

Human impacts of displacement from protected areas: lessons from the establishment of the Derema Corridor, north-eastern Tanzania

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The establishment of a conservation corridor between forest reserves in the East Usambara Mountains, Tanzania, involved the displacement of hundreds of small-holder farmers who held customary land rights to the area and paying monetary compensation for their livelihood losses. Through a combination of qualitative and quantitative social research methods, the conservation and compensation process and the livelihood responses of affected people were investigated. The results suggest that a failure to unambiguously identify rights-holders to resources in the area, inadequate commitment and follow up by the involved conservation agencies, and limited agency of local actors in the arenas of decision-making contributed to the unpredictability of the process and its outcomes, which were mostly experienced as negative. The process accelerated social marginalization as many of the affected rights-holders, especially women, were not compensated for their lost assets. The poorest people were among the most affected whereas few wealthy people received the largest compensation and were able to invest in improved livelihoods. Clear definitions of local rights to resources coupled with fair and timely compensation, inclusive mechanisms for participation, and a sustained presence and commitment of the conservation agencies, are seen as pre-requisites for forest conservation interventions involving compensated human displacement that are to avoid negative social consequences to the affected people.

Key words: protected areas, displacement, land rights, compensation, Tanzania

INTRODUCTION

Establishment of protected areas has for a long time been a core strategy in efforts to sustain the biological diversity and ecosystem functions of the world's tropical forests. This often involves different degrees of human exclusion from access and occupancy. In the past two decades, exclusionary conservation approaches have become subject to increasing criticism regarding lack of synergies between conservation and social development goals such as poverty reduction, economic growth and social equity (Brockington et al. 2006, West and Brockington 2006, Sunderland et al. 2008). As a consequence, rights and social justice are no longer sideline issues in conservation, but very much at the fore (Campese 2009:313). Still, exclusionary forest conservation remains on the agenda globally, especially now that increasing resources are directed to forest-based climate change mitigation efforts, raising concern about their impacts on the rights and livelihoods of indigenous and local forest-adjacent communities (e.g. Angelsen 2009).

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Recent discussion by academics and conservation and development practitioners has largely focused on the extent and nature of negative social impacts of exclusionary conservation, even spurring contentious debates (e.g. Schmidt-Soltau 2009, Curran et al. 2010). These debates reflect the normative and epistemological aspects of defining the problem and the meanings attached to it by scholars representing different disciplines and backgrounds. An example is the concept of 'displacement': some researchers have defined it narrowly, restricting it to the physical removal of settlements due to development or conservation interventions (e.g. Agrawal and Redford 2009). Yet, consensus in policies is moving towards recognition of restricted access as a form of displacement (Cernea 2005). We follow previous authors (Cernea 2005, Brockington and Igoe 2006, Curran et al. 2010) in using the concept of displacement to refer to lost access to important production resources, such as land and forest. The debates featured in academic journals may, however, be of little consequence to real-life, tough decisions on displacement from protected areas (cf. Dear and McCool 2010), when trade-offs between conservation and development goals seem unavoidable. Another, perhaps a more pragmatic strand of discussion concerns the ways to mitigate negative social impacts of conservation, and it is in that discussion that our paper aims to make a contribution.

Rights-based approaches to conservation are among the latest proposed tools to articulate conservation and development trade-offs and potential solutions (Campese et al. 2009). A number of international organizations that support conservation have adopted principles, policies, and programmes addressing rights and redress mechanisms in conservation related displacement. Addressing of substantive rights around resource access and land tenure is most common (Campese et al. 2009:316). Many policies of the international financing institutions and bilateral aid agencies also specifically call for timely, adequate and fair compensation for lost assets and supportive livelihood rehabilitation measures, so that at least the pre-intervention level of well-being of the affected population can be achieved (Siegele et al. 2009).

We wish to contribute to the growing discussion on the interlinkages between rights, conservation and livelihood impacts through an examination of the case of the establishment of the Derema Corridor in the East Usambara Mountains, Tanzania. In this case, there was an effort to recognize the customary land rights of hundreds of smallholder farmers and monetarily compensate for livelihood losses resulting from restricted access to the conserved area. Our central question is whether the efforts to mitigate negative consequences for the livelihoods of the affected people were successful, and which factors intervened in achieving this goal. We pay specific attention to how the outcomes of the conservation and compensation process were differentiated by social attributes of the displaced, especially gender.

We part from the premise that addressing substantive rights, such as rights to land and compensation, is interrelated with and indivisible from addressing procedural rights to participate in decision-making, acquire information and access justice in exclusionary conservation interventions that aim to mitigate negative human impacts (cf. Campese et al. 2009). Hence we assess the ways in which the intervention strived to legitimize the decisions and measures taken and to involve the affected villagers. Specific focus is on the method used to define rights to land and compensation. We demonstrate that the human impacts of the intervention were not only conditioned by the procedures adopted by the implementers, but also the social

structures and relations which affected the scope for effective participation and equitable benefits from compensation.

The East Usambara Mountains in north-eastern Tanzania represent a microcosm of the ecological, economic and social effects of changing forest management objectives and policies. Considered one of the global biodiversity hotspots with a high number of endemic species (Rodgers and Homewood 1982, Burgess et al. 2007), conservation of the now fragmented mountain forests has dominated official management strategies since the 1990s. A history of commercial logging and estate farming and the expansion of smallholder agriculture have created a mosaic of forest and agricultural land uses across the landscape. Expansion of farming and forest fragmentation are seen as a threat to the endemic biodiversity and ecosystem functioning (e.g. URT 2006). In addition to the enforcement of a number of forest reserves, efforts to conserve the remaining forests include participatory forest management. Since the 1990s, there has been a marked policy shift supported by legal reforms in Tanzania towards decentralized forms of natural resource governance, including devolution of rights to and participation by local communities in forest management and conservation. The expansion of a forest protected area network also remains a key strategy (cf. MNRT 2006). One of the suggested approaches to counter the threat of fragmentation of the East Usambaran forests involves the creation of several conservation corridors between the biggest forest blocks confined within reserves (Newmark 1993, Tye 1993).

We draw on ethnographic material (interviews, observation, discussion, as well as documentary material) collected at different points of the Derema conservation process, between October 2003 and February 2010. The most important source of data that we rely on is semi-structured and structured individual and group interviews conducted with local people in two villages adjacent to the Corridor. In addition, to a lesser extent, we draw from two household surveys, conducted in 2005 and 2008. Previous research reports from the area, official legal documents, and grey literature were used as material and as means of cross-checking some of the information.

CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK: RIGHTS, AGENCY AND ACCESS

Access to resources, such as forest and land, is a key factor in shaping rural livelihood strategies and outcomes (Scoones 1998). In our approach, the concepts of access and agency are closely interwoven in the analysis of social changes triggered by displacement. We assume that actors, including groups of people, involved in a specific intervention can strategically use different resources, symbolic or material, to promote their interests. In the Derema case, the interests were mainly related to access to natural resources from which people were excluded, and access to money that was to compensate for the lost resources. In theorising access and how it is constituted and contested by actors, we draw on Ribot and Peluso (2003) who have developed a 'theory of access' to analyse "...who actually benefits from things [...] and through what processes they are able to do so". We suggest a more limited definition of access, confined to the actual ability of the actors to benefit from the resources at stake.

Property rights indicate different types of socially acknowledged claims to resources and form a sub-category of access (Ribot and Peluso 2003). They authorize their

holder to use, manage and benefit from resources, but only when there is a statutory or customary social mechanism that allocates duties and binds individuals to them (Bromley 1991). The legal, or institutional, framework thus conditions access through defining rights. An important observation is that in a legally pluralist context, where statutory and customary normative systems exist side by side, claims based on national legislation, on the one hand, and on customary law, on the other hand, may often be conflicting. In addition, they may be recognized to different degrees by different social actors (Colchester 2008). Legal pluralism also implies dynamism of property rights, in that different institutional frameworks influence each other and change over time (Meinzen-Dick and Pradhan 2002). Differing and changing interpretations of rights to resources and compensation entail the threat of ignoring or further marginalizing individuals or groups that do not possess the 'voice' to claim or defend their rights in displacement processes.

Hence we concur with Ribot and Peluso (2003) in considering that access is more akin to "a bundle of powers" than "a bundle of rights". In addition to rights, it is important to analyze the means, or strategies, of claiming and defending access to given resources. They include, for instance, discursive means, existing social networks, and sometimes also more hidden ways of action, such as non-cooperation (cf. Ribot & Peluso 2003). In this action, actors draw from their bundles of powers, including access to resources and what Ribot and Peluso (2003) call the structural and relational mechanisms conditioning access, such as knowledge, authority, social identities and social relations. The relationship between agency and access is hence twofold: access to resources constitutes power and conditions agency, which in turn enhances or enables access.

Yet, the effectiveness of action is also constrained by the acts of other actors and organisations, and social structures. This wider setting of the intervention usually contributes to unequal conditions for different social groups to promote their interests and objectives in interventions related conservation and resource control (e.g. Ribot 1999; Ribot & Peluso 2003; Wilshusen 2003; Nygren 2004). The bundles of power from which people can draw also shift over time, and change forms of access (Ribot and Peluso 2003:154).

A central reservation is that the outcomes of a conservation intervention to different actors are not only conditioned by the structures and relations between rural communities and "outsiders", but also within the communities. Relations of gender, ethnicity, religion, cultural identity, power and authority govern the distribution of access (including property), patterns of work and division of labour, the distribution of income and the dynamics of consumption and accumulation (Scoones 2009, Sikor and Lund 2009). Nevertheless, interventions seeking to involve local communities in conservation frequently clump a 'community' as a single stakeholder, overlooking the various competing interests within the communities that may be at stake (Agrawal and Gibson 1999, Ribot 2003). Those seeking 'community consent' to an intervention may also choose to only inform the official or political representatives of communities, or members that they usually or conveniently work with, begging the question of representativeness and legitimacy of such consent (Freeman et al 2008).

In terms of the outcomes, we find the concept of 'human impacts' by Slootweg et al. (2001) useful: 'impact' is something that is felt or experienced in a physical or cognitive (perceptual) sense, whether at the level of individual, household or

community. This conceptualization allows identifying both impacts which are particular to the aspirations of actors in the local socio-cultural context, as well as impacts which are more measurable according to certain pre-defined, internationally accepted indicators of well-being (related to income, food security, health, etc.). In our analysis, we focus on the human impacts as experienced changes in access to land, compensation and livelihood outcomes.

In order to tie our analysis of the Derema process to the context, we first briefly address the history of natural resource use, livelihood strategies and the economic and policy changes in the case study area. We then present the relevant institutional framework, providing a backdrop for the overview on the Derema conservation and displacement process in the subsequent section. The strategies of the affected people to claim, contest and defend access, as well as the limitations to their agency are analyzed in order to conclude on factors that affected the livelihood outcomes and human impacts of the conservation intervention.

PEOPLE, LAND USE AND CONSERVATION IN THE EAST USAMBARA MOUNTAINS

Settlement of the Usambara Mountains dates back to 100 C.E. and experienced its latest wave of in-migration from around 1600–1700 to present (Schmidt, 1989). For a long time, the largest ethnic group in the area has been the Shambaa, whose extensive kingdom encompassed the West and East Usambara mountains in the 19th century (Feierman, 1974). Human presence has thus shaped the Usambara mountain landscapes for several centuries. Yet, the takeover by the Germans in the end of the 19th century is considered pivotal for the gradual intensification of forest and land utilization in the East Usambaras (Hamilton and Mwasha 1989, Woodcock 2002).

Under German colonial rule, land was divided into forest reserves, private estates and public land for the local people (Hamilton and Mwasha 1989). Sawmills were established in different locations of the mountains, including one in Derema (Schabel 1990). From the late 1940s, forest clearing for tea and timber extraction expanded in the East Usambara Mountains with the emergence of new profit-oriented actors (Iversen 1991:14; Conte 2004:156). In-migration from other parts of the country was fuelled by work opportunities in the emerging industries. This also contributed to agricultural expansion as many migrants settled in the area.

In the early 1980s, attention was drawn to the unique biodiversity values of the East Usambara mountain forests (Rodgers and Homewood, 1982). An international outcry ended the commercial logging operations by the Sikh Saw Mills, which had been intensified since late 1970s with support by the government of Finland (Mwalubandu et al. 1991). To make up for the environmental damage caused by the highly extractive logging, Finland supported forest conservation in the East Usambaras by around 7.6 million Euros through three consecutive projects from 1990 to 2002 (EUCFP 1995, EUCAMP 2002). The last one of them, the East Usambara Conservation Area Management Programme (EUCAMP), also launched the process of establishing the Derema Corridor.

The long-term management objectives of the East Usambara Mountains landscape with a strong focus on biodiversity conservation were the result of these projects, institutionalized through the local implementing partner, the Forestry and Beekeeping Division (FBD) of the Ministry of Natural Resources and Tourism (MNRT). Enforcement of forest reserves was strengthened, and the Amani Nature Reserve was established in 1997. Involvement of local communities in forest management also started to gain momentum during the 1990s (e.g. Kessy 1998, Woodcock 2002, Vihemäki 2009).

Cardamom was first introduced to the area by the Germans and gradually adopted by small-scale farmers as a profitable cash crop (Vihemäki 2009). It is grown in agroforestry systems in which the undergrowth of the rainforest is cleared to make way for crop seedlings. The Derema area was assessed to be almost completely under cultivation of cardamom and subsistence crops by the 1990s (Iversen 1991:64, Johansson and Sandy 1996), while at the same time it was also considered the largest tract of unprotected forest in the East Usambaras (e.g. Newmark 1993; Newmark 2002; FBD et al. 2004). It was considered part of five villages; IBC Msasa, Kwezitu, Kambai, Kwemdimu and Kisiwani (URT 2006). The fieldwork for this study focused on the subvillages of Makanya in IBC Msasa and Antakae in Kwezitu, which were perceived by local key informants the worst affected by displacement from the Corridor. According to official statistics, 570 individuals out of a total population of 2200 in IBC Msasa and 216 out of 2311 in Kwezitu signed up for compensation (URT 2006:12).

A Social Impact Assessment (SIA) study conducted in 2000 found out that virtually all villagers living adjacent to the proposed Derema Corridor depended on agriculture as the most important source of income (Jambiya and Sosovele 2000). Cardamom was their most important cash crop, followed by cinnamon, cloves and black pepper. Whereas many also kept cattle or were engaged in small businesses, 45% stated that they had no other means of income apart from farming. Only a handful of youth were employed by the tea estates. Thus, at the start of the process, the livelihood strategies of the people to be affected by displacement could be characterized as land-based and highly specialized in the farming of spice cash crops, combined with mixed cropping of subsistence crops such as banana and yams.

Cardamom farming is considered one of the main drivers of deforestation, as it initiates a chain of gradual clearing of trees and conversion to open land uses after the cardamom has exhausted soil fertility (Newmark 2002). More recently, sugarcane and tea have been gaining popularity as cash crops especially in areas where most cardamom forests have been cleared (Bullock, Rantala, unpublished data).

Nearly all of the respondents (97%) to the SIA survey considered to 'own' their farmland in the planned corridor, which they had acquired most commonly through inheritance (37%) or purchase (23%) (Jambiya and Sosovele 2000). The land access could be considered to be based on customary claims, as no one had a title deed for their farms. It was the result of both more recent land allocations by village leadership as well as traditional management by local Shambaa patrilineal descendant groups. In many cases, the inherited land had first been acquired by the family through allocation following the Arusha declaration in late 1960s – early 1970s (Jambiya and Sosovele 2000; authors' data).

INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK OF CONSERVATION AND DISPLACEMENT IN DEREMA

The legal framework of the establishment of the Derema Corridor was defined by the Land Act (1999) and Village Land Act (1999). These had been produced as part of the legal reform which aimed at improving the security of customary land tenure. Derema became classified as village land (URT 2006:14-15), a type of legal land category meaning the area managed by the Village Council (village government) within the village boundaries. On village land, customary land rights are protected by the law as private land rights. Nevertheless, as a colonial legacy, all land (soil) in Tanzania remains under the ownership of the Head of the State as a trustee on behalf of the citizens. The head of the State can also transfer village land to the category of reserved land for public benefit.

In such cases, the Village Land Act defines the procedures of informing, consultation of, consent by and compensation for local communities. These were also applicable to the Derema case. Rights-holders to the land to be transferred, including customary rights, whether registered or not (Village Land Regulations 2001) are entitled to compensation. The Village Land Regulations (2001, 8-10) define compensation to be paid for the land itself together with improvements, as determined by the current open market value, assessment of lost income, or by replacement cost. In addition, compensation must be paid not only for property of individual occupants but also for communal land within the village (Regulation 8a). The terms of the compensation, i.e. type, amount and timing, need to be mutually agreed upon before the transfer can take place. The Village Assembly (a public meeting open to all villagers above 18 years of age) has the power to approve or reject removal of land under 250 ha from the village domain. The land law thus defines a consultation and a negotiation component in the process and assigns the community a certain right to give or withhold consent to land transfer, but highly limits it by defining it to concern only areas smaller than 250 ha.

The establishment of protected forest areas is also governed by forest legislation. The Tanzanian National Forest Policy of 1998 (URT 1998) paved the way to a policy shift towards scaling up participatory processes in forest management nation-wide, which made it into the law in the Forest Act of 2002. The forest law defines the implications of customary forest rights in the establishment of forest protected areas. Any objections, comments and presentations made by the communities should be recorded and claims of customary rights investigated. If such rights are proven to exist, different alternatives – such as community-based forest management - should be considered. Rights-holders to the forest areas to be conserved are entitled to a “full and fair compensation” for the reallocation of their rights. The law also defines mechanisms to redress decisions (Forest Act 2002, Sections 23-24).

The Tanzanian laws were applied by EUCAMP in Derema instead of any international standards for compensation (URT 2006:8). At a later stage, the government of Tanzania sought financial assistance from the World Bank and thereafter agreed to follow the World Bank Operational Policy (OP) 4.12 on resettlement. Should there have been differences between the Tanzanian procedures and the OP 4.12, the “stricter of the two” was to be followed (URT

2006:17). The principles of the OP 4.12 that go beyond the Tanzanian law include informing displaced people about their options and rights pertaining to resettlement, and consultation and offering choices among different alternatives. The policy stresses timely information flow between affected parties and provision of prompt and effective compensation at full replacement cost for losses of assets. It calls for special attention to protect the needs of vulnerable groups among the displaced, such as women, children and the poorest.

ESTABLISHMENT OF THE DEREMA CORRIDOR

Conserving the Derema area was first suggested in the 1970s (Iversen, 1991), but the process did not start until the late 1990s under EUCAMP. Village meetings were planned in adjacent villages “to reach agreements of gazetting the proposed Derema forest reserve” (EUCFP 1999), but the Social Impact Assessment in 2000 is documented as the first actual step taken (EUCAMP 2002: 33). The SIA was to inform the planners of the conservation intervention about the potential effects of displacement from the Corridor (Jambiya and Sosovele 2000). It also served to inform local people about the conservation plan (Vihemäki 2009).

The Corridor plan was initially met with opposition in the surrounding villages. A common line of thinking was a rather open rejection to the appropriation of land, although villagers were informed that they would receive monetary compensation for lost access and income (Jambiya and Sosovele 2000). Some of the farmers had previously lost farmland in the establishment of the Amani Nature Reserve and other reserves, and many of them were dissatisfied with the level of compensation received (Jambiya and Sosovele 2001, Vihemäki 2005, 2009).

Nevertheless, the SIA reported that most people had “a clear understanding” of the ecological justification of the conservation exercise. This might have been related to years of environmental education by the various projects in the villages rather than a concern over forest fragmentation per se. The SIA survey also suggested that about 13 percent were willing to shift their farming activities to other areas and supported conservation (Jambiya and Sosovele 2000:25). A small group did not comprehend the whole thing. The feeling of resignation was also reported to be common (Jambiya and Sosovele 2000:25). The contrasting responses reflect the diversity of interests and discourses among the villagers, some of who had been more involved in the conservation and development projects and thus more likely to have been exposed to the ‘modern’ conservation discourse than others (cf. Vihemäki 2009).

Interestingly, in a workshop organized after the SIA to share the findings with all the stakeholders and make recommendations on how best to proceed (Jambiya and Sosovele 2000:56), the position of the villagers had shifted, at least in the official arena of discussion where their representatives participated. The SIA report gives an impression that the villagers’ representatives in the workshop were by and large positive about the conservation plan, and the general conclusion was that the Derema must be reserved (Jambiya and Sosovele 2000:65-66).

Yet, only 24 villagers represented the population of thousands of people in the five affected villages (estimated 7,878 in 2006, URT 2006), including the village and sub-village chairpersons and a handful of other villagers. Only one of them was a woman

(Jambiya and Sosovele 2000, Appendix 4; sub-village chairperson, October 2003, Makanya). The female representative in the post-SIA workshop echoed the general concern of women documented in the SIA survey; that specific measures would need to be taken to ensure that men alone would not collect the compensation money and use it for purposes other than for the benefit of their families (Jambiya and Sosovele 2000, Appendix 4).

The level of consensus within the villages could have been lower than suggested by the workshop declarations. This is supported by the finding of the household survey conducted by Rantala in 2008 that 54% of the male respondents (n=46) and only 12% of the female respondents (n=42) who had lost access to land in the Derema process felt that they had participated in the decision about the Corridor.

The mid-term review of EUCAMP in 2001 criticized the programme for sustaining an exclusionary approach to forest conservation and recommended Derema to be conserved through community-based forest management instead (Sjöholm et al. 2001, Pohjonen 2002). At this point, the boundary marking of the Corridor was already underway (Sjöholm et al. 2001). A “Derema villagers’ workshop on the selection of the management approach for the corridor” was subsequently organized in Muheza town. The participants preferred the establishment of a government forest reserve over conservation through village forest reserves. The EUCAMP Steering Committee subsequently decided to continue the establishment of the Corridor as a government reserve (Pohjonen 2002).

A report by the Forestry and Beekeeping Division and other organizations involved (FBD et al. 2004) suggests that the ‘communities’ did not accept the community-based approach because they believed that it would be impossible to combine cultivation with conservation. According to an FBD official who had been involved in the process (interview, Dar es Salaam, January 2008), this alternative approach was rejected because the farmers would not have received any compensation. He also cited doubts about the villagers’ capacities to control illegal activities in the forest. Some villagers in later discussions also mentioned the same risk as a reason to support the idea of making Derema a government reserve. At the same time, they also maintained that only a minority of the villagers had supported the exclusionary approach but “had given better reasons” or justified their position better in Village Assemblies, leading to the ‘community consent’ of the protected area (group interview, Makanya, May 2008).

The boundaries of the Corridor were designed to exclude settlements and homes to avoid costly relocation (URT 2006). The boundary demarcation in mid-2001 involved slashing the crops along a 3-metre wide, 27 km long boundary surrounding a 956 ha corridor (EUCAMP 2002, Pohjonen 2002). The slashed crops were recorded together with the farmer’s photograph. An estimate of the applicable compensation was not available until months later (Pohjonen 2002).

The subsequent developments imply that the consent over the Corridor within the villages was not as broad as the reports prepared to complete the process suggest. At the time of the boundary survey, some farmers refused to cooperate with the demarcation as they conceived the location of the boundary to be different from what had been agreed (Sjöholm et al. 2001:54; authors’ data 2005, 2008). The situation became tense and as the police intervened, some people were arrested in IBC

Msasa (interview of Village Environmental Committee Chairman, IBC Msasa, March 2005; group interview with women, Makanya, May 2008). The issue was later solved in a meeting between the village leaders, the EUCAMP representatives and a local Member of Parliament (Pohjonen 2002). An agreement was reached to move the boundary in two places (Sjöholm et al. 2001), and the demarcation was completed (Pohjonen 2002).

Since the early stages, the affected farmers were also concerned about the rates of compensation and the timing of payments (Sjöholm et al. 2001, authors' data). The compensation to be paid and funds reserved by EUCAMP for the exercise had first been calculated according to the old land law in 1998. According to Pohjonen (2002), a letter from the Ministry of Lands in October 2001 advised that "annual income per crop approach along with the new land act", should be used in Derema. Any discussion on the apparent contradiction of this advice and how to interpret it has not been documented. After the district officials concluded that they were not competent to discuss the new land law with the villagers, a legal consultancy was contracted (Pohjonen 2002). Still, an important departure from the Village Land Regulations and the World Bank OP 4.12 was maintained until the end of the compensation process. That is, compensation was only paid for lost annual income per crop, and not for the lost farmland itself or for communal land.

How the terms and form of compensation were negotiated between the parties has not been well documented. The law does not require, for example, the compensation to be monetary. Some interviewees stated that they had agreed to give up their land upon promise of payment within six months (IBC Msasa, October 2003; URT 2006:20). Pohjonen (2002) reports that "the farmers preferred personal cheques instead of payments to family accounts in the bank", but it is not mentioned who "the farmers" were. Even though the official reports and documents on the Derema process repeatedly refer to "consultations of the local stakeholders all along the way" (URT 2006:28) on "what alternatives..[the villagers].. would accept" (Derema World Bank, ND, 3), few events have been documented. These include the SIA and the two workshops where a few representatives of the villagers participated. Some meetings at village level were also held in mid-2004 in preparation for the World Bank involvement in funding the process.

A change to the compensation procedure mandated by the new legal framework that was implemented was using the farmers' own estimations on yield per plant as basis for compensation, instead of a periodically updated government crop value schedule (URT 2006). Compensation for the slashed boundary crops was paid in March 2002 at highly profitable rates per cardamom plant (Ths 28,800; approx. US \$22 in 2009) based on the farmers' estimations on yield. This was many times higher than the normal yield in similar conditions (Dr. T. Reyes, Pers. Comm., December 2007). Later seen as a decisive complication to the process by its implementers, the sum to be paid to the farmers increased 12-fold following the change of the calculation method (URT 2006). It also raised expectations among farmers about high compensation for the remaining crops.

In mid-2002, the crops inside the Corridor were valued. Teams formed by a consultant valuer, Muheza district agricultural officers, forest officers and research assistants visited each farm in the Corridor, counting crops and recording their stage of maturity. People were called to their farms, photographed and requested to sign a

form on which their crops were recorded. No other data concerning the people who showed up except their names were recorded (URT 2006:18-19). The farmers later described a two-step procedure in which they signed the crop form at the village office following the farm visit, but it was not always the same person who represented the family at the two occasions. A government representative who had been supervising the process equated the signing of the crop forms to an agreement by the farmers with the valuation (informal discussion with an FBD official, Dar es Salaam, February 2010). Agreements were probably also fuelled by expectations on profitable compensation. During the assessment, the number of farms in the Corridor increased from the estimated 648 at the time of the boundary marking to 1547. Rapid new plantings and a higher number of farms were observed in the villages that were counted later (URT 2006:18-19).

In 2002, EUCAMP closed without sufficient funds to complete the compensation payments. The government of Tanzania was left to collect bits and pieces of conservation funding from various international conservation organizations and development partners to finalize the process. In the completion report of the programme, the EUCAMP advisors pleaded for additional assistance to finalize the compensation process, the failure of which would “not only result in... the loss of investment, but also in conflicts within and between local communities, policy makers and the conservation institutions in the Tanga region” (EUCAMP 2002:46).

In 2004, the MNRT approached the World Bank funded Tanzania Forest Conservation and Management Programme to request funding in order to complete the compensation (URT 2006:11). In the meantime, half of the compensation was paid to each farmer in 2005, in anticipation of the coming presidential elections (URT 2006:11). The final compensation payments were paid with World Bank funding during the authors’ fieldwork in February-May 2008.

Some of the recommendations of the SIA – if not all of its findings – were taken into account in the Resettlement Action Plan, especially regarding the planning of the WWF-mediated ‘resettlement’ project. In 2001, alternative farmland on former sisal estates in the lowlands for those wishing to relocate was to be made available with the agreement of the District Commissioner. But although some farmers from the Derema villages signed up, the land was not explicitly intended for the displaced farmers (URT 2006:24). The plans to facilitate new three-acre plots for the affected farmers on the sisal estates only became part of the ‘resettlement’ project in 2008-2009.

As part of the Resettlement Action Plan, a component of creating alternative income generating activities such as dairy cattle and beekeeping, butterfly farming and fish ponds for those worst affected, i.e. those who lost land and received very little compensation, was also suggested (Dr. G. Jambiya, pers. comm., January 2008). In addition, interest was added to the final compensation sums to compensate for the inflation occurred during the delayed process (URT 2006).

VILLAGERS’ AGENCY AND ITS LIMITS

Although contacts and flow of information regarding plans to complete the conservation intervention between the government and the Derema farmers was

irregular after the closure of EUCAMP, communication continued upon involvement of new actors. In mid-2004, representatives of a World Bank supervision mission to Tanzania Forest Conservation and Management Programme together with representatives of donor and conservation organisations visited Derema and discussed the prospects of completing the conservation and compensation process with some villagers (Derema World Bank ND; interview of an FBD official, Tanga, December 2004). An official of the FBD explained the strategy used to convince the farmers to continue waiting for the compensation (interview, Tanga, December 2004): “We told them that as long you do not go there, we will be motivated to look for the money”. The completion of the compensation was thus made conditional upon continued restraint from active farming in the Corridor, while at the same time there was a large degree of uncertainty about the future of the intervention.

Increasing frustration was reflected in the discourse of the affected people while the compensation process lagged on. They repeatedly requested to be either paid the compensation or be given their old farms back. Many were also concerned about the government’s willingness and ability to complete the compensation payments.

The Derema conservation intervention gradually led to the affected villagers’ mobilization as they tried to exert pressure on different agencies. By late 2003, the farmers had already sent delegations to district and regional level authorities to request information about the compensation process (e.g. Village Environmental Committee group interview, IBC Msasa, October 2003). Several visits to the District Commissioner and other government offices were made in the subsequent years.

By May 2005, affected people from the five villages had organized themselves in a ‘follow up committee’, which had sent a delegation three or four times to the office of the Regional Commissioner. In their efforts to access information and ultimately compensation, the affected farmers tried to use their existing social networks in addition to the formal channels (Vihemäki 2009, 177). For instance, a delegation was sent to meet the Regional Commissioner of Dar es Salaam (meeting of the affected farmers’ committee, April 2005). The committee members considered the follow-up not only as a means of trying to acquire information but also as a way of putting pressure on decision-makers and officials to speed up the process. Yet, they only received partial information and were asked to come back later or to consult other officials, which undermined their efforts. In addition, the ‘locus’ of authority – who had the information and power to decide on the compensation payments - was not clear to them. The committee members contributed their time and money, their own as well as support collected from other villagers for the costs of the trips, which made follow up costly for them. By September 2009, interviewed members of the committee explained the cessation of follow up activities by exhaustion and running out of financial support, although they still did not consider the process to be over.

The uneven distribution of resources among the local people was reflected in who became more involved in the follow up. Those who represented others usually had previous contacts to government authorities, or experience and resources to commit to the task. Many of them were older, more affluent and educated men. Village Environmental Committee and Village Council members, and other people with connections and experience of representing others, were also among the most active local people. Perhaps reflecting their respected social position, the survey of 2008 revealed that the follow up committee was highly trusted by most of the

affected respondents, although many, especially women, were not well aware of their mission or activities. Yet, a few respondents expressed doubts about the capacity of the follow up committee to influence the process. They also questioned whether the committee was accountable to the villagers or to “higher levels”. This reflects the complexity of the role of the committee as a messenger and self-appointed negotiator between the affected villagers and the authorities, often forced to return home without news of the compensation, or with only vague promises of progress.

At the same time, the representatives of the villagers were in a position to filter the information distributed between the affected people and conservation officials, and influence the negotiations according to their own interests. For instance, at late stages of the process in 2008, a member of the follow-up committee who was also the leader of a local dairy farmers’ network, encouraged affected farmers to participate in a cattle keeping training for a fee and construct animal shelters upon a vague plan by the resettlement project to provide cows for the poorest, most affected farmers. The latter then felt betrayed “yet again” when the plan did not materialize.

Negotiations over the conditions of compensation and following up on the payments were largely a men’s affair. Most interviewed women considered that their voices were not heard or adequately taken into account in the displacement and compensation process. In general, women’s information channels differed from those of men. Sixty percent of the male respondents to the survey in 2008 had found out about the Corridor plan in a Village Assembly, whereas only one third of the female respondents had heard about it this way; most of them had learnt the news through family, neighbours and other villagers. Women’s participation in village meetings is limited by chores such as farming, taking care of children and domestic animals, cooking, and fetching water and firewood. In addition, it is not uncommon that women are directly discouraged from public participation by their husbands. Most of the village leaders and the follow up committee members who participated in the public consultations regarding the Corridor were men.

Nevertheless, women tried to use the channels available to them and voiced their concerns over the social effects of the displacement and compensation method through the surveys carried out at various points of the process (Jambiya and Sosovele 2000, Appendix 2; authors’ data 2005, 2008). They requested portions of compensation for family farms to be paid separately to husband and wife (Jambiya and Sosovele 2000, Appendix 2). Despite the early documentation of these concerns, they were not effectively taken into account in the process.

Access to information was thus a key constraint to the villagers’ efforts to influence the process and its outcomes. At the same time, the perceived ‘secrecy’ and gaps in information flow left room for differing interpretations on the terms of displacement and compensation. The affected villagers’ arguments changed as their understanding of the process grew and their perceptions of their rights changed. In 2009, a new issue had become central to the villagers: the question of why compensation had not been paid for the land itself in addition to the crops. A member of the follow up committee had learned about the legal right to compensation for land through a radio program. The farmers tried to apply different discursive means to keep negotiations open and shape the outcomes of the process even after the formal decisions about final compensation had been made. At the

same time, the authorities saw the last payments as closure to the lengthy and painful process. This was similar to the social dynamics of the process of establishing and negotiating the compensation levels in the case of Amani Nature Reserve that started in the 1990s (Vihemäki 2009).

OUTCOMES IN ACCESS TO LAND AND COMPENSATION

“Eligibility for compensatory measures for the loss of farm plots in the proposed Derema corridor is a simple matter. All those who had farm plots are eligible” (URT 2006:18).

The above statement of the Derema Resettlement Action Plan suggests that land tenure in the proposed Corridor was unproblematic to establish. The single measure taken to identify the rights-holders to land and eligibility for compensation was the crop valuation exercise, in which the people who turned up on farms on the valuation days were recorded as the “owners”. However, a more careful study of local practices regarding land access suggests that this method was inadequate to infallibly determine eligibility for compensation vis-à-vis lost access to land.

Farmland accessed by households in the affected villages is mostly owned by men, although women are sometimes distributed land by their husbands so that each spouse takes care of his/her own parcel of land. Polygamy is still fairly common especially among Muslim Shambaa (10% of married male respondents to the survey of 2008). It is further re-enforced by levirate marriage; that is, a deceased man’s wife is “inherited” by one of his brothers. Widows may access the land of their late husbands for farming, but the land still belongs to the children. When the children are small, mothers act as mere caretakers of land, unless an uncle has assumed this role. Fathers’ inheritances are usually distributed while he is still alive, so that different family members belonging to various households cultivate parcels that are still “officially” under the ownership of the father. Both male and female children may inherit land, but female children receive smaller portions – or male relatives may use their traditional right to re-allocate their father’s inheritances posthumously, and a woman may be excluded from a farm she has worked and depended on for a big part of her life.

In sum, intra-family relationships that define access to land are complex and dynamic, and drawing a relationship between land ‘ownership’ and dependency on land for livelihoods is not straightforward. Although 36% of the female respondents to the household survey in 2008 reported owning land themselves as opposed to accessing land that is owned by their spouses, jointly owned or owned by another family member, their land rights can in general be considered weak and easily disregarded. A woman’s ownership may be questioned especially when cash is to be received for land, such as in a land sale – or as compensation for appropriation.

After the final compensation payments in 2008, women’s concerns over the compensation process appeared to have come true. Whereas 95% of male survey respondents in 2008 had received compensation for the land they lost in the Derema Corridor, 73% of the women had not. Women were sidelined in the registration for compensation; only about 5-10% of the names on the compensation lists were

female (URT 2006:19). They also had reduced access to compensation for a jointly owned farm.

Most affected men and women stated that the compensation money was intended for the entire household regardless of who signed up for compensation. However, women usually had no or very limited knowledge about the amount and timing of the coming payments. This reduced their control over how the money was used. If the husband returned from the cheque collection trip with a gift such as bread or a *kanga* (a traditional textile worn by women) and the money was nowhere to be seen, “you could just accept that” (group discussion with women, Antakae village, April 2008). They would normally get a share for petty daily consumption. Women conceived this as a significantly worse arrangement than having access to the family farm where cardamom could be harvested and sold when financial needs arose, for example at the time of school fee payments. The women were thus effectively blocked from both access to land and access to compensation. Even with less knowledge of the amounts, the women concurred with men in that the compensation was less than expected to be able to carry on with normal life or making investments to improve their livelihoods.

In late 2005, when part of the compensation was paid, farmers rejected the values assigned to their crops (URT 2006:29). Many still did take the money. In 2008, after the final compensation payments, discontent with the amounts was widespread. Affected male farmers repeatedly stated that the sums received were smaller than what they had expected, based on the numbers and types of crops they recalled to have had and the levels of compensation per plant stipulated in the Resettlement Action Plan (of which the subvillage leaders held copies and the contents of which had been discussed among villagers). They also claimed that they had not received prior information on the amounts of individual payments, which came as a surprise when the cheque was collected, or that they were not informed about the exact way each individual payment had been calculated. In the household survey of 2008, the most salient response to what were seen as the problems of the Derema process was “insufficient compensation”. The discontent of the affected farmers with the final compensation is likely to have been a combination of two factors: the high expectations due to the boundary compensation, and incomplete knowledge and understanding of the methods of calculating the payments.

It had been observed that new seedlings were being planted in the Corridor as the 2002 crop valuation exercise progressed (URT 2006). In initial discussions during the authors’ field work, villagers explained that upon learning about the Corridor, young farmers had rushed to plant more seedlings in the area where they held farms but were not cultivating actively because many of them were still at school. From the conservation implementers’ point of view, farmers were attracted by the prospects of “cash bonanza” (URT 2006:9). As the rapport of the authors with the villagers developed, more ideas were offered and later confirmed in discussions in other villages. It was claimed that the area had been swarmed by new-comers from Bulwa tea plantation and business people from nearby towns as news of the compensation spread.

The tricks used by the new-comers to register for compensation included buying bush land from locals and quickly planting seedlings, or simply posing on someone else’s farm so that the same farms were valued repeatedly with different “owners” by

different valuation teams. Even corruption involving the valuation officials was hinted at. Whereas it is impossible at this point to verify the type and the extent of fraud that went on, some is likely to have taken place considering the observed increase in the number of farms during the valuation exercise. Farmers later saw the lower final compensation rates due to the categorization of their plants according to size and maturity, with seedlings entitling them to a very small payment, as a direct consequence of the increased number of “farmers”. “We were told not to invite guests, but some still called their relatives. We ruined it for ourselves” (key informant, Makanya village, September 2009). Some villagers stated that they had had no means of controlling the outsiders, offering a more victimized view of their position in the whole event (group discussion, men, Makanya, October 2009).

By October 2010, two and a half years after the final compensation payments and ten years after the start of the Corridor establishment, the 3-acre plots of land in the lowlands promised for the farmers as part of the Resettlement Action Plan were still not available. In 2008, only 36% of the respondents who had lost land in Derema had used compensation money received between 2002 and 2008 to buy new land. “I did not buy a farm because they promised to give us alternative farms” (male interviewee, Antakae village, October 2008). In 2008, some farmers expressed reluctance to accept farmland in the lowlands. They considered it of inferior quality compared to the fertile upland soils. Land had in most cases been bought in the uplands, especially cardamom farms in areas adjacent to the Corridor. Farmland purchases were concentrated on those who had received the largest compensation sums among the 2008 interviewees. The median amount of compensation used for buying new farmland (TSH 625,000) was nearly the same as the median sum of compensation received by the interviewed men (TSH 642,500, n=42) but well above that of women (TSH 300,000, n=11). In 2010, the average price for new farmland in Makanya/IBC Msasa was estimated at TSH 150-500,000/acre and TSH 600-800,000 in Kwezitu (D. Kaczan, Pers. Comm. October 2010).

An important dimension that affected the human impacts of the intervention was the temporal one. The eight-year time lag of the displacement and compensation process meant that changes in access to land and compensation and their effects were gradual. Farming in the Corridor was given up slowly. Negotiations between the project and the farmers in 2000 resulted in an agreement that crops could still be harvested in the Corridor while yielding, but farms were not to be maintained. Thus many people continued harvesting the Corridor farms throughout the delayed process, although yields and subsequently income from these crops gradually declined due to lack of husbandry. The legitimacy of farming restrictions was also contested until the final compensation payments were completed. In January 2008, we observed that a few farms inside the Corridor were still being maintained, while in large part farms had been abandoned and the forest was regenerating. Although the final payments in early 2008 constituted a turning point when most people considered to have given up access and use rights to the area, many still continued harvesting their Corridor farms until the end of 2008. By mid-2009, however, most people stated that they had stopped entering the forest, with the cardamom plants perished and farms largely overgrown.

The years between the initial agreement on the Corridor establishment and the completion of the final compensation payments could be considered a transition period during which the forest converted from a mix of communal and private

property to an open access resource. Former local tenure rights were dismissed by intruders from other villages who entered the farms in the Corridor and harvested cardamom for sale. In 2005 and 2008, former farm owners complained bitterly about 'cardamom thieves'. "Other people are just coming to our farms. They tell you that you are paid. If you are owner of the farm and you see the other person with a panga [knife], can you stay there?" (group discussion with women, Makanya, April 2008). The situation escalated at Christmas 2008, when a fight in the Corridor between farmers from Makanya and Antakae left a youth from Antakae in the hospital with a knife wound.

Despite the contested access and related conflicts, continued yield and income from the Corridor farms may partly explain the low proportion of compensation spent on buying new farmland in 2008. In addition, the farmers already had knowledge of the land allocation plan in the lowlands, which had been on the agenda of the 'resettlement' project since 2007. This probably also affected their decisions about the use of the final payments. In the meantime, farming was gradually shifted to land that had been previously laid fallow, and intensified in areas dedicated to food crops. In some cases, subsistence crops such as maize, beans and cassava became cash crops, as these were the only type of crops that could be cultivated on the remaining land.

In 2009, compensation money was but a distant memory for many, especially for those who had received small sums and used it on daily consumption. Those with the lowest income levels, who were generally the same farmers who had received the smallest sums of compensation, perceived the impacts of the intervention to be highly negative. "It has brought a huge negative effect because my farm is gone and you can't buy another farm with that money. To be honest, if this exercise is repeated, it should be with a gun. This exercise has benefited the big people" (male interviewee, Makanya, September 2009). In addition to cultivating the remaining smaller farms, many in this group occasionally resorted to wage labour as a means of livelihoods.

Receiving land in the lowlands became the new pressing issue in 2009, although many complained that there was no money left for the improvement of new farms due to the delay in the land allocation process. Resentment towards the authorities, who were perceived as "having cheated again" in the land issue, was increasing. The farmers were highly concerned over the land issue not being settled before the end of the WWF-facilitated resettlement project in early 2010. The alternative income generating activities planned in the Resettlement Action Plan for the poorest, most affected farmers had also not been facilitated yet. Most of the resettlement project coordinator's time had been spent first by making the final compensation payments, and later the bureaucratic procedures of re-allocating former sisal estate land to the farmers. This required revoking of the granted land rights of the sisal company and transfer of the land to the local Village Council, which could then distribute parcels to the Derema farmers. The despair of the project coordinator due to the slow progress echoed the pleas for assistance and follow-through of the out-going EUCAMP officers in 2002 (Pers. Comm., September 2009).

Only those respondents who fell into the highest 75% percentile of received compensation had purchased land in the lowlands, on the former sisal estates. Most often, they had started to cultivate oranges, and a few had taken up large-scale

cultivation of maize. The few farmers in this category were characterized by earlier higher access to land, an entrepreneurial attitude and long-term visions regarding their livelihoods. They harnessed the compensation to realize these plans. They were also generally the most content with the whole process, although they still criticized the way it had been carried out overall. “For me, conservation was a blessing. I wish they took more farms in the uplands so that I would get more money for my business development” (male interviewee, Hale, October 2009).

But, the future of even these few “winners” – or survivors – may be on a shaky basis. A number of farmers from IBC Msasa village were starting orange farms on abandoned sisal estate land, which they had bought from former estate workers. These workers had “taken over” the land after the cessation of the sisal company activities, with no formal rights of occupancy. Yet, the interviewed farmers did not seem too concerned about the fuzzy land tenure in their new location. “They already evicted us from the forest, they cannot evict us from here” (male interviewee, Muheza, September 2009). The difficulties of the resettlement project to secure unused sisal estate land for the Derema farmers indicate that transferring land rights from one legal category to another is not a simple matter. As an increasing number of displaced farmers aspire to invest in orange farming and suitable land is normally accessed through informal channels, new contestations over land are likely to evolve, unless serious attention is paid to the tenure issue at landscape scale.

CONCLUSIONS

In spite of the efforts of the Derema Corridor planners and implementers to mitigate negative impacts and to legitimize the intervention, many of the affected people found that they had lost more than gained in the end. In the following, we elaborate on some particular lessons that the Derema case contributes to the discussion on rights-based conservation and compensated displacement. In summary, these are: 1) efforts to achieve fair and inclusive definitions of local rights to resources, including compensation, as well as procedural rights to participation and information. Central to such efforts is 2) levelling power disparities among the involved actors by building local capacities to understand and claim rights. Similarly, there is also a need for 3) inclusive and institutionalized, sustained mechanisms for participation. Finally, exclusionary conservation interventions that are likely to have far-reaching consequences on local livelihoods are not suited for implementation through project approaches. Rather, 4) those initiating displacement processes should be prepared for a long-term presence and commitment to post-intervention livelihood rehabilitation, if they really intend to assume their responsibility over the consequences.

Substantive rights and access to land and compensation

In the end of the Derema conservation process, there was a widespread consensus among the affected farmers that the compensation was neither full nor fair. The method to identify those entitled to compensation failed to address all rights-holders, even if there was an effort to recognize customary rights as stipulated by the new land law. It did not capture the social relations that determined the actual distribution of access to and dependency on land within the affected population. More focused efforts to define rights-holders to land and compensation in the beginning, or at least

during the formulation of the Resettlement Action Plan, could have helped to mitigate the negative effects experienced especially by women, and exclude outsiders from accessing the benefits. The displacement process accelerated social differentiation as the actors who had few initial resources or means of defending their interests had very limited access to compensation. Livelihood benefits were concentrated on those already better off.

Successful cases underline the importance of thorough social research at the first stages of an intervention involving displacement (cf. Partridge 1993). Research alone is not sufficient, however; the results must be effectively incorporated in the planning and implementation of the intervention. Why the findings of the SIA — especially the concerns of the women, which were documented as fears in 2000 and as actual facts in 2008 and 2009 — were not better taken into account, remains subject to speculation. We relate this finding to the next point: the differing agency of the various actors involved.

Procedural rights and agency

The affected people were not only passive victims in the process. The consultations during the planning of the Derema Corridor, even though limited in scope and inclusiveness, probably served to give some of the farmers more confidence and opportunities to defend their interests later on. They actively tried to influence the conditions and outcomes of the Corridor establishment through their representatives and networks. This political mobilization was one of the unforeseen consequences of the process. In Ribot and Peluso's (2003) words, the farmers thus 'pooled their bundles of powers' to enhance their agency.

Access to information appears to have been a key factor that constrained the agency and strategies of the actors involved. Most of the time, the villagers had to base their actions on very limited or incorrect information; the conservation implementers probably faced similar constraints. As the affected farmers' understanding of the process grew and their knowledge and perceptions of their rights changed, their discourse and arguments changed, too. This is very illustrative of how actors often actively employ different interpretations of concepts and ideas in their attempt to influence and enact processes (cf. Freeman et al. 2008, Sikor & Lund 2009).

Clearly, the means and resources available to local actors to defend their interests varied across different groups. The effect of relational factors, such as social identities, is perhaps best illustrated in the case of women. Their agency is likely to have been dampened by both fewer opportunities to participate in decision-making as well as a relatively weaker weight of their voices in the actual decisions made.

The effect of contextual factors: can anything be learned and extrapolated?

Several factors point to a degree of unpreparedness of the actors involved in the Derema conservation process to deal with limiting structural constraints, which contributed to the unpredictability of the process and its outcomes. The effect of the legal pluralist context to the compensation outcomes is manifested not only in the failure to understand the implications of the complex local land access patterns. It is also evident in the complications brought about by the changing institutional framework, related to both the state law as well as the policies and practices of the funding agencies.

The new requirements imposed on the intervention by the 1999 Tanzanian land laws and the WB OP 4.12 from 2006 onwards were taken into account selectively. There was apparent confusion on how the new land law was to be applied in Derema. Using “real” estimates of yields caused the compensation sums to skyrocket, whereas the requirements for land compensation were quietly ignored. EUCAMP officials were also bound by the rules and practices of the development agencies involved (sometimes called ‘project law’, cf. Weilenmann 2009). They dictated the closure of donor funded activities according to the planned project cycle, leaving the Government of Tanzania with the formal responsibility over the pending compensation. Later, it took four years for the final compensation payments to materialize since the first World Bank mission, much to the growing frustration and resentment by the affected people. The alternative land in the lowlands is still not accessible to the Derema farmers despite over two years of efforts.

The Derema case is illustrative of how policies hailed progressive in terms of addressing both substantive and procedural rights do not automatically lead to equitable outcomes for the displaced. Rather, the outcomes depend on the interpretation and application of the relevant institutional framework by involved actors in a complex legally pluralist setting, and are also conditioned by other structural and relational factors. Such a context for applying these policies is likely to be the norm, rather than an exception, in a number of tropical countries where hotspots for biodiversity and poverty often coincide.

Despite the often unpredictable effects of dynamic, multi-scale socio-political contexts on the outcomes of compensated displacement, we must strive to identify regularities. Case studies on social consequences of development related displacement have often come to similar conclusions (e.g. Cernea 1993). Poor preparation leads to delays, increased costs and foregone benefits, which negatively affect the displaced and undermine development objectives. Particularly difficult cases may lead to unwelcome political backlash (Partridge 1993, Cernea 2008). Hence these apparently re-occurring issues of displacement can and should inform the future planning of similar interventions that are to avoid negative social consequences for the affected people.

The real challenge for mitigating the negative social impacts of conservation is no longer the absence of favourable policies. It *still* lies with getting the lessons learned from the pages of academic journals and policy documents and turning them into effective implementation by conservation and development actors world-wide.

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