Environmental Governance as if Values Matter:
Communities and Conservation in Africa

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Abstract

In much of the recent scholarship on environmental governance, *governance* is defined not as an organization or set of organizations, but as a set of social functions. These social functions can be understood in relation to values: governance is social coordination in a context of diverse values, the shaping of power relations because of the moral imperative of democratic values, and the setting of direction for collective action that is informed by stakeholders' values. However the literature on environmental governance, where it considers values, typically treats values as given and as inputs to governance, with little attention paid to the process of value formation. Value formation can be understood as a chain of causation whose general flow is from social context to held values, which help to determine assigned values, which are the basis of interests and positions. In this paper, these approaches to governance and to values are applied to case studies that were conducted in Ghana and Tanzania, with each case study involving a rural village and the relationship of people within it to two different protected areas nearby. The two communities have had very different experiences with conservation and, not surprisingly, residents expressed different sorts of values. The diversity and place-based nature of some values has clear implications for how particular communities relate to conservation agencies, and a key question for the design of governance processes is what happens when values held within a community do not align with the values embodied with conservation policies and programs. On the other hand, there was also remarkable similarity between these two communities in regards to some of people's most fundamental held values, values that have also been described for communities elsewhere in the world. These widespread, fundamental held values, such as wanting the best for one's children, represent an underutilized resource for global conservation. This research suggests that governance processes can benefit from multi-stakeholder deliberation that attempts to "trace back" the value chain and to identify commonalities in stakeholders' values while also respecting differences.

Keywords

environmental governance, Ghana, protected areas, Tanzania, values

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"We realized that these animals were getting finished…. We decided to do this because we want our children to grow up to see these animals."
 - One of the executive officers of Kunlog Community Resource Management Area in Ghana

INTRODUCTION

In the interdisciplinary field of development and environmental change, concerns such as accountability, legitimacy, participation, decision-making, institutions and policymaking are increasingly being looked at together under the over-arching umbrella of *governance*. The World Resources Institute (2003), the IUCN (Borrini-Feyerabend et al. 2004; Dudley 2008), the International Human Dimensions Programme on Global Environmental Change (2009) are but a few of the organizations that have turned their attention to governance. This attention to governance, however, is relatively recent, and researchers are still grappling with how to conceptualize, investigate and evaluate governance. Researchers who have examined ways of evaluating governance have typically built evaluation frameworks around value-laden criteria such as equity, accountability, legitimacy, voice, inclusiveness, transparency, and fairness (Adger et al. 2003; Graham et al. 2003; Lockwood 2010). Yet, in environmental governance research much remains to be done to unpack the relationship between governance and values. This paper attempts to do so by relating processes of value formation to social processes of governance. It considers two case studies that have been conducted under the Protected Areas and Poverty Reduction project[2]: the village of Jilinkon in Sawla-Tuna-Kalba District in Ghana and the village of Rwamchanga in Serengeti District in Tanzania. The two case studies investigated the relationship between the community and one or more protected areas adjacent to the community, and focused on questions of governance[3].

While there are a multitude of definitions of *governance*, in recent scholarship there has been a degree of convergence on core concepts. Virtually all literature on environmental governance over the past decade and a half makes a clear and deliberate distinction between *government* and *governance*. Governments can be described in this way:

> [O]rganizations—complex material entities possessing offices, personnel, equipment, budgets, and legal personality and often professing political ideologies—that we commonly take for granted as vehicles for the

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[2] www.papr.co.ca
[3] The Jilinkon case study has been described individually elsewhere: www.papr.co.ca/web_documents/kunlogcasestudyreport.pdf . A similar report on the Rwamchanga case study should be available shortly at http://www.papr.co.ca/index.php?p=1_29_Case-Studies. See these reports also for a description of methodology.

provision of governance because we are so accustomed to their efforts to perform this role in domestic societies.

<div align="right">(Young 1996: 2)</div>

Governance, on the other hand, is a set of social functions which can be performed by governments but also by a variety of organizations, networks, institutions, and decision-making processes working individually or in combination. These social functions have three interrelated facets. One of these relates to social coordination (Olsson 2007), including allocation of costs and benefits (World Resources Institute et al. 2003; Biermann 2008) and resolving trade-offs (Waltner-Toews and Kay 2005). Young describes the social coordination function of governance in this way:

[I]t centers on the management of complex interdependencies among actors … who are engaged in interactive decision-making and, therefore, taking actions that affect each other's welfare.

<div align="right">(1996: 2)</div>

A second function is the shaping of power relations. While it may be self-evident that power influences governance, the reverse is also true: governance shapes how power is exercised. Governance helps determine who has influence and who decides (Graham et al. 2003; World Resources Institute et al. 2003). The third social function of governance relates to setting direction (Graham et al. 2003), with some authors using terminology such as "re-visioning" (Waltner-Toews and Kay 2005) or "steering" and "guiding" societies and organizations" (Williams 2001; Young et al. 2008).

The relevance of values can be seen in all three of these social functions (see Table 1). The social coordination function of governance is derived from the need for value integration (Lockwood 2005): values and interests differ and there is a need to make decisions in light of these differences. The imperative for shaping how power is exercised—the second function of governance—derives, at least in part, from values such as justice and democracy that create a moral obligation for collective decision-making processes in which the role of power is curbed. These two functions highlight that within society there are different interests and values, the potential for conflict over these differences, and the possibility, indeed the likelihood, that power will play a critical role in what happens regarding these competing interests and values. The third function of governance—direction setting—is about translating *collective values* into visions, policy and programs, as well as *devising* visions, policy and programs that must function against a backdrop of *diverse values*. In a similar vein, Miller (2006) argues that positive governance reforms increase trust amongst people of diverse values, improving the possibility for collective action, and, I would argue, for the setting of a common direction. *Governance*, then, can be understood as the process by which an organization or society makes collective decisions in a context of differing values, finds and creates shared values, and sets direction for collective action that is informed by its members' values.

Table 1: Three Social Functions of Governance in Relation to Values

Social Function	Explanation	Relation to Values
Social coordination	• Making collective decisions in light of diverse and often conflicting interests and positions • Management of complex interdependencies among actors • Allocation of costs and benefits • Resolving tradeoffs	Collective decision-making takes place within a context of differing values. Differing values contribute to differing interests and positions.
Shaping of power relations	Governance is needed to help determine: • How power can and cannot be used in collective decision making • Who decides and how they decide	Certain values create a moral imperative for putting limits on the role of power in collective decision-making.
Setting direction	• Creating and articulating a collective vision • Guiding society towards well-being	There can exist a desire to see collective values translated into visions, policy and programs, but first those collective values need to be identified/created and articulated.

Literature on multi-stakeholder participation has pointed out the importance of making values explicit in participatory processes (Checkland and Scholes 1990; Checkland and Haynes 1994; Robinson and Fuller In press). Conversely, the process of *valuation* can be seen as being based on deliberation and democratic processes (Sagoff 1999). Nevertheless, there is still much to learn about how, in practice, to do these two tasks—how to make values explicit in participatory processes and how to use such processes to arrive at collective expressions of value. The matter of how to make explicit and express environmental values for policymakers has received more attention, with much of the focus directed towards using economic approaches to express values. This economic approach, which can be understood primarily in relation to the first of the three social functions mentioned above—the need for social coordination and resolving tradeoffs—has attracted a great deal of criticism, with many authors questioning the appropriateness of economic approaches for articulating the range of people's environmental values (e.g., Brown 1984; Craig et al. 1993; Sagoff 1999; Pagiola et al. 2004). A key consideration in the literature on environmental values is how to compare diverse and differing values, including different *types* of values, and how to articulate those values in ways that are useful for policymakers (Lockwood 1999).

Part of the difficulty in using economic approaches to describing values can be understood in the distinction between *held values* and *assigned values*. Held values are principles and ideas that are important to people, including modes of behaviour (e.g., bravery, compassion), end states (e.g., liberty, happiness), and desirable qualities (e.g., justice, happiness). Assigned values are values that we attach to things (Brown

1984; Lockwood 1999). Economic values are not and cannot represent all values; they are only one subset of the category of *assigned values* which itself is only a subset of the larger class of what we mean when we speak of *values* (Brown 1984).

The question of how to articulate diverse types of values, and diverse mixes of values amongst various stakeholders is only part of the challenge of governance. Assuming that a particular governance process has successfully articulated the diversity of values, perhaps bringing to light differences that may not have been identified before, how is this diversity, and potentially conflict, to be dealt with? The argument above that governance can be understood as relating to values does not imply that any particular governance processes *will* translate all pertinent values into social reality. The way a governance process is designed or the influence of powerful parties within a governance process, for example, may direct deliberation and decisions away from consideration of certain values. Even when some value is shared by a majority of the parties within a decision-making process, governance mechanisms may themselves reflect some other values. The powerful influence of economic models of valuing nature for example, direct decision-makers to think and make decisions in these terms, even when their own values put some intrinsic, non-economic value on nature. Indeed policymakers often feel constrained from letting strongly held environmental values play any role in their work (Craig et al. 1993). To repeat, *governance* can be conceived of as a set of social functions involving three broad tasks: social coordination in a context of differing values, shaping power relations based on important values such as justice, and finding/creating shared values and setting direction for collective action that is informed by its members' values. The critical unanswered question is *how* these three tasks are carried out.

Two sets of insights from the literatures on values and governance are particularly instructive here. The first relates to the important question of whether there are universal environmental values. Miller's (2006) analysis of international case studies from diverse cultural settings suggests that people in diverse settings value the environment but for different reasons. On the other hand, a growing number of authors are arguing that there are universal human values (e.g., Nussbaum 1999) and that environmental values, including belief in the intrinsic values of nature, are widespread and exist across cultures (Brechin and Kempton 1994; Schultz 1999; van den Born, Riyan J. G. et al. 2001; Bandara 2003; Winter and Lockwood 2004). These values can be powerful motivating forces (Uphoff and Langholz 1998). More common ground exists between local and external values and priorities than is commonly assumed, and this common ground represents a resource that conservation agencies do not take enough advantage of (Vermeulen 2007). Where an anti-conservation sentiment exists, it tends to result from neglect of local priorities and abuses by conservation agencies, rather than from a genuine value orientation against nature (Sharpe 1998).

The second set of insights relates to value formation. What is common in arguments both supporting and criticizing the use of economic approaches for taking account of values is that values and interests are treated as given. There is agreement that values exist; the debate rather tends to revolve around the question of whether values can be expressed and compared using some common denominator. In this

debate, values are typically treated as inputs to governance. While some research does examine value formation and the question where values come from, there is little that looks at the process of value formation and the processes of governance in tandem[4].

In addressing the divergence of opinion on universal values and in exploring the relationship between governance and values, it is useful not only to recognize that there are different types of values but also to consider how those different types of values relate to each other and to other factors such as knowledge and social norms, and how they affect behaviour. The general view is that held values are deeper and more stable and form the basis for assigned values, which in turn help to direct behaviour (Brown 1984; Lockwood 1999). Lockwood (1999) suggests a model of value formation and behaviour in which the general flow of causality is from social context to held values, which together form an overall value orientation, to cognitions (understandings) and assigned values, to intentions, and finally to behaviour. It is also important to recognize that people may hold values that are unformed and difficult to express (Fischhoff et al. 1980; Fischhoff 1991; Gregory et al. 1993; Schkade and Payne 1994). Lockwood's model implies then that the most fundamental held values must be combined with each other, some being given more weight than others in an overall value orientation, which then needs interpretation, expression, and action in order for the values to be realized, and translated from the mental realm into practical reality. The conceptual movement from held values to assigned values is part of the process of realizing values—that is, the process of making values *real*.

The model describes values at an individual level and how values influence the behaviour of the individual. But values are also social constructions, an observation that I return to later in the paper. Governance, as well, is social, taking place in the realm of relationships between actors, both individual and collective. It also has to do with the decisions that precede actions, and in understanding how decisions are deliberated and negotiated, *interests* and *positions* can also be important. Therefore, for understanding the relationship between values and governance, I propose adding *interests* and *positions* to Lockwood's model. The model, as summarized in Figure 1, depicts the relationship of the individual actor, in terms of his or her values, interests and positions, to collective decision-making processes. As with Lockwood's (1999) model, causal relationships are assumed to be strongest between elements closest to each other, and the general flow of causality is downward, although causal relationships may exist between more distant elements of the model and in the other direction.

The next section of the paper summarizes the two case studies. This is followed by an analysis and discussion of what role values have played in governance in these cases, as well as the consequences for governance of ignoring values. The paper concludes by arguing that effective governance is governance that assists stakeholders to "trace back" the chain of held values-assigned values-interests-positions, to

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[4] An important exception is the work of Miller (2006).

Figure 1: Individual values, interests and positions in relation to collective decision-making processes

Adapted from Lockwood (1999)

deliberate on fundamental held values, and to identify commonalities in their values while also respecting differences.

SUMMARY OF THE CASE STUDIES

Kunlog CREMA

In 2000, the government of Ghana instituted its Collaborative Community Based Wildlife Management policy which outlined the Community Resource Management Area (CREMA) framework within which communities, individually or in groups, could organize themselves and seek to be granted the right to manage wildlife resources within a specified local area. At the time that I conducted field research in Ghana at the beginning of 2010, ten CREMAs in the country had fully passed through the registration process and received a Certificate of Devolution, and others were in process (Agyare, personal communication, 2010). Implicit in documents from Ghana's Wildlife Division pertaining to the CREMA process is the idea of addressing conservation and livelihood objectives simultaneously. Nevertheless, interviews with executives from other

CREMAs and with the staff of NGOs working with CREMAs suggest that the primary focus and driving motivation for many community stakeholders involved in these CREMAs is the creation and expansion of livelihood opportunities. Conservation activities, for these local stakeholders, exist to serve livelihood objectives, and NGOs supporting these CREMAs place much emphasis on trying to ensure that the livelihood function of the CREMA is viable. However, Kunlog CREMA in Sawla-Tuna-Kalba District, Northern Region, seemed to have different motivation acting as the primary driving force for creating the CREMA.

Kunlog CREMA was formed by the village of Jilinkon during 2007 and 2008. Jilinkon is one of thirty-three villages that ring Mole National Park. Jilinkon, however, is different than many of the other communities in a number of ways, and the impact of the creation of the Park has not been as severe for Jilinkon as it has been for some other communities. For instance, the main settlement is located about seven km. from the Park boundary rather than right at the boundary as with villages such as Kananto, Kabampe and Jang. According to residents of Jilinkon, the community still has enough land for shifting cultivation as well as uncultivated bush for harvesting resources such as shea nuts, firewood, and herbal medicines. This is quite different than some other villages on the fringes of the Park, which are enclosed between the Park and the Kenikeni Forest Reserve and have effectively been deprived of their hinterland by the creation of these two protected areas. While some uses are permitted within the Forest Reserve, a key use that is not allowed is the clearing of new land for cultivation—a critical concern given that rural people in this part of Ghana practice shifting cultivation.

Jilinkon is also unique in having established a livelihood portfolio in which hunting has little to no role: it is widely acknowledged (by residents of Jilinkon, by people of other communities, and by and personnel of Mole National Park) that hunting, whether legal or illegal, is rare among residents of Jilinkon. This is a situation that has apparently prevailed for quite some time—more than fifteen years ago, Mason (1993) also reported that Jilinkon was unlike all of the other villages on the fringe of Mole National Park in that it did not have hunters moving into the Park to hunt. In addition, like many of the communities around they taboo a particular animal—in the case of Jilinkon, the bushbuck (*Tragelaphus scriptus*)—and place a very high cultural value on that animal. According to local custom, it may not be hunted or eaten within Jilinkon's territory, whether by residents or visitors. Over the years, however, residents have seen bushbuck become more scarce, perhaps because of hunting by outsiders, perhaps because of loss of habitat, or perhaps because of some combination of these and other factors. What was the motivating force for Jilinkon residents, however, was that in the past, bushbuck used to be seen walking freely through the village "just like sheep and goats", whereas now they are less common and more timid. The people of Jilinkon wanted to reverse that situation, and the CREMA framework provided them with the vehicle to do so. During 2007 and 2008, community meetings were held in Jilinkon and the seven settler communities at which Wildlife Division personnel described the CREMA concept and community members had opportunities to deliberate on whether they would adopt it. Then a constitution was drafted, representatives from each of the eight communities were selected to sit on an executive and eventually, on the 1st of

December 2008, the CREMA received its Certificate of Devolution from the Ministry of Lands and Natural Resources thus becoming officially recognized.

Kunlog CREMA received some important support in terms of awareness-raising, training, drafting of a constitution, and going through the registration process from staff of Mole National Park, but in terms of quantity this support was modest. The head of community conservation at the Park has thirty-three communities bordering on the Park that he and two junior staff[5] are responsible for interacting with, as well as being the primary linkage between the Park and the Protected Area Management Units and other stakeholders at the district level in four districts. The amount of attention and support that he can give to any one community is limited by lack of resources. It is also important to recognize that Kunlog CREMA, unlike most CREMAs in Ghana, was formed with no help from NGOs, and on the whole has received less outside assistance than some other CREMAs which are being supported by NGOs. While this has meant some difficulties given the lack of capacity at the village level, it has also meant that the CREMA has been truly community-driven. The CREMA is also widely supported in the community. The level of awareness among community members as to what has been happening with the CREMA process varies, but support for the initiative is quite strong. I encountered no one in the community with any objections to the establishment of the CREMA, and only a few who have anything more than very mild reservations about its operations. The strongest complaint came from a female respondent who stated that women have not been sufficiently involved in decisions regarding the CREMA or adequately made aware of its aims and activities.

Four respondents, in discussing their reasons for establishing a CREMA, mentioned the possibility of attracting tourists if the numbers of bushbuck and other wildlife in the area can be made to increase, but this was clearly a secondary consideration. Rather, the primary desire is to protect bushbuck and other wildlife for future generations. The reason given by one elderly resident of Jilinkon for supporting the CREMA was typical of both CREMA executives and community members who are not part of CREMA management at all: "It [the CREMA] is good idea—the animals are going to increase in number and one day our children are going to get up and be able to see them".

Another issue that I investigated in this research was the relationship between the community and the National Park. Park personnel and respondents from various communities around the Park reported that relations have improved in recent years. For Jilinkon, that relationship is perceived, both in the community and among Park personnel, as being particularly friendly and positive, more so than the relationship that the Park has with many other villages. Of four interviewees in Jilinkon who were specifically asked about relations with the park, all responded that relations were friendly, and none suggested that there is any significant amount of tension, a sentiment that was also reflected in focus groups and other interactions. This is quite different

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[5] These staffing levels refer to the time period when the field research was conducted, February to April 2010.

than some other communities around Mole, where, despite the overall improvement in relations, people are not shy to describe the community-Park tensions or to enumerate alleged injustices committed by the Park and its staff. Similarly, Park staff were asked which of the thirty-three communities bordering the park are most problematic and difficult to work with and also which are easiest to work with. Jilinkon was mentioned in the latter category. These comparatively friendly relations may be a function of the fact that people in Jilinkon do not rely on natural resources in the Park for their livelihoods the way people in many other communities do. People in some other villages around the Park complain of needing, and admit to sometimes illegally accessing, resources such as shea nuts, firewood, building materials and so on from the Park; residents of Jilinkon on the other hand consistently said that resources of this type are sufficient in uncultivated land within Jilinkon territory.[6]

Rwamchanga

Rwamchanga is a village of approximately 1400 persons located in Western Serengeti District in Tanzania adjacent to Ikorongo Game Reserve and close to Serengeti National Park. The Game Reserve was created in 1993, creating a buffer zone between the Park and several villages on the northeast side of Serengeti District. Rwamchanga is one of a number of villages that lost land when the Game Reserve was created. A permanent river formerly formed the approximate boundary between Rwamchanga and Serengeti National Park, but when the Game Reserve was created, land belonging to Rwamchanga on the southwest side of the river became part of the Reserve and residents lost access to the river. In 2002, Grumeti Reserves Ltd. obtained the rights to the hunting block that pertains to Ikorongo Game Reserve and since then, the Reserve has, in effect, been managed as a joint venture between Tanzania's Wildlife Division and Grumeti Reserves Ltd. Indeed, residents tend to make little distinction between Wildlife Division and the private enterprise[7]. Whereas in the past, some hunting by local residents had been allowed on a controlled basis, Grumeti Reserves is pursuing a strict conservation agenda. Enforcement of rules against poaching and other forms of resource extraction has become more strict, apparently resulting, according to interviews with NGO and government agency personnel, in a significant increase in wildlife numbers.

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[6] It was beyond the scope of this research to test this hypothesis. Anecdotal evidence suggests that there are certainly other factors at play. For example, another community having friendly relations with Park is Mognori which sits directly on the Park boundary. Aside from the issue of whether a community has sufficient uncultivated common land are the issues of local tenure relations and who *within a community* can and cannot access such resources and of how far the village settlement is in relation to the Park (for villages situated right on the Park boundary, desired resources may be closer in the Park than on common land).

[7] Given that no distinction is made, in the discussion of community-PA relations that follows when I refer to the Game Reserve I am referring equally to Wildlife Division, to the private enterprise, and to the Game Reserve itself as an institution.

Relations between residents of Rwamchanga and the Game Reserve are poor to say the least. The list of complaints that residents have against the Reserve is long and serious. In recent years, wildlife populations have apparently increased. Residents complain that predators such as hyenas regularly kill livestock, and that elephants are increasingly coming out of the Game Reserve to feed on people's crops. They claim that every year almost every farmer loses a significant portion of their crops to elephants. District level wildlife officers, who conceivably could play a role in chasing elephants back into the protected area, do not have the resources to move from the district capital to villages such as Rwamchanga with any degree of regularity or timeliness. Game Reserve personnel meanwhile, according to residents of Rwamchanga, put a very low priority on dealing with "the elephant problem". On the other hand, if it is not elephants but wildebeest or buffalos that have crossed from the Game Reserve onto people's farms, the Game Reserve is swift to respond. The reason, according to many respondents, is obvious and the explanation offered by one person in a community meeting was typical:

> It seems that they protect wildebeest because they know people will hunt them and they bring foreign currency. They have the ability to restrict elephants, too. A helicopter passes around the village threatening wildebeest to go back. But why not elephants? They, too, are frightened of the helicopter. They see their job as protecting wildlife from people, but they have no interest in protecting people from wildlife.

Access to other types of resources within the Game Reserve, and beyond that the Park, is also curtailed. Entering these protected areas, whether it is to take livestock to the riverside in the dry season, to harvest thatch for roofing or cut poles for construction, or to hunt, brings the risk of being fined, arrested, or, according to respondents, beaten. While enforcement has been relatively effective, there is nevertheless a perverse incentive created for people to poach. The logic expressed by many respondents is this: with agricultural livelihoods being drained, and in some years devastated, because of the protected area (wildlife raiding crops and livestock), and with few opportunities for paid employment, many people see little choice except to take the risk and sneak into the Game Reserve to hunt. This feeling is by no means universal—many respondents said that they feel the risk is just too great and that it is only selected people within the community who poach. But the feeling of being treated unjustly by Game Reserve personnel is almost universal in the community.

Nevertheless, many respondents expressed a strong conservation ethic. They spoke of wanting their children and grandchildren to be able to experience nature. Several respondents spoke fondly of the time when Serengeti National Park used to take children from the community into the Park by bus to see the wildlife—this is no longer done. Some respondents, despite feeling that they have been treated unjustly by the protected areas, especially the Game Reserve, were nevertheless of two minds about conservation practices, stating that protection of the wildlife is very important and acknowledging that the Game Reserve is carrying out an important task in an effective although unjust way. In response to the question of whether the community could itself effectively manage natural resources if the land that was transferred to the Game

Reserve in 1993 were to be returned to the village, several respondents expressed trepidation, emphasizing that the wildlife should be protected and that unfortunately the community might not be ready to police itself. Instead, such respondents spoke of wanting to improve relations with the protected areas and to be treated justly and equally as partners, rather than as enemies.

VALUES AND GOVERNANCE

My research echoes other research (e.g., Callicott 1994; Roberts et al. 1995; various contributions to Posey 1999; Berkes et al. 2000; van den Born et al. 2001; Edroma 2004; Vermeulen 2007) that has made the perhaps obvious but nevertheless critically important observation that rural and indigenous peoples often have strong environmental values that are important to their worldview and that are not obviously utilitarian or instrumental. In the case of Jilinkon the traditional value placed on bushbuck was a driving force for the formation of Kunlog CREMA. In the case of Rwamchanga, some respondents spoke about how knowledge of wildlife is being lost because of the criminalization of hunting and how a way of life is being lost. Many also spoke about the desire that their children be able to experience nature and wildlife. While the existence of such values should not be surprising, these two case studies also add credence to the idea that some of these kinds of values are remarkably consistent across cultures and are, in fact, universal values. The existence of universal values does not deny the importance of culture and place, particularly if seen in light of the behavioural model presented in Figure 1: these universal held values are translated, through the particular circumstances of different individuals, communities and cultures, into a diversity of assigned values, interests and positions. As noted above, not all values are easily articulated or necessarily come packaged in succinct language, and respondents in this case study research had various ways of expressing what were similar or perhaps identical values. So, although the wording is mine, I would suggest that two universal values encountered in these case studies could be described as *the best for one's children* and *the beauty of nature*.

The general direction of causality in the behavioural model described in Figure 1 is downward. Given that a variety of contextual factors can have an influence all the way down this chain of causation, the movement from held values through assigned values to interests and positions is usually in the direction of increasing particularity and diversity. This may help to explain why some researchers (e.g., Miller 2006) do not see universal values when examining diverse case studies: if the examination focuses on identifying values that are more clearly articulated, then it is predestined to emphasize assigned values over held values and thus to see diversity. But the relationship between different types of values, the way values are formed, and the similarity across cultures of certain held values are all critically important for the aspects of governance that involve mediating diverse and sometimes opposing values and finding commonality in values for the setting of collective direction. In a situation of collective decision-

making, parties may have positions and interests that are, or seem, diametrically opposed, even when many of their held values may be very similar.

Often, perhaps typically, some types of fundamental held values are ignored in collective decision-making processes. Thus, while residents of communities such as Rwamchanga may hold values that are remarkably similar to those of residents of communities such as Jilinkon, to those implicit in government conservation agencies, and to those held by middle class Westerners, these values do not always play a significant role in the way that conservation organizations make decisions that affect these communities or in the content of those decisions. The spaces in which residents of these communities can discuss and deliberate on their fundamental held values with other decision-makers are extremely limited. Thus, for example, many people in Rwamchanga have the view that government decision makers are not concerned about justice. That more powerful actors do not seem to recognize that residents of these communities care about the environment and would wish for their children and grandchildren to continue to experience the beauty of nature leaves an impression for these residents of not being treated as human beings. Despite the harsh treatment, many residents of Rwamchanga emphasized wanting to have a proper, friendly, constructive human relationship with managers and other personnel from the protected areas.

Among the communities surrounding Mole National Park in Ghana, the situation of Jilinkon is by no means typical. The particular circumstances of some of these communities, including the greater place of hunting in people's livelihoods and the reduced access to natural resources that some of these communities have because of the creation of protected areas as compared to Jilinkon which still has ample bush land, leads to a different expression of values in these communities than is seen in Jilinkon. Thus among the thirty-three villages surrounding Mole National Park, one can find a diversity of positions, interests, and assigned values even though *the beauty of nature* may be a value held by all.

The CREMA framework in the way it is being administered by Ghana's Wildlife Division is flexible enough to allow, and even support, CREMAs to pursue diverse strategies and objectives. Some CREMAs are focusing on eco-tourism, some on development of livelihoods based on harvesting natural resources, and at least one— Kunlog CREMA—is focused primarily on preservation of cultural values. In the case of Jilinkon, community members and personnel from Wildlife Division worked together in launching Kunlog CREMA based on values that were compatible. That community members see their values reflected in the way decisions and actions are unfolding has allowed them to support the CREMA idea such that it now enjoys widespread support in the community. The governance system, in other words, by allowing for the common values of various stakeholders to be reflected, has facilitated the setting of a direction that enjoys widespread support and that widens the circle for collective action.

It must be noted though, that in the case of Kunlog CREMA, the governance system did not so much directly engage with values as it took advantage of shared values that already existed. The value of protecting nature for future generations was

shared, and in this case values relating to justice and the right to earn a livelihood were not a source of controversy. Wildlife Division personnel and residents of Jilinkon found common ground that allowed them to move forward quickly. This begs the question of what happens when the values prominent in a community and values implicit within the government conservation agency do *not* align. Residents of communities such as Jang, Kananto and Kabampe near Mole National Park in Ghana and Rwamchanga near Ikorongo Game Reserve and Serengeti National Park in Tanzania have few openings in the existing governance mechanisms for their values to be reflected. Thus it is that residents of these communities find little stake in observing rules created by the state beyond the utilitarian calculation of how likely they are to be caught and what the punishment will be. And on the other side, the perception of the personnel of conservation agencies that these are problem communities is reinforced. In these cases, the governance system has failed in its function of finding common ground and setting a direction for collective action that citizens will participate in.

This is somewhat tragic in that people in these communities may hold fundamental values that are similar or identical to values held by conservation professionals. Despite perceived injustices, many residents of these communities still articulate a conservation ethic. Engaging with values, especially fundamental *held* values, and promoting dialogue and deliberation about these values should open up greater possibilities for resolving and pre-empting conflict. This can be conceived of as "tracing back" the chain of causation implied in Figure 1, dialoguing not only about differences in various stakeholders' interests but also exploring where those interests come from and what values lie behind those interests. For governance to be effective it must provide opportunities for this kind of deliberation, in this way allowing stakeholders to seek commonalities in their values while also respecting differences.

As already alluded to, the behavioural model used in this paper is individualistic. Values, however, are also social constructions. What this model does not make clear, and what deserves further research, is what role governance plays in social processes of value formation. Given that people may hold values that are unformed and difficult to express, deliberation on the values of multiple stakeholders should seek not only to expose those values, but also to help stakeholders to articulate them in a way that both allows for diversity and, where possible, facilitates shared expressions of values. There are a variety of methodologies and frameworks that may be helpful in this regard, including, for example, appreciative inquiry (Watkins et al. 2001; Cooperrider and Whitney 2005), soft systems methodology (Checkland and Scholes 1990; Checkland and Haynes 1994) and the ecosystem approach to policy process (Robinson and Fuller In press). An appreciation of the complexity of values also implies that policymaking and governance design need to do more than create new categories of organizations that can act as governing bodies (such as CREMAs), but also need to promote deliberative forums such as conferences, round tables, and multi-stakeholder policy dialogues that bring together stakeholders across sectors and levels of social organization. Could governance possibly be made worse by dialogue which helps us to realize that we *all* want our children to grow up to see these animals?

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