Dfft

4-1-92
WORKSHOP IN POLITICAL THEORY
AND POLICY ANALYSIS
513 NORTH PARK
INDIANA UNIVERSITY
BLOOMINGTON, INDIANA 47405

AB Project

APPRAISING NIGERIAN DEVELOPMENT: IMPLICATIONS FOR THE THEORIES OF DEVELOPMENT

by

Dele Olowu

Paper prepared for the Mini-Conference on Patterns of Order and Development in Human Societies, April 19th and 21st, 1986.

WORKSHOP IN POLITICAL THEORY & POLICY ANALYSIS

Indiana University
513 North Park
Bloomington, IN 47405

APPRAISING NIGERIAN DEVELOPMENT: IMPLICATIONS FOR THE THEORIES OF DEVELOPMENT

by

Dele Olowu

> If men are to remain civilized or to become civilized, the art of association must develop and improve among them at the same speed as equality of conditions spread.
> --Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America (1835).

> Development must be conceived of as a multidimensional process involving major changes in social structures, popular attitudes, and national institutions as well as the acceleration of economic growth, the reduction of inequality and the eradication of absolute poverty.
> --Michael P. Todaro, Economic Development in the Third World (1981).

The literature on development has emphasised economic growth almost to the exclusion of all other indicators of social change. Indeed it used to be argued that strong, highly centralised governments were necessary for the prosecution of the goals of economic growth and development in the Third World. Nigeria, Africa's most populous country, provided one of the best illustrations of this kind of reasoning. Competitive party politics in a relatively decentralised federal system led to economic rut and the collapse of the First Republic (1960-1966). On the other hand, strong and hierachically centralised military governance between 1966 and 1979 was reputed to have led to remarkable socioeconomic development.

The purpose of this paper is to critically examine these claims both from the points of view of economic, social, and political change

in Nigeria and underscore the implications for development theory. The paper will therefore be sub-divided into three major sections as follows: (1) The Development Debate, (2) Appraisal of the Nigerian Development Process, and (3) Towards an Integrated View of Development.

The Development Debate

It has been alleged with good reason that development is probably one of the most depreciated terms in the social sciences. In spite of this however, some consensus seems to have emerged. Development is now generally regarded as bi-focal involving both socioeconomic transformation or improvement of the material conditions of the people as a whole and an increasing effectiveness and institutionalisation of the political system (Figure 1). After a wide ranging review of the development literature, Ferrel Heady concluded that:

> Despite recent misgivings, the developing countries continue to share a generalised consensus of the objectives toward which change should be directed. . . . The twin goals of development are nation-building and socioeconomic progress. Agreement on the desirability of these goals is found even among political leaders who show wide variation in political orientation, political strategy, social origin, and opportunity for success in goal attainment. To the extent that they are politically motivated at all, the rank and file of the population of these countries share the belief that these are proper objectives, and will tend to bring pressure to bear on political leaders who may be tempted to give precedence to more immediate and selfishly motivated aims. These paired values seem to explain to a substantial degree the accepted ideological commitment in the developing countries (Heady, 1979: 244).

Figure 1

The Composite Elements of Development



For economists, 'socioeconomic progress' is measured by two indices: economic growth as reflected by the annual growth of the Gross National Product and the spread of its benefits (the distribution of income or welfare or both). On the other hand, 'nation-building' as a measure of political change has presented greater definitional problems for students of political science. A number of scholars have challenged the authenticity of the 'tribe-to-nation' approach which such conceptualisations presume (Gellar, 1972). Others have suggested other concepts such as national integration, political system capacity, effectiveness and political participation. Political participation, implying both popular acceptability and institutional responsiveness, seems to be the definition around which some consensus has been reached (Huntington and Nelson, 1976).

What should constitute the exact relationship between economic and political development as defined above has continued to be as

contentious as ever. Must economic modernisation precede political modernisation as some have contended or could they be pursued simultaneously? The lessons of economic history in the West, the East and the more recent breakthroughs in the Far East seem to suggest that socioeconomic transformation in terms of rapid economic growth constituted the prerequisite for the establishment of effective and popular political systems (Emerson, 1971). Indeed, political development came to be characterised by some political scientists as the ability of the political system to control and mobilise the people in a period of rapid socioeconomic change. This position seemed to have been vindicated by the fact that almost all the attempts made to promote liberal democracy in Third World countries led to political crises rather than to political stability (Huntington, 1968). Similarly, economic advisers of Third World governments have always assumed that Western style democracy led to weak governments which these countries could ill-afford at their stage of economic growth (Illchman and Bhagava, 1970). The dramatic ease with which many socialist countries carried out very rapid transformations of their economies seem to provide the full proof for this position.

As a result it came to be generally accepted that some sort of authoritarian coercion was essential for economic growth and economic development. This was regarded as a pre-condition for popular government. The conviction was generally shared both by the intelligentsia in the Third World as well as their foreign advisers and aid-givers, that economic development required political stability which only authoritarian governments could guarantee. The socioeconomic conditions of the new states were frequently likened to

that of Europe during the war years when democracy had to be suspended in most countries temporarily to undertake a successful prosecution of the war. As a corollary, it was expected that as a country "matured" economically and its peoples' social conditions improved, its political system would become more responsive, thereby guaranteeing stability.

The preference was thus for dominant mass party regimes or even dictatorships, whether civilian or military. A number of country cases within the Third World seem to vindicate this position that authoritarianism was more appropriate to the rapid social changes associated with modernisation. The alleged better performance of Nigeria's military in comparison with their civilian counterparts provided an additional evidence of the veracity of the authoritarian case. What hard evidence exists in support of this claim with respect to the performance of Nigeria's military record in government?

Comparative Performance of Civilian and Military Governments in Nigeria

Nigeria became independent in 1960. From that time till the present, the country has had two civilian republics (1960-1966; 1979-1983), five successful military *coup d'etats* and rule by the military for a total of about 15 years (1966-1979; 1983-present). Under all these regimes, government policy as expressed in the country's five yearly development plans and other policy statements, has always indicated the preference of Nigeria's rulers for rapid economic growth. Other goals such as redistribution, self reliance

were regarded as secondary and subordinate to the overall preoccupation with rapid economic growth. Most appraisals, by admirers and critics alike, concur that Nigeria has achieved some progress on this front. Moreover, there is also a widely shared conviction by those who have bothered to attempt a comparison that growth has been faster under the military than under civilians. Onyejekwe, for instance concluded that the evidence is overwhelming that the military regime of General Gowon during the period 1970-1975 achieved a higher rate of economic and social development than the preceding civilian regime (1960-66). He demonstrated that this was true "whether we looked at gross indicators such as the GDP or whether we looked at sectoral growth and development such as agricultural, industrial, transport, communications educational and health sectors" (Onyejekwe, 1981: 215).

Similarly, one of Nigeria's senior professors of sociology, Odetola argued the case for a positive correlation between coercion and development by submitting with respect to Nigeria that:

> high militarisation can be associated with high (levels of) development. For example in Nigeria between 1964 and 1966 during a civilian regime the GNP was 4.2 but between 1969 and 1971 during the military regime it jumped to 9.1 and in 1972 to 12.1. . . . By some statistical calculation I tried to remove the contribution of oil and the figure was still as impressive as 6.1. . . (Odetola, 1985: 17).

Results of aggregate analysis which show the military's better economic performance are not peculiar to Nigeria. Although not without contention, it has been asserted by scholars such as Halpern (1962), Pye (1962), Shils (1962), Johnson (1962), and Horowitz (1966) that the military is one of the best placed institutions by virtue of its training, organisation and monopoly of the instruments of violence

to bring about change in developing countries. Odetola contends in the paper already cited above that "whether by the military or civil government, coercion has been primary to state building . . . there is a great but at the same time real disparity between democratic liberalism and national development." His argument is simple: economic development requires social mobilisation which can be more easily obtained by coercion. That the military performed better, compared to civilians under competitive party politics in Nigeria is therefore a foregone conclusion.

As indicated above, there are those who differ from this comparative assessment of the Nigerian development experience in favour of the military. Gus Liebenow (1985) claims that the military's venture into agriculture in Nigeria was a disastrous failure. Both the International Labour Office (ILO) and Frances Stewart believe that while there has been an impressive overall growth of the Nigerian economy, the spread of that growth has been miniscule. Conceding the fact that notable achievements were made in educational, health, and transportation infrastructure, the ILO report noted that Nigeria's huge expenditures made much less impact on the conditions of the majority of the population. It noted the continuing heavy incidence of diseases of poverty, widening inequalities, greater regional imbalance, inadequate urban facilities and continuing dependency on oil accompanied by the decline of other economic sectors, notably agriculture (International Labour Office, 1981). Similarly, Frances Stewart, in a summary of her report of Basic needs achievement in Nigeria some four years later, in assessing a period dominated by military rule claimed that:

> Despite the dearth of good statistics, enough can be deduced to be confident about the broad picture of Basic Needs(BN) in Nigeria. All the indicators of health -- life expectancy, infant mortality and morbidity -- show a very poor state of health among most Nigerians.
>
> Nigerian health compares badly with some other African countries such as Kenya and Tanzania whose per capita income is significantly lower. All studies of nutrition in Nigeria suggest that Nigeria is on the margin of suffering a protein and calory deficiency on average. Such an average situation, suggests that there must be many people suffering from malnutrition, some of severe proportions. This is borne out by more micro-studies. Food production appears not to have kept pace with population increase during the past fifteen years or so; nutrition certainly has not improved over this period; the most optimistic interpretation of the figures is that nutritional standards have not deteriorated. Educational achievements among the adult population are very poor, with perhaps as few as 10 percent literate. But education has expanded rapidly recently and among the young achievements are much greater.
>
> The education sector is the one BN sector which has received substantial resources in recent years. Nigeria has spent rather little on health in relation to her income; within the health sector there has been a strong bias towards curative medicine and towards the urban areas. The Guidelines to the Fourth Plan conclude that only 25 percent of the rural population is covered by medical services. Water has received a negligible quantity of funds; throughout Nigeria water supplies are very poor in both quantity and quality (Stewart, 1985: 130).

Where lies the balance? Here is a situation in which beauty lies in the eyes of the beholder. For an intelligentsia that is committed to national greatness expressed in GNP figures (an aggregate measure), better inter-urban road connections, relatively cheap urban food, better and more higher educational and tertiary health facilities, the achievements of the military must seem superlative. Both civilian and military administrations in Nigeria, until the Fourth National development Plan accepted economic growth as the major preoccupation of government. The Japanese model, which relies on an enlightened bureaucracy in close collaboration with private capital remained the

major inspiration for Nigerian policymakers until this time (Tukur and Olajunju, 1970; Nigeria, 1981). But for those interested in the spread of the wealth (the usual indicators of Basic needs achievement) -- literacy, life expectancy, rural economy, rural infrastructures etc., the performance of the military can hardly be regarded as admirable. Many rural areas of Nigeria have not felt the impact of the government since the ouster of the civilians in the mid 1960s. Why is this so?

A military government, like any other dictatorship, has no systematic means of measuring popular reactions to its policies other than through the media. These are however, controlled by the urban elite, either in the public or private sectors. Rural interests which would have been dominant (about 70 percent of the population reside in rural areas), if there were representative institutions are read distantly only through the lenses of the urban elites. That the interests of the rural people receive very little attention has been sufficiently documented in the literature to make a full elaboration unnecessary here (Lipton, 1977; Bates, 1981; Mabogunje, 1980). These disparities between urban and rural interests are replicated at all levels -- federal, state, and local (Mabogunje, 1968; Olatubosun, 1975; Akeredolu-Ale, 1975; Olowu, 1980; Filani, 1981). The results of these misplaced priorities and over-dependence on the oil sector has become more easily manifest today in the wake of plunging oil prices which threaten to reduce the 1986 budget by more than two-thirds. (See profile of economic structure in Table 1.)

TABLE 1

Sectoral Distribution of Gross Domestic Product in Nigeria, 1958-1979

(Selected years in percentages)

	1958/59	1960/61	1966/67	1973/74	1979/80
1. Agriculture, Forestry & Fishing	64.4	64.1	51.9	34.1	18.0
2. Mining	1.1	1.2	6.9	17.8	25.9
3. Manufacturing	4.7	4.8	7.9	8.9	6.7
4. Electricity & Water	0.2	0.3	0.7	0.8	0.5
5. Building & Construction	4,2	4.0	5.3	8.1	11.1
6. Distribution	12.5	12.7	12.8	10.8	5.1
7. Transport & Communication	4.8	4.6	4.7	4.3	19.2
8. General Government	3.0	3.2	3.4	7.9	7.7
9. Education	2.5	2.6	3.6	3.0	
10. Health	0.5	0.5	0.8	1.2	5.7
11. Other Services	2.1	2.0	2.7	3.3	
TOTAL	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

Sources: F. A. Olaoku (ed.), Structure of the Nigerian Economy (London, MacMillan Press 1979), pp. 6-7. And Henry Bienen, Nigeria: Absorbing the Oil Wealth (London, Euromoney Publications, Ltd., 1982), p. 8.

There are also those who hold the opinion that whatever improvement that took place in the Nigerian economy during military rule was in spite of the efforts of the military rather than because of their efforts. For instance, in concluding his appraisal of 13 years of military rule in Nigeria, Dudley submitted:

> military rule and the oil boom could be said to have fostered the growth and spread of what might be described as "commercial capitalism", enabling the military hierarchy and their civilian aides - top bureaucrats, a few university men and the indigenous mercantilists - to emerge as the new dominant property-owning 'class' in the society. Whereas under a civilian regime, the key sectors of the economy - finance, banking and insurance, construction and manufacturing, prospecting and mining - had remained economic enclaves within the larger economic system and were controlled and dominated by foreign business interests, the spread of commercial capitalism has enabled the new property-owning class to make an incursion into these sectors, in some cases displacing the foreign interests; in others, collaborating with such interests in extracting the surplus which such control make possible. But in this enterprise, the main losers have been the rural farmers whose interests have been neglected by the new rich in the pursuit of collective interest, the utilisation of state power to accumulate wealth (Dudley, 1982: 120).

It is my opinion, however, that the greatest credit to the Nigeria military lies in its contributions to the country's political development -- the conscious search on the part of the several successive military administrations for better and more appropriate structures of social relations through a viable political system. It is contestible of course whether this ideal can be reached through the instrumentalities of the military, but the fact that they made deliberate efforts in this direction almost consistently throughout their 15-year rule is significant for several reasons. Firstly, it has been argued by scholars of military participation in Third World politics that whereas it is easy for the military to take power it is

often more difficult for them to relinquish such power. On the contrary in Nigeria, almost all the military administrations have been committed to the "abberation" theory of military participation in politics. This code seems to be held very strongly as much within the military itself as outside it. The military administration of General Gowon vascillated on a promise it made in 1972 with regard to bringing an end to military rule in 1976. He was replaced in a bloodless coup d'etat by the military administration of Murtala Mohammed which returned the country to civil rule promptly within four years. Similarly, the popular coup that toppled the civilian government of President Shehu Shagari (1979-1983) from power in 1983 was swept out of office by members of the military command in August 1985 (after about twenty months in office) because of its infringement of human rights which Nigerians have come to enjoy and cherish even under military governments . More importantly, the military regime of General M. Buhari (the successor to President Shagari) failed to articulate a commitment to its transient nature. The present military administration of General Babangida has initiated a search for a future political order and has promised to return to the barracks in 1990. Indeed, this is a renewed search since similar efforts preceded the outbreak of civil war (1960-67) and the inauguration of the second republic (1977-79). Few doubt the current government's commitment to this 1990 deadline though a number of those who believe in the supremacy and better performance of the military would prefer the military continue in office for a longer period.

This pattern of voluntary military disengagement from politics is of course not a universal experience. There are many other countries where the military has continued in power perforcedly and it is difficult to explain the rather different behaviour of the Nigerian military. One explanation which I have suggested elsewhere is the highly complex nature of the Nigerian political environment (Olowu, 1986). There are multiple centres of power, given the social diversity and complex economic and social system. In other words, the Nigerian polity is a highly complex and sophisticated one. A ruler at any point in time has to contend with such widely dispersed and powerful groups, drawn from almost 250 major ethnic groups, traditional rulers, the intelligentsia, the business community, student groups, a vigorous and relatively independent press, the bureaucracy and of course the military. It is not for nothing that Nigeria has been consistently referred to by its leaders as a difficult country to govern.

The second reason why the role of the military's search for better structures of governance is significant is because many political theorists have asserted that the military can bring about reform, but no lasting structural or institutional change that will outlast the military (Lieuwen, 1964; Zolberg, 1966; Huntington, 1969). Yet this is exactly the task which successive military administrations have set themselves in Nigeria: to create political institutions which will outlast it and which will prove popular and effective. To what extent have they succeeded in this self-appointed enterprise? In order to answer this question we shall need to understand the type of problems confronting the Nigerian political system at independence.

Four major problems bedevilled Nigeria's politics since independence. The first was how to accommodate the diverse interests of the country's almost independent multi-ethnic units within the new nation state. Before the colonial encounter, each of these existed as separate entities (empires, nation-states and indeed one of them, the Egba Kingdom, had achieved its independence from the British). Even though the British had separately secured treaties with each of these as early as 1900, the northern and southern parts of the country were not brought under a single administration until 1914. Even then, substantial autonomy was retained by the subnational groups until a federal constitution was formally adopted in 1954. But this led to fresh problems.

First, for a combination of reasons (naivete, complicity on the part of the British colonial rulers), one of the three regions (states) comprising the new federation had 79 percent and 55 percent of the whole country's territory and population respectively. It was thus easy for one of the regions to dominate not only the central government, but also through ingenuous coalition arrangements, even the other regions as well. This was exactly what happened and remained one of the perennial causes of the instability of the Nigerian federal system (Jinadu, 1985). Indeed, before 1967, when the secessionist bid was made by the Eastern region, each of the regions had at one time or another threatened secession (Ayoade, 1973).

In the civil war that ensued, the Biafran rebellion was crushed but not before the regional units had been reorganised by the military. Whereas the unstable civilian coalition succeeded in creating only one additional state in 1966, the military increased the

component units of the federal system first to 12 in 1967 and subsequently in 1976 to 19 units. In addition, the local government system was reformed nationally by acknowledging its autonomous existence as a third tier government, redefining its structure, responsibilities and resources. All of these changes to the basic units of government were enshrined in a new constitution bequeathed to the country by the military after extensive deliberations with broadly selected and elected groups of elites. The promulgation of the constitution in 1979 marked the end of 13 years of military rule.

This was not all. The second problem was that the original federal structure was not constructed on the basis of cultural groupings, but on very broad regional divisions based on the perception of regional power. Table 2 shows the proportion of the diverse ethnic groups in the federation. It also shows that the three major ethnic groups which shared the whole country between themselves represented only about two thirds of the whole country. Moreover, whereas the federal arrangement gave very broad powers to the regions, such autonomy was denied to the various minority groups (for instance, through the local government system) within each of the regions. Hence, even before independence in 1960, strong pressures already existed in each of the three regions for self-determination by the different minority groups. Each of the regional political leaders recognised the problem but none was willing to concede self-government to its own minorities without concurrence from the other two. After broad consultations with the people, first in 1967 and again in 1976, the country was divided up by the military government into 19 states,

very much along the lines of ethnic and sub-ethnic configurations. It also went further to reform the nation's local government system by redefining them and providing more resources for them through national, state, and local sources.

Table 2

Major Ethnic Groups in Nigeria

Ethnic Units by 1960 Regions	Estimated Population	Estimated Ethnic Percentage
a) Northern:		
Hausa-Fulani	15,370,000	29.0
Tiv and Plateau Cluster	4,860,000	9.0
Kanuri	2,484,000	5.0
Idoma-Igala-Igbira	1,404,000	2.6
Bororo (Pastoral Fulani)	957,000	1.5
Nupe	682,000	1.2
b) West:		
Yoruba	10,800,000	20.0
Edo	1,784,000	3.3
c) East:		
Igbo	9,180,000	17.0
Ibibio and Semi-Bantu	3,240,000	6.0
Ijaw	1,083,000	2.0
Others Unclassified	3,830,000	3.4
TOTAL	55,670,000	100.0

Source: National Population Census, 1963. Abstracted from T. O. Odetola, Military Politics in Nigeria: Economic Development and Political Stability (New Brunswick: Transaction Books, 1978), pp. 165-168.

The third major problem was that the different parts of the country had had varying exposure to modernisation (especially Western education, but this also affected the availability of other social infrastructures and economic investments). The northern parts of the

country (not all to be sure) had been more exposed to Arabic influence while the southern half had been more associated with the West through its coastal trading connections. This created problems in terms of locating national infrastructures and economic investment, and much more seriously in terms of recruiting new entrants into a merit-governed federal public service. Whereas all the southern regional departments had indigenised their services by independence, top positions in the Northern civil services were still manned by colonial expatriates. Surplus skilled labourers who migrated from the South in search of jobs migrated to the northern parts of the country were denied by a brand of indigenisation policy (Northernisation) which gave preference to northerners and expatriates over and above people of southern indigenes. How were the demands for merit introduced early into public institutions such as the military, university, and public service be reconciled with the problem of uneven educational attainment between the northern and southern parts of Nigeria? This was one problem which the civilian politicians who were committed to ethnic politics could not openly resolve and constituted a sore point for the new federal state until its collapse in 1966.

The military tried to diffuse the above-mentioned problem using two strategies: First, by promoting an ideology of nationalism and constructing stronger physical, social, and economic lines of intranational communication (National Youth Corps Programme, which made it compulsory for every University graduate to serve in a state other than his own for one year; universal primary education programme

introduced in 1976; the construction of federal unity schools and universities (and the take-over of all regional universities), etc., in each of the states of the federation).

Secondly, the government recognised explicitly the need to balance the merit principle with some principles of representativeness in recruiting for the public services and in admissions to the nation's higher educational institutions (Gboyega, 1984; Jinadu, 1985). All these institutions (organisations, rules, and procedures) were incorporated into the 1979 constitution which the military initiated and promulgated in collaboration with the country's elites. For instance, Section 14 (4) of the Constitution stipulates that the composition and conduct of the affairs of the government at all levels -- federal, state, and local -- must reflect the ethnic or sectional diversity within the area comprising the governmental unit. This extends in particular to composition of cabinets, selection of chairmen of agencies, and the appointment of senior civil servants (permanent secretaries) who were the division chiefs both at the federal and state levels. It was a constitution that rejected the Westminster model and replaced it with one much closer to the American constitution.

There was however a fourth problem, almost imperceptible before 1967 but which was aggravated by military rule: the disproportionate growth of federal power vis-a-vis those of the state units. Very many reasons were responsible for this situation under the military (the military's hierachical command structure, the rapid growth of oil revenues, most of which accrued to federal coffers, the civil war and the take-over by the federal government of a range of responsibilities

and resources hitherto handled by the state units). But this trend was also discernible before the military. Oil exports began in 1958 and although the proceeds were not great, it was substantial enough to tilt the balance of resources in favour of the federal government as early as 1965. Furthermore, central planning powers administered by the federal government, though rather feebly, were still sufficient to further tilt the balance of administrative power and resources in the same direction. As central powers increased so did the competition on the part of the different ethnic groups to capture the central machinery of government. For instance, whereas politicians and top administrators had moved to their respective regions in the years preceding independence, there was a strong incentive for a movement towards the centre after independence. Chief Awolowo, the Premier of the Western region, left the West in 1964 to contest the federal election as Prime Minister. That was the beginning of the crisis that engulfed the region a year later, spread to the rest of the country, and culminated in the first military coup in 1966.

Whereas the military dealt with the first three problems fairly well, they appear merely to have aggravated this fourth and fundamental problem confronting the Nigerian nation. Thirteen years of military rule in Nigeria led to centralisation on three fronts:

1. From the private to the public sector: Whereas the private sector made an investment of approximately 45 percent of the first national development plan (1962-68, only plan drawn by civilians), the fifth national development plan (1981-1985) left only 14 percent to the private sector. Most analysts agree that even in spite of the non-nationalising orientation of the indigenisation decrees of the 1970s, the private sector has shrunk substantially in Nigeria.

2. From the sub-national to the national or federal government. Whereas state revenues were 50 percent of

federal revenues in 1960, it had fallen to 30 percent during the 1975-80 period. Similarly, states expenditure was 119 percent of federal expenditure in 1960, but this had fallen to 44 percent during the 1975-80 period. In turn, the states raised 40 percent of their revenues in 1968 but only 13 percent in the 1980-85 period. In turn, the massive efforts made at the federal level to reform local governments were nullified by State governments, who took over their resources and responsibilities.

3. From the legislature and judiciary to the executive. The legislature was yet to establish itself as a countervailing institution to the executive, at least at the federal level, when the army struck again in 1983. In many states, especially where the same party controlled both the executive and the state assembly, the legislative branch operated as an arm of the executive (Olowu, 1985). As for the judiciary, special provisions were made in the 1979 constitution to preserve its independence. Nevertheless, its independence was compromised by one important administrative legacy inherited from military rule: the judiciary was not financially autonomous of the executive branch. In spite of this, however, the judiciary as a whole, with special reference to the Supreme Court, can still be generally regarded as a relatively autonomous. Its judgments involving the executive branch in the multitude of litigations it had to settle was generally perceived as impartial. Some of these cases involved revenue sharing amongst governments, interpretation of constitutional powers in the field of intergovernmental relations and election petitions.

The seriousness of this oversight cannot be better demonstrated than by the fact that within three years competitive politics had again become an unhappy forebodings for many Nigerians. Indeed, the competition for central resources were even more desperate, either through demands for an endless number of local or state governments, or through the violent nature of the elections. The arson and killings that accompanied the 1983 elections were no different (except perhaps worse) than those that accompanied the elections of 1965 (Adamolekun, 1985). Hence, even assuming that economic growth and development has been accelerated by the military in Nigeria, growth has not been translated into a higher level of political culture.

Rather, it has even increased the features of political underdevelopment -- gross corruption, instability, and mutual suspicion among the different groups in Nigeria. The latter has proved a great hindrance to overall development in the country. Even the basic statistical information on the country's population size cannot be secured. All the population censuses conducted since independence have proved unacceptable to diverse groups within the country and even now all socioeconomic and political indicators are based officially on a census count which dates back to some 23 years. It is understandable that in a country where no acceptable population exists, election results must be continuously controversial and contentious. All theses underscore one fact: that political development is not necessarily related to economic development and is much more than creating new rules, structures, and procedures. So what is it?

Towards an Integrated View of Development

Serious study of the relationship between economic and political development can be regarded to have started with the path-breaking work of Samuel Huntington. He demonstrated that increasing economic development and its social concommitants led not to political stability but to instability. He contented that completely different organisational requirements were called for in bringing about political order. Whereas western nations had a long time to embark on their technological and industrial revolution as well as evolve acceptable social structures (the least of which took about a

century), the fact that the newer nations had to confront these two major revolutions simultaneously meant that the challenge facing the newer nations was a tough one indeed. For him, however, in line with the tradition of his fellow political scientists of his time, the great need of the developing countries was to evolve effective mass political parties. Taking India as the proto-type of political stability in the Third World, he pressed for the development of mass parties such as the Congress Party which he regarded as one of the oldest and best organised political parties in the world, as a desirable counterpart to the highly reputable Indian bureaucracy (Huntington, 1968; Esman, 1963).

In spite of the important contribution of Huntington, however, he was not too different from others who believed in the need for strongly centralised governments as an essential condition for rapid economic growth. The only difference was that he would wish to see one or two political parties develop as a countervailing power center to the state bureaucracy, which in this case was the highly reputable Indian bureaucracy. This was not an altogether different emphasis from those of the Comparative Administration Group. But it cannot be claimed that strong party systems have provided the solution to the problem of social order in the Third World. They might have succeeded as they have in countries such as India, Singapore, Korea, South Africa, Ivory Coast, or Tanzania in bringing about stability but they have not produced acceptable social orders of productive relations (Zolberg, 1966; Chantornvong, 1985; Young, 1982; Lombard and du Pisanie, 1985).

There is no doubt that Huntington was right about the fact that economic and political development, though very closely inter-related constitute discrete technologies of social organisation. Economic growth (the first component of economic development, see Figure 1) entails the increasing capacity of a people to manipulate their environment to their own advantage. This involves the use of appropriate technologies in relating to that environment. It is, thus, a technological revolution.

But this technological revolution can take place only in the context of appropriate institutions for productive human relationships. Since most social science literature has relied on the historical experiences of Europe mainly, it is generally thought that this technological revolution can be brought about mainly through an elite group in possession of immense capital either as representatives of the state or as private individuals. However, to the extent that this revolution involves human cooperation (teamwork), its long-run success depends on the acceptability of the social order which such cooperative effort entails by those involved in such teamwork. In some other context related to this, Vincent Ostrom states that:

> The ingredients of teams are people. Their relationships with one another are conceptualized in relation to positions and roles where each relates to another by reference to mutual understandings which can be formulated as rules. Implicit in these rules are norms or standards about how individuals act so as to take account of the interests of others. Teamwork depends upon shared understandings about how individuals properly relate to one another as human beings and how they perform their particular tasks as artisans in an organised effort that yields some aggregated product or result (Ostrom, 1983: 6).

Although coming from sharply contrasting backgrounds, agreement between Huntington and Ostrom on the importance of social organisation

for all productive activity is not accidental. Both are very close students of the French aristocrat who wrote on the democratic revolution in two important works that are highly relevant for our time: Democracy in America (1835) and The Old Regime and the French Revolution (1856). It is my belief that these two works contain a theory of human development and one which can inform our understandins of the dynamics of human development within diverse institutions. Tocqueville's work is useful in helpins to reconcile the seemins contradiction between economic development and political centralisation. We turn to a broad outline of this theory.

* * * * *

The social sciences has lons been preoccupied with the ramifications of the technological revolution which has brousht about the remarkable improvements in the material conditions of modern man as he increasinsly acquires the capacity to control and manipulate his physical environment to his advantase. Indeed, the main thrust of economics and economic development scholars has been on how this revolution can be sustained in technologically advanced countries and how the process can be replicated in the less technologically "developed" countries of the Third World (Meier, 1984). Political scientists, enamoured with the problems of the Third World, have found it convenient to trod alons the same paths as the economists, senerally associatins development with centralisation.

Tocqueville, however, calls our attention to a different but much more important social revolution sweepins through all the nations of the world. This sreat social revolution is what he calls "equality of conditions" or democracy. Its inevitable and unarrestible spread

throughout the world was not only propelled by all the innovations and increasing sophistication in the arts, sciences, and commerce, but also by providence. According to him:

> Running through the pages of our history, there is hardly an important event in the last 700 years which has not turned out to be advantageous for equality. . . . Everywhere the diverse happenings in the lives of peoples have turned to democracy's profit. . . . Therefore, the gradual progress of equality is something fated. The main features of this progress are the following: It is universal and permanent, it is daily passing beyond human control and every event and every man helps it along. Is it wise to suppose that a movement which has been so long its train could be halted by one generation? Does anyone imagine that democracy which has destroyed the feudal system and vanquished kings will fall back before the middle classes and the rich? Will it stop now, when it has grown so strong and its adversaries so weak? . . . effort to halt democracy appears as a fight against God himself, and nations have no alternative but to acquiese in the social state imposed by Providence (Tocqueville, 1969: 11-12).

However, democracy needs to be tamed through intelligent exercise of constitutional choice: through laws, customs, and mores to make it a profitable revolution. For Tocqueville, whereas, the great social revolutions and battles for democracy were fought in Europe, only in the United States of America, where the Pilgrim Fathers took the fruit of the revolution, leaving the military struggles behind them, had the great, creative element in this social revolution been realised in his time. According to Tocqueville, equality of conditions was the creative element in the American society "from which each particular fact (of social reality) was derived." There, the crisis of legitimacy and social agitation which accompanied the democratic revolution gave way to a new social order based on three key principles: free association of citizens, popular sovereignty, and strong provincial institutions (divided governmental sovereignty).

The result was reciprocal courtesy and a steady hum of productive social activities beginning at the level of the smallest community. This constituted the very antithesis of a centralised political order, which, Tocqueville argues, produces only docile subjects and a miserable economy:

> I cannot conceive that a nation can live, much less prosper without a high degree of centralisation of government. But I think that administrative centralisation only serves to enervate the people that submit to it, because it constantly tends to diminish their civic spirit. Administrative centralisation succeeds, it is true, in assembling at a given time and place, all the available resources of the nation, but it militates against the increase of those resources. It brings triumph in the day of battle, but in the long run diminishes a nation's power. So it can contribute wonderfully to the ephemeral greatness of one man but not to the permanent prosperity of a people. A central power, however enlightened and wise one imagines it to be, can never alone see to all the details of the life of a great nation. It cannot do so because such a task exceeds human strength. When it attempts unaided to create and operate such complicated machinery, it must be satisfied with imperfect results or exhaust itself in futile efforts. . . . Centralisation . . . in a word excels at preventing, not at doing. When it is a question of deeply stirring society or of setting it a rapid pace, its strength deserts it. Once its measures require any aid from individuals, the machine turns out to be astonishingly feeble; suddenly it is reduced to impotence (Tocqueville, 1969: 90-91).

In addition, Tocqueville, especially in The Old Regime, makes two important points. First, economic prosperity does not guarantee political stability. France was not only a prosperous country before the revolution but the reign of Louis XVI was the most prosperous period of the monarchy. Indeed, he claims that it was this very prosperity that hastened the outbreak of the revolution. Secondly, whereas there is a very great need for some cohesion and decisiveness at the governmental level with respect to the competencies of all

governmental systems within a system of multiple authorities, the centralisation of administration undermines national prosperity, citizenship, and patriotism.

Tocqueville's conception of the state has been developed into the theory of the "compound republic." In contrast to theories of sovereign indivisibility and monocratic public administration, the compound republic articulates an alternative governmental structure based on the concept of multiple authorities and popular control (Ostrom, 1971). Similarly, there is a renewed interest today among economists on the importance of social institutions to the process of economic development. This was largely a result of the questions generated by the failure of the application in the Third World of the Marshall Plan economic policies which had proved successful in Europe. The most famous economic theories which supported the reapplication of the Marshall Plan type policies in the Third World was the capital constraint model, a combination of Rostow's economic growth stage model and Harrod-Domar savings-capital theory. According to Todaro:

> Unfortunately, the tricks of development embodied in the theory of stages of growth did not work. And the basic reason they didn't work was not because more saving and investment isn't a necessary condition for accelerated rates of economic growth - which it is - but rather because it is not a sufficient condition. The Marshall Plan worked for Europe because the European countries receiving aid possessed the necessary structural, institutional and attitudinal conditions (e.g., well-integrated commodity and money markets, highly developed transport facilities, well-trained and educated manpower, the motivation to succeed, an efficient government bureaucracy) to convert new capital effectively to higher levels of output. The Rostow-Harrod Domar models implicitly assume the existence of the same attitudes and arrangements in underdeveloped nations. But in many cases, they are not present nor are the complementary factors such as managerial competence, skilled labor, and the ability to plan and administer a wide assortment of projects often present in sufficient quantities (Todaro, 1981: 61).

This helps to explain the failure not only of several aid programmes which has increasingly become bothersome to many aid-giving countries, but also explains the continuing poverty of several countries like Nigeria who have benefited from the sale of mineral products (1980). What is of importance to us here are the essential conditions for productive social relations in the Nigerian federal system. Nigeria has tried diverse constitutional models since 1947: semi-unitary (1947-51), quasi-federal (1951-54), federal/confederal (1954-63), republican (1963-66), military (1967-present), and Presidential (1979-83) models. The 1979 constitution was expected to be an improvement on all these previous constitutional models -- able to address the country's economic and political yearnings. In all senses, it is a constitution, initiated and modeled largely by the military. The Head of the Military Government (with the help of invisible adivsors, mainly from the civil service) dictated the ground rules for the constitution and endorsed it after the deliberations of the popularly elected Constituent Assembly. Neither the Constitution Drafting Committee nor the Constituent Assembly made any changes to the ground rules set by the military (Dudley, 1982).

It is thus a constitution made by the military for the good of Nigeria and with the best intentions. The question can now be posed with the advantage of hindsight whether the constitution contained the essential attributes for productive relations within the Nigerian federal system (as already discussed above). The answer is obviously no, for the reasons already advanced above. To effect corrections, special attention must be paid to two fundamental principles. First, the need for a radical decentralisation of governmental authority to

allow citizens to play a greater role both singly and through associational groupings in meeting their economic and social needs. This implies a greater role for the market mechanism as well as local institutions of an associational and governmental nature. The private sector has been an important sector in Nigeria, especially in agriculture. But, over the years, governmental efforts have been aimed at direct participation in industrial and agricultural production through its range of parastatals. By 1982, there were over 200 such parastatals at the federal level and the number ranged between a dozen and fifty among the various states. The record of these parastatals have been consistently disastrous.

It is true that the governments entered into these ventures for good reasons: nationalism, fairness, and justice. But the record of waste, corruption, and the generally low productivity of these organisations make it necessary to examine other alternatives to direct production of services by the government. There are ways in which the government can promote these policies through an appropriate system of law that allows others to produce services rather than by direct production. Individual self-interest needs to be liberated by an appropriate system of law. The current downturn of the economy (involving the loss of about two thirds of the 1986 budget due to the slide in world oil prices) is an opportune time to reexamine the nation's economic priorities.

Local governments have rarely existed in Nigeria in spite of successive efforts of governments both at the national and state levels to make them operational. The reason has been the tendency for state governments to conceive of local governments as extensions of

state power. Local councils are dissolved at random and management committees comprising government nominees are put in their place. In addition, local government personnel are managed directly by the state government through a state government-controlled Local Government Service Commission. Rather than generate their own revenues, local governments have over the years been highly dependent on higher level governments for unpredictable flow of grant-revenues. The state and federal government incentives encourages such dependence. Though local administration has not been a complete failure in Nigeria (important successes have been achieved, especially in Northern Nigeria and in a few cities such as Lagos, Benin, Owerri, Aba, and Port Harourt), nevertheless, all these have remained "local administrations" rather than local government which both the 1976 reform and the 1979 constitution aimed for.

The weakness of local administration is grounded in the fact that they were never perceived as institutions representing the local people. The result in that alternative grass root institutions exist for meeting almost the same needs for which local councils exist. Some of these indigenous institutions achieved tremendous success (Cohen, 1969; Smock, 1971; Kolawole, 1982). Unfortunately, however, the relationship between these two organisations is usually marked by hostility.

The theory of popular government rests on the notion of "self-government" and is best understood by considering the principle that the individual is the best judge of his own interest. If this is so, opportunities must exist within the framework of new local government structures for individuals within the same community to

associate together to create and maintain local institutions which will serve their interests. The rationality arguments against such small-sized local governmental units is that of financial viability. But research in human organisations now indicates that local governments could be responsible for local services without entering into direct production and that these small-sized local governments can under certain circumstances be more effective than large-sized ones (E. Ostrom, et al., 1978). Moreover, the argument of viability falls flat when it is realised that people who refuse to pay flat rates of 7.50 naira to their distant local governments are ready to make huge contributions in cash or in kind to their respective community organisations. A number of possible alternative institutional arrangements can be made: Joint production among local governments; contractual production between local governments; or contractual production by private enterprises. All these are effective though only when they are entered into voluntarily rather than managed through a governmental hierarchy. This is because each of the local governments will endeavour to act in the best interests of its citizens who could much more readily hold their councils responsible than central governments can.

Finally, substantial decentralisation of responsibilities (especially for domestic services) and resources to the state governments is necessary for two reasons. The first reason is the need to restate the principle that federalism is a governmental system that is entered into by people who simultaneously desire to retain their varying cultural identities and independence, they also want the economic and security advantages of the union. By centralising so

many responsibilities and resources in the Federal government, this cultural independence is undermined, thereby fanning the embers of political instability. As presently constituted, neither elections nor even a population census can be successfully undertaken in the country because each group regards such exercises as crucial in its bid to "capture" the central government.

The second reason for strengthening the states emanates from the principle of popular sovereignty. The degree of representation at the national level is less than at the state levels. Even though there is only one house of assembly at the state levels and two at the national level, the combined numbers of representatives at the National Assembly was about 544, while the combined total at the state level was 1,349. The same comparison can be made for national and state executives. If local governments were operational, they would even be be closer to the people than the state governments. When there is an opportunity for people to make an input to the way in which their lives are managed closer to them, government becomes not only more responsive but also more accountable. Of course, it is also possible that such institutions can, through elite coalitions, be more repressive, but over time such coalitions tend to break down as other members learn the potential opportunities that exist through building their own coalitions.

This brings us to the second major principle: the principle of accountability. For a long time, Nigeria has been rocked by stories of large-scale public corruption. Some of these turn out to be false, but the general feeling is that corruption runs riot in Nigeria's public sector (Ekpo, 1979; Aina, 1982; Olowu, 1983). Why is this the

case? Several reasons have been proferred among which are low ethics of public servants, the large amount of social resources that passes through the public sector, the alienation of the people from their government, and poverty. It is, however, a problem that is not peculiar to Nigeria. Not even the most economically or politically developed countries have produced corruption-free political systems. Indeed, Nigeria's brave efforts in tackling the problem seems to have been poorly rewarded: ad hoc commissions, corruption investigation bureaus, public complaints, code of conduct bureau and tribunal, etc. Why had this been the case?

The reason is simple. The self-interest of politicians and public servants make it relatively profitable for them to pilfer public funds. The major contribution of the principle of separation of powers, developed first in its most primitive form by John Locke, and perfected by Montesquieu and Tocqueville is that of setting self-interest against self-interest. There is a need to strengthen the judiciary and legislative arms of government at all levels vis-a-vis the executive. If the executive can be made accountable both to the ordinary citizens through a more independent and less costly judicial system, and a legislature which is equally relatively independent of the executive, accountability in public management will be greatly improved. For instance, a situation in which most parastatals and government departments have not had any audits of their activities for between six and ten years arises because of the absence of an active legislative arm of government that is expected to inspect the accounts of the executive branch.

Critics will retort that all these will make coordination more difficult for the economic system of a developing country like Nigeria. The poverty of this very 'coordination strategy' has been the thrust of the work of management scholars within the last 50 years: that there is a limit to human capacity to coordinate the work of others. Moreover, the seemingly uncoordinated management of the economy through individual decision makers yield to market regulation and brings about overall efficiency of the economic system. This was a thesis long established by Adam Smith two centuries ago. What Tocqueville did was to call our attention to the importance of these principles for the totality of social relations and for the structure of the political system.

It needs hardly be stated that Nigeria has a responsibility to her people and the rest of Africa in building on her strong tradition of free enterprise and democratic culture to bring about the rounded economic and social development of her people. Nothing which I have written above suggests that a national government is not important. Indeed, the Federal government will continue to be in a position to pass general laws where necessary to assist the various states and local governments in realising their economic and social development programmes, such as in the fields of an agricultural research and extension, adult and primary education, and the encouragement of national commerce, etc. All these it could do without taking direct responsibility for the production of these activities. Indeed, because of the importance of the national government, it might be necessary to operate a national coalition government with a rotating Presidency. Important lessons may be learned in this respect from

Yugoslavia and Switzerland (Dubey, 1975; Kaufmann, 1985). Radical decentralisation of the federal government is a prerequisite for increasing the possibility of consensus politics at the national level: the rewards of office and the cost of losing office, both to the citizens and the politicians, must be reduced for this to occur.

The most important contribution of this discussion for development theory is that development is no longer defined in a static sense, solely in terms of the relationship of people to their national environment, but in terms of the dynamic aspects of social relations on the one hand, and the effect of such relationships upon the environment. Defined in this manner, human development becomes related not just to GNP performance but to such important elements as the autonomy of individuals, associations, local units of government, and state governments in overall social productivity. All countries according to this conception are therefore continuously presented with the possibility of increasing human happiness as new opportunities for productive cooperation among people are explored.

References

Adamolekun, L. (1985) The Fall of the Second Republic. Ibadan: Spectrum Books.

Aina, S. (1982) "Bureaucratic Corruption in Nigeria: A Search for Causes and Cures." International Review of Administrative Science, Vol. 1, 291-294.

Akeredolu-Ale, E. O. (1975) "Poverty as a Social Issue: A Theoretical Note." In Nigerian Economic Society, ed. Poverty in Nigeria. Ibadan: Nigerian Economics Society.

Awa, E. O. (1964) Federal Government in Nigeria. Berkeley: University of California Press.

Ayode, J. A. A. (1973) "Secession Threat as a Redressive Mechanism in Nigerian Federalism." Publius, Vol. 3, No. 1 (Spring), 54-74.

Bates, Robert H. (1981) Markets and States In Tropical Africa. The Political Basis of Agricultural Policies. Berkeley: University of California Press.

Cohen, Abner (1969) Custom and Politics in Urban Africa: A Study of Hausa Migrants in Yoruba Towns. Berkeley: University of California Press.

Dudley, Billy (1982) An Introduction to Nigerian Government and Politics. Bloomington, Indiana: Indiana University Press.

Ekpo, M. U., ed. (1979) Bureaucratic Corruption in SubSaharan Africa. Washington, D.C.: University Press of America.

Esman, Milton J. (1963) The Politics of Development Administration. Bloomington, Indiana: International Development Research Center.

Filani, M. O. (1981) "Nigeria: The Need to Modify Centre-Down Development Planning." In W. B. Stohr and D. F. Fraser-Taylor, eds. Development from Above or Below? The Dialectics of Regional Planning in Developing Countries. Chichester: John Wiley & Sons, 283-304.

Gboyega, Alex (1984) "The 'Federal Character' or the Attempt to Create Representative Bureaucracies in Nigeria." International Review of Administrative Sciences, Vol. 1, 17-24.

Halpern, Manfred (1962) "Middle-Eastern Armies and the New Middle Class." In J. J. Johnson, ed. The Role of the Military in the Underdeveloped Countries. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press.

Heady, Ferrel (1979) Public Administration: A Comparative Perspective. Second Edition. New York: Marcel Dekker.

Horowitz, Irving Louis (1966) Three Worlds of Development. New York: Oxford University Press.

Huntington, Samuel P. (1968) Political Order in Changing Societies. New Haven: Yale University Press.

_____ (1969) Soldier and State: Political Order in Changing Societies. New Haven: Yale University Press.

_____ and Joan M. Nelson (1976) No Easy Choice: Political Participation in Developing Countries. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

Ilchmann, Warren and R. C. Bhagarva (1970) "Balanced Thought and Economic Growth." In Fred Riggs, ed Frontiers of Development Administration. Durham, North Carolina: Duke University Press, 247-273.

International Labour Office (1981) First Things First: Meeting the Basic Needs of the People of Nigeria. Addis Ababa: Jobs and Skill Programme.

Jinadu, Adele (1985) "Federalism, the Consociational State, and Ethnic Conflict in Nigeria." Publius, Vol. 15, No. 2 (Spring), 71-100.

Johnson, J. J., ed. (1962) The Role of the Military in Underdeveloped Countries. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press.

Kaufmann, Otto K. (1985) "Swiss Federalism." Mimeo. Bloomington, Indiana: Workshop in Political Theory and Policy Analysis.

Kolawole, A. (1982) "The Role of Grassroots Participation in National Development. Lessons from the Kwara State of Nigeria." Community Development Journal, Vol. 17, No. 2, 121-133.

Lipton, Michael F. (1977) Why Poor People Stay Poor: Urban Bias in World Development. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press.

Liuewen, E. (1964) "The Military: A Force for Continuity or Change?" In John Te Paske and Sydney Fisher, eds. Explosive Forces in Latin America. Columbus, Ohio: Ohio State University Press.

Lombard, J. A. and J. A. du Pisanie (1985) Removal of Discrimination Against Blacks in the Political Economy of the South. The Republic of South Africa. Bloomington, Indiana: Workshop in Political Theory and Policy Analysis, Indiana University.

Mabogunje, A. L. (1968) Urbanisation in Nigeria. London: Oxford University Press.

_____ (1980) The Development Process: A Spatial Perspective. London: Hutchinson University Press.

Meier, Gerald M. (1984) "The Formative Period." In Gerald M. Meier and Dudley Seers, eds. Pioneers in Development. New York: Oxford University Press.

Nigeria, Federal Republic of (1981) Guidelines for the Fourth National Development Plan. Lago: Ministry of National Planning.

Odetola, T. O. (1985) Guns, Pens and Words: The Military, the Politicians and the Intelligensia in the Process of Political Mobilisation. Inaugural Lecture. Ile-Ife: University of Ife.

Olatubosun, Dupe (1975) The Neglected Rural Majority. Ibadan: Nigerian Institute of Social and Economic Research.

Olowu, Dele (1980) "Urban Local Governments Under the 1976 Local Government Reform in Nigeria." The Bureaucrat, Vol. 8, No. 3, 12-16.

---------- (1983) "The Nature of Bureaucratic Corruption in Nigeria." International Review of Administrative Sciences, Vol. 3, 70-76.

---------- (1984) "Basic Needs Strategy and Social Equity: THe Nigerian Experience." Ife Social Sciences Review, Vol. 7, Nos. 1 & 2, 24-40.

---------- (1985) Government and Administration of Lagos State, 1967-83. A Case Study of the Role of State Governments in the Development Process. Lagos: John West Publications.

---------- (1986) "Is Africa Developing? A Case Study of the Role of the Military in Institutional Change in Nigeria." Paper presented to the World Affairs Council of Northwest Indiana, Gary, Indiana.

Onyejekwe, Okeyh (1981) The Role of the Military in Economic and Social Development. A Comparative Regime Performance in Nigeria, 1960-1979. Washington, D.C.: University Press of America.

Ostrom, Elinor, Roger B. Parks, and Gordon P. Whitaker (1978) Patterns of Metropolitan Policing. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Ballinger.

Ostrom, Vincent (1971) The Political Theory of a Compound Republic. Blacksburg: Virginia Polytechnic Institute.

---------- (1983) "Configurations of Relationships in Human Societies." Mimeo. Bloomington, Indiana: Workshop in Political Theory and Policy Analysis, Indiana University.

Pye, Lucian (1962) "Armies in the Process of Political Modernisation." In J. J. Johnson, ed. op. cit.

Shils, Edward (1962) "The Military in the Political Development of the New States." In J. J. Johnson, ed. op. cit.

Smock, Audrey (1971) Ibo Politics: The Role of Ethnic Unions in Eastern Nigeria. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press.

Stewart, Frances (1985) Basic Needs in Developing Countries. London: Longman.

Tocqueville, Alexis de (1835) Democracy in America. Edited by J. P. Mayer, Translated by G. Lawrence. Garden City, New York: Doubleday Anchor Books.

Todaro, M. P. (1981) Economic Development in the Third World. Second edition. New York: Longman.

---------- (1856) The Old Regime and the French Revolution. Translated by Stuart Gilbert. Garden City, New York: Doubleday Anchor Books.

Tukur, M. and O. Olasunju, eds. (1972) Nigeria in Search of a Stable Political Order. Zaria: Institute of Administration.

World Bank (1975) Yugoslavia: Development with Decentralisation. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.

Young, Crawford (1982) Ideology and Development in Africa. New Haven: Yale University Press.

Zolberg, A. R. (1966) Creating Political Order. The Party States of West Africa. Chicago: Rand McNally.