies, and discounts the improvements of practice through a more conscientious use of the available instruments. Thirdly, it cannot account for local resistance or the possibility of drawing lessons from local resistance in order to improve development practice. In summary, while the political economy analysis is essential to an understanding of the context of practice, it neither offers a complete explanation for the paradoxical outcomes nor does it open up other ways of dealing with the problem of failure to address the core concerns.

The second perspective relates to characteristics of practice, that is, the degree to which practices are good or bad. The logic of this perspective is derived from an idea of progress, which emerged during the Enlightenment. This idea was based on the belief that humans were capable of controlling and manipulating their social and physical environment to improve their material well-being. The systematic and progressive application of science and technology within the Western rationality tradition was seen as the vehicle for progress and a better life (Rich, 1994:201). The unparalleled technical and economic accomplishments during the industrial era, created a sense of optimism that contributed to the persistence of the earlier idea of development. This idea became associated with economic-managerialism, that is, the systematic allocation of scarce resources to satisfy human wants. When the same logic was applied to development practice, rural development came to be seen as the systematic manipulation of various factors of production (land, labor, technology and capital) within the institutional framework of the 'project' (Porter, Allen and Thompson, 1991:4-5). By association, community forestry has come to be seen as the application of various techniques and approaches of practice at the community level, to achieve the three core objectives.

The 'characteristics of practice' perspective — unlike that of political economy, account for the peculiarities of practice and the diversity of the local situation. It advances the idea that the failure to address the central concerns is due to poor application of particular techniques by the individuals or institutions. It argues that the appropriate application of more 'refined' techniques by responsible individuals or institutions has the potential to realize the objectives.

Still, the characteristic-of-practice perspective is incomplete by itself. It lacks the political, economic, and historical perspective, necessary to understand the broader context of practice. It also fails to account for certain 'tendencies' of the different techniques to produce negative, unforeseen or contradictory effects in practice. Thus, when it offers solutions, this approach is more inclined to argue for improved application, without an

[6] Important contributions in the Philippine forestry literature with perspective of political economy, include: Porter and Ganapin (1988); Kummer (1992); Broad and Cavanagh (1993); Vitug (1993); Broad (1995).

appreciation of the broader political-economic context that these applications tend to have in practice. A person coming from this perspective is likely to endorse a managerialist-technocratic approach in order to improve practice. Yet, this approach has been repeatedly shown not to work. An understanding of the features associated with the application of the different instruments may enrich the perspectives provided by the political economy and the characteristics of practice.

The third perspective therefore concerns the instrumental nature of community forestry techniques which draws its intellectual tradition from the 'rationalization thesis'. This too has a long and respectable heritage, with roots as far back as the Enlightenment. The 'rationalization thesis' is attributed to the works of Weber in the early 1900s, and sustained through the 1930s and the 1940s by the critical theorists and more recently by the contemporary works of Rose and Miller. The theme of this thesis was summarized earlier in Weber's (1948:182) 'iron cage' metaphor and more profoundly in the works of Rose and Miller examining British experiences of liberal democracy, along the lines of 'governing the soul' (Rose, 1989) and 'governance at a distance' (Rose and Miller, 1990; 1992; Rose, 1993).

Rationalization has been described as an historical process in which an increasing number of decisions are made using technical procedures to choose between alternative ways of achieving specific goals (Porter, 1985:8). In development practice, these technical procedures are embodied in the use of various techniques and approaches such as those applied in project planning and implementation. In community forestry, these techniques and approaches include resource access instruments, RRA, participatory planning techniques such as the use of Socio-Economic Development Plan (SEDP), and sustained-yield forest management and related technical procedures. Because they are designed to achieve specific goals which are set prior to their application, these techniques are not ethically or politically neutral. Despite recent focus on people's involvement in their application, they normally at the end — as demonstrated in the four cases — favor homogeneity, efficiency, technical solutions and central control. The reason why the central goals are not realized is partly explained by these tendencies in practice. The analysis of the different techniques and their propensity for producing paradoxical effects in practice is poorly covered by much of the development literature, including community forestry.

The analysis of the four case study projects indicates that these three perspectives do not necessarily contradict each other., They could be combined into one analytical framework to broaden the compass of the community forestry, and by extension, sustainable development debate, through a better awareness of local realities. Indeed, as the examination of the four cases have demonstrated, this framework provides a better understanding on the difficulties of realizing the three main objectives on the ground. Using this framework, it is possible to summarize the major distillation from the case analyses:

> *The poor application of most common techniques and approaches used in community forestry in an unfavorable social and political contexts, exacerbates the inherent tendencies of these techniques to produce paradoxical development outcomes.*

WHAT IS TO BE DONE?

> *It is surely correct that we cannot solve problems by throwing money at them, but it is also correct that we dare not throw national problems onto a scrap heap out of indifference. The upland poor may be out of political favor, but they are not without human needs. They are angry and are getting angrier, but they have not lost the dream that all of us — lowlanders included — can advance together.*
>
> Carlos Fernandez
> *People of the Ash-Covered Loam, 1984:29*

The perspectives offered by the political economy and the rationalization thesis suggest that achieving the three central objectives is far from straightforward, and goes beyond the policy recommendations commonly found in the conclusions of most studies of the problem. While community forestry policies have, since the latter part of

the 1980s, been more progressive, realizing the three central objectives on the ground has yet to be achieved.

I suggest that if the three core concerns are to be effectively addressed, the key is not to resurrect the purely corporate alternative, which was mainly responsible for the present dual crisis of upland poverty and forest degradation. Solutions can not also be found in pessimism and despair, nor by throwing the national forestry problems 'onto a scrap heap of indifference' (Fernadez 1984:29). 'Throwing money' at the upland poor is not the best way forward either. The most urgent challenge is to improve on the current practice of community forestry. A more *responsive practice* has to be worked out. This mode of practice will go deeper than the conventional managerial approach currently applied in most community forestry projects. It will have certain distinct attributes.[7]

- First, responsive practice will begin with an acknowledgment of the mix of global interests and local circumstances and will harness this reality to move away from determinism, towards a more pragmatic and realistic search for better options.
- Second, responsive practice will put emphasis on the importance of diversity of approaches. It will reject standardized and well-rehearsed approaches to development intervention.
- Third, responsive practice will seize the opportunities offered by the current favorable political and institutional climate in the Philippines, and the more flexible 'project frames' that characterize recent development practice.
- Fourth, responsive practice will concentrate on improving outcomes through the 'conscienticized'[8]application of the different instruments of practice.
- Fifth and most importantly, responsive practice will acknowledge the central role of the human agency in the development process, and will capitalize on it to address the three core objectives of community forestry.

The diversity of local situations and the peculiarities of practice mean the details of responsive practice in community forestry will vary from one area to another. There is no single correct approach that can be considered as a panacea. Success will be slow. It will be patchy and will come in small pockets. 'Initial failures', such as unmet physical targets and people's resistance, may also constitute as necessary components of success. Nonetheless, success will be sustainable in the long term because local people will be responsible for their own resources, while concerned institutions will be more responsive to the people's needs. This will bring direct local benefits and also regional and national advantage.

Under responsive practice, enlightened policy recommendations have also the potential to regain their relevance. Yet more importantly, responsive practice will open possibilities to transform policy formulation from what has been described as a 'vicious cycle of regulation'[9] (Revilla, 1986:4) into a virtuous one. Indeed, responsive community forestry practice may just rekindle that dream — that lowlanders and uplanders can advance together.

[7] Details of these attributes are found in Pulhin, 1996.

[8] This stems from Paulo Freire's concept of 'conscientization', roughly translated in English as 'consciousness-raising' (Cf. Manzo, 1991).

[9] Revilla (1986:4) describes the 'vicious cycle of regulation' characteristic of Philippine forest policy to mean, 'when a provision of a regulation is violated, another regulation is handed down to curb further violation of said provision instead of strengthening the implementation system'.

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