

# Management of Wildlife as a Fugitive Natural Resource: A Case of Wildlife Conservation in a Savanna Ecosystem in Africa

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## ABSTRACT

The objective of this paper is to consider the applicability of the two recently (re)defined community-based approaches to wildlife conservation in savanna ecosystems with consideration of the historical perspectives and the fugitiveness of wildlife. The first approach is a pluralistic and deliberative one, which regards biodiversity as a complex adaptive system and its conservation is a multi-level and manifold problem. The second model is neo-liberal CBNRM asserting that economic value is an important motive for people to involve themselves in conservation and its guarantee at the local level is the best way. Maasai people in southern Kenya lived side-by-side with wildlife. After the colonisation of Kenya, suzerain and state-led conservation was introduced. The local people resisted the establishment of a national park and also the development and conservation plan devised by community-friendly outsiders for fear of the hidden agenda and betrayal. The experience of the Kimana Wildlife Sanctuary taught the local people the economic value of wildlife, and the local landowners assent to the establishment of conservancies. While their understanding of conservation differs from that of outsiders, benefits dominated the discourse in the local meetings among stakeholders. The applicability of the neo-liberal model to the savanna ecosystem is questionable because wildlife habitat is too broad compared to local political, social, and economic units to form a single collective management body, and the approach overlooks situations in which local people lack sufficient “capabilities” to generate profits from wildlife. The pluralistic approach emphasises the importance of deliberation, but the local communication processes are never interactive because the outsiders overlook the fact that fugitiveness turns into destructiveness. Deliberation is necessary, but in order to exchange views and discuss values, necessary steps are to lend an ear to local people’s grievances born of serious human-wildlife conflicts, and empathise with and embody in oneself them.

**Key words:** *Wildlife, Community-based conservation, Fugitiveness, Savanna ecosystem, Kenya*

## INTRODUCTION

### ***Development of CBC and fugitiveness of wildlife***

In the mid 1990s, community-based conservation (CBC) was conceptualised and became the mainstream approach in wildlife conservation. Its fundamental belief is “local participation in decisions and benefits could reduce hostility towards conservation efforts” (Western and Wright 1994: 4). The old paradigm, or “fortress conservation,” is characterised as top-down and centre-driven, seeing local people

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as destroyers of nature, and separating nature from people. By contrast, CBC is a bottom-up and grass-roots approach which regards local people as drivers of conservation with their knowledge and skills, and strives for the coexistence of people and wildlife (Western 1994b; Western and Wright 1994). Also, this paradigm shift signifies a change in the focus of conservation from species to ecosystem, and the inclusion of human activities within the dynamics of ecosystems (Berkes 2004; Child 2009a; Western 2003).

Pioneers in modern wildlife conservation in Africa, such as David Western and Graham Child, realised the necessity of a new paradigm before conservation biology emerged in the West (Western 2003). This is because wildlife in savanna ecosystems with which they were concerned was “fugitive resources.” Here, “fugitive (wildlife)” means someone or something moves far beyond artificial borders drawn by people (e.g., protected areas) and comes into contact with local people, with positive and negative interaction. Child (2009b: 432) discusses the fact that the fugitiveness of wildlife is connected to the difficulties of internalising the cost and benefits of managing wildlife especially at the individual level. While Woodroffe et al. (2005: 405) point out that such human-wildlife conflicts (HWC) as crop-raiding, livestock predation, and human injury “are inevitable if we are to share the planet with other species,” this topic is not documented well in Suich et al. (2009), in which Child (2009b) contributed a concluding chapter.

Since the 1990s, CBC has been discussed both theoretically and experimentally in the realm of wildlife conservation. Empirical studies of CBC widely examine and support “benefit-based approaches,” whose common premise is that “tangible benefits from conservation are vital motivational factors for local people to change their attitudes, support conservation efforts, and align their behaviour with conservation goals” (Kideghesho et al. 2007: 2214). The case studies analyse the effects of benefits on local attitudes, which arises from CBC initiatives like direct payments, employment, and social services. The results indicate that the benefits have the potential to reduce local hostility towards conservation. However, the positive effect of benefits is offset by these conditions: undervaluation of benefits by local beneficiaries (Infield and Namara 2001; Parry and Campbell 1992), unfair benefit distribution in local communities (Gillingham and Lee 1999; Songorwa 1999), and greater damage than benefits from wildlife (Archabald and Naughton-Treves 2001). HWC is considered one of the negative factors against “benefit-based” CBC projects. In these studies, for example, the relationships between socio-economic and ecological factors, and people’s tolerance of problem animals are examined (Naughton-Treves and Treves 2005). Most of them are survey-based and quantitative, and the historical way local people have dealt with wildlife in their daily life and the social context surrounding it is not explored in detail.

### ***Plural deliberation or neo-liberal individualism***

Berkes (2007) states that biodiversity is a complex adaptive system and its conservation is a multi-level and manifold problem in this globalised world, meaning that community institutions are only one layer in vertical and horizontal institutional linkages and we need to broaden our horizons. He cites the importance of partnership and deliberative process among these networks in order to understand the multiple objectives held by various stakeholders (Berkes 2007: 15190–15191).

When CBC was theorised, it was clearly stated that “no community stands alone today” (Western and Wright 1994: 10), and the goal of CBC is to form local conservation initiatives in a form that is compatible with the interests of outsiders (Western 1994b: 500). CBC is not, in the first place, a prejudicially locally oriented movement, and its scope transcends those of local communities. Berkes (2007) confirms and emphasises this tendency, and presents a pluralistic and deliberative approach as an idea to improve and modify the classical idea of CBC.

By contrast, the neo-liberal community-based approach to wildlife conservation, community-based natural resource management (CBNRM), is formulated from long experience in southern Africa (Child 2004; Suich et al. 2009). Its core philosophy is “price, proprietorship, subsidiarity hypotheses,” meaning that “if wildlife is valuable, if this value is captured by the landholder, and if rights are devolved to the lowest level, the probability of successful wildlife and natural resource conservation is greatly increased” (Child 2009a: 4). In this approach, how to organise and manage collective action is one of the most central issues. Child (2009a: 10) says that those who have worked in southern Africa and contributed to the development of this type of CBNRM had similar interests in devolution, institutionalisation, and collective action as commons scholars like Ostrom (1990) did. However, CBNRM, which adapts the sustainable-use paradigm and economic instrumentalism (Jones and Murphree 2004: 64-65), narrows their targets to “those with a highly individualist culture” (Child 2009b: 432). The approach is utilitarian and pays little attention to customary and communal affairs. It is said that aesthetic values like wilderness and recreational values are said to be “important to richer, urban societies,” and that what is of more importance in Africa is “jobs and economic growth” (Child 2009a: 12). Western (1994b) says that tangible benefits is the primary concern for local communities, and that conservation based on non-utilitarian values is difficult for local communities to accept. The original concept of CBC and the newly defined CBNRM have similarities with regard to attaching importance to tangible benefits for local initiatives, but it must be noted that Western (1994c: 553-554) takes a cautious stance concerning free trade and mentions the importance of paying attention to the environment and local concerns.

### ***Objectives of this article***

The objective of this paper is to consider the applicability of these two recently (re)defined community-based approaches to wildlife conservation in savanna ecosystems with consideration of the fugitiveness of wildlife. The first approach is a pluralistic and deliberative one, which insists that several actors on different scales who have various multiple objectives are concerned with biodiversity conservation, and that in order to have collaboration among them, a deliberative communication process is recommended. The second model is neo-liberal CBNRM. It asserts that economic value is a universally important motive for people to involve themselves in conservation. It also assumes that the importance of economic value overcomes other values, and thus its guarantee at the local level is the best way to engender collective actions and institutionalisation.

The central research question of this article is: Do stakeholders have multiple objectives, views, or understanding concerning wildlife conservation, as the first model states? Or, do economic incentives commonly exceed other motivational

factors, making the suppositions of the second approach hold? In the course of inquiring into this question, I adopt a historical perspective and examine what is called the “social memory” of the targeted local community. “Social memory” is defined as “the arena in which captured experience with change and successful adaptations, embedded in a deeper level of value, is actualized through community debate and decision-making processes into appropriate strategies for dealing with ongoing change” (Folke et al. 2005: 453), and it is considered crucially important to plan environmental governance. Besides this, two other explicit questions are also kept in mind: To which extent the argument of each approach is applicable, and in which way fugitiveness affects the processes and results of wildlife conservation.

This article is based on a case study on a savanna ecosystem that used to be the territory of pastoralists in southern Kenya. Wildlife conservation covers numerous types of wildlife species and ecosystems. Therefore, the conclusion of this article may have some limitations in terms of applicability. However, the study site is not only the very site of CBC’s “background,” but also shares cultural, economic, social, and natural characteristics with other important protected areas in east Africa (e.g., Nairobi, Maasai Mara, Ngorongoro, and Serengeti). The result will contribute to a better understanding, further research and more effective CBC on such areas.

## **METHODS**

Fieldwork was carried out intermittently for about a year between October 2005 and August 2010 in Kimana Group Ranch (GR) in southern Kenya, where Kimana Wildlife Sanctuary, a flagship case of CBC initiatives in the country, was established in the mid-1990s. After this, in the 2000s an international NGO launched a project to form conservancies on wildlife corridors between a national park and the sanctuary. In addition to the preceding literature, including the biographies of conservationists working in this field, general information on the targeted community such as history, political and social structure, changes in local livelihood, human-wildlife relations, and development/conservation projects implemented by outsiders were collected from former and current community leaders (members of the GR committees and those who worked for the local government office as advisory/consultant committee members). Concerning the CBC projects, the kinds of people interviewed in the manner of a semi-structured open-ended interview were: the former and current GR Committees responsible for communication and negotiation with outsiders, staff members of related organisations who were involved in the projects, and those local residents who were involved in CBC activities, such as a former sanctuary manager, game scouts, or interpreters between the community and outsiders.

Participatory observation was conducted at local meetings concerning wildlife conservation to record the opinions of stakeholders and the communication processes among them. These meetings were divided into three groups: one about the establishment of conservancies, another on the choice of a company that would manage the sanctuary from 2009 after the former managing company, and others. When I was not available, field assistants attended meetings and took minutes. In total, information on 29 meetings held between July 2007 and July 2009 was collected.

## DESCRIPTION OF RESEARCH SITE

Kimana Group Ranch (GR, 25,120 ha) is situated in Loitokitok District (about 635,600 ha, before 2007 it was a division in Kajiado District) in Rift Valley Province in Southern Kenya (Fig. 1). The GR was formed in 1972 and now has 843 registered members who have a legal right to GR land that was originally communal with no private allotments. The district has six GRs (Eselenkei, Olgulului, Imbirikani, Kimana, Kuku, and Rombo), with the area of individual landholding mostly on the southern part near the national border, but local people usually move beyond their borders without any procedures. Thus, local residents in a GR included the relatives and friends of the members, some of whom were registered members of other neighbouring GRs. Kimana GR is bordered on the west by Amboseli National Park (39,200 ha), one of the most famous tourist destinations in Kenya because of its African elephants (*Loxodonta africana*) and views of Mt. Kilimanjaro. Annual rainfall around the park is about 346.5 mm, with occasional droughts (Altmann et al. 2002). There are some rivers and springs due to water veins from Mt. Kilimanjaro and most of Kimana Swamp, whose conservation was the major objective of creating the Kimana Sanctuary because wildlife often go for water from the park, which is inside the GR.




Figure 1: Map of Loitokitok District

Loitokitok District is considered the traditional territory of *Loitokitok* sub-section, a sub-group of the Kisongo section of Maasai people, whose traditional subsistence was semi-nomadic pastoralism. Prior to the 1960s, the people of this sub-section used to migrate with their livestock and household members within their territory, which is basically equivalent to the current Loitokitok District, following irregular rainfall. In the sub-section, three clans (*Laiser, Laitayok, and Molelian*) are found, but (sub-)sections, not clans, are the foundations of political and social units that autonomically govern territory (Spencer 2004). Cattle are important in terms of subsistence, culture, and social life (Homewood and Rodgers, 1991; Western, 2002).

The land was subdivided into three zones: grazing land for (mature) cattle, calves, and small livestock (goats and sheep), and these areas and water sources were managed under the direction of local leaders and elders. As explained above, permanent water resources existed around the current Kimana GR. After the 1970s, more and more local Maasai undertook farming due to severe droughts and herd losses (Campbell, 1993). In the 2000s, the GR decided and began to subdivide the GR's communal land so that each registered member received a 0.8-ha plot for cultivation around the water points, and a 24-ha parcel for livestock grazing. As individual plots were allotted, more people became serious about cultivation, but the risk of crop-raiding by wildlife increased. Non-Maasai people arrived in the area in search of fields or opportunities for small businesses, and are mostly found around towns.

Maasai society is ordered by the age-grade system. New age groups are formed about every 15 years, and with their formation, each age group moves up to the next-higher age-grade (Sankan 1971; Spencer 2004). The age-grade system is applied only for Maasai men, who first become warriors (*il-murran*) after circumcision, and subsequently become young (married) elders and senior elders (Spencer 1993: 142). Among the Maasai, hunting is practiced by warriors, and its main purpose is to kill wildlife that is dangerous to livestock and people. Only lions are given cultural meaning, and the success in lion hunting provides social status to warriors and leads to festivities with neighbours. Killing for bush meat was unusual and not admired behaviour, although at times of severe drought they hunt wildlife and eat bush meat. They utilise only specific parts of some wildlife, like lion manes as men's dress (headbands) for dancing, giraffe tails as flappers, and buffalo skins as material for warriors' shields. However, local human-wildlife relations in the research site have changed fundamentally as a result of the Maasai's agriculturalisation and sedentalisation through land subdivision, and a hunting ban (Meguro 2010).

## RESULTS

### ***History of wildlife conservation in the Amboseli ecosystem***

In 1895 Kenya became a British protectorate and shortly after that suzerain/state-led wildlife conservation was introduced in the Amboseli ecosystem. In 1899 the Southern Game Reserve (around 34,000 km<sup>2</sup>) was established and incorporated the territory of Loitokitok sub-section. The purpose of the game reserve was to protect both wildlife and local people (Western 2002). The national park system was introduced into Kenya in 1945, and the focus of national conservation policy shifted from hunting management to land (habitat) protection (Western 1994a). By this time, Amboseli had become a famous tourism destination among Europeans, and the creation of Amboseli National Park was proposed in order to conserve a variety of wildlife there (Smith 2008). However, since local people would be ejected from the park if created, there was fierce local opposition and killing of wildlife. As a result, Amboseli remained a national reserve where local people were able to use resources and live inside (Western 1994a). In 1968, the Ministry of Tourism and Wildlife re-proposed the creation of a national park, but the local Maasai rejected the idea and killed wildlife again as a sign of their antipathy. In 1971, President Kenyatta announced that Amboseli would be a national park and this time again, Maasai

warriors killed several kinds of wildlife. However, at last in 1974 Amboseli National Park was established and local people were removed from within it (Smith 2008).

“Development Plans for Amboseli” is a “background” of the CBC approach that was worked out in 1973 with David Western playing the central role (Western and Wright 1994). The plan suggested that core areas were conserved (preserved) without human intervention while major parts were opened to local people and wildlife so that they can live in harmony. Tourism development was proposed, and benefits were planned so as to reach local communities (Western 1994a). This development and conservation plan was devised through communication and collaboration among various stakeholders at that time. As explained above, David Western (a white researcher from outside) was the key person, but he worked together and negotiated with other researchers (the Institute for Development Studies at the University of Nairobi), leaders in the local Maasai community (elders and an area MP), governmental organisations (Game Department, the Ministry of Tourism and Wildlife, and the Ministry of Livestock Development), and international organisations (the World Bank, the Food and Agriculture Organisation, and the New York Zoological Society) (Western 1994). However, as Western (1994a: 40) himself says, it was in the late 1980s that “the first genuine local initiatives” were sparked, and thus, most of the local people played no active role with regard to the completion of “Development Plans for Amboseli.”

Kenya Wildlife Service (KWS) was established in 1990 and undertook CBC initiatives. While intensifying the crackdown against poachers, they started the distribution of park entry fees to adjacent communities, environmental education, and tourism development. Kimana GR received around Ksh. 1 million (around US\$ 13,000 in 2009) annually. In 1992, the KWS brought forth the idea of creating a wildlife sanctuary on the communal land with the intention of protecting an important water source outside the park (Kimana Swamp). The GR was told by the KWS that they would gain tourism income through the sanctuary, and agreed the plan in 1995. The Kimana Community Wildlife Sanctuary (6,000 ha) was officially opened in the following year under the management of a locally elected manager along with the GR committee. In 1999 a tourism company, African Safari Club (ASC), signed a contract with the GR and took over the management right of the sanctuary for a 10-year period (2000 to 2009). In 2004/2005, the GR received around Ksh. 8.8 million (around US\$ 120,000 in 2005) a year. With the income from the ASC, the GR realised the land subdivision. The local people rejoiced in the land subdivision because it led to hoped-for agricultural development. However, the expansion of agricultural fields threatened wildlife with habitat loss and segmentation.

In 2007, an international NGO, African Wildlife Foundation (AWF), started the CBC initiative to establish conservancies in order to protect a wildlife corridor between the national park and the sanctuary. The AWF persuaded local landowners whose 24 ha-plots were situated on the corridor to form landowners associations, and persuaded them to sign a conservancy contract as a group with the AWF. Game scouts were selected from among the members of each association to patrol their conservancy in order to chase away intruders and protect wildlife from poachers. Resource use in the conservancies was restricted, but the landowners received Ksh. 30,000 (around US\$ 390) annually. The AWF attempted to establish four conservancies, and by January 2009 achieved contracts with two groups.

### ***Intentions of outsiders***

The basic philosophy of CBC, crystallised in the “Development Plans for Amboseli”, was reflected in Sessional Paper No. 3 of 1975, which is evaluated to be “a radical departure from the preservationist policies preceding it” because it recognised that “wildlife needed space outside the protected areas” (Kameri-Mbote 2008: 291). However, it was not until Kenya Wildlife Service was launched in 1990 that CBC was officially implemented in earnest. In 1996, under the directorship of David Western, the KWS started the “Parks beyond Parks” programme for pushing CBC initiatives on the 50th anniversary of Kenya’s national parks. In this programme, CBC was explained as an attempt “to empower the person on the ground to benefit from wildlife and therefore take the initiative in conserving it, as he does his own cattle” (KWS 1996: 37). While the “essential ingredients” of CBC are empowerment, participation, awareness, and education, and its ultimate criteria are “how deeply the effort is embedded in each community’s aspirations and how effectively its members’ efforts sustain it” (Western 1994b: 507, 510), it is said that CBC “covers both new and traditional conservation methods, as well as conservation efforts that originate within or outside a community, so long as the outcome benefits the community” (Western and Wright 1994: 7). Benefiting local communities is critically important because it is the vital condition that local people approve wildlife conservation on their land. That is why most of the CBC projects on the ground are categorised as “benefit-based approaches.”

To this end, in the case of the Kimana Sanctuary, the KWS and other donors (USAID, the World Bank, the EU, etc.) assisted and empowered the community in several ways. They constructed tourism facilities and provided necessary materials. A local manager selected from the community was trained in the KWS facilities, the GR committee held conservation-related seminars, and game scouts were trained by the KWS scouts. The sanctuary was first managed by the local management body. Local participation was achieved both in wildlife conservation and community development. However, the local management was abolished in three years and the sanctuary was leased out to the ASC due to the small profits realised. Compared to the ASC, the local people had neither enough capital for the investment in tourism facilities nor knowledge to effectively sell their products to the world market (Meguro forthcoming).

A series of local meetings were held in the Kimana GR to foster CBC initiatives, where local people and outsiders (the AWF, the KWS, local governmental officers, and representatives of local tourism business) conducted discussions. In these assemblies, one of the most popular statements made by the outsiders was that wildlife conservation was important because wildlife brought economic benefits to people. Tourism (income) is the very example mentioned by the outsiders to demonstrate the economic potential of wildlife, although specific benefit amounts were seldom mentioned. A KWS staff who came from the head office at Nairobi (the capital city of Kenya) said that wildlife conservation was important because the nation gained significant revenue from wildlife-related industries. He continued that the Maasai people were lucky because they had abundant wildlife on their land. Also, when local officers of the AWF talked with landowners about the conservancies, the officers said that the landowners were able to receive benefits if a tourism company

was invited to run the business in the conservancies. When interviewed, a project manager of the AWF who was responsible to conservancies said that most of the local landowners had entered into a contract for conservancies because of monetary income (land fees of Ksh. 30,000 per year). With regard to the conservancies, bidding based on economic benefits was repeated, and neither environmental education nor enlightenment activities were attempted.

Originally, CBC strived for coexistence between local people and wildlife. Coexistence calls for land outside of protected areas to be open for wildlife. However, extensive crop-raiding occurred in Kimana, and in 2008, 77% suffered the wildlife damage (Meguro 2010: 58). Against these conditions, outsiders tried to persuade the people that wildlife was truly more beneficial than problematic so that they would accept wildlife conservation on their land and realise profits. In the meetings, the local people repeatedly asked them to provide higher income and more job opportunities (e.g., game scouts, cultural villages to sell souvenirs and perform traditional dances), and insisted that these activities must contribute to poverty reduction. However, these issues were discussed only from economic and benefit perspectives, and in terms of the importance of community participation or more direct involvement.

### ***Local definition of wildlife conservation***

The secretary of the Kimana GR said that good conservation was meant to keep tourism inside the protected areas and stop wildlife from coming out of them. This opinion sounds like the request for separation in a “fortress conservation” manner rather than the coexistence recommended by CBC. According to Meguro (forthcoming), the majority think that wildlife conservation is important (81%) and that the construction of another sanctuary is a good idea (76%). However, the reasons they supported new sanctuaries are mostly economic (employment, monetary profit, and land subdivision), while only 4% (multiple answers) cited conservation. The people understand that the sanctuary provides job opportunities and funding for land subdivision. Such tangible benefits are the main reason for local support of the sanctuary. Although most of the respondents say that some species are acceptable for coexistence, with regard to where wildlife should stay, their answers are (inside) national parks, the sanctuary, and far away from houses and farms. No one approves of unimpeded wildlife movement on their private land because of the risk of wildlife damage. In fact, 91% have experienced crop-raiding so far, and only 11% think that wildlife brings more benefits than problems. In the Kimana GR as well, the sense of direct benefits has a significant effect on people’s opinions, but even among the beneficiaries, only a quarter said that wildlife bring more profits (Meguro forthcoming). Opinions such as “I want to kill wildlife” are expressed not only by the expected agro-pastoral Maasai people, but also by sanctuary staff members and a person who received a scholarship from the KWS, worked for its environmental education programme, and understood the importance of ecosystem conservation.

Whereas the majority answered that conservation is important (Meguro forthcoming), their understanding of the term “conservation” disagrees with that of outsiders. In a meeting held by the AWF on 28th August 2008, local participants discussed the strong points and weak points, and the challenges faced by four major local subsistence occupations: agriculture, livestock husbandry, business, and wildlife

(tourism). Conclusions on wildlife included: "Wildlife cannot live together on fields", "All benefits are monopolised by the government", "The government must compensate for damage", and "If the KWS want to protect wildlife, they should restrict wildlife to the park and enclose it with electric fences". On the possibility of community participation, most people said that the government or the KWS should carry out wildlife conservation, while only 4% named the local community as a body responsible for practicing conservation (Meguro forthcoming). This result indicates that most local people are not willing to help with wildlife conservation. And many people argue that the responsible bodies must build electric fences, keep wildlife away from people and fields, or chase them back into protected areas. These practices were obviously meant to sequester wildlife.

Therefore, wildlife conservation desired by the local people means activities to separate wildlife from local people that must be performed by governmental bodies without specific community participation. In one meeting called by the AWF to discuss conservancies, a local representative (the wife of a chairman who was absent) criticised the NGO for providing no allowances. To the local people, the meetings were somewhat bothersome, and not events they would voluntarily attend without any instant rewards. Now that the sanctuary was managed by the ASC and conservancies would be administered by the AWF (and tourism companies), the local people had no need to make conservation effort for the sake of benefits.

### ***Interactions in local meetings***

In meetings, when the outsiders mentioned income and job opportunities provided by CBC initiatives, the people asked the amounts and number of such benefits, and they usually continued discussing it. Contrary to this, the issue of wildlife damage (crop-raiding) was seldom raised by outsiders. It became a subject of discussion mostly after local people asked whether the outsiders had specific provisions against HWC, nearly always resulting in an answer of no plan. The amount of land fees paid to local landowners of the conservancies had been agreed more than one year before contracts were signed, and while local people continuously requested compensation and electric fences, these countermeasures were not included in the contracts.

When the outsiders explained that wildlife is profitable, some local people complained that such benefits were never returned to the community, and others objected that wildlife brought more damage than benefits. When a KWS staff asked the local people to establish more sanctuaries for the purpose of acquiring more wildlife benefits, he called the sanctuaries places for "making friends (with wildlife)." This phrase ignited emotional opposition, and community members how they could make friends with very harmful creatures, or asked how they should deal with wildlife that encroaches on and destroys their fields. After these objections, the KWS people answered that the construction of sanctuaries was one method. However, the local people were not satisfied with this answer and kept arguing that they will not make friends as long as wildlife exit the sanctuary and encroach on their land. Finally, the local people requested that wildlife be confined to the protected areas, but the KWS people rejected it for the reason that wildlife cannot be kept inside. While saying so, he showed no sympathy or apology for the victimisation of the local people. In the discussion of conservancies, local landowners urged the AWF to build electric

fences, saying that if the AWF would not promise their construction, they would kick out the AWF and partner with other developers. The AWF responded that if they obtain more funding from international donors, they would do so. The people satisfied themselves that the AWF had made a promise to them. The project manager said that the organisation was hungry for money, and it is as much as they can do to keep running the project with limited budgets.

The local people and the outsiders knew the potential of wildlife-based tourism and the occurrence of crop-raiding. While the benefits of wildlife were noted and discussed by both sides with some agreement reached, HWC were made into an issue mostly by the local people, and the countermeasures they requested were not approved by the outsiders. In these meetings, the outsiders described wildlife as profitable natural resources and said that conserving its habitat was necessary to gain benefits, while the local people regarded wildlife as destructive creatures and asked the outsiders to sequester wildlife from humans in the name of conservation.

## **DISCUSSION**

### ***Discrepancy in the understanding of conservation***

At the beginning of suzerain and state-led conservation, local people in Amboseli lived side-by-side with wildlife inside protected areas, although other sections experienced land-grabbing and exclusion from their customary land (Hughes 2006). The people resisted the establishment of a national park and for while they were successful. With the introduction of the national park system, governmental organisation was rearranged and the policy focus changed, but generally speaking, local people were seen as actors who had no connection to wildlife conservation. When the draft of the “Development Plans for Amboseli” was submitted to local elders in the late 1960s, a foreign researcher thought that certainly such a fair and logical proposal would be accepted by the local people, but the local people disagreed with the plan because they dreaded land grabbing by the government under the guise of the plan. While outsider conservationists thought rationally or scientifically, local opinion was occupied with the bad memory of the suzerain and top-down governmental approaches. For conservationists, objectiveness and rationality of the plan itself were important, but for local people the central concern was the plan’s hidden agenda and the possibility of betrayal, with the content being less important. The concerns of the two sides did not mesh.

It took around three years to reach agreement on Kimana Sanctuary, and it opened with considerable community participation. Its starting conditions were ideal as a CBC project because local people fully participated in its management. However, the sanctuary was later leased out to the ASC due to the small benefits obtained, and the community retreated from the front line. This management change brought an increase in profits and led to agricultural development through land privatisation. Local people now understand that wildlife has economic potential, and that outsiders are necessary developers or managers of wildlife. KWS (1996) increases empowerment, benefits, and initiative as the major components of CBC in Kenya. The second objective of these was achieved, which led to the realisation of the hoped-for community development. Yet, the first objective was not fulfilled because

the people entrusted the management of the sanctuary to the ASC. Regarding the third objective, the local people approved conservation but their understanding of the term differed from that of outsiders, indicating the lack of will to put it into practice. Further, the expansion of cultivated fields as a result of the sanctuary providing a substantial amount of money to the community is a good reason for conservationists to worry. In the African savanna, the expansion of agriculture is the major historical reason for the destruction of the elephant population (Hoare 1999), which is a main tourism resource in Amboseli. What is more, because of the higher risk of wildlife damage to agriculture than to pastoralism, the people became more antagonistic to wildlife that ventured outside the protected areas. In line with the aims of Kenya's CBC, the sanctuary taught the local people the economic value of wildlife, but it brought about development that is contradictory to that intended by the outsiders. This is because the outsiders overlooked the possibility that economic benefits bring about future changes (Meguro forthcoming), a situation that proceeded from the discrepancy in the understanding of conservation.

In the case of the conservancies, local landowners assent to the proposals from an economic perspective. They agree with the outsiders on the profitability of wildlife, but they do not take the same stand on wildlife damage. Local people are afraid that elephants will intrude into their cultivated land, and they want some effective measures implemented. The opinion of the AWF is that wildlife naturally comes out of the conservancies, and so damage is almost inevitable. The difference in views on wildlife leads to conflicting opinions on the extent to which wildlife conservation needs to be carried out. The same word was used in totally opposite ways, reflecting the different values or understanding of these two groups. This gap has already caused friction. In 2010, the chairman of the landowners association in Osupuko said that they felt betrayed by the AWF because it did not put up electric fences. He said that without the fences, they would not renew contracts with the AWF. He insisted that the issue of electric fences was in the contracts. But in fact his statement was not true and he misunderstood the English-language contracts, which he could not read well. The landowners at first were delighted with money from conservancies, but recently more members have been demanding an increase in the payment amount. The AWF managed to have the local people understand the profitability of wildlife, but there is no agreement on the other important issues of HWC. Because benefits (what are wildlife benefits, and how to realise them) dominated the discourse in the meetings, other issues received only scant attention from stakeholders.

### ***Applicability of neo-liberal CBNRM***

When the "Development Plan for Amboseli" was accepted by the local community, the area MP played a decisive role against the elders' hesitation, which was a top-down and patriarchal way of collective decision-making (Western 1994a). By contrast, matters concerning the Kimana Sanctuary have been decided basically in annual general meetings of the GR. The corruption of the GR committee is suggested in the literature (Mburu et al. 2003), and at the meeting held on 3rd Dec 2008 the secretary was accused of embezzling GR income. The AWF pays the money to the landowners of the conservancies directly to each individual bank account. The people appreciate this manner of payment, and no problem about money distribution has occurred in the associations. In this way, the people in the

Kimana GR have a history of collective action, which became more individualistic and free from traditional authority. However, the situation is still a somewhat distant from the suppositions underlying neo-liberal CBNRM (Child 2009a, 2009b; Jones and Murphree 2004).

Child (2009b: 437) stated that wildlife is a comparatively advantageous land-use form in areas like savanna ecosystems, and because of its virtues, people living in wildlife habitat are thought to act collectively in order to profit from fugitive natural resources. However, from the experience in Kimana, two fundamental critiques are raised. First, wildlife habitat is very broad compared to local political, social, and economic units. The distribution of several types of wildlife in the Amboseli ecosystem covers all of six GRs in the district, and some even extend to the Tanzanian side (KWS and Tanzania Wildlife Research Institute 2010). Now that each GR has its own development activities (e.g., tourism development with each own developers/investors), the traditional unity as a sub-section is weak. The Kimana GR has already subdivided its communal land, leading to more household-based economic activities. Although most of the land of the other GRs is still under communal title and the traditional age-grade system still exists, even if weakened, when the population of the district exceeded 130,000 (137,496 according to the national census in 2009), it was no longer realistic to set proprietorship and form a single wildlife and landholder forum or conservancy in the ecosystem based only on neo-liberal individualism.

The second question is how to measure and realise the economic value of wildlife. Neo-liberals discuss this as if the price of each type of wildlife can be determined uniformly in the market. However, the amount of income from (non-consumptive) tourism-based utilisation depends on such non-wildlife aspects as tourism facilities, access to the habitat, and advertising technique. The difference in monetary income to the community between the two management bodies demonstrates that even if wildlife is abundant with good tourism value, local people can not get its price (Meguro forthcoming). Neo-liberal CBNRM is called “rights-based conservation” and differentiated from the former “incentive-led conservation” (Child 2009a), but it overlooks situations in which local people lack sufficient “capabilities” (Sen 1985), which prevents full use of resources entitled to them to generate profits. Also, when the landowners of the conservancies demand higher land fees, they have no economically rationalised price. In Kimana, wildlife has value and the people acquire more power and rights to it, but they do not have the capability to utilise it by themselves.

### ***Overlooked issues by pluralistic and deliberative CBC***

The central difference between the two approaches is whether to admit the need of deliberative processes to mediate different values found in wildlife by different stakeholders. In Kimana, the motivational factor for local people to join the conservation initiative is to obtain economic and material benefits with outsiders taking the lead. Yet, the outsiders prioritise wildlife conservation outside the protected areas over the compensation for wildlife damage, while local people have the opposite priorities. Local people and outsiders have different opinions on how to deal with wildlife outside protected areas, but conservation on people’s land remains a concealed subject, and HWC become an issue only when local people complain.

An urgent question posed by the Kimana case is how make progress on substantive deliberations concerning the “invited spaces” (Cornwall 2004: 1-2) where local people show little eagerness to participate in or assume the burden of wildlife conservation while their hope for effective countermeasures against problem animals is denied. In this connection, the importance of keeping a historical perspective on local subsistence strategies and human-wildlife relations is suggested (Meguro forthcoming).

Berkes (2007: 15190) explained that deliberation is “processes for communication and for raising and collectively considering issues in which the various parties engage in discussions, exchange observations and views, reflect on information, assess outcomes, and attempt to persuade each other”. The communication processes in Kimana cannot be called deliberative, because although the various actors engage in dialog, their manner seemed one-way rather than interactive. The outsiders listened to the local people telling about dangerous animals, but did not commiserate as far as I observed. Also, when the outsiders made conditional offers, the local people accepted them as if they were non-conditional, and criticised them, sometimes calling them “liars”, when the perceived promise was not fulfilled. These attitudes retarded the establishment of mutual trust and partnership.

The local people thought that conservation was the government’s task. The history of suzerain/state-led policy and changes in the local human-wildlife relationship were seen as background. First of all, the government have “protected” or worked for the sake of wildlife, and monopolised its benefits without any return to local communities. The autobiographic literature of past conservation practices in Amboseli (Smith 2008; Western 2002) records local complaints about how outsiders favour wildlife, and even now, local people make similar complaints. This antipathy may be strengthened by the experience of losing customary land to other peoples (white settlers and agricultural peoples). A second background factor concerns local human-wildlife relations. When semi-nomadic pastoralism was the major means of subsistence, people and wildlife moved to the same land in search of water, grass, preys, and the like. When people hunted wildlife, the wildlife attacked livestock and people. This resulted in coexistence with wildlife with a certain distance of separation and tension, and in this era only lions had significant meaning, in a cultural and social sense, because hunting them proved warriors’ bravery and gave them fame (Meguro 2010). This mode of coexistence has changed to a one-sided relation in which local people are victims with no means to deal with elephants, which are now the main problem animal since agriculture became the major subsistence means to more people, and the KWS reinforced control over hunting (Meguro 2010).

Recently the local people have suffered acute wildlife damage to their livelihoods and to substantial wildlife benefits, but before that, local people have a long history of regarding wildlife as problematic or at least worthless, rather than seeing it as something like a resource. CBC theory arose on the recognition that wildlife in savanna ecosystems was fugitive, and required wide-open areas. However, it did not cover HWC or explain the possibility that fugitiveness would become destructiveness. For the outsiders who come to the field occasionally and concentrate their attention on local concerns, HWC look exceptional and non-critical, but the local people consider them critical because they thought that nearly all fields were at risk of being attacked by elephants. Many people, including the GR committees, said that they

realised wildlife benefits only after receiving direct and personal benefits in recent decades. To the Maasai people, the negative side of wildlife is more easily realised. Although crop-raiding is a relatively new phenomenon and elephants were not so problematic before, they have lived side by side with dangerous wildlife. Therefore, when they cannot believe the economic potential of wildlife, they hope that the harm of wildlife will be eliminated rather than waiting with anxiety for unreliable persons to bring benefits. The outsiders in Kimana did not understand such subtleties of local feelings and just tried to persuade them to accept wildlife on their land in anticipation of wildlife benefits. Like the criticism of Young (1996) in the theory of deliberative democracy, personal and emotional affairs tend to be excluded from the deliberative process in public spaces. Berkes (2007: 15188) pointed out that “context (history, politics, and culture) is important in understanding a particular case,” but we cannot depend only on reason. In order to have rapport and to exchange views and discuss values, a necessary step is to understand, sympathise, and relive or embody in oneself the personal experiences and feelings of local personalities. When we listen to what others say, translations always accompany it. Deliberation is necessary for the collaboration of numerous stakeholders, but there is room for improvements so as to take advantage of the freshness and liveliness of peoples’ experiences and expressions.

## **CONCLUSION**

Among stakeholders there are many objectives and differences among them. Due to the realisation of community development with income from the sanctuary, local people now understand the value of wildlife. On this point, CBC imbued local people with the same opinion as that of the outsiders. However, with regards to other important conservation issues like HWC and the conservation of outside protected areas, the local people and outsiders have opposing ideas, and these are not discussed in the local meetings. In addition, the people in Kimana have a totally different understanding of the concept of “conservation”, and their priorities regarding HWC and conservation on their land are likewise opposite to those of the outsiders. This situation is that anticipated by the pluralistic approach, but not what is assumed by the neo-liberal model. In the Kimana GR, communal land is privatised and local people understand that wildlife bring benefits. However, the income from wildlife depends on wildlife-independent economic conditions, and the people do not understand what amount of money they should receive, as they rely on outsiders for wildlife benefits. These conditions run counter to the understanding of neo-liberal CBNRM theory, in which local landowners themselves make decisions to optimise returns. Economic incentive is central to local people, but the decision-making model seems inadequate for understanding the local dynamics of interaction among stakeholders.

The fugitiveness of wildlife is problematised by Child (2009b) from the viewpoint of internalisation of cost and benefit at the individual level, but in Kimana, the problem is the fact that fugitiveness turns into destructiveness. Outsiders strive to conserve fugitive wildlife on their habitat as their top priority, but when it is impossible for local people to clearly gauge the value of wildlife, and when they distrust outsiders, they want immediate and effective measures against HWC and do not want to wait for benefits. Various stakeholders come together and they seem to be having

discussions, but the communication is one-way, not interactive. For the deliberative process to work, the parties must form social networks and establish social capital (Folke et al. 2005), but the historical experiences of coercion in the name of wildlife conservation leads to the current local distrust of outsiders. This feeling is reinforced with the neglect of local requests to do something about HWC. In order for outsiders to achieve partnership and collaboration with local people, consideration of HWC is essential because it directly affects local livelihood. However in the process of deliberation, other stakeholders need to lend an ear to local people's grievances born of serious human-wildlife conflicts, and empathise with and embody in oneself them.

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