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CONSERVATION, DEVELOPMENT AND COLLABORATION: ANALYZING INSTITUTIONAL INCENTIVES FOR PARTICIPATORY CONSERVATION IN UGANDA

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Submitted to the faculty of the University Graduate School
in partial fulfillment of the requirements
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CONSERVATION, DEVELOPMENT AND COLLABORATION: ANALYZING INSTITUTIONAL INCENTIVES FOR PARTICIPATORY CONSERVATION IN UGANDA

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ABSTRACT

Throughout the world, scholars and practitioners are increasingly promoting participatory conservation strategies as improvements over traditional protected area models that focus on enforcement. Despite this widespread support, most examples in practice have experienced little sustained success at either eliciting participation or improving ecological outcomes. This dissertation addresses this policy dilemma by examining how different community conservation incentives encourage the participation of local people in the conservation of Ugandan national parks.

This thesis draws on arguments from the new institutionalism literature to portray the content and outcomes of participatory conservation policies as resulting from the daily decisions and interactions of individuals. Employing insights from theories of credible commitment and self-governance, I argue that analysis of participatory conservation strategies must take into account both how the process of institutional design creates incentives for individuals to collaborate as well as how the resulting institutional arrangements protect against strategic behavior and tie the cooperation to behavior that promotes conservation.

To analyze how both the process and the policy create incentives for encouraging local participation in conservation in Uganda, this study examines three empirical puzzles. First, why did the Ugandan national park authority select policies advocating

collaboration in conservation of national parks? The second puzzle explains the variation in local rights and responsibilities existing in the two collaborative agreements. The final question examines collaborative agreements at Mt. Elgon and Bwindi National Parks to assess the extent to which collaboration improves participatory conservation outcomes. My analysis employs archival, key informant interview and rural household survey data obtained through ten months of field research in Uganda.

Results indicate that in situations of mutual mistrust, individual decisions whether or not to cooperate are contingent upon the degree of credible commitment demonstrated by the park authority, the extent the rules reflect local values and the costs of non-compliance. Therefore, collaborative institutions need to provide not only incentives to participate, but demonstrate assurance mechanisms. These results indicate the importance in identifying both how the process of collaboration and the attributes of the rules themselves influence the daily decisions to cooperate of local people.

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ABBREVIATIONS USED IN THE TEXT

BINP	Bwindi Impenetrable National Park
CARE	Cooperative for Assistance and Relief Everywhere
CCU	Community Conservation Unit
CPR	Common Property Resource
DTC	Development Through Conservation Project (CARE)
FD	Uganda Forest Department
GD	Uganda Game Department
ICDP	Integrated Conservation and Development Project
IUCN	World Conservation Union
LC (RC)	Local Councils (Formerly Resistance Councils)
MBIFCT	Mgahinga-Bwindi Impenetrable Forest Conservation Trust
MECDP	Mt. Elgon Conservation and Development Project (IUCN)
MENP	Mt. Elgon National Park
MNR	Ministry of Natural Resources
MOU	Memorandum of Understanding
MP	Member of Parliament
MTWA	Ministry of Tourism Wildlife and Antiquities
NGO	Non-Governmental Organization
NEAP	National Environmental Action Plan
NRM	National Resistance Movement
PMAC	Park Management Advisory Committee
PPC	Park-Parish Committee
SAP	Structural Adjustment Program
UNP	Uganda National Parks
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
UWA	Uganda Wildlife Authority



Source: Uganda Wildlife Authority

CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION: THE RISE AND RECONSIDERATION OF NATIONAL PARKS AS CONSERVATION MODELS

Statement of Problem

Since the creation of Yellowstone National Park in 1872, the national park philosophy of setting aside wilderness areas to prevent potential transformation by human use, has symbolized the epitome of conservation (McNeely, 1994). The distinctive aspects of the national park model that emerged from Yellowstone include centralized management, restriction of settlement and most forms of consumptive use, and the promotion of tourism. National parks, with the defined objective of: protecting relatively large natural and scenic areas of national or international significance for scientific, educational, and recreational use (IUCN, 1985) have since been established throughout the world following this model of isolating habitats from human populations. Although less restrictive types of protected areas exist, the restricted national park model has remained the preeminent symbol of a nation's commitment to conservation (Antle & Heidebrink, 1995; McNeely, 1990). Today, over 1500 national parks exist in over 150 countries and despite increasing pressures, are widely seen as "the most successful habitat conservation measure of modern times," (McNeely, 1990; 40) and "indispensable to conservation," (McNeely, 1990; 19).

However, this idyllic conception of unspoiled wilderness often fails to match the reality of widespread illegal use and environmental degradation. Especially in many

developing countries, parks exist only as *paper parks* (Wells & Brandon, 1992; Fearnside, 1984) as park neighbors regularly violate the restricted rules. Responding to this failure to arrest environmental degradation throughout the developing world, scholars and practitioners are reassessing the traditional national park model. Scholars are learning that, regardless of formal restrictions, the actions of park neighbors have significant influence on conservation outcomes. Instead, gaining the support of local participation in conservation of the protected area is becoming an essential component of a conservation model. Over the past decade a vast literature has emerged championing participation has the future of conservation (Ghimire & Pimbert, 1997; Borrini-Feyerabend, 1997; 1996; Pimbert & Pretty, 1995; Western & Wright, 1994; Carter & Lewis, 1993; Bonner, 1993; Adams & McShane, 1992; Rao & Geisler, 1990; Kiss, 1990). Despite this widespread promotion, many policies ostensibly designed to encourage such participation have frequently failed to achieve success at either encouraging local participation or protecting the natural resources (Songorwa, 1999; Oates, 1999; Brandon, 1997; Barrett & Arcese, 1995; Wells & Brandon, 1992).

Encouraging the participation of local people in conservation evokes the broader question of the underlying motivations for human behavior. Improving understanding of local participation will require an improved understanding of how different institutional arrangements influence the actions and interactions of individuals. To analyze this issue, this study examines institutions designed to encourage the participation of local people in the conservation of Ugandan national parks. Examining how different institutional arrangements structure individual interactions can provide compelling explanations for the variations in strategies and outcomes of different conservation strategies.

To analyze how different methods of encouraging local participation in conservation in Uganda, this study focuses on two central components: explaining how policies offering different levels of local participation become favored by policymakers and examining how these different institutions influence local participation in conservation.

Theories of Resource Management

The support of participation represents a reevaluation of the desirability of state control or local control over natural resources. The national park model exemplifies the belief that the state is the most effective protector of natural resources. State level management involves a centralized authority managing based on the scientific data that are most relevant to the resource being managed (Berkes, George & Preston, 1991). The central government authority determines the laws and regulations and actively enforces these regulations. Both local people and private accumulators deem the scientific management and enforcement capacities of the state necessary to prevent eventual transformation of natural areas. In developing countries however, it is often rural park neighbors rather than private accumulators, who conservationists' fear will inevitably overuse the resource leading to its degradation in the absence of state intervention.

Garret Hardin's oft-cited article, *The Tragedy of the Commons* (1968) best represents this belief in the ineffectiveness of local resource management. Hardin argued that in commons situations, such as those that exist in many non-Western societies, rational individuals would attempt to maximize their individual gain, eventually leading to resource degradation. Overcoming this tragedy requires the establishment of private

property rights or state control. In addition to protecting against local communities, state control offers the most effective protection against exploitation by large industrialists with the power and resources to transform rapidly an environment. This belief in the superiority of the state and the inefficiency of local people has dominated conservation policymaking for much of the past century.

Despite this belief, in many countries, the demarcation of national parks and centralized control has not protected natural areas from resource degradation (Kramer & van Shaik, 1997; Wells & Brandon, 1992). This lack of success has caused a reevaluation of the supremacy of centralized management techniques. By redirecting the focus to rural communities, scholars have recognized how the uniform rules of the national park model inherently ignore the local conditions and norms that have arisen to adapt to the specific local environmental conditions. Moreover, this preservationist approach places much of the costs of conservation on park neighbors who suffer both actual damages of crops and livestock from wildlife depredations as well as the opportunity costs of not having access to the resources within the park. Anthropologists argue that small-scale non-Western societies frequently developed local resource management systems that protected natural resources over time. In contrast to Hardin's despoilers, local people with their detailed site-specific knowledge and social sanctioning mechanisms can serve as better resource managers than external enforcement (Ghimire & Pimbert, 1997; Pimbert & Pretty, 1995). The local rules that develop are often complex layers associated with differing rights to differing resources in sharp contrast to the exclusionary design of national parks which treats "nature" as a resource in itself. These decentralized systems tend to be consensus-based and enforced through social sanctions

(Berkes, George & Preston, 1991). Central resource managers frequently fail to recognize these systems, based on customary practice, local knowledge and cultural tradition, rather than formal science, as resource management systems.

This recognition of the characteristics of successful self-governing institutions has redirected the focus of conservation policy towards local communities. However, even in the case of successful local resource management systems, modern pressures such as state intervention, increasing market orientation, commercialization, migration and population pressures are eroding these complex traditional systems (Kramer & van Shaik, 1997). These changes can transform existing systems of rules into open-access exploitation that more closely reflects Hardin's tragedy (Bromley & Cernea, 1989).

New Conservation Paradigm

This reconsideration of local communities has caused widespread calls for local community involvement. Over the past two decades, a large literature has developed promoting the need for local participation in development projects (Chambers, 1996; 1984; World Bank, 1994; Cernea, 1991; Esman & Uphoff, 1984; Cohen & Uphoff, 1980). This literature perceives the failure to incorporate local conditions, needs and knowledge to cause the failures of many "top-down" interventions. Improving cooperation and effectiveness of project objectives thus requires increasing local understanding of project activities and incorporating local knowledge. Advocates of community-focused conservation have borrowed this logic to claim that using participatory development can help achieve conservation goals (Ghimire & Pimbert, 1997; Pimbert & Pretty, 1997; 1995; Western & Wright, 1994; Wells & Brandon, 1992).

Proponents of community conservation[1] recognize that the hardships national parks place on rural communities often cause people to not only have negative feelings towards the park, but often to transfer these feelings into action by actively flouting conservation regulations. If given a stake in the resource, local people will not only cooperate in restricting illegal use, but work to keep others out as well.

Despite this new local focus, many participatory experiments in Africa have had little sustained success either at inducing local cooperation or protecting the natural resources within the park (Brandon, 1997; Gibson & Marks, 1995; Wells & Brandon, 1992). In Zambia and Zimbabwe, policies that return a share of park revenues to local communities have not stopped people from illegally using the park (Gibson & Marks, 1995; Metcalfe, 1994). Failing to maintain the promised stream of benefits has actually increased resentment of the park (Ghimire, 1994; Western, 1984). In addition to the difficulties in engendering cooperation, altering the distribution of benefits can aggravate political tensions. In Zambia, politicians usurped community conservation revenues to reward clients (Gibson, 1999). In Kenya, controversy over designing a revenue sharing system that could avert this patronage dilemma forced the reforming director of wildlife to resign.

Critics of community conservation claim that the poor performance of many national parks in Africa does not indicate a failure of the enforcement-oriented paradigm, but a failure of implementation due to corrupt and ineffective enforcement institutions

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[1] Numerous terms exist in the literature representing the approach, including community conservation (KWS, 1990), community-based conservation (Western & Wright, 1994) and participatory conservation (Pimbert & Pretty, 1997). The common denominator of these different terms is a conservation planning approach that incorporates policies addressing the needs of local people. This dissertation will employ both terms, community conservation and participatory conservation, as all efforts to gain local support for conservation require participation, either in formal management bodies or informal agreements.

(Barrett & Alcese, 1995). Although even if true, the economic and institutional constraints faced by most African governments implies that substantial improvement in performance will be difficult and time-consuming. Moreover, a focus on reforming enforcement overlooks the ethical considerations of restricting access to the resources inside the parks. Therefore, despite the relative ineffectiveness of existing participatory models, there is an emerging consensus that the future of conservation. especially in developing countries, lies in addressing the needs of local peoples (Pimbert & Pretty, 1995; Western & Wright, 1994; Carter & Lewis, 1993). However, as the loss of the aesthetic, ecological and economic benefits provided by natural areas is potentially irreversible, understanding which incentives will be most successful at encouraging participation with conservation measures will be essential before more unsuccessful programs "accelerate the very damage their proponents intend to reverse," (Korten, 1995).

Objective of Study

This dissertation addresses this knowledge gap by examining two primary research questions: *Why do policymakers select policies promoting greater local participation? How do these policies influence individual choices to participate?*

This dissertation claims that identifying the institutional influences on policy formation and policy outcomes can fruitfully address these questions. Community conservation programs involve efforts to gain local support for conservation. These programs attempt to encourage (varying levels of) local participation in the sharing of benefits and management responsibilities of the protected area. However, this logic and

the linkage between participation and conservation outcomes, remains largely unproven (Barrett & Alcese, 1994). This dissertation addresses this gap in the literature by examining the creation and outcomes of community conservation programs in villages bordering two Ugandan national parks.

The East African nation of Uganda provides a unique opportunity to study these issues. Uganda's ongoing political and institutional rehabilitation after years of turmoil provides a useful context from which to examine the design and implementation of policies. Faced with the dilemma of rebuilding its dilapidated conservation network while improving the living conditions of its growing population, President Museveni supported the creation of policies that focus on local communities, including limited user rights within some recently demarcated national parks (Butynski & Kalina, 1993). International donors and non-governmental organizations (NGOs), recognizing that Uganda's high population growth threatens its natural resources (World Bank, 1993), have provided necessary support to facilitate implementation of these policy changes. Consequently, Uganda's experiments promise a greater degree of local participation and user rights than in most other African national parks.

Significance to the Study of Environmental Policy

The policy dilemma guiding this dissertation is the widespread promotion of participatory conservation strategies despite the poor record of success in practice. This contradiction is representative of the shortcomings of environmental policy literature as a whole. Numerous scholars have bemoaned the lack of rigorous and generalizable study in the environmental and natural resource policy literature. The literature in

environmental policy has been characterized as being in an early state of theory-building (Sabatier, 1999; Fairfax & Ingram, 1990) and research has been spread over a wide range of disciplines, and within a wide variety of theoretical perspectives within the disciplines. These competing theories identify different concepts as critical and specify widely different hypotheses to test (Jenkins-Smith, 1991). Therefore, too often the literature has not been cumulative with limited replication, testing and amending of theories. Much of the research has been local and case oriented, rather than global, which has served to limit generalizability (Adams, 1990). Finally, much of the environmental policy literature has been prescriptive (Francis, 1990). Scholars have been more interested in stories and outcomes than yielding rejectable hypotheses or testing general theories (Fairfax & Ingram, 1990).

Organization of Study

Chapter Two develops the conceptual lens through which this dissertation analyzes policy creation and outcomes. I employ an approach based on the new institutionalism literature that focuses on identifying the different actors involved and the motivations for their actions. An integral component of this approach is a focus on incentives; examining how existing institutions and institutional changes alter the incentives of policymakers, park rangers and local community members. As the decision whether or not to participate is a political decision, I examine differing conceptions of participation in terms of who is likely to support them and how they are likely to alter the incentives of local community members. I finish by identifying how collaboration has the potential to overcome many of the limitations of other participatory conservation

activities and put forth research propositions that suggest under which conditions collaboration is likely to be selected and to improve outcomes.

Chapter Three details the political and economic reforms implemented by Ugandan President Museveni to place the conservation policies in an institutional context. Uganda's turbulent political history and limited institutional capacity influenced community conservation activities by heavily constraining policy options as well as conditioning relationships. I subsequently apply this institutional approach to address three puzzles concerning community conservation. Chapter Four examines the first puzzle: the unusual decision to increase conservation restrictions by upgrading six forest reserves to national park status. Despite Uganda's tremendous constraints and many competing demands for scarce government resources; the government increased the number of national parks from four to ten within a three-year period. Uganda's turbulent history of institutional collapse and recent rehabilitation severely constrained policy options and allowed international donors to hold a great deal of influence in policy decisions. By examining the policy changes as reflections of political struggles for control of scarce government resources, as much as support for conservation, this chapter explains why President Museveni supported such a seemingly unpopular policy.

The fifth chapter examines the second puzzle: why did Ugandan policymakers adopt a community conservation policy that promoted collaboration and greater local responsibilities for management and use? The expansion of the parks greatly strengthened the authority of the Uganda National Parks, however without a corresponding increase in the resources required for managing them. Faced with such a dilemma, the Uganda National Parks allied itself with groups that could provide the

support it needed to attempt to manage its estate. This analysis builds on the results of Chapter Four by showing that the institutional changes regarding national parks represented as much struggles for control, as they did philosophies towards conservation.

Chapter Six examines the development of collaborative management at the local level. Representing the wide array of possible community conservation arrangements, policymakers selected different strategies at the different parks. This analysis shows that these strategies represented the outcomes as various stakeholders involved exerting their preferences. At Bwindi, the relatively greater power of the park authority, and interest by conservation organizations, resulted in the creation of a community policy that was more oriented towards protection. At Mt. Elgon, the inability to control illegal use led the park management to accept rules allowing greater local use. The history of interactions plays a large role in determining how willing local people will be to work with them in developing a collaborative agreement.

The seventh chapter examines the final puzzle: to what extent does collaboration, or more active local participation, improve outcomes of participatory conservation? I compare pilot projects initiating collaborative management at two national parks, Bwindi and Mt. Elgon, to nearby sites offering less active local participation. Results indicate that although sharing of rights and responsibilities does not always improve outcomes, given appropriate incentives and assurance mechanisms, collaboration can more effectively generate local involvement as well as direct that involvement towards activities that support conservation.

CHAPTER TWO

AN INSTITUTIONAL APPROACH TO ANALYZING PARTICIPATION

Introduction

The goal of this study is to develop an improved understanding of the origin and outcomes of different participatory conservation incentives. This chapter begins by describing the institutional analytic approach that guides this inquiry. An institutional approach focuses attention on how different structures of rules influence behavior and as a result, policy outcomes. Different rules create incentives for behavior that lead to characteristic choices. As "community" responses ultimately depend on the behavior of individuals, both within and outside local communities, this dissertation employs a framework for institutional analysis that focuses on how different participatory strategies interact with the physical and cultural environment to create incentives for the involved actors (Ostrom, Gardner & Walker, 1994).

Employing this framework, I show how protected area policies create incentives for local people to oppose the national parks and why the incentives created by the dominant participatory conservation strategies often fail to improve this situation. Approaches promoting economic benefits or local empowerment often fail to provide convincing explanations of why locals should participate or how this participation will improve conservation outcomes. Collaboration, or the sharing of responsibilities between local communities and the park authority, offers the potential to improve upon many of the limitations of traditional participatory programs. However, historical mistrust,

potentially high transaction costs and the possibility of strategic behavior make collaboration a costly and uncertain process. Therefore, successful participation involves the interrelated problems of encouraging reluctant people to cooperate while ensuring that the desired activities improve conservation.

This chapter concludes by outlining the research propositions that guide this study and the methods used in examining them. My first proposition employs a structural choice argument to argue that government actors and policymakers support participatory policies because they receive benefits from the promotion of these policies unrelated to conservation. My second research proposition states that to encourage reluctant people to participate, successful collaborative arrangements must provide not only incentives, but assurance mechanisms that increase trust and demonstrate the commitment of the government towards the collaborative process. My third research proposition suggests that successful collaborative arrangements must direct the activities towards the intended objective through institutional mechanisms that protect against strategic behavior. I examine these propositions by studying the process of constructing participatory conservation policies in Uganda and their subsequent application in communities bordering two national parks.

I. Analytic Approach

To guide analysis of participatory conservation, this dissertation employs a conceptual framework for institutional analysis derived from the new institutionalism

literature (as per Ostrom et. al, 1994).[2] Institutions – rules, norms and shared strategies - define what actions are required, prohibited, or permitted and the sanctions authorized if the rules are not followed (Ostrom et. al, 1994; 38). Such an approach focuses attention on how these rules affect the behavior of individuals, the actions they may take, and the likely outcomes of their actions. Institutions structure incentives and determine resource allocations by delineating who gets to play and what tools they get to use. As such, institutions do not determine outcomes, but influence them be setting parameters to choices (Levi, 1997; Koelble, 1995). As institutionalist scholars examine the impact of institutions on actors' behavior, it is an ideal lens from which to view the potential outcomes of participatory programs offering different packages of incentives (Hall & Taylor, 1996).

Scholars employing an institutional approach assume that outcomes can be effectively identified by examining how the structure of rules, operating within the existing political and social structures, provide opportunities and constraints that guide individual behavior. Therefore, individuals, their preferences and institutions form the center of analysis (Knight, 1992; North, 1990). This is an especially fruitful method of analysis as both the nature of policies selected and the implementation process ultimately depends on the choices and actions of individuals. The park management authority as

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[2] There are at least three schools of New Institutionalism: historical institutionalism, rational choice institutionalism and sociological institutionalism (See Hall & Taylor, 1996; Koeble, 1995). However as noted by Ostrom (1995), there has been a convergence of the different approaches as rational choice institutionalists have been moving closer to the historical and sociological schools. Rational choice scholars have begun dealing with questions of power and distribution that interest those associated with the historical approach (See Knight, 1992) as well as incorporating culture and informal institutions as suggested by the sociological approach (See Ostrom, et al, 1994). The remaining major difference between the schools becomes the question of scale. Rational Choice new instituiuionalists believe that social outcomes can be explained by individual actions, thus they employ the individual as the unit of analysis. Historical and sociological approaches are more macro in focus, believing that social institutions explain individual behavior.

well as rural villages are comprised of individuals whose decisions whether or not to cooperate or which rules to follow greatly influence the outcomes of these participatory policies. An institutional analysis involves examining how the institutional arrangement creates incentives for the involved actors.

New institutionalists assert that institutions help prevent sub-optimal collective outcomes as represented by the *Tragedy of the Commons* by reducing actors' uncertainty (Gibson, 1999; Ensminger, 1992; North, 1990). Through formal rules, informal rules and enforcement mechanisms, institutions influence the pattern of costs and benefits that individuals face (Levi, 1997; Hall & Taylor, 1996; North, 1990). By reducing incomplete information and coordinating individual behavior, institutions can help to harness individual rationality to produce more efficient collective outcomes (Gibson, 1999; Levi, 1997; Ostrom, Gardner & Walker, 1994; Bromley, 1992). This recognition is important as with unreliable formal enforcement, participatory conservation strategies ultimately rely on the involved actors agreeing to cooperate.

The problem of collective action (Olson, 1965)[3] depicts the often substantial barriers for individuals to work together to resolve problems that they collectively face. Where individuals jointly consume a resource and exclusion is difficult, rational individuals have the incentive to free-ride, or enjoy the benefits without contributing personally, rather than contribute to the collective good (Olson, 1965; Ostrom, Gardner & Walker, 1994; Ostrom, 1990). As with the *Tragedy of the Commons*, the common solution to the collective action problem is privatization or the introduction of an external authority strong enough to impose and enforce behavior towards the collective good (G.

[3]Sandler (1992) and R. Hardin (1987) present reasoned refutations of Olson's logic.

Hardin, 1968, Olson, 1965). National parks and other protected areas are representative of this imposition of a set of rules and external enforcement authority on resident peoples, while the intended collective good of conservation accrues to the nation as a whole or all of mankind. As exemplified by the *Tragedy of the Commons*, individual self-interest can lead to environmental degradation. Through shirking and corruption, park authorities in many African countries have contributed to degradation by failing to enforce effectively conservation regulations. Thus an institutional approach provides insights into why these seemingly undesirable outcomes, for both Hardin's rural herders and for African park rangers, sometimes occur. The free-riding problem can make voluntary contributions to the public good non-rational, thus requiring outside coercion.

Identifying collective action as an insurmountable obstacle leads to pessimistic conclusions not verified empirically. People do organize successfully and work together to overcome the barriers Olson identified (Sandler, 1992; Ostrom, 1990). Therefore, analysts can gain utility by identifying the conditions under which people cooperate, rather than focusing on the obstacles. Collective action is not simply the joint actions of a homogenous community, but the outcome of choices and interactions made by individuals, both inside and outside the community. Thus successful collective action relies upon these individuals developing a common understanding that cannot simply be provided by the imposition of external authority (Lam, 1994). Inducing cooperation with conservation authorities differs from a collective action problem as non-community actors are organizing community members to cooperate with government policies that may not necessarily be in the best interest of local community members. Nevertheless identifying the factors that enhance collective action demonstrates the usefulness of an

institutional approach towards understanding the conditions under which rural communities can successfully generate collective behavior.

Thus examining what types of rules can enhance the likelihood of generating the desired outcomes is a primary focus for new institutionalists. Scholars have successfully addressed this question in terms of the design principles of successful commons management systems. Successful self-governing institutions demonstrate how individuals have crafted institutions to overcome the dilemma of collective action to enforcement imposed by an external authority.

The literature on common-pool resources has identified community characteristics and institutional design criteria that encourage sustainable use of natural resources. A common-pool resource occurs in situations where exclusion is difficult and resource use is subtractable (Ostrom, Gardner & Walker, 1994). In contrast to the pessimistic outcomes suggested by the logic of collective action and the tragedy of the commons, Ostrom (1990) discovered numerous societies that have organized successfully to sustainably manage natural resources. Key characteristics of such self-governing institutions include attributes such as the existence of clearly defined boundaries, graduated sanctions and users having the ability to design and change rules and effective monitoring. These characteristics define who is allowed to participate, the rules that people will follow and the penalties for violations. Of crucial importance is the design of collective-choice arrangements, ensuring that the individuals affected by the operational, or daily, rules can participate in modifying them. To the extent that participation entails organizing local cooperation, these institutional attributes provide guidance for assessing participatory conservation as well.

Rational Action and Incentives

Identifying how institutional arrangements are likely to influence policy outcomes requires assuming a model of individual behavior. New institutionalists from the rational choice tradition assume a model of the individual (at least somewhat) as a rational actor. However, they reject *thick* rational choice assumptions such as individuals strategically calculating utility maximization with complete information (North, 1990). Additional *thick* rational choice assumptions such as actors responding primarily to economic self-interest and that different people can be expected to behave alike have been claimed to be inappropriate to non-Western cultures where people pursue multiple, often contradictory courses of action not to maximize utility, but to keep their options option (Berry, 1993). In reducing human motivations to preferences, thick rationality overlooks the diversity of ways in which humans value things (Taylor, 1994). Moreover, and possibly as a result, thick rational choice explanations often fail when tested empirically (Green & Shapiro, 1994).

However, *thinner* versions incorporating bounded rationality (Simon, 1981) that assume individuals act according to different structures of incentives are being increasingly applied with empirical success to situations throughout the world, including Africa (Gibson, 1999; Firmin-Sellers, 1995; Ensminger, 1992; Thompson, 1992). Boundedly-rational actors make decisions under uncertainty with incomplete information, therefore decision-making may be influenced by interpersonal interactions as well as perceptions of the actions of others (Ostrom, 1990). This conceptualization of the rational actor places more emphasis on situational characteristics, or understanding the action situation confronting individuals, than just on an individual's internal

calculation processes (Ostrom, 1990). This leads to a more inductive research approach, seeing how people actually behave rather than relying solely on the formal deduction of equilibrium conditions (McGinnis, 1998; Thelen & Steinmo, 1992).

Although bounded-rationality is an important refinement, recognizing the importance of cultural constraints on behavior can further increase its utility and policy relevance (Lockhart & Wildavsky, 1998; Wildavsky, 1994). Preferences are shaped by culture and therefore even if individual behavior is purposeful, similar institutions in different circumstances may elicit very different behavior (Kloppenberg, 1995; Ensminger, 1992). Therefore, incorporating socio-economic and cultural structures can improve institutional analysis (Snyder & Mahoney, 1999). Although the incorporation of culture, power and bounded rationality decreases deductive power, by mirroring the real world more closely, it offers a more useful approach to policy analysis (Uphoff, 1992). In so doing, an institutional approach provides the bridge between the historical contingency and path dependency of historical institutionalists (Robertson, 1993; Steinmo, Thelen & Longstretch, 1992) and the importance of society and culture in constraining institutions of Sociological Institutionalists (Powell & DiMaggio, 1991)[4]. However, recognizing culture as an influence does not imply it to be the dominant explanation for political decisions and behavior.[5] Therefore, unlike the societal and cultural determinism of some sociologists (Powell & DiMaggio, 1991), my approach endogenizes history and cultural attributes as influences, but not necessarily determinants, of institutional responses.

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[4]Ostrom (1995) and Koelble (1995) also make this argument.

[5]In political science, cultural influences are commonly considered insubstantial and residual (Coleman , 1990; Lowi, 1984) and incapable of accounting for political change (Steinmo, 1994; Rogowski, 1974).

Assuming that people are boundedly-rational implies that they act purposely based on some perception of incentives. Devising policies that will induce local people to cooperate in conservation activities thus involves identifying the appropriate incentives given the structure of the situation they face. Much of the public policy literature considers incentives primarily in terms of economic inducements (Weimer & Vining, 1992; McNeely, 1988; Baumal & Oates, 1988). Under this conception, policymakers prescribe policies such as tax incentives or subsidies to motivate the desired change in behavior. However, even while assuming individuals are rational actors, assuming people respond primarily to economic inducements ignores the reality that incentives such as norms or social approval seem to be major influences on behavior (Taylor, 1994; Ensminger, 1992).

The analytical approach used in this dissertation focuses on how different policies, economic as well as non-economic, create incentives for local people to cooperate in protecting the resource. An incentive for conservation is any inducement that is specifically intended to incite or motivate governments, local people, or international organizations to conserve biological diversity. A disincentive is any inducement or mechanism designed to discourage depleting of biological diversity. Alternatively, a perverse incentive induces behavior that depletes biological diversity (Borrini-Feyerabend, 1997; 100). Together, incentives and disincentives provide the 'carrot' and the 'stick' for motivating behavior that will conserve biological resources. Incentives facing individuals cannot be determined from the inducements offered from the policies themselves, but only in relation to the specific institutional, physical and cultural context (Ostrom et. al, 1993; Putnam, 1993). Analyzing the policy process thus

involves the study of interactions among different actors subject to these various incentives.

From this perspective, the national park rules generate incentives that make it unlikely that local communities will support the parks. As they suffer damages from the parks while receiving few benefits, not only do park neighbors fail to support the rules, often they actively violate them. The goods provided by national parks - biodiversity conservation and tourism - are often substantially different than the goods desired by local residents - hunting, grazing land, firewood. As park rangers themselves face few incentives or available resources to enforce these unpopular rules, unregulated illegal resource use is the outcome at many national parks. Analyzing participatory conservation policies therefore requires addressing the extent to which they reverse this pattern of perverse incentives and induce local communities and park rangers to work together in supporting the park rules and conserving the resource.

Identifying characteristics of successful self-governing systems demonstrates how communities can create rules that influence whether cooperation or free-riding becomes the dominant incentive. However, in addition to understanding the types of rules that are necessary, new institutionalist scholars examine the conditions under which groups of people are likely to make these rules and follow them (Knight, 1992). Participatory conservation often does not involve encouraging communities to organize and develop self-governing institutions, but encouraging interactions between local communities and the relevant government authority. In many African countries, not only have the formal rules failed to include avenues for local participation, but also government representatives have actively discouraged such involvement. Under such conditions, individuals may

not be willing collaborators, even when invited to do so. Thus examining potential outcomes of participatory conservation institutions will require identifying not only how different rules provide incentives for cooperation or free-riding, but how successfully the government agency can change reputations and encourage local communities to participate in the process.

Incorporating Politics into Institutional Analysis

Missing from numerous nature-society studies is the "serious treatment of politics," (Peet and Watts, 1993; 240). In addition to an improved understanding of incentives, my approach recognizes the importance of politics in explaining how the structure of policies influences outcomes. Rather than viewing policymaking as the result of a rational policy process whereby government agencies select the policies intended to produce the most efficient outcomes, I follow new institutionalist scholars that assume that rationality and efficiency are not always the desired outcome (Ensminger, 1992; Knight, 1992). Politics is crucial to policy outcomes. Policy is the product of the actions of interested actors who bring their resources to bear upon politically ambitious actors and the policy process (Bates, 1989). Individuals within government agencies operate under constraints imposed by their institutional structure and norms of actions (Ostrom, Gardner & Walker, 1994). Faced with these competing influences on decision-making, improved conservation often represents only one objective of conservation policies, and not necessarily the dominant objective (Gibson, 1999). Therefore, inefficient policies that may be harmful to the nation as a whole can be preferred if they create the opportunity for certain individuals within the government

to gain tremendous wealth and power (Knight, 1992; North, 1990; Bates, 1981). Given adequate resources, these individuals have the ability to not only resist, but also corrupt, attempted reforms. Examining the motivations of government officials, as well as the institutional constraints within which they work, presents a more accurate explanation of why officials adopt particular policies. As these underlying expectations and motivations are likely to influence how government agents implement the policies once they are selected, and in so doing, influence policy outcomes. Under these assumptions, analyzing participatory conservation policies involves examining both the process of policy formation as well as the subsequent impacts of the policies towards encouraging local participation.

New institutionalist studies of the politics underlying institutional change can provide helpful insights into how these changes may affect policy outcomes. Recognizing that individuals lack complete information increases the importance of transaction costs - the costs of negotiating, monitoring and enforcing agreements (Eggertsson, 1990). High transaction costs can create incentives for individuals to create institutions to counteract them. Minimizing these costs are important as over the long-term, high transactions cost will inhibit investments in exchange relationships (Eggertsson, 1990). However, the claim that the goal of minimizing transaction costs motivates institutional change has troubling limitations. Claiming that individuals create institutions to improve the collective good can be inconsistent with individual rationality (Knight, 1992). Moreover, rather than improving efficiency, some institutional arrangements, such as those encouraging local participation, can raise transaction costs by increasing the numbers of bargaining partners and interactions (Levi, 1988).

Designing and implementing participatory conservation institutions represent significant changes to the established enforcement-oriented conservation policies common in Africa, thereby altering the existing distribution of authority and resources. Incorporating politics into the analysis recognizes that individuals can desire institutional change for distributive purposes or personal gain, rather than efficiency (Knight, 1992).

The study of common property resources represent one of the most fruitful areas of empirical research for institutionalist scholars. Self-governance scholars have explored the combination of rule configurations and property rights that facilitate local communities to successfully organize and overcome collective action problems (Berkes, 1998; Bromley, 1992; Ostrom, 1990). The participatory conservation programs that are the focus of this study do not represent opportunities for self-governance, but opportunities for cooperation between local communities and the government authority. Therefore, the analytic approach must include an examination of incentives for government actors as well. It must include an examination of why government authorities select certain policies as well as how the actions of government actors influence the likelihood for local cooperation.

Scholars of bureaucratic politics have focused on how the structure and organization of bureaucracies inhibits or enables efficient outcomes. The new economics of organization altered this focus of bureaucratic study to how the designers of bureaucracies create institutions to allow them greater control (Moe, 1984). Under the politics of structural choice, politicians, interest groups and bureaucrats compete to structure public agencies to achieve their own particular goals (Gibson, 1999; Moe, 1984). Early work in this vein sought to understand bureaucracy by developing the

theory of legislative control. Legislators create institutions to prevent bureaucratic drift and control behavior of self-interested bureaucrats (McCubbins, Noll & Weingast, 1987). Scholars often analyze this approach in terms of principal-agent theory with the legislature as the principal and the bureau as the agent. The different goals between principals and agents give agents the incentive to shirk. The information asymmetry allows bureaucrats to be unresponsive to agents (Waterman & Meier, 1998). As bureaucrats and legislators do not have exactly the same interests and because monitoring behavior is costly, legislatures design institutional arrangements that minimize the costs of the undesirable behavior of agents and of the activities undertaken to control it (Jensen & Meckling, 1986). Principals can limit shirking and opportunistic behavior of the agent by establishing selective incentives, incurring monitoring costs or employing sanctioning.[6] These methods reward the agent for foregoing is own interest in the present for greater rewards in the future. Examining how bureaucrats and interest groups create institutions to avoid such control represents an alternative focus for this theory (Gibson, 1999, Horn, 1995; Moe, 1984).

These approaches have provided useful insights over the perspective of bureaucracies being either bloated and inefficient or as faithfully serving in the public interest. However, ascribing the dominance of legislatures or bureaucracies more effectively explains politics under the separation of powers existent in Western democracies than in other systems where an executive dominates politics. In Africa, the one-party president dominates decision-making (Wunsch & Olowu, 1990; Diamond, 1988; Jackson & Rosberg, 1982) and thus analysts must place his preferences in the

[6]Models that account for multiple principals more closely match most empirical conditions of multiple principals and agents (Waterman & Meier, 1998; Moe, 1987).

forefront of policymaking analysis. Recognizing the importance of the executive directs analysis towards how the powerful president creates institutions to control the bureaucracy or how bureaucratic and interest groups compete for the executive's patronage (Moe, 1997; Gibson, 1999). In order to gain the resources necessary to compete with the executive, groups often seek the financial support of foreign donors and organizations (Gibson, 1999). However, the executive as well often requires the support of foreign donors, perhaps not to gain policymaking authority, but to implement them effectively.

In Africa, although the executive dominates formal decision-making structures, it is often too weak to follow through and secure that these interests are met (Costello, 1994; Diamond, 1988). The substantial costs yet limited potential benefits from engaging the state authority provides individuals the opportunity to evade formal institutions. Thus, although holding little formal power, citizens nevertheless influence outcomes of formal rules by their decisions whether or not to cooperate. Where the executive may have the formal authority, but not the capacity to coerce, the executive must design institutions to encourage voluntary compliance (Weimer & Vining, 1992). This extends a traditional principal-agent problem as the problem for the executive extends beyond agency problems of government representatives to include encouraging the cooperation of citizens. Consequently, successful institutional arrangements must not only provide citizens with benefits from cooperation, but also demonstrate the trustworthiness of government actors (Weber, 1998; Kloppenberg, 1995).

Reputation and Credible Commitments

Understanding how both rules and reputation influence policy outcomes represents an important contribution to an institutional approach to analyzing policies. Much of the participation literature ignores the complexity of relations between state and society by viewing local people as willing collaborators (Borrini-Feyerebend, 1997; McNeely, 1994; Carter & Lewis, 1993). However, many African governments have not only ignored, but also actively discouraged, local participation. As many African societies have suffered from regimes that have employed state power in authoritarian, corrupt and predatory manners, communities have often tried to evade, rather than engage, state authorities (Hyden, 1980). In addition to these perceptions of personal costs and benefits, expectations conditioned by previous experience influence individual decisions whether to comply with park access restrictions. As this power to withdraw consent is an important "weapon of the weak," (Scott, 1976), analyzing the impacts of participation requires identifying the motivations of local community members. Individual decisions whether or not to cooperate can reflect quasi- voluntary compliance whereby individuals recognize that they will receive some benefit from compliance, and that there will be sanctions, or costs, to violations of the rules (Levi, 1988).

Under these conditions, simply revising policies or promoting potential incentives is unlikely to be effective unless communities can be convinced that the government will meet its obligations (Levi, 1997; Eggertsson, 1997; Root, 1989). Thus demonstrating an assurance mechanism, the set of rules governing political interaction, is an essential component of encouraging actors to cooperate community cooperation. The assurance mechanism can include factors such as: a credible commitment to collaboration by

political leaders, a reputation for commitment to collaborative processes by the agency in charge of the rule and formal binding agreements (Weber, 1998). Incorporating such mechanisms helps reduce uncertainties and provides individuals a stake in the outcomes thereby engendering the trust necessary for cooperation to take hold.

Credible commitment exists when players expect that all parties will follow the rules, either formal or informal (North, 1995; Kraybill & Weber, 1995; Ostrom, 1990). North (1995) distinguishes between two types of credible commitment: motivationally credible commitments (not requiring punitive action) and imperative credible commitments (which require the threat of punitive action to achieve compliance). Thus, credible commitments can occur with or without enforcement. In situations of self-governance, the commitment problem frequently resembles a tit for tat strategy, in which community members will cooperate if they are convinced others are as well. Therefore commitment depends on mutual monitoring and information on the behavior of others (Ostrom, 1990). As involving cooperation with government actors in national parks involves the added dimension of cooperation with a perceived untrustworthy government, the commitment problem entails not only differences in information, but in power (Root, 1989). Inducing cooperation with conservation policies is especially problematic as local communities often distrust the central government authority and the armed park rangers, with whom any contact is mostly adversarial. Thus, in many cases, individuals pursue the exit option (Hyden, 1980), choosing to avoid contact as much as possible both with government and park authorities.

Implementing community conservation policies thus will be more difficult in communities whose relations with park authorities have been openly hostile. However, it

also presents an opportunity for reforming governments to change this perception – if they can convince people that the reforms are credible. This is essentially a problem of reputation-building; how to both change the way the state agency operates and simultaneously change the public's perception of the state.

Numerous scholars have identified the importance of reputation in influencing the likelihood of cooperation (Ostrom, Gardner & Walker, 1994; Milgrom & North, 1990; Milgrom, North & Weingast, 1990). These scholars note that repeated interactions and establishing a continuing relationship can improve reputations. Commitment to a course of action occurs by setting a precedent of responsible behavior and of being committed to a set of rules (Knight, 1992; Milgrom, North & Weingast, 1990; North, 1990). Such commitment necessitates providing an arena for communication, reputation building and the growth of trust. However, the vast differences in power and formal authority between state representatives and rural villagers make reputation building more difficult. By leaving the confines of the park and becoming actively involved in local communities, park authorities can begin to improve their reputation with local people. To this end, African national park authorities are beginning to alter militaristic approach of the rangers and involve the rangers more in the local communities. Reforming governments have frequently contributed to this lack of trust their failure to deliver what they promise. Raising expectations and then failing to deliver as promised weakens the incentives of people to participate (Esman & Uphoff, 1984). Therefore, obtaining support for conservation institutions likely will be one of the most difficult of all sectors. Unlike other sectors such as education, where citizens would welcome state return after years of

neglect, most park neighbors will likely not welcome state enforcement of conservation laws after years of non-enforcement.

The theory of *contingent consent* (Levi, 1997) further reinforces these arguments by positing that under such conditions of mutual mistrust, local compliance is contingent upon assurances that the government will meet its obligations, that local people value the collective good and assurances that other citizens will in fact contribute (no free riding). Individuals will be more likely to contingently consent if they perceive the policy to be legitimate and its implementation as fair (Levi, 1997). Policies most likely to evoke widespread behavioral consent are those that facilitate interaction between rangers and local people and whose objectives are consistent with the social values of the individuals. Rather than indicating agreement, compliance can signify that individuals realize that they can nevertheless do better by complying than from defecting (Levi, 1997; Knight, 1992). Thus, compliance requires monitoring and information on the behavior of others, as individuals are less likely to comply if they know that others are enjoying increased benefits from defecting.

An Integrated Institutional Approach

By providing explanations for policy creation as well as likely outcomes, these variants of the new institutionalism literature contribute useful tools to assess the potential for participatory conservation. The politics of structural choice demonstrates why government actors may select these policies, even when they involve voluntarily ceding some formal authority. Policymakers may design policies to provide advantages for the designers, rather than the accomplishment of the stated objective. In addition, the

new institutionalism provides improved understanding into the determinants of individual choices to participate as well as rules that will structure interactions towards productive outcomes. Identifying the importance of assurance mechanisms and credible commitments offers insights into the likelihood of encouraging local people to participate in the process. The design principles of self-governing institutions demonstrate how different configurations of rules can make cooperation, rather than defection, the dominant incentive for individuals. Individuals act in their self-interest, constrained by formal rules as well as informal rules or norms. Individuals are more likely to cooperate when they perceive the benefits to be greater than the costs (Ostrom, 1990), value the good being produced (Levi, 1997) and perceive cooperation to be the dominant action (Knight, 1992). This approach directs attention towards examining the preferences of the involved actors, the process of rule creation and attributes of the rules themselves.

To guide analysis of incentives, this dissertation relies on an analytical framework derived from the Institutional Analysis and Development (IAD) Framework (Ostrom et. al, 1994). Individuals are the focus of analysis and individuals respond to differing incentives. The interaction of bio-physical, institutional and cultural factors shapes these incentives. This framework focuses on an action arena - situations where diverse participants decide among a range of actions in light of the information possessed about how actions are linked to possible outcomes and the different costs and benefits assigned to actions and outcomes (Ostrom et. al, 1994). Employing this framework thus involves analyzing how physical, cultural and institutional factors interact to structure the incentives of individuals and the corresponding outcomes likely to result (Ostrom & Wertime, 1995; Ostrom et. al, 1994).

This approach thus improves upon both the narrow rational choice approach as well as the conception of incentives as being strictly economic (as per McNeely, 1988). In addition, it focuses attention on the interactions between the different actors involved in the policy process, not simply rural communities. How park rangers interpret and implement the policies will in part determine how rural communities respond to the policies. By incorporating both formal and informal rules,[7] this approach produces a much more accurate representation of reality than approaches that focus on formal rules and regulatory mandates (North, 1990). In Africa, as well as other developing regions, many of the most important rules are informal (Bratton & van de Walle, 1997; Williams, 1996). Finally, the framework directs attention towards the multiple levels of analysis from which decision-making affects institutional rules.[8] All rules are nested in an additional set of rules that define how the first set of rules can be changed (Ostrom, Gardner& Walker, 1994; 46). This is crucial as identifying how these different types of rules influence decision-making provides a valuable framework for examining how the processes of rule creation are often influential in determining operational outcomes.

By focusing attention on the interactions among individuals and directing the researcher to identify who is participating, their motivations and the likely outcomes, this approach can assist scholars to gain an improved understanding of policy choices concerning local participation and the resulting likely outcomes. Most conceptions of participation focus on two types of incentives, those providing material benefits and those providing empowerment or managerial responsibilities. The following section will

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[7] Also referred to as rules in use (See Sproule-Jones, 1993).

[8] Ostrom et. al (1994) refer to three different levels of analysis: operational (day to day activities), collective choice (operational decision-making) and constitutional (collective-choice decision-making).

examine these two conceptions through the analytical framework described above to demonstrate why collaboration may be a more fruitful approach.

II. Alternative Theories of Participatory Conservation

Participation has become so ingrained in the policy literature that it is rare to find a current article, project document or management plan involving either conservation or development that does not directly refer to local participation. This recognition of the need for local participation, but also of the ineffectiveness of many participatory strategies, highlights the puzzle of how best to improve the quality of participation. Participation as a term is used to represent many different concepts in both the academic and practitioner literatures (Michener, 1998). A village meeting where park rules are discussed, a small group selecting the type of project to be built with revenue sharing funds or a village leader deciding the punishment of someone caught illegally in the park can all be examples of local participation. The following discussion will review the primary themes of the existing literature on participation.

To understand this diversity of meanings, scholars have developed different classification systems focusing on different dimensions. A popular approach focuses on the level of participation, underlying the relative power of outsiders and local people as key characteristics in defining participation (Pimbert & Pretty, 1995; Deshler & Stock, 1985). This typology examines the relative influence of local people at different stages of the process with the higher degrees of involvement characterized as *Active* (Pimbert & Pretty, 1995) or *Genuine* (Deschler & Sock, 1985). By contrast, *Passive* (Pimbert &

Pretty, 1995) or *Pseudo-Participation* (Deschler & Sock, 1985) represents more limited means of local influence.

An alternative means of categorizing participation disaggregates participation by the type of activity (decisionmaking, implementation, benefits, evaluation), people involved (local residents, local leaders, government personnel, foreign personnel) and how it is organized (Cohen & Uphoff, 1980). This approach usefully recognizes that communities rarely encompass homogenous interests as well as begins to identify that the kind and purpose of local involvement influences outcomes. These typologies are useful for identifying the differences in participation. However, these typologies frequently lack adequate theoretical explanations to facilitate understanding which types and under what circumstances, participation is likely to be successful.

Part of the confusion results from participation being conceived of as both an objective in itself as well as a means to achieving the goal of conservation (Michener, 1998). Proponents of the participation as end viewpoint depict participation itself as the goal, facilitating the empowerment of local people to take greater control over the lives (Pimbert & Pretty, 1995; Chambers, 1997; 1984). Supporters of the participation as empowerment viewpoint often either overlook the eventual effects of greater local control on environmental outcomes or assume that greater control will improve conservation. The empowerment literature identifies the failure to incorporate greater participation as the rationale for poor performance (Ghimire & Pimbert, 1997) and the link between improved participation and improved conservation is often not fully developed.

Participation as Sustainable Development

Economic theories of participation conceptualize the park/people conflict in terms of the economic loss imposed by the parks on local communities. People illegally use park resources because they are poor and lack alternatives. By restricting access to its resources, the park rules place hardships on already poor rural communities, while any benefits from tourism revenues accrue elsewhere. Under such conditions, attempts to encourage local support for conservation must focus on improving living conditions of park neighbors.

First widely promoted by the *World Conservation Strategy* (IUCN, 1980) and further articulated in *Our Common Future* (1987) and the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED) in 1992, the logic of integrating conservation and development is based on the premise that conservation is unlikely to be sustainable unless it contributes to meeting the needs of local people. Practitioners have based many community-based conservation strategies on the principle that providing economic and participatory benefits will improve local attitudes towards the park and entice cooperation with conservation activities. Integrated conservation and development projects (ICDPs) are common methods of attempting to gain local support for conservation. ICDPs link the conservation of biological diversity in parks with local social and economic development. Hypothesizing that rural poverty and resource scarcity drive illegal resource use, many ICDPs focus on improving the productivity of land outside the park and increasing local incomes in order to reduce the pressure for exploitation of park resources (Ghimire, 1994; Wells & Brandon, 1992).

The ICDP approach exemplifies the leap from problem recognition to policy prescription, without adequate theoretical justification. Identifying that poor countries suffer resource degradation does not show that it is poverty causing the degradation, nor that economic improvement will therefore improve environmental conditions. As the objective of ICDPs and other such resource substitution strategies is to reduce dependence on the park, such programs maintain the separation between local people and the national park. Although the soil conservation and income generation activities may improve living conditions of park neighbors, they are unlikely to improve attitudes towards the park. As interactions are usually between local people and extension agents representing an international conservation organization, these activities often do little to improve the antagonistic relations between local people and park rangers. Local participation in conservation of the park remains minimal as although people may cooperate in the resource substitution activities, their actions and intentions remain outside the park, on their own land. Moreover, providing people with tree products on their farm may not necessarily diminish the value of the wood resources within the park. Thus, success at encouraging on-farm resource substitution, and the corresponding provision of benefits, remains disconnected to the conservation of the park. There is little reason therefore to expect that the schemes will have much of an impact reducing illegal use.

An alternative method of providing economic benefits consists of channeling revenues generated from the park outside to the surrounding communities; such as through sharing a portion of the tourism revenue or direct income through sales of handicrafts or camping fees (UNP, 1994; Barrow, 1993; KWS, 1990). In contrast to

resource substitution schemes, revenue sharing more closely links the provision of economic benefits to the conservation of the park. As tourism revenues are dependent on maintaining an adequate level of conservation of the park resources, local people have a stake in cooperating to reduce illegal use. Additionally, as locals begin to receive economic benefits, they may no longer perceive the parks as reserved for the benefit of outsiders. However, although the community projects funded by revenue sharing may begin to link the benefit to the park at a community level, at an individual level, schemes that fund community projects such as schools fail to directly tie the benefit to individual behavior (Gibson & Marks, 1995). Although communities may recognize that the project has resulted because of the park, the community benefit has the quality of a public good. As all community members can benefit from the project, whether or not they participate or comply with park rules, individuals have an incentive to free-ride (Olson, 1965). As exclusion from the benefit is difficult, individuals have an incentive not to comply, as they will nevertheless still receive the benefit. Under such conditions, community projects can possibly improve people's attitudes towards the park, and allow them to see some value to it, but are unlikely in themselves to transform these attitudes into behavioral change and improved compliance.

Additionally, as with resource substitution, revenue sharing maintains the separation between local people and the park. Although the benefits may originate from the park, local people themselves remain restricted from park access and estranged from the rangers. Thus, revenue sharing may provide more adequate compensation, as well as a more direct link from benefit to the resource than resource substitution schemes. Nevertheless, participation remains conceptualized as the receipt of economic benefits

while retaining local isolation from the resources within the national park as well as the decision-making concerning its management.

Participation as Local Empowerment

Proponents of economic-based approaches and most participatory conservation programs have interpreted participation not in ways that cede control to local people, but instead as a means to achieve cooperation with the protected area rules (Ghimire & Pimbert, 1997). The economic approach interprets the simple provision of benefits to local communities as "participation." However, the substitution and compensation components of ICDPs, although potentially providing some benefits from the protected area, do not alter the restricted rules of the national park model. For example, scholars frequently cite the CAMPFIRE program in Zimbabwe as an example of successful local participation in Africa[9]. Yet, although local people have benefited with cash, meat and projects, they have hardly participated in management and decision-making (Olthof, 1995; Metcalfe, 1994). Unilateral concessions by the park do not improve the management of relationships, nor does the economic development of the surrounding areas necessarily make conflicts between parks and the local human communities disappear (Hough, 1989). Depending on the existing underfunded, ineffective and often corrupt formal state structures to allocate and regulate use rights in multiple-use protected areas is also unlikely to produce the desired results. Although directed at local communities, these policies are often designed by outsiders who are neither subject to the

[9] See for example, Borrini-Feyerebend, 1997; Carter & Lewis, 1993. These are typical of many favorable characterizations in that they present project objectives as actual outcomes.

direct costs and benefits nor the externalities of the projects they launch (Ascher & Healy, 1990).

Improving the success of participatory conservation strategies will require improving the quality of participation itself to respond better to these conflicts. Pimbert & Pretty distinguish between passive and active modes of participation (See Table 2.1).

Table 2.1: A Typology of Participation

Typology	Components of Each Type
1. Passive participation	People participate by being told what is going to happen or what has already happened. It is unilateral announcement. The information being shared belongs only to external professionals.
2. Participation in information-giving	People participate by answering questions posed by extractive researchers or project managers. People do not have the opportunity to influence proceedings as the findings are neither shared nor checked for accuracy.
3. Participation by consultation	People participate by being consulted, and external agents listen to views. These external agents define both problems and solutions. The agents do not concede any share in decision-making and are under no obligation to take into account people's views.
4. Participation for material incentives	People participate by providing resources, for example labor, in return for food, cash or other material incentives. Rural people provide the resources but are not involved in the process of learning and have no stake in prolonging activities when the incentives end.
5. Functional participation	People participate by forming groups to meet predetermined objectives related to the project. Such involvement does not tend to be at early stages of project cycles or planning, but rather after major decisions have been made. These institutions tend to be dependent on external initiators and facilitators, but may become self-dependent.
6. Interactive participation	People participate in joint-analysis, which leads to action plans and the formation of new local groups or the strengthening of existing ones. These groups take control over local decisions, and so people have a stake in maintaining structures or practices.
7. Self-mobilization	People participate by taking initiatives independent of external institutions to change systems. Such self-initiated mobilization and collective action may or may not challenge existing inequalities of wealth and power.

Source: Modified from Pimbert and Pretty, 1995.

Moving from Type 1 to Type 7, local participation becomes more extensive throughout the different stages of the project cycle and becomes less dependent on outside intervention. Types 1-4 can be characterized as *passive* in which participation is unlikely to continue without outside involvement. Types 5-7 are more *active*, in which participation contributes to empowerment and sustainability is increasingly likely to occur. Most ICDP-type interventions in Africa fall into the passive category. Supporters of greater empowerment claim that a primary reason for the poor success of participatory programs is that they have primarily employed passive participatory components, and that incorporating more active participation strategies will improve the success of these programs (Axinn & Axinn, 1997; Chambers, 1996; Pimbert & Pretty, 1995). Combining these benefits with meaningful management responsibilities will provide a stake in the protected area, and therefore justification for cooperating in its conservation. In addition, local input will allow for the incorporation of specialized local knowledge and management practices that could lead to improved conservation (Pimbert & Pretty, 1997).

A primary focus of empowerment involves allowing people to make decisions over resource use. Although the restriction of most consumptive use has long distinguished national parks from other forms of protected areas such as national forests and game reserves, many scholars now argue that restoring human activity is not only morally justified, but can lead to more effective conservation (Pimbert & Ghimire, 1997; Pretty & Pimbert, 1995; Western & Wright, 1994). By eliminating the human interactions that have traditionally played a role in ecosystem processes, the creation of parks actually served to increase environmental degradation (Pretty & Pimbert, 1995). In

southern Kenya, livestock grazing by the Maasai had long helped maintain rich grasslands for savanna wildlife. Since the expulsion of the Maasai from the grasslands, scrub and woodland have proliferated in the parks, leaving less grazing for the wildlife (Adams & McShane, 1992). However, uncontrolled use, in essence transforming the park into an open-access resource, has the potential to lead to severe environmental degradation. Without a sense of responsibility, transferring to local communities the right to use resources carries the risk of even worse ecological destruction (Western & Wright, 1994). If communities are willing to cooperate, providing individuals with some rights to the resources within the protected area, may help create a sense of stewardship as locals understand that the park is not just being protected for the benefit of outsiders. Additionally, given the low level of formal enforcement, allowing local people to be present in the park can help increase the diligence of rangers as well as protect against use by outsiders.

Others scholars argue that active participation such as multiple use projects are being promoted without evidence of success while relying on untested biological and economic assumptions, many of which are likely false (Barrett & Arcese, 1995). Granting material benefits from the resource runs counter to the objective of decoupling rural livelihoods from resource exploitation. Moreover, it is not clear that the benefits reach those whose behaviors are threatening the resource. "Are these [benefit recipients] the encroachers of today, tomorrow or never?" (Stocking, 1993). Allowing multiple use with few controls or relying on the ineffective and often corrupt park authority to manage it has the potential for misuse. Therefore, local communities agreeing to take some responsibilities for its management must accompany the granting of local user rights. The

potential for misuse of the system by local people, outsiders or park rangers will be reduced if local users are actively involved in the management of the user rights systems, including monitoring and sanctioning.

Nevertheless, the recognition that a lack of participation has harmed local communities and likely hurt conservation objectives does not imply that ceding control to local people will inherently improve outcomes. Often overlooked in the empowerment literature are discussions of the potentially negative effects of participation: domination by unrepresentative elites, increasing local conflicts and the difficulty of the public being sufficiently informed to make responsible decisions (Weber, 1998; McMullen & Nielson, 1991; Esman & Uphoff, 1984). Under such conditions, participation itself may serve to alienate further local people. Thus, it is important to focus on the participatory process as well as local values to understand motivations behind decisions whether or not to participate. Empowerment as an objective ignores the reality that external stakeholders, primarily international donors and conservation organizations, are integral to local social and environmental sustainability (Warner, 1997). Devolving control from the government authority to local populations will require agreement by the government authority, in this case the park service. The park authority also requires incentives to agree to cede some of its power. Therefore, some scholars claim that consensus building, rather than empowerment or institutional sustainability, should be the driving-force behind participation (Warner, 1997).

Moreover, if the goal is to move towards the active end of this typology, towards complete local control, the objective of conservation of the protected area may be lost if local communities do not share the same values towards conservation as do the

supporters of the protected area. Conceiving participation as empowerment, as an end in itself, requires the assumption that either local people will value conservation or that it is acceptable if they choose not to. Allowing local people to decide for themselves what is important may well be the most just alternative. A discussion of the ethical considerations of whether or not conservation should be valued is beyond the scope of this dissertation. However, assuming that the policymakers and practitioners that support such an arrangement are doing so in the hopes of improved conservation, combining a program of greater local empowerment with a conservation objective will require agreement on both sides that conservation of the park is a desired objective.

Participation as Collaboration

The literature on collective action and self-governance offers important insights towards the potential for community cooperation. However, participatory conservation differs from a collective action problem due to the extensive involvement of non-community actors, including government actors and often non-governmental organizations as well. Not only did the imposition of the national park rules remove the control over rights and responsibilities from local communities, but actors outside the community have also led the promotion of participatory conservation. My study expands this literature to examine the potential for collaboration between local communities and the park authority, rather than self-organization.

Systems of co-management, in which local communities and the central authority share rights and responsibilities for the park, address the dilemma of encouraging more active participation, while maintaining the goal of conservation (Paulson, 1998; Borrini-

Feyerabend, 1996; Selin & Chavez, 1995; Pinkerton, 1992; 1989). Such arrangements of joint forest management (Fischer, 1995; Arnold, 1993), collaborative management (Scott, 1998; Borrini-Feyerebend, 1997; 1996; Porter & Salveson, 1995) and co-management (Sunderlin & Gorospe, 1997; Prystupa, 1998; Pinkerton, 1992; 1989; Jenthoft, 1989), involve some combination of sharing of power and responsibility between the government and local resource users (Berkes, George & Preston, 1991). As used in Uganda, I will employ the terms *collaboration* and *collaborative management* to depict such agreements.

Agenda 21, the United Nation's action plan for sustainable development, formalized the support for sharing of management responsibilities. Agenda 21 emphasizes consultations, capacity building and empowerment of citizens through the delegation of authority, accountability and resources to local communities (UNCED, 1993). The term *collaborative management* describes a "partnership among different stakeholders for the management of a territory or set of resources," (Borrini-Feyerabend, 1997; 65). The centerpiece of collaborative management is the development of an agreement by all primary stakeholders that specifies their respective roles, responsibilities and rights in management of the protected area (Borrini-Feyerabend, 1997). Collaborative management differs from other forms of participatory conservation in that it entails an official distribution of responsibility and authority, although with the recognition that it is generally neither possible nor desirable to vest all management authority in the local community. Collaborative management represents a continuum from complete government control to complete local control (See Figure 2.1).



Figure 2.1: Continuum of Participation (Modified from Borrini-Feyerabend, 1996).

The extent of local rights and responsibilities increases moving from left to right along the continuum. Thus, the passive provision of benefits offered by traditional ICDPs fall at the left end of the spectrum. Under collaborative management, representatives of the major stakeholders, including the park authority, accept specific roles, rights and responsibilities in its management (Borrini-Feyerabend, 1996; Fischer, 1995). The nature of the distribution of these rights will vary according to specific local conditions, therefore no specific location along the continuum represents c*ollaborative management.* Collaborative management thus represents a process, rather than a fixed state.

The process of negotiation is central to a collaborative agreement, as both sides must agree to the specified rights and responsibilities. Pinkerton's (1989; 1992) propositions regarding the likelihood of the interested parties organizing to develop co-management agreements emphasize the importance of the process of negotiations.[10] Most of her factors hypothesized to facilitate the development of agreements include

multiple source of power such as fair and accessible courts, legislature and public boards and the absence of large power differential between parties (Pinkerton, 1992; 339-340) apply more to developed countries with diversified economies and stakeholder groups than in developing regions. Community-led collaborative efforts, which are becoming increasingly common in the U.S., are more able to take advantage of these conditions (Selin & Chavez, 1995; Porter & Salveson, 1995). In developing countries, frequently the emphasis for developing a collaborative agreement comes from outside the community, often from the government authority and/or involved non-governmental organization.

A successful collaborative process can integrate both economic and empowerment benefits to the local communities, provide a forum for interaction between the park and local people, allow for the incorporation of different values and local knowledge of the biological resources and human activity (Prystupa, 1998; Borrini-Feyerebend, 1996; Fisher, 1995; Selin & Chavez, 1995). However, encouraging collaboration represents a time-consuming, intensive and uncertain process as the transactions costs of participating combined with the historical antagonism between the park authority and local communities present formidable barriers to cooperation (Weber, 1998; Sunderlin & Gorospe, 1997; Porter & Salveson, 1995). Moreover, people may choose to participate for strategic reasons, or for individual gain, rather than in the hopes of contributing to the collective good (Ostrom, Schroeder & Wynne; 1993; Pinkerton, 1992; Ostrom, 1990). Thus, substantial barriers exist towards both encouraging participation and directing the participation towards the goal of conservation. Although

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[10] Prystupa subsequently tests her propositions in New Zealand (1998).

scholars increasingly view centralized management as inefficient and ineffective (Ghimire & Pimbert, 1997), especially where local institutions have been displaced, the ability of social sanctions to effectively regulate behavior is far from assured. Therefore, successful collaboration must incorporate incentives to participate and incentives that tie that participation to successful outcomes.

Many collaboration scholars have focused on community-led collaborative efforts, where community members have already demonstrated interest in contributing to the process (Porter & Salveson, 1995; Selin & Chavez, 1995). In Uganda, the conservation agencies, rather than local communities, are leading the collaborative efforts. Agency-led collaboration thus involves the additional problem of encouraging people to participate. This requires an assurance mechanism; the set of rules governing political interaction. The assurance mechanism is an institutional arrangement that reduces the uncertainty and risks associated with the collaboration by selectively promoting it, structuring participant behavior to minimize the likelihood of defections and giving each participant a meaningful stake in the outcome (Weber, 1998). Assurance can be demonstrated by a credible commitment to collaboration by political leaders, a reputation for commitment to collaborative processes by the agency in charge of the rule, formal binding agreements governing the negotiations and their aftermath, the inclusion of all parties who are in a position to block or undermine outcomes, and/or the need for participants with long-term interests in pollution control policy (Weber, 1998).

As the central government controls the rights to the land and natural resources contained within national parks, they represent state property. However, the admission that participatory strategies are necessary components of national park management

implies that parks need no longer represent strict government control either. Proponents of active participatory strategies, such as collaborative management agreements recognize that both local communities and the central government authority are necessary components of successful conservation. In this respect, community participation represents a problem of co-production between local communities and the park service. Co-production occurs when a service cannot be produced unless the consumer actively participates in the production (Lam, 1994; Ostrom, Schroeder and Wynne, 1993). Successful conservation of the natural resources within the national park boundaries is unlikely based on efforts of either park rangers or local community members, but requires a joint effort on the part of local community members and park rangers. This interdependency often causes such systems to suffer from problems of shirking of responsibilities, as neither party will invest much effort into the arrangement if they perceive it to be the responsibility of the other party.

Whether or not people choose to cooperate will depend on the incentive structures faced by the individuals involved. Often, the incentives from the participatory programs fail to tie individual rewards to conservation outcomes and therefore have little impact at reducing shirking and corruption (Gibson & Marks, 1995; Wells & Brandon, 1992). If the conservation status of the park has little relevance to the way the performance of rangers is evaluated, individual rangers will have little incentive to increase their effort in order to prevent illegal use (Gibson, 1999). Similarly, if local communities receive revenue sharing benefits regardless of whether or not illegal use of the park is decreasing (as with many ICDPs), they have little incentive to reduce illegal use. To avoid a situation of shirking and bribe taking, an appropriate institutional arrangement will require low-cost

incentives towards monitoring the behavior of others. One of the justifications for allowing local user rights is that the presence of local people in the forest can help monitor the behavior of rangers as well as non-local users. For example, then-president Jomo Kenyatta is rumored to have supported Kenya's 1977 hunting ban because he was involved in ivory poaching and therefore wanted to keep legal hunters out of the bush to protect his own poaching operation, rather than as a concern for wildlife (Bonner, 1993).

This conception of collaboration representing an improvement over the traditional passive approaches relies on the assumption that economic benefits or limited use rights alone will rarely be sufficient to ensure cooperation. Instead, providing people a sense of ownership and a stake in the resource will lead to increased cooperation in conservation. Therefore, the approach relies on the assumption that people indeed desire greater rights and responsibilities. Participation, however, is often costly. The time and energy spent negotiating, monitoring and sanctioning, or the transactions costs of participating, can represent substantial barriers to eliciting participation (Weber, 1998; Ostrom, Schroeder & Wynne; 1993). Under what conditions are local people likely to take the time and effort necessary to achieve such working agreements? Scholars recognize that communities are comprised of individuals with different interests and power, however have found difficulty modeling how these competing interests can combine to obtain an acceptable collaborative agreement. Additionally, important obstacles to collaboration exist when there is an institutional culture of rational planning, if the actors involved have been previous adversaries and significant power differences exist between parties (Selin & Chavez, 1995; Pinkerton, 1992). All of these unfavorable conditions exist in Uganda.

As with other models of participatory conservation, relatively few examples exist demonstrating sustained success of collaborative management in practice in developing countries.[11] Although some degree of success has been reported in South Asia (Fischer, 1995), its applicability to the often different circumstances existing in Africa has been questioned (Wily, 1994). Joint forest management in Asia has generally been targeted at woodlands, rather than gazetted national parks. Additionally, each forest is associated with a specific village, rather than the hundreds of villages that may border a national park. Finally, the majority of Asians under joint agreements are forest dwellers, whose culture and livelihoods are dependent on the forest (Wily, 1994). Thus, as with the application of the national park model to different physical and socio-cultural conditions, empirical testing will be necessary to gauge the potential for transferring the Asian experience of joint forest management to Africa. Understanding the values and motivations of the different actors involved will be essential towards determining the relevance of transferring this model across cultures.

Evaluating Approaches to Participation

This discussion of prominent participatory conservation strategies has provided compelling explanations for why incorporating greater participation can improve outcomes. However, it has also highlighted several potential reasons for poor performance (See Table 2.2).

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[11] Numerous studies of collaboration in resource management in the United States do report varying degrees of success (See Weber, 1998; Paulson, 1998; Porter and Salveson, 1995; Selin and Chavez, 1995). However the capacity, knowledge and resources of the collaborating agencies and individual actors decrease their applicability to experiences in Africa, as well as other developing regions.

Table 2.2: Evaluating Participatory Conservation Interventions

Cause of Poor Performance	Policy Option	Limitation
Lack of alternative resources Poverty	Resource Substitution	Lack of direct link to conservation. Reinforces separation between people and park
Lack of benefits from park	Revenue Sharing User Rights	Communal benefits Free-rider problem Participation primarily passive Poor monitoring
Poor Enforcement	Improve Enforcement	Funding limitations Lack of monitoring
Local institutions destroyed	Collaboration	Mistrust of Park Authority Participation is costly Participation for strategic reasons

Collaboration provides the potential to improve these outcomes as the meaningful sharing of rights and responsibilities can diffuse monitoring costs, incorporate local knowledge, tie benefits to conservation through user rights and encourage repeated interactions (Prystupa, 1998; Borrini-Feyerabend, 1996; Fisher, 1995). However, historical mistrust, high transaction costs and the potential for strategic behavior make collaboration a costly and uncertain process (Porter & Salveson, 1995; Pinkerton, 1992). The new institutionalism provides explanations for how the design of institutional arrangements can potentially overcome these limitations.

Participation involves the interrelated problems of encouraging reluctant people to cooperate while ensuring that the desired activities improve conservation. Individuals are more likely to cooperate when they perceive the benefits to be greater than the costs (Ostrom, 1990), value the good being produced (Levi, 1997) and if the government demonstrates a credible commitment to supporting local involvement (Weber, 1998;

Levi, 1997). Therefore, examining the effectiveness of collaborative arrangements entails examining the nature of the incentives involved for the involved actors as well as assurance mechanisms of the organizing party. Insights from the design principles from self-governing institutions (Ostrom, 1990) provide the linkage for the effectiveness of the institutional arrangement. If local communities are allowed meaningful local influence in decision-making and if there is effective monitoring and sanctioning, individuals will be more likely to follow the rules that they help create. Meaningful participation implies influence on decisions, not just involvement (Feeney, 1998; Chambers, 1996). Therefore, scholars should examine not only who is involved, but also the level of influence that they possess and are able to exert during the crafting of the specific operational agreements. This logic suggests that collaborative arrangements that incorporate these components by both encouraging cooperation as well as directing that cooperation towards compliance will be more successful.

As collaboration can represent any point on the continuum (Borrini-Feyerabend, 1996), I will avoid specifying the responsibilities that need to be shared necessary for genuine collaboration. Rather, I will examine characteristics of participatory institutions involving some degree of collaboration. Moreover, the continuum depicts local involvement as a linear progression, representing successively greater degrees of control. Sharing authority and responsibilities encompasses local participation in daily, or operational-level, activities. These activities are qualitatively different from participating at the collective-choice level, determining the specific rights and responsibilities to be shared and which actors will share them. Moreover, these operational outcomes are in large part determined by the negotiation process depicted earlier in the continuum.

Therefore, it is useful to distinguish the different activities as not just an extension of participation, but as a qualitatively different type of participation based on the three levels of interactions described earlier.

III. Research Propositions

Of the different methods of organizing participation, collaboration has the potential to overcome the limitations proposed by new institutionalist scholars. Successful collaboration has the potential to increase interactions, information and monitoring, promote ownership in the outcomes and create the political space necessary for crafting solutions that all involved parties can agree on (Prystupa, 1998; Weber, 1998; Borrini-Feyerabend, 1996; Pinkerton, 1992). However, collaboration also represents a risky, uncertain and untested process (Weber, 1998; Porter & Salveson, 1995; Pinkerton, 1992). This study will demonstrate how Uganda's institutional environment created incentives that encouraged the promotion of collaboration in conservation. I will then examine collaborative agreements at two national parks in Uganda to see if actively sharing rights and responsibilities improves outcomes.

The first question I will address is why the Ugandan government is promoting active local participation despite the fact that such policies are not only often unsuccessful, but require that the government agency voluntarily cede some of its authority to local communities. My first proposition employs a structural choice argument (Gibson, 1999; Moe, 1984) to argue that government actors and policymakers support these policies because they receive benefits from the promotion of these policies unrelated to conservation. I do not claim that policymakers are selecting these

institutions because they represent the most efficient or socially acceptable outcomes. Rather, I will explore the development of community conservation policies in Uganda to demonstrate that governments and policy organizations receive political benefits from the promotion of these policies and therefore have incentive to continue their promotion irrespective of eventual outcomes.

My second and third objectives involve examining whether collaboration, or the sharing of rights and responsibilities, improves performance. Based on the logic of scholars emphasizing the importance of contingent consent (Levi, 1997) and credible commitment (Weber, 1998; Root, 1989), my second research proposition states that to encourage reluctant people to participate, successful collaborative arrangements must provide not only incentives, but assurance mechanisms that increase trust and demonstrate the commitment of the government towards the collaborative process. Through factors such as incorporating meaningful local influence in decision-making, increasing community interactions and supporting the programs with formal legislation, reforming governments can reduce the uncertainty and risks associated with the collaborative process (Weber, 1998; Pinkerton, 1992).

The final component of this study examines the linkage of process to outcomes by examining whether the sharing of rights and responsibilities improves outcomes. My third research proposition suggests that successful collaborative arrangements must direct the activities towards the intended objective through institutional mechanisms that protect against strategic behavior. Borrowing from design principles of successful self-governing institutions (Ostrom, 1990), I suggest that institutional arrangements that allow for the incorporation of meaningful local influence in rule creation and effective

monitoring and sanctioning will mitigate against strategic behavior and defection. In addition to demonstrating commitment, allowing local influence can produce rights and responsibilities that are more valued and rules that are more likely to be followed (Prystupa, 1998; Weber, 1998). By increasing the costs of defection, effective monitoring and sanctioning can help make cooperation the dominant behavior.

IV. Research Methods

To examine processes of developing participatory conservation strategies and the resulting outcomes, I selected community conservation programs outside two Ugandan national parks: Mt. Elgon and Bwindi Impenetrable. These two parks contain the most advanced participatory conservation programs among Ugandan national parks and therefore likely to provide the best indications of preliminary outcomes. Both parks also have comparable physical characteristics, management histories and socio-economic community characteristics that will facilitate comparability. Both were forest reserves until the early 1990s, when they were designated national parks[12]. Both parks are montane forests, surrounded by communities with high population density and a history of high levels of illegal use. Each park has an international conservation organization that has been active since the late 1980s implementing community conservation programs. At each park, I will compare pilot parishes that have signed collaborative agreements with the control parishes that are not part of the participatory schemes. At each park, I selected one pilot parish and one non-pilot (or control) parish for analysis (See Table 2.3). This design will allow for comparisons both within the parks between

[12]Bwindi Impenetrable National Park was created in 1991, while Mount Elgon Forest Reserve became a National Park in 1993 (See Chapter 4).

the pilots and controls and across parks, to examine differences in effectiveness of different forms of participatory incentives.

Table 2.3: Research Sites

National Park	Pilot Parish	Non-pilot Parish
Mt. Elgon	Mutushet	Moyok
Bwindi Impenetrable	Mpungu	Bujengwe

Operationalization of Variables

To examine how different participatory conservation institutions encourage local participation as well as improve conservation outcomes, this dissertation predicts that institutional performance will be a function of the demonstration of assurance mechanisms, the extent of local influence in the process, the threat of enforcement and the values held by the participants. Table 2.4 details the primary indicators and sources of data for the primary variables of interest. As the data obtained and methods of analysis are primarily quantitative, multiple indicators and multiple sources are employed to increase reliability through triangulation and corroboration (Yin, 1994), rather than an attempt to increase the sample size (as per King, Keohane & Verba, 1994).

Table 2.4: Operationalization of Key Variables

Variable	Indicator	Data Source
Local Participation (Operational Level)	Attendance at Meetings Practicing Resource Substitution Reporting Illegal Users	Surveys
Local Participation (Collective-Choice Level)	Seats on a Forest Management Body Influence on Design of Rules Ability to change rules	Surveys, Interviews Document Analysis
Threat of Enforcement	Fear of Being Caught Number of Arrests	Surveys Arrest Records/Ranger Interviews
Assurance Mechanisms	Reputations Credible Commitment to process by UWA Supporting Formal Legislation	Surveys Surveys, Interviews Archival Research
Values	Value towards different forest goods	Surveys
Institutional Performance	Rule Compliance Attitudinal Change Reporting Illegal Users Knowledge of Park Rules Stability of Institution	Surveys, Ranger Interviews Committee Interviews, Ranger Interviews, Committee Records

Data Collection

Numerous scholars have highlighted the difficulties of data collection in developing countries (Chambers, 1996, 1984; Honadle & Cooper, 1990). As cultural, political and logistical difficulties interact to disrupt meticulously planned methods and itineraries, "Conventional and professionally respectable methods for rural research are often inefficient,"(Chambers, 1984). Surveys can produce misleading results because of difficulties in cultural interpretation, translation and role selection, the incentive of respondents to give incorrect answers either to please the interviewer, fear of political

reprisal or expectation of future benefit (Gow, 1990, Derman, 1990). Some scholars prefer in-depth interviews with key informants (Derman, 1990; Hough, 1989), however locating appropriate respondents can be difficult and responses can be unrepresentative (Maxwell, 1996; Honadle & Cooper, 1990). If available, existing records are often incomplete, inaccurate and subject to large biases (Honadle & Cooper, 1990). Employing methods of direct observation avoids many of these problems, but can be unrepresentative, susceptible to misinterpretation and confounded by the presence of the investigator (Honadle & Cooper, 1990).

In light of these concerns, I employed a combination of data collections yielding both qualitative and quantitative information. I used six primary methods to collect data: organizational interviews, existing records, sample survey, key informant interviews, small group interviews and direct observation. Employing multiple sources and using multiple methods should both ensure greater reliability of the data collected and increase the probability that the research findings will be used in policy formulation (Maxwell, 1996; Singleton et. al, 1993). I collected preliminary data in Uganda during June 1996 with formal fieldwork occurring between February and December, 1997. Data collection procedures followed Indiana University's guidelines for research on human subjects (See Appendix).

Organizational Interviews – Many different organizations are involved with designing and implementing national park policies in Uganda. I interviewed representatives of the different government and non-governmental organizations involved in conservation in Uganda at headquarters in Kampala and relevant field offices to ascertain agency goals and policy objectives. Respondents included officers and field

staff from government agencies such as the Uganda Wildlife Authority, Forest Department, Ministry of Tourism, Wildlife and Antiquities and National Environmental Management Authority. Representatives from donors and non-governmental organizations included officers from USAID, World Bank, Mgahinga Bwindi Impenetrable Forest Conservation Trust (MBIFCT), African Wildlife Foundation (AWF), CARE and the World Conservation Union (IUCN). I employed semi-structured interviews to allow for deeper probing of responses and limited variation of questioning depending on the differing respondents' areas of expertise. I interviewed several respondents both early and late in the period of fieldwork to allow them to respond to and explain empirical findings in the field.

Existing Records – I sought existing records to obtain background data regarding policy formation as well as to identify and existing data regarding the specific field sites. The primary sources of information included reports and census data from government agencies, project documents and evaluations from the involved non-governmental organizations, maps, and studies from Makerere University faculty and students. Recognizing that the data in existing documents such as arrest records and project documents are often biased towards presenting a more favorable image of the organization, I interviewed scholars, researchers and other relevant knowledgeable individuals to verify the level of accuracy of the data in these various studies. I had anticipated park arrest records to serve as the primary quantitative records of illegal use. However, I found the official records to be both inconsistently recorded as well as being a poor indicator of the level of illegal use, therefore I dropped them to instead use reported information from park officials, NGO representatives and community members.

Sample Survey – Surveys provide the best opportunity to collect quantifiable data and background information as well as corroborate results of other methods (Chambers, 1984). I conducted household interviews of park neighbors at each of the four research sites. The surveys were a primary source of data in ascertaining the impacts of the participatory programs on local communities and any corresponding changes in local relations with the park. I randomly selected fifty respondents from each parish. In each parish, I created a map depicting the location of all villages and then selected ten villages to be included in the survey giving a representative geographical sample of the parish. In each of the ten villages selected, I asked village leaders to compile a list of all households. From each village household list, I selected five respondents (and two alternates) randomly by rolling dice. This method of selection ensured respondents from different economic levels (villages near roads are generally more prosperous) and interests in the park (individuals in villages bordering the park are more likely to be users as well as suffer crop damages than those that live farther away).

Accompanied by a guide and translator, I then walked to each household to conduct the interviews, which took about one hour each. The guide was a well-known parish member who could lead us to the specific households identified as well as introduce us to the respondent, thereby reducing fear and facilitating cooperation. During the interviews, the guide would not be present to prevent the possibility of biased responses. The translator was from the same ethnic group and a native speaker of the language, but not from the specific parishes chosen. This allowed for maintaining the trust of the respondents, without the bias likely if the respondents knew the interviewer. Respondents could be either the male or the female head of household, with efforts made

towards gender equity if we started getting too many of one gender. The translator conducted the interviews in the local languages: *Rikiga* (Bwindi) and *Kutsabiny* (Mt. Elgon), while I inscribed the responses. This method allowed me to both verify the interviews were indeed taking place under the process selected as well as to clarify responses and ask in-depth probing questions when applicable. I personally attended over 90% of the surveys. The surveys included a combination of multiple choice, ordered and free response questions. Although occasionally it was necessary to look for a respondent in the fields or village center, or return to a home several times, in all cases we were eventually able to locate the desired respondents thereby maintaining the validity of the random sample.

Key Informant Interviews – At each parish, I sought out knowledgeable individuals to for semi-structured interviews to provide more insightful data into the cultural context and motivation behind observed or reported actions. These interviews allowed me to obtain information not available from the survey as well as to explore responses obtained from the surveys and existing records. To reduce the potential for role-selection and non-representative viewpoints, I sought individuals from a variety of positions – church leaders, park rangers, women leaders, elders, youth, and political leaders at the village (LCI) and parish (LCII) level.

Group Interviews – In addition to the key informant interviews, I conducted semi-structured small group interviews to gain information not available from the survey, to verify inconsistent findings, as well as to explore in detail responses received from the survey. At each parish, I arranged interviews with forest user groups (at the two pilot parishes), women's groups and village elders. Group interviews allowed for greater

collective memory and the presence of others reduced the likelihood of obtaining misleading responses possible with individual interviews. Additionally, detailed transcripts of the key informant and group interviews provide rich sources for qualitative comparison.

Direct Observation – Throughout the data collection process, I employed direct observation to obtain preliminary assessments and data verification, which is important whenever detailed written information is unavailable and respondents might have an incentive to be untruthful. Unstructured observation while conducting the surveys and interviews provided a continual source of data collection and verification. Additionally, guided forest walks with rangers and villagers, and attending village meetings provided rich insights into the state of the forest, the amount of compliance to the regulations, and interactions between different villagers and between villagers and park rangers. Staying in the parish during the entire period of data collection and getting to know people at an informal level increased cooperation and reliability of data.

Data Analysis

I analyzed the data using a combination of qualitative and quantitative methods. Qualitative data analysis involves identifying patterns and regularities in the data (Miles & Huberman, 1994). I have supported these patterns with quantitative survey results, coded and analyzed using chi-square tests. Embedding the survey results within the qualitative results reinforces the results of each method.

Threats to Reliability and Validity

As previously indicated, researchers in developing countries must undertake special precautions to ensure to improve both the reliability and validity of their findings. *Reliability* refers to the stability and consistency of the data, the extent to which repeated applications of the operational definition under similar conditions yield consistent results (Singleton, Straits & Straits, 1993; 115). To increase the reliability of my results, I employed the triangulation of both data sources and methods discussed earlier. This allowed for greater corroboration of results and reduced the possibility of obtaining misleading answers. Additionally, living in the parish while conducting the research and personally conducting over the 90% of the surveys greatly increased reliability by allowing for greater familiarity by community members and multiple opportunities, both formally and informally, for verifying results.

The primary types of validity problems are internal validity and external validity. *Internal validity* concerns the certainty of causality, the degree to which the data supports the conclusions. The primary threats to internal validity of my study were potential biases in *selection*, *history* and *instrumentation* (Cook and Campbell, 1979). *Selection* bias is the likelihood that an effect may be due to the difference between the kinds of people in one experimental group as opposed to another (Cook and Campbell, 1979; 53). The careful random selection of survey respondents alleviates the likelihood of a biased sample. *History* is the potential problem that an observed effect might be due to an event that takes place between the pretest and posttest (Cook and Campbell, 1979; 51). The lack of adequate baseline data in my study makes this a potential problem. Measuring indicators of change, rather than absolute levels, reduces this threat. *Instrumentation* is the chance

that an effect might be due to a change in the measuring instrument between the pre-test and the post-test (Cook and Campbell, 1979; 52). Employing translators always leaves open the possibility of differing interpretations by the translator and investigator, as well as intended or unintended misrepresenting of questions or responses by the translator. I employed four different translators at Mt. Elgon and Bwindi due to scheduling problems as well as different languages spoken in the two regions. In order to minimize the potential for differences in interpretation by the different translators, I personally trained all translators in the same manner, and was present at the interviews to ask clarifying questions and ensure that the investigators were asking each question in the same way and with the interpretation intended. The triangulation of data sources and methods used in this study will also help to increase internal validity (Miles and Huberman, 1994). Finally, I have carefully described the socio-political context (Maxwell, 1996) and addressed and ruled out alternative explanations (Cook and Campbell, 1979) as further means of increasing internal validity.

External validity concerns the generalizability of my findings, the degree to which it is possible to extend these findings to other populations and other cases. Employing multiple replication (Cook & Campbell, 1979), both within and across cases and backing up with a strong theory increased external validity. Employing pattern-matching (Campbell, 1975; Yin, 1994) to measure multiple indicators within the case effectively increases the sample size and therefore external validity. In addition, comparing the four cases as wholes, as well as between the 200 individuals surveyed, greatly increased the sample size. In qualitative studies, the scholar is generalizing from a sample to a theory, not from a sample to a population (Yin, 1994). Therefore, imbedding the results within

the context of a strong theory that has been tested in many different cases has increased the generalizability of my findings (Ostrom, 1990). Despite these precautions, context is clearly important in determining outcomes and I discuss the potential scope and boundaries of applicability of my findings in the concluding chapter.

Conclusion

Examining the process of developing participatory institutions through the differing levels of interactions provides a means of linking policy processes to outcomes and therefore assessing the different forms of participatory incentives. In order to agree to cooperate, local people will have to perceive that cooperating is in their best interests, that the benefits from cooperating outweigh the potential sanctions from withholding cooperation. However, due to the previous history of antagonism, local people may not be willing collaborators with the park authorities. Therefore, collaboration will have to be encouraged through incentives that encourage the building of trust, active local monitoring and receipt of benefits valued by the local community.

This study will examine the variations in outcomes between strategies that promote participation as a means towards gaining support for the park, and strategies that promote a more active and collaborative approach towards participation. To begin to analyze potential outcomes, it will be necessary to examine the motivations of both the policy designers and the intended recipients in the local communities. The first section of this dissertation examines the political and economic environment existing in Uganda to understand why policymakers selected a collaborative strategy and which actors favored such a strategy. Uganda's structural adjustment policies necessitated an increasing

dependence on foreign actors as well as increased expectations of the citizenry. As the actions and reputation of the new government influence the interest of local people to cooperate in conservation, the following chapter will examine how government policies served to facilitate or hinder trust and cooperation. These factors led to significant changes in the conservation network that culminated in the consolidation of control over Uganda's protected areas by the Uganda National Parks. The succeeding chapter examines how this change in conservation rules created the opportunity to develop active community conservation programs. These chapters demonstrate that the conservation agency can support policies that relinquish its power. The second section examines outcomes of collaboration compared to other participatory incentives by examining communities bordering two national parks to see how the process of developing the specific conservation initiatives influenced outcomes.

CHAPTER THREE

RECONSTRUCTING THE PREDATORY STATE: INSTITUTIONAL REFORM UNDER THE NATIONAL RESISTANCE MOVEMENT

Introduction

State policies far removed from conservation nevertheless play a central role in structuring human-environment relations (Bryant, 1992). This chapter examines the extent to which the policies of the NRM government encourage or discourage local participation in conservation. The prevailing social, economic and political context conditions participation activities, including those involving conservation. Uganda's recent tumultuous history destroyed most government functions causing citizens and civil servants alike to ignore formal structures and rules. The limitations of Uganda's economic and political institutions combined with widespread demand for increased goods and services necessitated that Museveni's rehabilitation efforts depend on extensive foreign involvement. However, these widespread political and economic changes also created an opportunity for reputation building, allowing Museveni's regime greater legitimacy and creating opportunities for him to maintain the political support necessary to maintain regime stability by dividing his support among different interests.

Local level democratization and structural adjustment represent the NRM's flagship rehabilitation policies. These somewhat conflicting measures allowed the regime both to generate both the local support and resources necessary for national rebuilding. Structural adjustment reforms have left African governments struggling to

deliver even the most basic of government services (Schroeder, 1999). Under such conditions, the devolution of responsibility for environmental management to the community can represent a convenient means of extending the reach of limited state resources. Therefore, community conservation can serve to extend, rather than devolve central control over both resources and communities (Schroeder, 1999).

Although local participation requires some form of decentralization, not all decentralization measures imply greater local participation (Feeney, 1998). Decentralization may increase accountability and community participation (Feeney, 1998) but may also lead to inefficiencies due to increased transactions costs (Eggertsson, 1990). The apparent decentralization of responsibility and authority has often been motivated by the government's desire to gain access to crucial local knowledge or by the donors' own economic and political interests (Schroeder, 1998). Thus, examining the process of decentralization can be a useful indicator of the degree to which the government is committed to facilitating local involvement. This chapter examines the primary policies implemented by Museveni's government in terms of how they affect the potential for local involvement.

Establishing an Enabling Environment

The formal establishment of policies notwithstanding, participatory conservation outcomes hinge upon not only the attributes of the policies but also the relationship among the involved actors. In Uganda, the centralized conservation agencies typified a highly centralized government bureaucracy (Kothari & Suri, 1995). Therefore, encouraging participation represented a dramatic shift in orientation for government

agents. Ugandans citizens experienced a highly antagonistic relationship with government representatives, especially those enforcing conservation regulations. Governments can facilitate the improvement of such antagonistic relationships by developing government policies directed towards establishing trust (Ostrom, Gardner & Walker, 1994; Esman & Uphoff, 1984) and decentralizing authority (Feeney, 1998). To this end, public administration reforms must accompany change at the local at the local level (Esman & Uphoff, 1984).

By conditioning relationships, history greatly influences institutional choices (North, 1990; Thelan & Steinmo, 1992; Johnson & Libecap, 1989). Previous relationships both constrain the choices available as well as frame expectations. Uganda's tumultuous recent history heavily constrained Museveni's efforts to rebuild formal institutions and construct his version of a new Uganda. Uganda's decline from what Winston Churchill termed, "The Pearl of Africa," to the political turmoil of the 1970s and 1980s has been well documented and represents the prototypical example of the failures of the African state (Ofcansky, 1996; Apter, 1997; 1995; Brett, 1994, 1993; Hansen & Twaddle, 1991; 1988). As the government was widely perceived as brutal and untrustworthy, citizens attempted to evade government representatives and formal institutions. Upon reestablishing stability to most of the country, Museveni faced the interrelated problems of increasing the capacity of the government and reengaging citizens with formal institutions. Museveni thus needed to demonstrate to all Ugandans that he was serious about reforms and distance the NRM from previous governments.

To achieve meaningful reforms, Museveni realized that he needed the support of both foreign donors and Ugandan citizens to secure his position in a stable Uganda. He

needed to demonstrate that his commitments to reform were credible, both to Ugandan citizens familiar with successive repressive military regimes, and to prove to foreign donors that he was not just another undemocratic African military ruler. To appease both he needed to change the reputation of a Ugandan leader as well as develop institutions to provide credible commitment to compliment reputation (Levi, 1997; Root, 1989; North & Weingast, 1989). Credible commitment can be established by establishing a reputation for "responsible behavior" or being constrained to obey a set of rules that do not permit leeway for violating commitments (North & Weingast, 1989). Specific policies that can serve to check the authority of the sovereign include establishing legislative bodies (North & Weingast, 1989) and allowing local and regular elections (Levi, 1997). The role of reputations in inducing honest behavior is crucial towards the potential for voluntary cooperation (Milgrom, North & Weingast, 1989).

Governments have frequently contributed to this lack of trust by their failure to deliver what they promise. The raising of expectations can weaken the incentives of people to participate if the government fails to deliver as promised (Esman and Uphoff, 1984). This need for foreign assistance complicated Museveni's burden. In the late 1980s, donors directed much interest towards structural adjustment and conservation. To rural communities, these policies often led to decreased government services and increased restrictions on access and use. Understandably therefore, local resistance frequently accompanied implementation of these programs in Africa. Thus, Museveni faced the burden of pleasing the donors and local communities, who favored somewhat contradictory policies. Gaining the support of both groups, historically antagonistic towards Ugandan rulers, required more than just verbal pronouncements, but

demonstrated changes in policies. The following sections will explore the policies of the NRM government to identify the extent which they will facilitate local participation.

Political and Economic Rehabilitation

Recent Political History

Until the mid-1960s, Uganda had one of the most developed social and economic infrastructures in sub-Saharan Africa (Hansen & Twaddle, 1988). At independence, Uganda's constitution provided a unique power sharing agreement between a directly elected prime minister and the traditional ruler of the Baganda, Uganda's largest and most powerful ethnic group, as president. This agreement lasted until 1966 when Prime Minister Milton Obote stormed the palace of the Baganda leader, who subsequently fled into exile. This act signified a transformation to authoritarian rule and disregard for legally established structures and procedures that culminated in Idi Amin's 1971 *coup d'etat*. Amin's regime initially released political prisoners detained by Obote and enjoyed the support of Britain and Israel. This support did not last long however and Amin employed Nubian army troops as extermination squads against his perceived enemies among officers, soldiers and civilians. In 1972, Amin ordered all Asians, including Ugandan citizens, to leave the country. Over 12,000 citizens and 50,000 non-citizens were forced to flee leaving about 3,500 businesses and $400 million worth of property (Walker, 1995). Later that year Amin nationalized property belonging to the British. These attempts to regain local support decimated the national economy. By 1980, "most commercial plants were wrecked and empty, manufacturing plant was operating at only 5% of capacity...only the subsistence farming sector survived in

reasonable order," (EIU, 1993; 11). By the time of his overthrow in 1979, Amin's notorious six-year reign had not only decimated economic, social and institutional structures, but also institutionalized a climate of fear and incapacity of formal state structures.

Three short-lived regimes followed Amin's overthrow until Obote returned as Prime Minister in 1980. His succeeding reelection as President was widely criticized as fixed and one of the unsuccessful candidates, Yoweri Museveni, returned to the bush and began a guerilla insurgency against Obote. The environment of insecurity and incapacity of government structures continued under the second Obote regime, until the Okello brothers' *coup* in 1985. Their brief regime was overthrown the next year as Museveni's National Resistance Movement guerilla force captured Kampala after a six-year armed struggle.[13]

Over the past decade, Museveni has since established a period of relative stability and gradual reconstruction of Uganda's political and economic institutions (Dicklitch, 1998; Brett, 1994, 1993; Hansen & Twaddle, 1991). Museveni inherited state structures where markets and formal sector institutions had ceased to be effective and were replaced by the parallel economy. The state had retreated from rural areas, thereby strengthening the autonomy of the peasantry. However, as Khadiagala (1995) notes, this autonomy did not lead to greater development, as alternative rural strategies for survival were poor substitutes for formal institutional structures providing regular links to the national economy. The excesses of Museveni's predecessors also caused a tremendous distrust of

[13] Uganda's post-Amin leaders include: Yusuf Lule, 1979; Godfrey Binaisa, 1979-80; Paulo Muwanga, 1980; Milton Obote, 1980-85; Bazilio and Tito Okello, 1985-86; Yoweri Museveni, 1986-present. For details on these post-Amin regime transitions see Ofcansky, 1996.

government, especially of the military. Consequently, citizens chose the *exit option* (Hyden, 1980) and disengaged from government authority and formal structures. Situations in urban areas were not significantly better and therefore Uganda was one of the few countries in sub-Saharan Africa that did not experience a massive increase in rural-urban migration during the first two decades of independence. Almost 90% of Uganda's population still resides in rural areas and the agricultural sector provides employment to about 80% of the labor force and provides 90% of export earnings (MPED, 1997). This overwhelmingly rural population has helped provide Museveni's government a degree of autonomy in policymaking by isolating it from special interests.

Political Institutions

Museveni has combined features of populism with a discourse emphasizing technocratic authority and a paternalistic orientation toward Ugandan society. These contradictory elements have been held together in large part by the popularity of Museveni himself, whose technocratic self-image has relied on a paternal sense of Ugandans requiring a "political doctor" to keep them from harming themselves (Kassimir, 1998). Among Museveni's primary political emphases have been the reestablishment of an active civil society, and his version of participatory (although not multi-party) democracy. The National Resistance Movement (NRM) has dominated Ugandan politics since Museveni achieved power in 1986. Ideally, this system will replace the divisiveness of a system of different political parties with an inclusive political *movement* of which all Ugandans are members by birth. Political parties are legal, but permitted only to issue statements to the press. Despite Western pressures,

parties cannot participate in the political process, such as holding public meetings or sponsoring candidates for election.[14] Apter (1995) terms this a "consultative democracy," or a "movement-state," where the movement supercedes agendas of any specific political parties. However, although nominally an independent politician, Museveni clearly represents the NRM and lack of support for him equates with lack of support for *The Movement.* The NRM maintains many of the trappings of a dominant political party by its control of the public media, use of public facilities and transportation and its massive public education program (Sabiti-Makara et al., 1996). The creation of elected posts in 1998, has fueled speculation that its leaders plan to turn their organization into a political party.

Representing Museveni's vision of inclusive democracy, the parliament contains 217 directly elected members (about 150 representing NRM supporters) and 62 members elected as representatives of special groups – women, handicapped, youth. Typical of Ugandan political institutions, the Parliament plays a role somewhat between a rubber stamp and an independent consultative body. Vibrant debate and criticisms of official policies and even Museveni himself are common. Parliament has demonstrated its growing independence by censuring several MPs supported by Museveni for alleged corruption, including his brother. Nevertheless, Parliament rarely fails to pass legislation of interest to Museveni. Voters routinely oust incumbents in national elections, further exemplifying the limited control of the government over the behavior and electoral success, of individual members. However, personalities and promises are more important

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[14] Despite this prohibition, the party affiliation of most candidates is common knowledge. For example, former vice-president and 1996 Presidential candidate, Paul Ssemogerere was the leader of the Baganda-led DP party, while outspoken Museveni-critic and parliamentarian, Cecilia Ogwal, represents Obote's UPC party.

determinants of electoral outcomes than policies promoted. Therefore, MPs can support potentially unpopular policies with little detrimental effect on their electoral support.

The movement system has failed to institutionalize mechanisms of government distinct from the personality of Museveni (Apter, 1997; Oloka-Onyango, 1997). Thus despite this openness to debate, policymaking is dominated by the executive (Dicklitch, 1998). Museveni however, has continually proven receptive to listen to different views and even change his mind on issues (Hauser, 1997). Thus, policymaking in the NRM can be depicted as Museveni exploring policy options, rather than following a coherent ideological program or foreign demands. The initiation of local councils, yet refusal to allow multi-party politics is an example of the trend towards being receptive, yet not beholden, to donor requests. The initial resistance, then acceptance of structural adjustment reforms further exemplifies this trend towards exploring policy options from within the constraints imposed by Uganda's economic condition and donor conditionality.

Local Councils

The cornerstone of Museveni's version of participatory democracy and decentralization of state power has been the establishment of the Local (Resistance) Councils.[15] Originally a means of establishing village support for his rebel National Resistance Movement group in fighting the guerilla war, they have remained as a means of rebuilding faith and competence in formal structures. The Local Council (LC) system is a series of committees in which the representatives are elected by the layer below

[15] Resistance Councils (RCs) were renamed Local Councils (LCs) under the 1996 Constitution.

which they operate and are accountable to. The five LC levels are village level (LC1), parish (LC2), sub-county/town council (LC3), county/municipality (LC4), and district/city (LC5)[16]. The LCs are intended to be the main democratic input into local authorities and their decision-making (Amis, 1992).

At the village and parish level, LCs often play a primary role in dispute resolution and local development planning, superceding the role of the chiefs, whose responsibilities have been reduced to being primarily tax collectors. At the higher levels, LCs coexist with the district administration system. However, great disparities exist between their mandate and how they function on the ground (Apter, 1995). At the county and district level, LCs have been given judicial, service delivery and developmental roles, but without adequate financial resources, technical skills and experience (Brett, 1993). At the higher levels, LC council members tend to be viewed more as self-interested politicians, and play minimal roles in the daily lives of people (Cherop, 1997). Among the flaws of the LC system are that there has been no clear demarcation of tasks between officials and politicians, unclear lines of authority and responsibility, no clear system of revenue generation, accounting or auditing, and councils are expected to voluntarily do the job of civil servants (Dicklitch, 1998; Brett, 1993). However, since Parliament passed a new local government statute in 1993, budgeting allocations have gone directly to local councils rather than through ministries, improving their planning ability. Once the government started funding local councils directly, instead of through Ministries, performance and activity has increased in some areas (Brett, 1995). These changes have

[16] The LC structure includes both rural and urban areas, so an LC3 would serve a sub-county in a rural area or a town council in an urban area.

not however undermined the NRM's ability to control decision-making at the highest levels (Dicklitch, 1998).

Structural Adjustment

Over the past two decades, donors led by the World Bank have promoted structural adjustment reforms, primarily measures to reduce the size and scope of government involvement in the economy, as prerequisites for receiving funds. Articles frequently portray Museveni and Uganda as textbook proponents of structural adjustment reforms (See Oloka-Onyango, 1997). However, actual progress has been uneven, representing a gradual exploration of policy options rather than straightforward acquiescence. Originally, Museveni and the NRM leadership were originally heavily influenced by Marxism and dependency theory. Not surprisingly, upon achieving power they rejected reform packages advocated by the International Monetary Fund (IMF), instead extending government control over the economy. Despite its previously socialist orientation and the perception that a similar reform package in the early 1980s had failed, the government reversed itself only sixteen months later and agreed to an IMF structural adjustment package. Rather than representing merely an ideological change, this reversal was due largely to influential factions within the government realizing that the economy could not recover without increased economic aid (Harvey & Robinson, 1995). Consequently, the NRM only partially implemented the components of the structural adjustment package. In 1992, Museveni replaced the last holdouts and the government began embracing the reforms. Thus, between 1987-1992, although economic growth

improved significantly, most other indicators – inflation, exchange rates, exports and services – did not (Brett, 1995).

Only a relatively privileged group of civil servants and parastatal managers opposed reform because it would reduce their privileges. In 1992, Museveni replaced the last prominent holdouts in the government, especially the hostile Minister of Finance, with supporters of the program. This action enabled acceleration in implementation of the structural adjustment measures. By 1994, Uganda had at least partially achieved most key objectives, but the process has been slow and uneven. Museveni legalized parallel foreign exchange markets in 1990, but did not begin privatization of state-owned enterprises until 1994. The return of Asian properties expropriated in 1972, began in 1991 and many have since been recovered (albeit completely run-down). Civil Service Reform has also proceeded quite rapidly since the early 1990s. By July 1998, Museveni had reduced Uganda's civil service to 134,000 people, down from 320,000 in 1990 (Flannery & Watt, 1999). The number of ministries has been reduced from 34 to 21 and by the end of 1998, more than 80 public companies have been sold (Mutumba-Lule, 1999).

These measures demonstrate that despite the inconsistent implementation, privatization of state-owned enterprise, down-sizing and rationalization of the civil service have proceeded much more completely and with less of the continual stalling and backtracking experienced in other countries, such as Uganda's neighbor, Kenya. Nevertheless, the piecemeal and uneven acceptance of the reforms demonstrates that the Museveni regime was exploring policy options rather than simply acquiescing to donor demands. After the government leaders decided that structural adjustment was the most

desired option, implementation began much more completely. This pattern of openness to foreign interventions and concerns is evident from choices made concerning conservation policies as well.

Effects of Political and Institutional Liberalization

These political and economic liberalization measures are still ongoing. However, several primary themes are evident: the reestablishment of a civil society, increasing availability of goods and services and continuing foreign involvement. Although these reform policies have not always been popular and despite ruling with what has been termed a paternalistic discourse (Kassimir, 1998), Museveni and the NRM are perceived, although decreasingly, as a legitimate and popular government (Ottemoeller, 1998; Hauser, 1997).[17] Museveni carried almost 75% of the vote in the 1996 presidential elections and despite the failure to implement multi-party democracy, Uganda has remained a favorite of Western nations. Unlike other African nations that frequently experience aid terminations or delays for the failure to implement political reforms, Museveni has never been threatened with aid reductions for his failure to implement multi-party democracy (Hauser, 1997).

When Museveni attained power, the civil service hardly functioned as the preceding governments had spent their energy and resources on remaining in power rather than on performing services (Apter, 1995). As a result of working in decrepit office buildings with little support and receiving an official salary that amounted to just a fraction of the amount needed to feed a family, government employees did very little

[17] The non-Karamoja Northern regions, which remain Obote supporters, represent the exception.

official work, were easily bribed and spent large portions of their time undertaking income generating schemes in the informal sector, rather than their official duties. As a result, service provision was minimal, and what little was implemented, was done so in a selective and corrupt manner. Since 1987, tax collection and civil servant salaries have increased markedly (Klitgaard, 1997). In an effort to improve motivation within the civil service, pay for teachers, nurses and policeman rose from 900-1200% between 1993-97. As a whole, the government wage bill has risen from 1% of GDP in 1990 to 3% of GDP in 1996 (Goldsmith, 1999). However, in absolute terms the salaries remained extremely low, ranging from only $66 (policeman) to $87 (nurse) per month, making it difficult to feed a family in Kampala's high cost of living (Flannery & Watt, 1999). In late 1997, Museveni prohibited civil servants, including Members of Parliament (MPs), from holding second jobs.[18] While this may induce civil servants to spend more time physically in the office, it does not resolve the problem of poor compensation that required them to seek outside employment in the first place.

The austerity measures associated with Structural Adjustment Programs (SAPs) potentially restrict state capacity to invest in institutional improvements and have often been associated with increasing poverty. Even the World Bank has acknowledged that real poverty has increased under the SAP (Oloka-Onyango, 1997). However, improved security, infrastructure and service provision have likely helped rural producers (Brett, 1995). In Uganda, the urban dwellers, rather than the rural poor, have suffered the most as the extremely high cost of living in Ugandan cities has hurt the development of a middle class. Women have been particularly adversely affected, having to shoulder the

[18]Many nevertheless still hold jobs informally.

extra responsibilities from the elimination of subsidies from their children's education, health care and food (Tamale, 1999). Thus, these economic reforms are beginning to improve conditions, but both living conditions and civil service performance remain at very low absolute levels.

Reestablishment of Uganda's Civil Society

Throughout most of Uganda's independence, the government has been perceived as a predatory state, in which official structures prey on, rather than provide services to, citizens (Khadiagala, 1995). Consequently, citizens retreated from and feared representatives of the government, especially the armed forces. Museveni has tried to reverse this fear of the state; to reestablish a civil society in which rule of law is enforced and participation in formal structures increased. Thus, although the success of the economic reforms has been uneven, social and political reforms such as maintaining military discipline, incorporating a wide range of political forces, restoring essential services, and establishing law and order have been much more successful (Brett, 1995). Since his time as a rebel fighting a guerilla war against the Obote government, Museveni emphasized discipline within his NRM army, in contrast to the gross violations that had been characteristic of Ugandan soldiers. While there are still abuses committed, they are less egregious and less widespread than those of the pre-NRM armies or of the current rebel groups in the north and west. Although people generally still try to avoid contact with army personnel, the relative discipline exhibited has played a primary role in generating rural support and legitimization of Museveni's regime. Despite these steps, people still fear the army and try to avoid contact if possible. However, as services are

being performed - roads repaired, schools built, public transportation running – people are slowly re-gaining faith in the government itself and in its formal institutions.

Civil society is growing and becoming more of a counterweight to the central government (Hauser, 1997). Ugandans have re-engaged the political process through selection of local council, parliamentary and presidential candidates. People are seeing that at least at the electoral level, their voice can be meaningful as locally popular figures win parliamentary seats, regardless of whether or not they support the NRM. At the local level, the LC system has given people an opportunity to communicate with government representatives and to settle their disputes locally. However, as the local influence in decision-making promised by the LC system has not been matched with real authority at the lower levels, many lower LC members are beginning to feel that their goodwill and sacrifices are being exploited (Dicklitch, 1998). Moreover, at the national level, rural citizens have little if any insight into the methods of policymaking and little communication with their member of parliament who spend the vast majority of their time in Kampala.

These political and economic liberalization measures have raised the international reputation of Museveni. His portrayal in the international media has been so positive, that the editor of the opposition newspaper, *The Monitor*, lamented, "It seems the only place you will read anything critical about President Yoweri Museveni is in the Ugandan Press," (Onyongo-Obbo, 1997; 25). External involvement in the Ugandan economy has remained high and by the mid-1990s, official aid was more than double the value of Uganda's exports and represented 45% of all foreign exchange available (World Bank, 1996). As Uganda regained stability in the late 1980s, foreign donors and non-

governmental organizations (NGOs) have played a dominant role in economic rehabilitation and service provision. Foreign investors, tentative at first, have become increasingly important during the 1990s. Many Asians, displaced in 1972, have returned and quickly resumed their dominant position in Ugandan industry and trading. Donor support has allowed Museveni to implement SAP measures without corresponding cuts in service provision. Uganda has maintained social services, infrastructure and development spending at a much higher level than would be possible without foreign contributions. Accordingly, Uganda's external debt has mushroomed over the past decade.[19]

This increased foreign involvement also has resulted in increased foreign influence on policy choices, as well as growing cynicism, after the initial welcome, on the part of citizens. Finally, the influx of donor funds, along with the privatization programs, has increased the temptations for corruption by high government officials. Well-placed politicians and Museveni associates have figured prominently in the successful bidding for state enterprises (Oloka-Onyango, 1997) and Uganda ranked seventh in Transparency International's global survey of international corruption. In efforts to alter this reputation, Museveni has promulgated a code of conduct meant to encourage civil servants to adhere to high ethical standards in their public lives. There is also a new inspectorate of government charged with rooting out corruption and proposing regulatory and administrative reforms of public interest. The inspectorate's investigations have resulted in hundreds of corrupt officials being dismissed (Goldsmith, 1999). Moreover, parliamentary probes into corruption recently led to the firing or resignation of

[19] Although Uganda is expected to qualify for debt relief due to fulfillment of adjustment measures.

three senior ministers, including the president's brother and defense advisor, Salim Saleh. This is reflective of the relative power and independence of the Parliament, in contrast to the toothless bodies common in one-party regimes. Moreover, even if forced, that Museveni allowed the sackings to take place represents at least a token attempt to reduce high-level corruption.[20] Despite the publication of corruption, foreign aid has not suffered. In December 1998 alone, as a large corruption scandal involving several top government officials was unfolding, Uganda received nearly US$ 3 billion in aid from the World Bank and bilateral donors (Anonymous, 1999).[21]

Conclusion

These policies of the NRM government have established an admirable degree of political stability and economic growth, while creating the opportunity for increased citizen involvement. The local councils demonstrate a willingness to grant authority at the local level while the budgetary restrictions of the structural adjustment program created the opening for further divesting of public control. Although the changes have had mixed results economically, they helped improve the credibility and legitimacy to Museveni's regime necessary to change the reputation of the government. The local councils and increase in service provision have helped reestablish civil society and reengaged Ugandans with formal state structures. However, the vast majority of this

[20] By contrast in Kenya, which Transparency International ranked as the third most corrupt country in the world, despite continual assurances from President Moi to donors and warnings to the Kenyan people, not a single high level official has been convicted on a corruption charge.

[21] Donors have increasingly become impatient about corruption in Uganda and in March 1999, the IMF delayed aid disbursements for the first time. See Flannery & Watt, 1999.

participation is concentrated in the lower LC levels, which also happens to be the most ineffectual.

Improved compensation and threat of job loss have given government employees an increased incentive to perform. The increasing visibility of wealth after decades of subsistence living caused the aspirations of both citizens and civil servants to rise much faster than the actual improvement in living conditions. Moreover, the austerity measures required by the SAP potentially restrict state capacity to invest in rebuilding dilapidated state institutions, making it especially difficult to reinvigorate the conservation sector. This discrepancy between demands and institutional capacity has necessitated the influential participation of foreign actors to both finance and implement government programs. This increasing reliance on foreign actors is potentially threatening damaging to the NRM government by giving critics the opportunity to claim that the government represents foreign interests rather than the interests of the Ugandan people (Hauser, 1997).

The dominance of foreign actors and funding is especially evident in the field of conservation. The following chapter will describe Uganda's history of protected area rules and the changes initiated by the Museveni government. The initiation of protected area rules and behavior of the conservation authorities represented substantial constraints to the development of an effective park-community relationship. The likelihood of encouraging local participation will therefore hinge on providing incentives that demonstrate that the commitment of the government and park authorities to the process is credible.

CHAPTER 4

THE POLITICS OF CONSERVATION: REFORMING PROTECTED AREA INSTITUTIONS IN UGANDA

Introduction

As described in the introductory chapter, the poor conservation status of many national parks has led to an increase in the promotion of conservation strategies that encourage local participation. Over the past decade, Uganda has seemingly reversed this trend by more than doubling the number of protected areas demarcated as national parks, with their corresponding restrictive rules of access. Given the numerous competing demands for Uganda's scarce economic resources and limited institutional capacity, this decision seems paradoxical. Moreover, Uganda's tumultuous political history presented an urgent need for the current government to maintain local support for the stability of the regime. Under such conditions, why would the government of President Yoweri Museveni risk its fragile hold on the country policies and structures as well? In addition, perhaps more importantly, how did Museveni gain the political support at a time when pressure for degazettement of existing protected areas is more common?

This chapter will examine the politics of conservation policymaking in Uganda to explain why the Museveni government favored by the Museveni government and assess its subsequent potential impacts on conservation in Uganda. The increasing reliance on international donors and non-governmental organizations described in Chapter Three constrained not only Uganda's economic choices, but would constrain its choices regarding conservation policy choices as well. However, international donor influence

constrained, but did not dictate policy choices. Museveni's economic and political liberalization measures provided his regime with the legitimacy and widespread support that allowed more open criticism while shielding him from repercussions from promoting unpopular policies. Therefore, within the constraints imposed by the donor demands, different Ugandan agencies competed for control of the conservation estate.

The first section of the chapter presents a logic for examining the transfer in status. The second section of this chapter will introduce the conservation institutions present at the onset of the NRM regime. The third section will apply a politics of structural choice argument to explain the decision to create six new national parks in the early 1990s. The final section will then chronicle the merging of the Uganda National Parks and the Game Department to form the Uganda Wildlife Authority.

I. Conservation Institutions as Political Choices

Over the past two decades, the dominant conservation paradigm has been shifting away from restricted national parks towards models employing greater local participation. Many examples exist of local groups that have successfully managed natural resources over time calling into question the necessity of state control (Berkes, 1998; Ostrom, 1990). The inability of cash-strapped governments to enforce effectively regulations has turned many parks into open-access resources (Ostrom, 1990; Bromely & Cernea, 1989). Moreover, the trends in Africa of civil service reductions and democratization further the rationale for turning over responsibilities to local communities. For these reasons, the decision of the NRM government to more than double the number of national parks is especially surprising.

In addition to these overall trends in conservation, the NRM policies of developing local councils and implementing structural adjustment measures demonstrated the NRM's commitment to decentralize government structures and further make the decision to expand conservation restrictions paradoxical. These policies demonstrated to Ugandan citizens that Museveni was willing to transfer authority to the local level, complementing the trends in the international development and conservation fields. Moreover, the reestablishment of an elected national parliament produced an increased need to respond to local constituencies. Over 80% of Ugandans live in rural areas and thus likely resent increased conservation restrictions. Parliamentarians, needing to be response to their constituencies, typically support reducing, rather than increasing, conservation restrictions.

Viewing this as a political decision, rather than a conservation decision, offers explanations to this surprising policy choice. Environmental policies are political choices reflecting national agendas, a variety of interest groups and divergent political agendas (Peluso, 1992). The politics of structural choice presents a rationale for the selection of institutions to show how the designers of bureaucracies create institutions to allow them greater control (Moe, 1990; 1984). Politicians, interest groups and bureaucrats compete to structure public agencies to achieve their own particular goals (Gibson, 1999; Moe, 1990). Legislatures may structure institutions to reduce agency problems and control the behavior of self-interested bureaucrats (McCubbins, Noll & Weingast, 1987). Alternatively, bureaucrats and interest groups create institutions to avoid such control (Gibson, 1999, Horn, 1995; Moe, 1984). In addition to legislatures and bureaucracies, powerful executives can create institutions to control the bureaucracy or how

bureaucratic and interest groups compete for the executive's patronage (Moe, 1997; Gibson, 1999). In order to gain the resources necessary to compete with the executive, groups often seek the financial support of foreign donors and organizations (Gibson, 1999). However, the executive as well often requires the support of foreign donors, perhaps not to gain policymaking authority, but to implement them effectively. The following sections will examine how the executive and bureaucratic agencies competed over the design of conservation institutions to further their own interest and expand their share of scarce government authority and resources.

II. Establishment of Protected Areas in Uganda

The creation of game reserves in the early 1900's initiated the formal establishment of protected areas in Uganda (See Table 4.1). The original reserves were located in sparsely populated areas managed primarily for preserving wildlife for sport hunting. The colonial government transferred game laws virtually in tact from England that were primarily directed towards maintaining populations of prime hunting animals (Graham, 1973). These laws banned local subsistence hunting, as well as settlement and cultivation within the reserves.

Table 4.1: Early Protected Areas in Uganda

Conservation Area	Year Established	Type	Current Status
Mabira	1900	FR	FR
Bunyoro	1910	GR	NP (Murchison Falls)
Lake Edward	1925	GR	NP (Queen Elizabeth)
Toro	1926	GR	GR
Gulu	1928	GR	NP (Murchison Falls)
Lake George	1930	GR	NP (Queen Elizabeth)
Kibale	1932	FR	NP
Semliki	1932	FR	NP
Bwindi Impenetrable	1932	FR	NP
BudoNGO	1932	FR	FR
Kalinzu/Maramagambo	1932	FR	FR
Bugoma	1932	FR	FR
Kashyoha-Kitomi	1932	FR	FR
White Rhino Sanctuary	1937	GR	GR (Ajai)
Mt. Elgon	1938	FR	NP
Rwenzori Mountains	1941	FR	NP

Legend: FR = Forest Reserve; GR = Game Reserve; NP = National Park

Earlier than other countries in East Africa, Uganda faced serious human/wildlife conflicts, especially elephant damage to crops. Some scholars claim this problem was exacerbated by the creation of these reserves, as wide areas were removed from cultivation (Ofcansky, 1981). Moreover, that agriculturists lived in some of the prime game areas exacerbated these conflicts. By contrast, in Kenya and Tanzania, pastoralists lived in the prime wildlife areas. By being mobile and not cultivating, pastoralists can more easily avoid conflicts with wildlife than can cultivators. In 1924, the colonial government created the Elephant Control Department to deal with elephant damage complaints.[22] The Department was given the somewhat contradictory mandate of regulating hunting of wildlife within the reserves, while controlling the destructive elephant population outside the protected areas (Graham, 1973). These early conflicts

[22] In 1925 the Department was renamed the Game Department.

caused the Game Department in Uganda to develop a different outlook on game as its counterparts in Kenya or Tanzania as it focused more on the control of wildlife, rather than on its preservation. From 1925-1969, game rangers killed an average of 1,000 elephants a year (Naughton-Trevas, 1996). Maintenance of natural habitats or ecosystem functions, or even conservation of non-valued wildlife, was not a management priority. An early Kenyan game warden described game management as based on perceptions and almost completely disinterested in scientific research and knowledge. Being driven by emotions it was therefore more a religion for the early gamekeepers than a science (Graham, 1973). Thus, the colonial government did not create protected areas in Uganda for scientific purposes and did not manage according to scientific principles.

Game reserves were primarily savannahs and in the early 1930's, the government created a Forest Department and formally gazetted most of the country's principle forests as forest reserves (See Table 1), totaling 3,657 km^2.[23] As was common in Europe at the time, foresters managed the reserves for timber production, but allowed regulated local use of many minor forest products. As with the game reserves, the primary management objective was not nature preservation, but to maintain a harvestable supply of a few valued species.

British nature enthusiasts began lobbying for the creation of national parks in the East African colonies early in the 20th Century. Creating national parks however had little support within Uganda, as while some wealthy farmers could afford to regard game as a natural asset, "small farmers continued to view it as an unmitigated curse," (unnamed District Commissioner aqi Ofcansky, 1981; 40). However, a combination of official

[23] Although, it took another two decades before the formal boundaries were consolidated.

apathy and public apprehension (of both African and European farmers) postponed their creation until after World War II (Ofcansky, 1981). The national park issue was so sensitive that a committee created by the colonial government in 1948 to assess suitable sites for national park creation, recommended areas with: few settlements, low agricultural potential and no minerals – land that had little value under any other use (Ofcansky, 1981). Among their recommended sites were Murchison Falls – a tse-tse fly infested area along the Nile in the North and (what would be later called) Queen Elizabeth – a dry savannah region in the South-west. In 1952, these two areas became Uganda's first two national parks. Being incorporated from existing Game Reserves (See Table 1), the creation of these parks did not necessitate widespread expulsion of local populations. During this period after World War II, as nationalist African political consciousness was fomenting, most African leaders viewed the creation of these national parks as an "imperialist trick" designed to "take land away from the people," (Ofcansky, 1981; 193). The low priority placed on parks, by both the public and the government, continued as over the next thirty years, only two additional parks were created: Kidepo Valley National Park in 1962 and Lake Mburo National Park in 1982.

The creation of the national parks and the new agency to manage them (Uganda National Parks), drastically changed the focus of conservation in Uganda. While the Game Department's mandate was conservation for hunting and controliing problem animals, the mandate of the national parks was preservation of both wildlife and habitat. UNP thus posed a challenge to the Game Department's monopoly of control over the regulation of hunting, the policing of poaching and the policies of game preservation. In Kenya, the establishment of a separate national parks entity, outside the jurisdiction of

the national legislature and separate from the government departments responsible for conservation created a situation of tension and rivalry (Steinhart, 1994). This change caused a similar reaction in Uganda. It also represented a victory for conservationists by removing areas from control and influence of the government and the settler-dominated legislature (Steinhart, 1994).

As a means of attracting tourism, the two original parks, Queen Elizabeth and Murchison Falls, never approached the international popularity of other East African parks such as Amboseli, Tsavo and Serengeti. Nevertheless, they dominated the Ugandan tourism market, attracting almost 90,000 visitors between them in 1971, propelling tourism to become Uganda's third largest source of foreign exchange after coffee and cotton exports.[24] However, just four years later, visitors totaled only 1/5 of that figure, and virtually ceased coming at all to Murchison Falls until the early 1990s. The two later parks (Kidepo Valley and Lake Mburo) never aroused substantial tourist interest. Isolated hundreds of kilometers from Kampala along the Sudan border, in a region of perpetual fighting and banditry, guaranteed that Kidepo would never generate much tourism or notice. Lake Mburo, established controversially during the unstable 1980s, has only recently begun to generate interest as a tourism destination.

Conservation Status

Uganda's conservation sector did not escape the general turmoil of the 1970s and 1980s, as national parks became parks on paper only. During the decade of the 1970s,

[24] Hiking in the Rwenzori Mountains also gained some international publicity, but its year-round wet weather prohibited it from attaining the popularity of sites such as Mt. Kenya and Mt. Kilimanjaro.

Uganda's elephant population plunged from 30,000 to only 2,000 (Naughton-Treves, 1996). In Murchison Falls National Park alone, 12,000 of the park's population of 12,500 elephants (96%), were killed (Bonner, 1993). Scholars attribute much of these killings to soldiers and park staff killing for meat as well as for the easy money generated by the boom in the international ivory trade. Hunting animals for meat, and to a lesser extent for ivory, does not require sophisticated technology, expertise or institutions for managing or marketing – all of which were in short supply. Hunting did require weapons, which were common and cheap in Uganda during this period.

Although hunting decimated savannah wildlife populations, this combination of state retreat and the limited capacity of local institutions inadvertently allowed much of Uganda's natural resources, especially its forests, somewhat of a sanctuary where exploitation was much less than in more stable countries. Exploitation of forests for timber resources is far more difficult. Harvesting trees in large scale requires technology such as mechanized logging and saw mills, and selling requires transportation facilities and functioning marketing structures – characteristics that were lacking in Uganda (except for the ivory trade, which was organized from abroad). Overgrown and abandoned tea plantations in the Fort Portal area became a source of local firewood, reducing the pressure on nearby Kibale Forest Reserve (Prinsloo, 1996). As a result, with the return of stability in the mid-1980s, Uganda found itself with very little savannah wildlife, but with forests still covering about 20% of the country's total land area (Howard. 1991). Deforestation was occurring on a smaller scale by pit-sawing, a technique that is labor and time intensive, yet requires only a hand-held saw blade and so was well-suited to Uganda's constraints. Most forests had therefore experienced some

degree of damage by pitsawing (Howard, 1991). 12% of the land within Uganda's principle forest reserves was affected by agricultural encroachment in the late 1980s (Howard, 1991). This combination of viable patches of forest remaining and small-scale encroachment, along with increased awareness of its biodiversity value, led to widespread international concern over the need for increased protection of Ugandan forests during the 1980s.

Agencies Responsible for Conservation

Uganda was the last colony in East Africa to create national parks and by 1990, had demarcated only four areas as national parks – Queen Elizabeth, Murchison Falls, Kidepo Valley and Lake Mburo – covering about 7,000 km^2. This figure is even more striking when one considers that Uganda was renowned for its biological significance and scenic beauty. However, unlike Kenya and Tanzania, most of Uganda's biological interest and *charismatic megafauna*[25] were contained in forests, rather than savannahs and therefore managed as forest reserves, rather than national parks. As was common in the region, a parastatal (Uganda National Parks) and two government departments (Forest Department and Game Department), under two different ministries (Ministry of Tourism, Wildlife and Antiquities and Ministry of Environmental Protection[26]) shared responsibility for managing these protected areas. This created rivalry, duplication and lack of coordination over the management of these resources. In addition, the different

[25] Term used to describe the large mammals such as elephants, pandas, whales and gorillas that are able to generate worldwide popular interest irrespective of their biological importance.

[26] Later the Ministry of Natural Resources.

departments had different mandates and organizational cultures that tempered how they governed as well as how they perceived and interacted with the public.

Game Department

By 1990, thirteen major game reserves existed in Uganda, including several managed jointly as Forest Reserves. In these joint reserves, the Forest Department was responsible for the flora, while the Game Department managed the fauna. The Game Department originally had a dual mandate of preserving wildlife for hunting and controlling problem animals. The creation of the national parks and the Uganda National Parks (UNP) had greatly diminished the prestige and authority of the Game Department. The Ministry of Tourism, Wildlife and Antiquities, which was responsible for both national parks and game reserves, was primarily concerned with promoting the development of tourism in the national parks, especially after hunting was banned in 1984, the game reserves were virtually ignored. UNP had greater autonomy, financial resources and international recognition. UNP rangers were better paid, better equipped and better trained than their counterparts in the Game Department. Wardens often selected game rangers from the uneducated nomadic pastoral tribes, often poachers themselves. By contrast, park rangers were more educated, hired from the areas near the parks or on a national competitive basis.

As a result, the creation of UNP caused a corresponding decline in the influence, morale and effectiveness of the Game Department. The hunting ban eliminated any direct financial return to the Department. Being continually understaffed and underfunded, the Game Department was not able to manage or protect the Game

Reserves. Describing the behavior of the Game Rangers at Bwindi, one observer noted, "they made no attempt whatsoever to catch any of those [poachers] that we came across," (Harcourt, 1984). By the late 1980s, many, if not most, of the game reserves were virtually completely devoid of wildlife. To summarize the game rangers tended to be militaristic, received little respect and had low morale. Not surprisingly, the department was ineffective at conservation, had little influence in government and had poor relationships with local communities.

Forest Department

The Forest Department managed the network of forest reserves. The Department was guided by the Forest Act (1964) that focused on timber production, with regulated local use of non-timber forest products also allowed.[27] The Department has been highly centralized and management directives have often been arbitrary. For example, the Forest Act empowered the Minister to declare unilaterally any area that he deems fit to be a forest reserve. The Forest Department was decentralized in 1993 as part of Museveni's government decentralization program, but was recentralized in 1995 and has remained a very hierarchical, top-down organization, with a self-proclaimed weak link between the department and local communities (Forest Department, 1996). The Forest Department has frequently moved to different ministries destabilizing its long-term planning ability.[28]

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[27] Protective forestry was not emphasized until the revised Forest Policy in 1988.

[28] From 1962-1979, the FD was under the Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry, Cooperatives and Marketing; from 1980-1986, the FD was under the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry; from 1987-1990, the FD was under the Ministry of Environmental Protection; from 1990-1993, the FD was under the Ministry of Water, Minerals and Environment Protection; from 1993-present, it has been located in the Ministry of Natural Resources.

Amalgamating the department with other larger departments, such as agriculture, which receive more attention than forestry, worsened this situation.

The Forest Department had a contradictory history regarding its interactions with local communities. The rules emphasizing use rather than protection created opportunities for local people to view them more favorably than the game rangers did. Local people were allowed harvesting rights, including *taungya* cultivation rights in reserves with plantations. Unlike game and park rangers, forest rangers did not carry guns and therefore feared less than UNP rangers. Hiring local people as forest guards enabled a means of communication between the department and local people. In addition to the legal rights, enforcement was very lax, including forest officials occasionally leasing land within the reserves for cultivation. The lenient rules and even more lenient enforcement allowed local people to view the forest department more favorably than their counterparts in the GD or UNP. However, since the late 1980s with attempts to reinforce existing laws, the department has been responsible for the eviction of more than 130,000 encroachers (Feeney, 1998).

This haphazard enforcement, with burning of huts followed by months of inactivity, created conditions whereby local people never knew what to expect (Siwa, 1997). Therefore, despite being seen as too lenient by many outsiders, this inconsistency hurt their potential for building trust with local communities. The enforcement measures become ineffective, as people expelled from the reserve often returned after a few days because they did not believe in the diligence of the rangers to continue enforcing regulations. In this respect, the rules-in-use became the official rules as perceived by local people. When the rules-in-form were enforced, people therefore perceived them as

unjust persecution, rather than as upholding of the law. This lack of trust, in the legitimacy of the rules and in the individuals themselves, characterized the forest department.

The culture of the Forest Department was not very amenable to effective preservation. Although by the 1950s, Uganda had become a leader in forest management in Africa (Howard, 1991), by the early 1970s, formal planning for forests ended. Reserves operated without management plans, funding was inconsistent and morale among rangers was extremely low. Corruption and shirking were the common activities of rangers, leading to an almost complete lack of protection. Howard (1991) found that even in the nature reserve areas of the forest reserves – the areas accorded the most rigorous protection – there was substantial illegal use and almost no visible sign of enforcement. Forest rangers were not armed, nor did they have a mandate to guard wildlife, and resultantly were no match for armed hunters. Reserves such as Mt. Elgon and Rwenzori were almost completely denuded of wildlife. Powerful officials from within the Forest Department and other government agencies were often involved in illegal harvesting of timber, and it was not uncommon for forest officials to lease plots within the reserves for cultivation for their own personal gain (Howard, 1991)[29].

Between 1988-1993, the World Bank and European Economic Community sponsored a $38 million Forestry Rehabilitation Project, with the objective of transforming it again to a viable organization. The principle objectives of the project were the demarcation of forest boundaries, establishment of nurseries and replanting of

[29] The leasing of plots by the Forest Department was verified repeatedly during interviews in Mt. Elgon. The assistant warden in charge was subsequently transferred.

degraded forest, improving patrolling and revenue collection, establishment of management plans and increasing the conservation area to 50% of the total natural forest. Neither forest dwellers, forest neighbors nor forest product users were consulted during the establishment of these objectives, which were geared largely towards increasing enforcement (Feeney, 1998). Donor priorities dominated forestry sector funding since the department has not developed its own set of priorities (Forest Department, 1996). However, this perception of an organizational culture dominated by corruption and inefficiency was so engrained that many doubted the potential to transform it into a viable organization. As will be explored later, this poor reputation was to make it difficult for the department to hold onto the valuable portions of its estate.

Uganda National Parks

Uganda National Parks[30] represented the newest and smallest of the organizations, and was responsible for the management of the four national parks. As with the Game Department, it fell under the Ministry of Tourism, Wildlife and Antiquities. However, as a parastatal, it had a greater degree of financial and policy autonomy than either the Game or Forest Departments, which were government departments. A semi-autonomous body, a parastatal is directed by a government appointed board of trustees, but has a large degree of financial and managerial autonomy. Importantly, revenues from the national parks could be returned to the parastatal to be used for park management, instead of being sent to the central government to be used as the government deemed fit (with only a tiny portion sent back to the park authority). With some degree of established tourist

[30] Reconstituted as the Uganda Wildlife Authority (UWA) in 1996.

attractions, UNP had potential to earn its own revenue through tourism. Before Amin's rule, tourism to national parks had become Uganda's third greatest source of foreign exchange.

Similar to the GD, enforcement was the management focus of the UNP. Its mandate involved the protection not just of plants, or wildlife, but of all natural phenomena within the parks. In the national parks, rules regarding access and use were more restrictive than in either of the reserves. Access rules were clearer than in the reserves as all forms of settlement and use, except for tourism, were prohibited. Therefore although enforcement was often lax, park neighbors nevertheless knew the rules and expectations of leniency or ignorance of the rules was far less of a problem. Relations with communities were very poor; UNP rangers were underpaid, often worked under difficult conditions and were armed – conditions that were not conducive for positive interactions with the local people.

Summary

Thus, Uganda's recent political history, protected area rules and organizational cultures created an environment that encouraged poor performance regarding both conservation outcomes and park/community relationships. In conservation, as throughout all sectors of government, official institutions functioned at very low capacity, if at all. As a result, despite the formal creation of different protected areas encompassing different sets of rules and conservation priorities, actual rules is use varied significantly from those officially proscribed negatively affecting conservation status. Moreover, the creation of protected areas restricted local rights to land and the cultures of

the organizations responsible for management of these protected areas focused on confrontation with local communities.

III. Changing Conservation Institutions

During the first twenty-five years of Uganda's independence, the political system oscillated between a one-party system and military rule (Apter, 1995). Upon ascending to power in 1986, President Yoweri Museveni has attempted widespread political reforms intended to decentralize government and instigate grass-roots democracy.[31] Although officially a "no-party" system,[32] Museveni retains tight control over legislative and bureaucratic decision-making resembles a one-party system. Nevertheless, within this system exists a high degree of electoral competition. Scholars frequently portray Museveni as being more democratic than his one-party president contemporaries for his acceptance of criticism, attempts to curb government power and decentralization under the Resistance Councils. In contrast to other one-party states, citizens routinely vote out incumbent MPs during elections. Thus, in contrast to the frequent portrayal of African leaders, Museveni has experienced a relatively high degree of legitimacy both from Ugandan citizens and the international community desperate for an African "success story" (Apter, 1995). By restoring peace and stability in much of the nation, reducing the predatory behavior of the armed services, initiating participation at the local level through

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[31] See discussion in Chapter Three.

[32] Political parties are not allowed to promote candidates, contest elections or make public pronouncements. Officially, no elected official represents any particular party. Unofficially, the party loyalties of most MPs and RC leaders are common knowledge.

the Local Councils, reinstating traditional kingdoms,[33] tolerating opposition and returning an elected parliament, Museveni personally and the NRM regime enjoyed a high degree of legitimacy from most of the population throughout its first decade in power despite the fact that he achieved power through non-democratic means.[34]

Tolerating dissent and allowing electoral competition has increased Museveni's legitimacy among Ugandans, but at the cost of less control over legislators than prototypical one-party executives enjoy. Nevertheless, his ability to dominate policy-making resembles that of a typical one-party executive. For most of his tenure, he has been able to override potential opposition from elected legislators by allying himself, when necessary, with the unelected bureaucracy.[35] Decentralization through the Local Councils provided an additional means of cultivating support that did not need to be directly reciprocated as lower level LC members had no direct voice in national level policy-making. The debate over accepting structural adjustment reforms exemplifies the extent of Museveni's influence. Although the NRM widely disseminated its Marxist platform prior to attaining power, Museveni was able to gain support for the very un-Marxist structural adjustment policies by replacing those bureaucrats that he was unable

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[33] The most important of which was the Kabaka, or King of Buganda, Uganda's largest and most economically and politically powerful ethnic group. The overthrowing of the Kabaka (constitutionally enshrined as the national President) by Obote in 1966 signaled the end of Uganda's constitutional government and the beginning of authoritarian one-party rule. A non-Baganda, Museveni promised the return of the Kabaka to gain the support of the Baganda, without which he would have been unable to achieve power.

[34] This legitimacy has waned during the last half of this decade as people are tiring of his continuance in power, the slowing of economic growth and his inability to cease guerilla wars in the west and north of the country.

[35] This level of influence has notably waned in the past few years, especially after the elections of 1996. The deteriorating economy and growing disenchantment with Museveni's apparent interests in remaining in power have created a vocal and increasingly effective opposition to his objectives. The censure in Parliament of several close advisors including his brother represents his increasing inability to control Ugandan politics.

to convince to go along with him (Harvey & Robinson, 1995). The reversal and acceptance of these reforms also signified the ability of Museveni to call upon, when necessary, the resources and prestige available from the international community. Thus despite a vocal opposition, Museveni effectively shielded himself from the potential opposition of legislators by allying himself with non-elected actors such as the bureaucracy, rural citizens and the international donor community.

Expanding the National Parks

Along with economic policy choices, the aforementioned policy processes influenced conservation policy choices as well. Thus, the executive's preferences dominated, but did not determine, politics in Uganda. As with other policy choices, conservation policy decisions represented competition among Museveni and other actors for access to scarce government resources. During the late 1980s as Museveni was consolidating power and returning most of the country to stability, one of his primary goals was to reassert political stability and respect for the rule of law (Apter, 1995). As formal rules were unheeded in most aspects of Ugandan life, Museveni attempted to reassert the integrity of the formal rules as the *rules in use*. Therefore Museveni's initial actions towards protected areas involved improving enforcement of the existing regulations, rather than developing participatory structures or providing incentives for local cooperation. Beginning in the late 1980s, the government evicted more than 130,000 squatters from existing parks and forest reserves (Feeney, 1998; 90), including more than 50,000 people from the Kibale Game Corridor alone (Siegel & Catterson, 1992). However, by the late 1980s, international recognition of the importance of

biodiversity had directed attention to the biological wealth located in Uganda's tropical forests (See Hamilton et. al, 1990; Butynski, 1984). Therefore, stronger enforcement of existing rules was not sufficient to appease many conservationists who also wanted to increase the protective status of these forest reserves by transferring them to national park status

Although activists had proposed increasing the areas under national park status occasionally since the early 1970s, after the return to stability in the late 1980s, the battle for control of them began in earnest. In the 1980s, two prominent biological research projects led by American scientists – Tom Struhsaker at Kibale Forest and Tom Butynski at Bwindi Impenetrable Forest – began publicizing their findings on the ecological significance of Ugandan forests.[36] Their results described the rich species diversity that existed in Uganda's rain forests as well as the widespread forest use, both legal and illegal, that threatened the habitat for endangered, and charismatic, gorillas and chimpanzees. They called for stricter conservation measures, such as conversion to national park status. Sites of primary interest were the forests in the south-west that were home to the endangered chimpanzee and mountain gorilla and the Rwenzori Mountains, the famous *Mountains of the Moon*. The advantages promoted of protecting the areas as national parks instead of forest reserves included: national parks did not have conflicting interests in promoting consumptive use; management decisions were made by a Board of Trustees rather than a single civil servant; national parks were more secure as they could only be degazetted through an act of parliament; national parks

[36] For detailed results of their research findings and management recommendations, see T. Struhsaker, 1997, *The Ecology of an East African Rain Forest* and T. Butynski, 1984, *Ecological Survey of Impenetrable Forest, Uganda and Recommendations for its Conservation and Management.* Unpublished Report to the Government of Uganda, Kampala.

protected entire ecosystems, not just the flora or fauna; the Forest Department had little experience in developing tourism; and that national parks were more internationally recognized and more likely to generate international support (See Howard, 1991). These arguments set the stage for a battle between UNP and the FD for control of several of Uganda's most valuable forests.

The growing stability in the country after Museveni gained power, created an opening for supporters of increased protection to act. In 1988, the government held a series of inter-governmental consultations involving representatives of the primary government agencies involved in conservation. These meetings turned into debates between FD and UNP officials and their supporters, as to which, if any, forests should be transferred to national park status. The participants reached a compromise agreement declaring that Mgahinga Forest Reserve and the areas above the tree line at Mt. Elgon and Rwenzori would become national parks. Bwindi, as well as the areas below the tree line at Mt. Elgon and Rwenzori would remain as forest reserves (Kamugisha et. al, 1997). Bwindi was perceived as the crown jewel of Ugandan forests and because of its populations of gorillas and abundant species diversity, seen as the most important economically and ecologically. Thus, the Forest Department was willing to cede less valuable portions of its estate such as Mgahinga and Mt. Elgon in order to maintain control of Bwindi.

Conservationists however were not convinced that the wide degree of consumptive uses allowed within forest reserves could adequately protect the value of the park and continued lobbying Museveni's Cabinet and gaining support from UNP directors. This informal maneuvering resulted in Uganda National Parks violating the

terms of the agreement and unilaterally requested the Cabinet to designate Mgahinga, Bwindi and the entire Rwenzori Forest Reserves as National Parks. In 1989, the Cabinet subsequently approved the request, although the local people had not been consulted and Parliament had not debated the issue as was constitutionally required. After pressure from the Forest Department and consultations with the local community, who adamantly opposed the creation of these national parks, it was eventually agreed, and approved by Parliament, that Mgahinga and the area above the forest line at Rwenzori would be redesignated as national parks and that Bwindi would remain a forest reserve.

As the heads of the Forest Department recognized that they were in danger of losing the most valuable portions of their estate, they proposed creating a new protected area category: forest parks. Forest parks would remain under their management, but would be subject to different rules than forest reserves thus providing a greater emphasis on protection. At least 50% of their area would be protected against extractive use, mechanized logging would be prohibited, mutual harvesting of forest products would be licensed and strictly regulated within designated areas only, and park guards would be empowered to enforce regulations protecting both animal and plant life (Kigenyi, 1988). Thus, forest parks would offer more protection than a traditional forest reserve, yet unlike a national park, still allow some consumptive use. In Uganda, where there was high population pressure outside some of the important reserves, and where a large degree of local use already existed, forest parks seemed a more feasible alternative than the restricted rules of national parks. However, although the Forest Department belatedly developed management plans for *Bwindi Forest Park* and *Mt. Elgon Forest*

Park, they did not finalize them until after the areas had already been accorded national park status.[37]

Despite the previous agreement, in October 1991, under pressure from USAID and other donor agencies, the President directed Parliament that Bwindi and all of Mt. Rwenzori Forest Reserve would also become national parks (Kamugisha et. al, 1997). Thus, redesignation of the forest as a national park was a political decision that went against the wishes of both the local people and the arm of government mandated to manage it. Avid conservationists and UNP welcomed, the addition of these three forests to the national park system but still were not satisfied. Pressures to expand further forests of significance continued and despite the forest park proposals, the Forest Department again lost the battle. In 1994, Mt. Elgon, Semliki and Kibale forest reserves became national parks. The national park system had expanded from four to ten parks, a 250% increase, in just three years. The Forest Department meanwhile, lost the most valuable portions of their estates.

[37] The Forest Department has not continued with this proposal, and has not upgraded any of its remaining reserves to Forest Park status (even though three that remained as reserves had been recommended by Howard for upgrading – Budongo, Maramagambo and Kashoya-Kitomi), an indication that maybe the Department was not too serious about the idea in the first place. Instead they have shifted attention to following the current trend towards collaborative management. See Forest Department, FORI and IUCN. 1996, *An Assessment of Opportunities and Constraints for Collaborative Management in the Forest Department's Operation in Uganda.* Unpublished Report, Kampala.



Figure 4.1: Ugandan National Parks (Source: Uganda Wildlife Authority)

Table 4.2: Ugandan National Parks

National Park	Area (km²)	Year Established
Murchison Falls	3840	1952*
Queen Elizabeth	1978	1952*
Kidepo Valley	1344	1962
Lake Mburo	260	1982
Bwindi Impenetrable	331	1991
Mgahinga	34	1991
Rwenzori Mountain	996	1991
Mount Elgon	1147	1994
Kibale	766	1994
Semliki	276	1994

**Pre-independence*

Explaining Institutional Change

Given Uganda's increasing population, limited resources and the democratically elected legislature, expanding the national parks seemed an improbable policy option. Park rules restricting access are generally unpopular with local communities and thus supporting them would be risky for elected officials. As parliament would have to approve the transfer, MPs in a system in which incumbents were routinely voted out would be unlikely to publicly support or vote for the transfer. Moreover, Local Council leaders, many of whom were likely forest users themselves, would also be unlikely to support the change in status. If indeed individuals and agencies seek to construct conservation policies to advantage themselves, Museveni would be unlikely to gain the necessary support for such largely unpopular policies.

However, policymakers operate within the constraints and opportunities afforded by the existing institutional environment and their resource endowment. Ugandan politicians and bureaucrats supported the change because of the political capital gained by supporting Museveni as well as the support of international agencies. To counteract the lack of local support, Museveni allied himself with agencies that would individually

gain from the transfer, while shielding himself from potential negative reactions. First, Museveni personally enjoyed widespread support and his regime seen as increasingly legitimate through NRM institutions such as the Resistance Council systems and by maintaining peace and stability throughout most of the country. Moreover, the lack of an upcoming election shielded the President from direct electoral threat.[38] UNP and international donors represented the primary supporters of this transfer. UNP, controlling a fraction of the estate of the FD stood to gain by greatly increasing the resources under control. Moreover, the forests to be transferred were among the most valuable forests economically with the most tourism potential.

Donors of course were generally unknown to local residents and shielded from direct retaliation. USAID, Uganda's largest bilateral donor, was the driving force behind increased conservation. Conservation had been a priority for USAID since the negative environmental impacts of many of its activities had been publicized in Congressional hearings in the mid-1980s and USAID selected Uganda as a priority country for biodiversity conservation due primarily to its remaining tropical forests. Museveni, being a shrewd manipulator of donors, accepted the transfer in exchange for the political capital gained with the international donor community. In addition to conservation funding, his support further solidified his position as an enlightened leader and ensured him a continuing stream of funds for activities far removed from conservation. As donors supplied as much as 60% of Uganda's budget, maintaining their support was essential to his economic programs and political security. Thus, Museveni's regime

[38] Direct elections for president would not take place until 1996.

enjoyed political and economic benefits from the transfer not directly related to conservation, while being shielded from potential negative reactions to the policy.

Despite the great deal of support from expatriate conservationists and international donors giving the impression that the transfer was reflecting the interests of foreign actors, not all involved conservation NGOs operating projects in the forest reserves supported the transfer. Agencies such as IUCN at Mt. Elgon and CARE at Bwindi had initiated their projects by allying themselves with the Forest Department. Realizing that the transfer would be unpopular and relying on public trust, NGO representatives distanced themselves from supporting the policy. Being active locally, and largely seen as outsiders and conservationists, their activities rely directly on local cooperation and therefore would suffer directly from any local backlash.[39]

Consensus exists among policymakers interviewed that Museveni supported the move and used his influence to secure approval for the transfer. Museveni is widely perceived to personally favor conservation (Victorine, 1997) and he personally identified himself with the NEAP process in speeches and attending ceremonies (Lutz & Caldecott, 1996). That the cabinet initially bypassed the Parliament to initiate the transfer is evidence of Museveni's approval. Nevertheless, parliament still had to pass the transfer. In Museveni's Uganda, a substantial portion of MPs are voted out of office, so elected officials need to respond to voter demands. As national parks are usually unpopular with local people, locally elected MPs might be wary to support the move.

[39] After witnessing the backlash at Bwindi, project directors of the IUCN project at Kibale and Semliki were lobbying against the transfer to national park status fearing that they would lose the opportunity to continue with sustainable harvesting activities (Posthauer, 1996).

Most forest and park officers interviewed felt that donor pressure was the reason behind the transfer. An international presence in conservation is common throughout Africa and is especially strong in Uganda. Most of the national parks in Uganda, including all that were demarcated over the past decade, have an international conservation organization project active in the local communities, including Bwindi and Mgahinga (CARE), Rwenzori Mountains (WWF), Lake Mburo (AWF), Kibale, Semliki and Mt. Elgon (IUCN), Murchison Falls (GTZ). Peace Corps volunteers worked at the Kampala headquarters of UNP as well as at many of the national parks and game reserves, and British volunteers worked at many forest reserves. The World Bank and USAID have instigated the completion of a National Environmental Action Plan and have provided extensive funding for rehabilitation and development of the infrastructure in the parks. Donors fund a large portion of UNP's budget. These international actors often hold values regarding conservation that may differ from those of most Ugandans. They valued Uganda's natural resources for its biodiversity, habitat for endangered species and scenic wonders. These, generally non-consumptive values, are best served by the restrictive rules of a national park. The promise of continued activities such as these therefore present strong incentives for the government to support them through policies favorable to their interests.

International donors and NGOs have certainly played an influential, if not dominant, role in Uganda's economy since 1986 (Khadiagala, 1995). The very low economic base with which Museveni had at his disposal, resulted in the need for overwhelming dependency on external resources (Khadiagala, 1995). Ever the opportunist, Museveni was generally more receptive to listening to donor conditionality

than most of his neighbors (Hauser, 1997). Despite the Marxist platform with which the NRM emerged from the bush, Museveni moved relatively quickly towards financial liberalization and privatization, in the process becoming a model for the World Bank and supporters of structural adjustment. Uganda was the first country in the region to allow free trade of its currency, virtually eliminating the black market. Although Museveni initially resisted privatization of government firms, since 1994 the government has sold dozens of parastatals and other government assets. These economic liberalization measures likely reflect as much Museveni's practical realization of the need for foreign assistance as his belief that they will be successful. However, the gradual acceptance of these measures and the purge of opponents are a strong indicator of presidential support.

Despite, the widely held impression that the creation was a donor stipulation, donors demanded greater protection of the forests – not necessarily a change in protected area status. Environmental protection was one of USAID's five primary policy objectives for Africa (USAID, 1996) and USAID stipulated that Bwindi and Rwenzori Mountain be converted to national park status as a condition for release of Action Program on the Environment (APE) funds (Moore, 1997). However, this does not explain why this stipulation was so easily accepted or why four other forest reserves were also converted. Uganda has a representative democracy and according to an official at the MTWA, "It couldn't have been too unpopular, because it was ratified by Parliament," (Abura, 1997). Nevertheless, local people were rarely consulted, and when they were, almost unanimously opposed the transfer. As several people at Mt. Elgon reported "The forest went early in the morning," meaning that it disappeared as people slept. One measure of the closed and secretive nature of the transfer, was the extreme confusion

regarding how it all came about. The 1994 transfers were especially intriguing as even the foreign conservation organization active at two of the reserves[40] fought against the transfer to national park status as they felt it would further aggravate relations with local communities (Posthauer, 1996).

A more complete explanation requires identifying not only external pressures, but looking at inter-agency rivalries within the government itself. By 1990, Uganda National Parks controlled four national parks, with a combined area of 7,000 km^2 and visited by 10,000 - 15,000 tourists each year. By contrast, the Forest Department estate included twenty reserves, most experiencing widespread use and receiving negligible tourism. With a return to stability, the government was eager to increase tourism to generate much-needed foreign exchange. Three of the existing national parks were devoid of the wildlife species that tourists most wanted to see, and the fourth was located in a dangerous area on the border with Sudan, therefore accessible only by chartered aircraft. Uganda's savannah wildlife could not hope to compete with the parks of Kenya or Tanzania with their vast herds of game.

However, Uganda enjoyed a comparative advantage with its forests and mountains. Its tropical forests not only contained the wildlife most likely to attract tourists – gorillas, chimpanzees and other primates, but also were becoming increasingly recognized internationally for their high biological diversity. Gorillas inhabited the Mgahinga and Impenetrable Forests, chimpanzees at the Budongo, Impenetrable and Kibale forests, and mountain trekking was possible at Mt. Rwenzori and Mt. Elgon – all of which were forest reserves and not national parks. Therefore the Ministry of Tourism,

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[40] IUCN, which operated a conservation and development, project at Kibale and Semliki.

Wildlife and Antiquities lobbied for the transfer to national park status, not only because UNP fell within its jurisdiction, but because they would share in the benefits if and when tourist revenues boomed.

Thus, the arguments rested on two grounds – a policy argument that national park rules were more effective at conservation than the rules of the forest reserve; and an agency argument, that the UNP was a more effective agency than the FD. The FD lost on both counts. The MTWA and UWA were able to pursue their objectives more effectively than the MNR and FD because of better organization, better lobbying and more support at higher levels of government. The perception that the Forest Department as inherently inefficient, corrupt and incapable of being reformed, was an important factor in the decision not to leave the forests as reserves. Even senior Forest Department officials indicated to me that the department was inefficient and corrupt and that was a primary reason why they lost the reserves. The Forest Department had established a system of nature reserves located within portions of forest reserves. However, of the 24 proposed sites, only nine had been implemented, and only three of them were essentially intact at the time of Howard's survey (1991). The Impenetrable Forest (Bwindi) had two nature reserves, both of which he described as suffering heavily from pit sawing as protection was virtually non-existent. A nature reserve had been proposed in 1954 for Mt. Elgon, but despite repeated observation over the years that one was needed, had never been implemented. This history of inconsistent management and implementation helped the supporters of national parks claim that the Forest Department could never effectively protect the valuable forests. Finally, even if conservation status was not improved, it would send a signal to the international community of Uganda's commitment to

conservation, thereby increasing the nation's standing among the international and donor communities.

Thus, the park expansion represents the result of inter-governmental competition for control of scarce resources. From the executive's perspective, national parks signified both better protection and increased tourism revenue. Individual MPs could benefit from the increased attention, and therefore increased funding opportunities, in their area. From the international perspective, a national park signified increased environmental protection. From the perspective of UNP, it was the best opportunity to expand its influence and revenues. Thus, Museveni, UNP and foreign donors all had incentives to designate the forests as national parks. Their combined resources easily outdistanced the Forest Department, and by furtively bypassing a hesitant Parliament, they were able to gain the support necessary to transfer the forests to national parks.

Effects of Expansion

Because of their more restrictive rules, many conservationists view national parks to be inherently a more secure form of protection (See McNeely, 1990). However, this conception overlooks the difference between rules in form and rules in use (Sproule-Jones, 1993). In Uganda's environment of institutional breakdown, the form of governance regime became misconstrued with the general incapacity of governmental departments as a whole. Employees of all three Ugandan conservation agencies were underfunded, understaffed, corrupt and had poor morale, which resulted in the decimation of many protected areas. The consensus among policymakers, however, both within Uganda and externally, was that UNP was slightly less corrupt and slightly more

effective than the other two departments. Nevertheless, wildlife poaching in the parks was extensive, and other illegal use, including settlement, also existed. Therefore, whether or not UNP was indeed more effective than the other organizations, it was not effective enough to protect the parks. UNP did have greater financial autonomy, a capacity for revenue generation, and relative to the reserves, national park rules were more respected by local communities. Additionally, the international community respected national parks more than other forms of protected areas. Therefore, UNP was potentially in a better position to enforce protected area rules than the other two departments, but perhaps the least prepared to work with a community focus. As all use was illegal, the only options for local people if confronted were to bribe or be arrested – neither of them very attractive for community members

Community responses to the creation of the national parks ranged from passive resentment to active sabotage. In addition to losing land and access to forest resources, rural community members perceived the national parks as intended for tourists to observe wildlife and therefore feared that wild animals would be brought in to the area. Ironically, this change to more restrictive regulations regarding local use created opportunities for improved relationships between communities and UNP. The public perception and historical enforcement difficulties necessitated efforts to gain local cooperation. The involvement of donors assisted the development and implementation of UNP's community conservation programs through workshops and the development of policy guidelines and ranger training. The involvement of foreign donors and conservation organizations that were keenly promoting community conservation,

provided initiative, expertise and funding to instigate and implement these activities, rather than languish as had the Forest Park proposal.

Did the change have the anticipated effect of improving the conservation status of the forests and increasing tourism revenue? 220,000 tourists arrived in 1997, an increase of almost tenfold over the past decade. Tourism brought in $US 107 million in 1997, ranking second only to coffee exports as Uganda's leading sources of foreign exchange. However, these figures are heavily dependent on gorilla tourism. 75% of Uganda's tourism revenue comes from just two parks, Bwindi and Mgahinga. Moreover, this as likely reflected improved conditions as Uganda returned to stability, and that tourist facilities were developed; rather than the protected area designation. The training of guides and porters, the development of tourist facilities, and the marking of trails were responsible for the increase in tourism; were funded and implemented by the NGOs, not by UNP or the FD. Moreover, in several of the parks: Rwenzori, Kibale and Semliki, tourism development had begun while they were still reserves. Two forest reserves, Budongo and Mabira, which developed similar tourist facilities, currently receive more tourists than most national parks (Kigenyi, 1997).

Given its increased responsibilities due to the new parks, UNP obtained major foreign donations from the World Bank, the European Community and USAID. Although this was not enough to meet all of its demands, it marked a substantial increase in funds available. These new funds provided temptations for UNP officials, and in mid-1997, the disappearance of $560,000 in donor funds became public and the UNP director and several top officials were forced to resign (Nannozi, 1997). Thus, whether or not the UNP is a more effective organization than the FD is certainly open to doubt. From a

conservation standpoint, the change in status has shown mixed results. Gorilla populations encouragingly reported an increase from previous counts (Plumptre, 1997). However, the situation at other parks has been less effective with widespread illegal use common, the increased restrictions notwithstanding. These mixed results seem to indicate that the increased attention and support, rather than governance regime, may be a more important indicator of success.

IV. Restructuring of the National Parks Authority

In 1996, the Uganda National Parks merged with the Game Department to create the Uganda Wildlife Authority (UWA). As there had been much duplication and lack of coordination over the management of wildlife and habitats because of the conflict of responsibilities between UNP and the GD, supporters of the merger claimed it would improve efficiency by increasing coordination and eliminating duplication. Additionally, the merger offered the potential for more complete protection, with personnel trained to manage both flora and fauna. Finally, transferring the agency from a Ministry to a semi-autonomous parastatal would allow the wildlife authority greater control over its finances and policies.

In Kenya, a similar merger had taken place in 1976 as the Wildlife Conservation and Management Department assumed responsibility over both wildlife and the national parks.[41] In Kenya, the merger did not markedly increase effectiveness as ivory poaching continued unabated over the next decade. However, the institutional autonomy provided

[41]The reserves remained in control of local authorities.

by the transfer of authority to a parastatal (Kenya Wildlife Service) in 1990 was, for a time, successful at improving the effectiveness and efficiency of the organization.

The UWA restructuring represented a component of the IMF structural adjustment program to streamline all ministries in an effort to reduce costs and to improve the performance of Uganda's devastated civil service. Therefore, although a similar merger had taken place in Kenya, the creation of UWA was more representative of the changes in the government as a whole than in wildlife management exclusively. However, as with all local government initiatives, unless benefits are given, local authorities will be hesitant to increase their responsibilities. Once the government started funding local councils directly, instead of through Ministries, performance and activity increased markedly (Brett, 1995). By the same principle, once UWA retained the money made by the parks, its performance was expected to be better than that of the FD or GD, which were not responsible for their own funding.

An additional rationale for developing the new agency was the opportunity to improve its poor reputation with the international community and among local Ugandans. The wildlife authority faced a two-fold reputation problem with local communities. First, the agency had to change the negative image of park rangers in the eyes of local communities. People associated the loss of rights with the creation of the parks. Moreover, UNP and GD had been associated with the armed forces and shared the reputation for indiscipline and brutality. A new agency would escape such an unfavorable reputation. To some extent the new agency could also avoid responsibility for some unpopular incidents regarding the parks including the resettlement of the Ik (Calhoun, 1991) and the forced resettlement of over 100,000 people associated with the

re-establishment of the rule of law in the parks and reserves (Siegel & Catterson, 1992). UWA was also to emphasize community conservation, in contrast to the historical lack of attention paid to local people by the wildlife management authorities. A new Wildlife Statute (1996) that recognized the right for consumptive use of wildlife if harvested at a sustainable level and legally empowered UWA to give priority to community conservation activities. The merger thus offered the potential for increased efficiency and effectiveness in management of the protected areas, and the new mandates offered the chance to create a more positive relationship with local communities.

Preliminary Effects of Restructuring

Combined with the increased responsibilities associated with the national park expansion, the restructuring placed a tremendous strain on a relatively small organization. Quickly, it became evident that the UWA's administrative capacity was overburdened. Howard's 1991 study concluded that UNP in 1991 did not have the administrative capacity to manage the four parks already under its jurisdiction, let alone new ones. UNP was a tiny organization, responsible for only four national parks with minimal management, tourism or research promotion. Yet, besides the six new national parks, UWA found itself responsible for ten game reserves. The agency moved from managing four protected areas to twenty, a five-fold increase, in just a three-year period. As the national parks were the most visible yardsticks of conservation success, as well as providing the best opportunity to obtain revenue directly, UWA concentrated on the parks and the game reserves continued to languish.

Witnessing the turmoil faced by the Kenya Wildlife Service (KWS) for placing highly paid expatriates in prominent positions, UWA tried to avoid appearing as an expatriate agency. No expatriates were full time employees by 1997, and only two, a Peace Corps volunteer, and an USAID technical advisor with experience in Tanzania, were on staff at the headquarters in Kampala. However, UWA had no one like KWS's Richard Leakey to recruit massive international donations, nor was it able to compete with Kenya's long-established tourist market. It thus was not able to generate the funding needed to manage its expanded responsibilities. UWA headquarters in Kampala was so underequipped that it had only one telephone line and no photocopiers. Salaries to park staff were commonly several months in arrears. This made it difficult to manage its increased responsibilities, both in terms of the number of parks in its estate, as well as those required by the community conservation mandate.

Nevertheless, UWA was able to obtain major foreign donations, from the World Bank, the European Community and USAID. Although this was not enough to meet all of its demands, it marked a substantial increase in funds available. These new funds provided temptations for UWA officials, and in mid-1997, the disappearance of $560,000 in donor funds became public and the UWA director and several top officials were forced to resign (Nannozi, 1997). Thus, the expansion of duties caused a crisis at UWA by overburdening it financially so it could not meet its obligations to the parks and employees. At the same time, the increased amount of foreign funding overwhelmed the directors, and financial improprieties paralyzed the organization. The merger also did not succeed fully in changing the organizational reputations. The new UWA was composed largely of former GR and UNP personnel, as well as FD personnel at the former forest

reserves. Therefore, to community members, these were the same individuals who had bothered them in the past. Success at conservation was more difficult to ascertain and this will be a topic for discussion in subsequent chapters.

Conclusion

This chapter has outlined the politics behind the development of formal conservation institutions in Uganda. The NRM government expanded the number of national parks by 250% over a three-year period because it gained support for its regime and policies that extended beyond conservation. Museveni aligned himself with the resources of international donors and the support of bureaucratic agencies that would benefit from the change. In so doing Museveni's government successfully engineered such a widely unpopular policy by bypassing the two primary representatives of citizen interests, the Parliament and Local Councils. Rather than improved conservation, Museveni and UNP supported the transfer to gain greater financial resources and prestige.

This examination of Uganda's conservation history demonstrates how early protected area creation removed control over resource management from local people to government agencies with differing mandates and institutional cultures. The different agencies with different responsibilities generally experienced limited success at conservation, and had limited legitimacy and support among local people. Increasing the conservation restrictions by expanding the national parks just further adds to the poor base from which to initiate community conservation programs. Despite this poor base,

Uganda would become one of the leaders in Africa in developing collaboration in management of national parks between local communities and UWA. The next chapter will examine the development of these formal community conservation structures.

CHAPTER FIVE

DESIGNING COMMUNITY CONSERVATION IN UGANDA:

THE POLITICS OF CONTROL OVER FOREST RESOURCES

Introduction

This chapter examines why UWA policymakers developed active community conservation programs and how the process of crafting the policies is likely to influence implementation. Formidable domestic constraints and donor conditionality led the NRM government to increase conservation restrictions by expanding the number of national parks. Although this policy choice appears to contradict the widespread promotion of local participation discussed earlier, paradoxically it led to the development of policies reducing the restrictions typical of national parks. This chapter examines why the agency responsible for national parks,[42] after successfully extending its authority over conservation in Uganda, opted to relinquish some of its newfound control by adopting a community conservation policy which promoted greater local involvement in park management. As with the decision to expand the national parks, the convergence of foreign and local interests shaped the specific community conservation policies developed in Uganda.

Encouraging local participation in conservation is being widely promoted for both ethical reasons and managerial effectiveness (Pimbert & Pretty, 1995; Western & Wright,

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[42] Uganda National Parks (UNP) merged with the Game Department to form the Uganda Wildlife Authority (UWA) in 1996 (See Chapter 3). To avoid confusion, this chapter will refer to the national park authority as UWA, whether before or after 1996.

1994; Kiss, 1990). In Uganda, conservation policy decisions had historically been developed with little input from local community members (Graham, 1973). Surprisingly therefore, the community conservation policies eventually adopted allow for more active local participation than exist in most other African countries, including the development of an official policy for collaborative management of parks and reserves.

This chapter will explain this outcome by demonstrating that institutions matter – the set of rules in use influenced the development of formal rules by altering the structure of incentives and therefore, outcomes. The inability of UWA to control the regulations within the park, exacerbated by the capricious actions of its rangers, necessitated that UWA demonstrate to local communities as well as donors that their commitment to change was credible. Therefore, although both the park authority and international conservation organizations possessed a preference for protection, the dominance of the informal rules compelled them to support policies allowing active local participation. Rather than support for conservation, both UWA officials and community members accepted community conservation as a means of regaining control over the protected area.

This chapter begins by examining the divergence between the restricted national park rules and the rules in use actually occurring. Secondly, I examine the preferences of the primary actors involved in conservation policymaking in Uganda: UWA, international donors and non-governmental organizations. Finally, the development of different community conservation incentives are explored demonstrating that collaboration resulted from a gradual shift from one policy to another, rather than a major philosophical shift favored by UWA directors. The lack of interest in the policies

themselves indicates that the park officials may not be seriously committed to encouraging cooperation.

Community-Based Conservation

Conservation programs that address the needs of local communities are being widely promoted throughout the world as being more equitable and effective than the restricted national park model (Pimbert & Pretty, 1995; Western & Wright, 1994). Despite this widespread promotion, most of these programs have experienced little sustained success (Brandon, 1997; Wells & Brandon, 1992). Much of the existing participatory programs have employed passive measures of participation such as attendance at meetings or reception of benefits rather than active decision-making responsibilities leading to local empowerment (Brandon, 1997; Ghimire & Pimbert, 1995; Olthaf, 1994). The reluctance to transfer meaningful authority to local communities can therefore explain the lack of success of these endeavors as well as indicate that UWA is promoting local involvement as a means to an end of conservation, rather than an objective in itself (Ghimire & Pimbert, 1997). This conceptualization suggests that often the initiators of such programs have little commitment to encourage meaningful local involvement. If the failure of community conservation has been due to the absence of actively incorporating local people, involving local people in meaningful managerial authority should improve outcomes (Pimbert & Pretty, 1997; 1995; Borrini-Feyerabend, 1996; Chambers, 1996).

Through the sharing of rights and responsibilities between the park authority and local communities, collaboration can lead to more efficient use of resources and

knowledge and therefore improve policy outcomes (Selin & Chavez, 1995; Porter & Salveson, 1995). However, conservation authorities in developing countries experience serious constraints limiting their ability to ensure compliance, including limited resources, poor salaries and difficult physical conditions. Moreover, the often antagonistic relationship between local people and the park rangers, as well as the dissatisfaction with the formal access restrictions, has caused park neighbors frequently not to cooperate with formal park access restrictions. Through its promotion of an arena for repeated interactions, collaboration can improve these negative relationships. Transaction cost analysis suggests that for people to agree to collaborate, they must realize that the transaction costs under the existing approach are high and significant savings are possible from a different approach. However, the process of collaboration can itself be extremely costly, involving potentially high transaction costs associated with negotiating, implementing and enforcing the agreements (Porter & Salveson, 1995).

Therefore, successful collaboration will require both incentives to participate as well as reputation mechanisms that demonstrate a credible commitment to reform (Weber, 1998; Levi, 1997). Transaction cost scholars suggest that the government authority will be willing to cede authority when the costs of upholding the current arrangements are excessively high (Eggertsson, 1990). However, if the costs of enforcement are excessively high for the rangers, they may not be sufficiently high for local community members to desire such cooperation. Local communities may be willing to maintain their favorable situation vis a vis the rangers by maintaining the current arrangements. Under such conditions, successful cooperation requires both incentives for transaction cost savings as well as a credible commitment to reform by the

park authority. Examining why the policies were selected will provide indications of the degree of commitment of UWA personnel to implementing local involvement.

Involving local people is also a function of the actions of the park authority. In situations characterized by mutual mistrust, the park authority must demonstrate a credible commitment to change. Therefore, improving outcomes will also depend on the extent to which the park authority is committed to facilitating local participation. The establishment of formal binding rules is one method of assuring potential collaborators that their efforts will not be wasted (Weber, 1998). An initial step in assessing the potential for community conservation requires examining the preferences of the developers of the policies to determine the rationale for the support of participatory policies. Who supported community conservation in Uganda and for what reasons? Analyzing the existing institutional arrangements can help explain both how policies are created as well as their likely outcomes. The following discussion will analyze how existing rules in use, at both the legislative and operational levels, created conditions whereby both legislators and UWA officials preferred policies espousing greater community conservation.

The Problem of Control over the Parks

Where enforcement is ineffective, values and norms than can influence the rules in use more by formal regulations. Under such conditions, the rules in use can range from citizens pursuing the exit option and avoiding official structures (Hyden, 1980) to merely consenting to the formal rules (Levi, 1997) to actively collaborating with the formal authority (Borrini-Feyerebend, 1996). In Uganda, the divergence between the

formal rules and existing rules in use compelled conservation policy-makers to develop policies promoting community conservation.

Typical of national parks worldwide, Uganda's national park rules prohibited most local access and use. Park management policies focused inside the protected area and park neighbors were viewed as illegal users to be forcibly excluded. Rangers completed paramilitary training, carried shotguns and wore uniforms resembling military fatigues. Their primary responsibilities involved daily patrols searching for people illegally in the park. As all local access was officially restricted, most interactions between local people and park rangers involved confrontations over illegal use. Consequently, rangers frequently harassed park neighbors, who therefore tried to avoid contact with the rangers as much as possible. By contrast, access rules in forest reserves were much more lenient, allowing local people widespread use rights including the licensed harvesting of timber (Forest Department, 1996). Moreover, due to the lack of effective enforcement, the rules in use at many of these forest reserves included unlicensed widespread timber cutting and hunting (Howard, 1991).

The transfer of six of the most valuable forest reserves to national park status drastically restricted the official rules of access. Under traditional national park rules, local communities would lose all rights of access and decision-making authority over the resources within the park boundaries. As the stated objective of the transfer to national park status was to improve conservation (Kamugisha et al, 1997), a primary rationale for the transfer was the incorporation of the more restrictive set of rules characteristic of national parks. Indeed, both supporters and opponents of the transfer anticipated that the traditional national park restrictions would accompany the change in status (Struhsaker,

1997; Posthauer, 1996). Thus, in designating the areas as national parks, rather than the proposed forest parks,[43] policymakers signaled that prohibiting use, rather than merely restricting use, was a more effective means of both conserving nature and attracting tourists.

UWA Preferences

As described in Chapter Three, reestablishing an active civil society and respect for rule of law has been a primary objective of the NRM government (Tidemond, 1992; Hansen & Twaddle, 1991). The NRM version of grass roots democracy, the resistance councils, originally a method of gaining support for the NRM rebel movement, became a primary means of reengaging the citizens with formal government structures. During Uganda's long period of instability, informal rules predominated and local non-state actors gained increasing power relative to the state (Khadiagala, 1997). Attempting to alter the historic instability necessitated the desire for the government to reestablish control over the nation, including its protected area network. The widespread illegal use occurring within protected areas exemplified disregard for the official rules. Museveni's initial attempts to reestablish the rule of law in the parks and reserves focused on enforcing the established rules. Forced resettlements occurred at several prominent protected areas including Lake Mburo National Park and Mt. Elgon and Kibale forest reserves.[44] The government resettled over 50,000 squatters from the Kibale Game Corridor alone (Siegel & Catterson, 1992). In terms of protected areas therefore, the grass-roots democracy encouraged by the NRM was directed more towards gaining

[43] See discussion of forest park proposal in Chapter Three.

consent for the established rules than encouraging meaningful input into decision-making. Despite the widespread support for the NRM government, rural Ugandans resisted the new restrictions on use and continued their reliance on the informal rules. The structural adjustment and civil service reforms limited the ability of the government to increase its manpower and technical support to the level necessary to enforce these rules. At the local government level, resistance council leaders, being local people and frequently illegal users themselves, had limited interest in enforcing these rules.

The Problem of Enforcement

Typical of Uganda's civil servants, park rangers worked with limited support and poor compensation. UWA rangers received a salary of only US$40 per month, food rations consisting solely of beans, maize and salt, and no access to transportation. Despite this limited support, rangers were expected to patrol under difficult, at times dangerous, conditions. These difficult conditions also limited monitoring of ranger performance by park supervisors. With little fear of detection by supervisors, rangers often shirked responsibilities and patrolling was generally inconsistent and ineffective. The gorilla parks, Bwindi and Mgahinga, were exceptions to this characterization as a constant stream of tourists, revenues and international attention improved working conditions and perhaps more importantly, necessitated more active monitoring of ranger performance from park supervisors. Consequently, the enforcement capability at the two gorilla parks is substantially more effective than at most other national parks.

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[44] An extended discussion of these resettlements is found in Marquardt, 1994.

Thus, despite the formal restrictions, park neighbors frequently took advantage of the poor enforcement and illegally utilized park resources. On occasion, rangers themselves encouraged illegal activities by allowing use in return for payments. An especially egregious example concerned Mt. Elgon, where park authorities allowed people to "lease" land within the park for cultivation. The difficulty in disguising tracts of cultivated land makes the action difficult to get away with. However, in the more common instances of individuals bribing in return for resource collection, discovery is much less likely. Therefore, these rules created incentives for local people to illegally use the forest. Individuals recognized that there was little chance of capture, and if confronted by a ranger, one could usually bribe to avoid arrest. Rangers had little incentive to patrol and if they did catch someone in the park illegally, it was much easier for them to extract an immediate payment than to physically accompany the person to the park headquarters for punishment. This was especially true if the rangers received no personal benefit from diligence in arrests. Thus, the actions of rangers required monitoring and supervision, as did the actions of local community members.

Under these conditions, interactions between local people and park rangers were primarily confrontational commonly resulting in arrest, beatings or bribes. This historical pattern of unfavorable interactions caused park neighbors to perceive the rangers and the park rules they represented as unjust, arbitrary and corrupt. Their paramilitary training as well as the park management culture oriented towards enforcement taught the rangers to treat local people as criminals, rather than as potential partners in management of the protected area. Rangers therefore viewed encounters with local people in the park as opportunities to supplement their meager salaries. Despite the occasional evictions, park

authorities were unable to prevent squatters from reestablishing illegal settlements or park neighbors from illegally harvesting park resources. As a result, despite the slowly improving relationship between citizens towards representatives of other sectors of government (Brett, 1994; Tidemond, 1992), park authorities remained representative of the previous authoritarian regimes with citizens choosing to avoid rather than engage park staff.

Despite this increase in formal restrictions, informal agreements and lax enforcement caused the actual rules in use to vary substantially from the official regulations, as well as vary from park to park. At Queen Elizabeth National Park, thirteen small fishing villages exist as enclaves within the park boundaries (Kamugasha, 1990). At Murchison Falls National Park, rampant poaching had eliminated much of the wildlife, while regional insecurity extended within park boundaries causing park staff to vacate the Paraa park headquarters and relocate on the south side of the Nile River. Over 300 households holding an estimated 20,000 heads of cattle still reside permanently within Lake Mburo National Park (Kamugisha et. al, 1997). These examples demonstrate the inability to enforce the laws at the older, established parks. The subsequent expansion of authority into the six new national parks exacerbated this lack of capacity. This discrepancy between the restrictive formal rules and the rules in use represented an embarrassment to the Museveni government as well as to UWA and therefore created an opportunity to engage local communities.

This dominance of the informal rules galvanized both the Museveni government and UWA leaders to alter its approach to conservation. As the low level of institutional capacity of Uganda's civil service had provided the opportunity for expanded donor

influence in the economy, the poor performance of UWA at both its Kampala headquarters as well as field sites, allowed for the emergence of foreign donors and non-governmental organizations to increase their influence in both policy development and implementation. The objectives of improving performance while reducing government spending necessitated by the structural adjustment measures led the government to turn to foreign donor and non-governmental organizations to provide the support necessary to improve UWA's effectiveness.

Preferences of Non-Governmental Organizations

The high degree of influence and independence allowed international conservation organizations in Uganda allowed them to experiment with different conservation incentives in the absence of change of formal policies. Non-governmental organizations (NGOs) activity in the national parks increased markedly under the NRM government. NGOs are currently, implementing projects at most of the national parks including World Wide Fund for Nature (WWF) at Rwenzori Mountains, CARE at Bwindi Impenetrable, Mgahinga and Queen Elizabeth, World Conservation Union (IUCN) at Kibale, Semliki and Mt. Elgon and the African Wildlife Foundation (AWF) at Lake Mburo. The involvement of different NGOs at different parks has also allowed for each park to become the focus of an intervention, rather than the incremental implementation that would have been necessary if UWA alone was to be responsible for their activities. With the limited resources available, it is likely that the most important parks economically such as the gorilla parks of Bwindi and Mgahinga and the legendary

Rwenzori Mountains would have taken precedence over other parks which are less internationally renown and economically important.

These international conservation NGOs have frequently been portrayed as supporting the interests of conservation at the expense of national development and the interests of local people (Bonner, 1993; Adams & McShane, 1992). Political ecologists have suggested that their prioritization of nature conservation over the interests of humans has caused critics to claim their activities resemble cultural imperialism (Bryant, 1992; Redclift, 1987). Intentionally or unintentionally, their involvement in enforcing conservation regulations has often harmed local people (Pimbert & Pretty, 1995; Adams & McShane, 1992). To address these criticisms as well as gain local support, NGOs have altered their agenda and widely promoted community programs.[45] Such programs have often been portrayed to be designed as passive, or primarily a means to achieving an end to conservation and directed towards gaining acquiescence towards protected areas rather than local empowerment (Pimbert & Pretty, 1997; 1995).

Representing this change in focus, and in contrast to the disregard towards local communities reflected in the formal UWA policies, as well as in the behavior of rangers in their interactions with community members, these NGO projects are to varying degrees incorporating community conservation incentives. Many of the project titles indicate this focus on conservation activities that also address the needs of communities: *Mount Elgon Conservation and Development Project, Development through Conservation Project* (Bwindi/Mgahinga) and *Kibale/Semliki Conservation and Development Project.* However, as is reflected in the project titles, these activities

[45] See AWF's *Neighbors as Partners* program or WWF's *Partnership* programs as representative examples.

incorporate conceptions of community participation as reception of benefits and primarily focused on increasing the effectiveness of conservation. Consequently, conservation education and resource substitution were the primary community incentives originally promoted. Moreover, in addition to the community focus these projects all provided support for increasing enforcement capacity of the park rangers, thereby supporting the initial enforcement orientation of UWA.

Implementing Community Conservation

Resource Substitution

Resource substitution has been the most widely implemented community conservation tool in Uganda. NGOs initiated projects involving resource substitution at Bwindi and Mgahinga in 1988, Mount Elgon in 1991 and Kibale and Semliki in 1992. Resource substitution involves training and facilitating park neighbors to utilize their personal land to grow products that they desire collecting from the forest, thereby reducing their dependence on the forest. Examples of resource substitution activities include encouraging the planting of trees for firewood or napier grass for fodder. The assumption underlying resource substitution is that poverty and lack of substitutes drive illegal resource use. Thereby, if local people are able to gain access to alternatives to the resources found within the park, exploitation of the park resources will diminish. Substitution becomes a community conservation tool to the extent that it improves local attitudes towards the park by reducing animosity from being denied access to park resources. Additionally, as some activities such as beekeeping or establishing tree nurseries can be income generating, they provide an opportunity for local development,

which would both improve attitudes towards the park and improve local living conditions. Conservation organizations and the park authority tend to support these policies as they provide benefits while reinforcing the existing rules.

The nature of resource substitution schemes reinforces the separation between local people and the national park. Thus, they are among the least controversial and most commonly implemented community conservation schemes. By promoting resource substitution, the NGOs conceptualized participation as passive reception of benefits as a means of gaining acceptance of the park/people separation. As an extreme example, (despite the project title) the first phase of the Mount Elgon Conservation and Development Project focused completely on enforcement and demarcating park boundaries (MNR/IUCN, 1988). These activities reflected the primary preference for conservation, rather than participation, of these international organizations.

Although community concerns were beginning to be addressed, the aforementioned resource substitution projects had minimal impact on reducing illegal use. Especially after the demarcation of the forest reserves to national parks[46], local communities would not accept the on-farm activities as substitutes for the forest resources forgone. Community actions ranged from passive ignoring of the formal rule change at Mt. Elgon to violent anti-park actions of burning park land and stoning park vehicles at Bwindi. In order to gain acceptance for the new parks, conservationists therefore began exploring the potential for revenue sharing in order to provide tangible benefits to local people from the national park.

[46] Bwindi and Mgahinga in 1991; Kibale, Semliki and Mt. Elgon in 1993.

Revenue Sharing

Proponents of community conservation argue that local people suffer costs from the national park while the government receives any benefits accruing from tourism revenue (Pimbert & Pretty, 1995; Kiss, 1990). Revenue sharing programs attempt to address this disparity by sharing a portion of the park receipts with local communities. Revenue sharing both serves as compensation for any income lost by forgoing park resources as well as a gesture of good faith for voluntarily complying with access restrictions. The Kenya Wildlife Service initiated revenue sharing in 1992, and shortly thereafter Ugandan policymakers began devising their own program, with an official policy developed in 1994.

USAID initially promoted revenue sharing as the primary community conservation initiative.[47] This approach is less controversial as it serves as a means of providing benefits to park neighbors without altering the traditional separation between the park and local people or limiting any authority of the UWA. Moreover, other countries had already implemented revenue sharing, notably Uganda's neighbor Kenya and thus UWA had a model to follow. However, as Uganda was not yet receiving widespread tourism, and therefore had little revenue to share, it was not as controversial as in Kenya, because so little money existed. For these reasons, revenue sharing received initial support and in 1994, UNP proposed an official revenue sharing policy.

Uganda's revenue sharing program involves funding community development projects from a portion of park revenues. As the revenue to be shared typically comes from park entrance fees, park management is often less supportive than are politicians or

local leaders. Promoting revenue sharing provided an avenue for MPs to atone for the transfer of the parks in the eyes of their constituents. Not surprisingly therefore, parliament adopted revenue sharing guidelines before an official community conservation policy had been developed. Parliament supported a policy requiring UWA to share 20% of park revenues with local communities, while UWA developed a policy sharing 12% of revenues. Of the 12%, 8% is to be returned to local communities for development projects, 2% is to go to local administration and the remaining 2% goes into a central pool to pay for parks that generate few revenues themselves (UNP, 1994).[48]

Because of the heavy tourism revenues at the gorilla parks, UWA initiated revenue sharing in Uganda at Bwindi and Mgahinga in 1995. By 1997 each of the 25 parishes surrounding those parks had received at least one revenue sharing project. However, UWA scheduled revenue sharing to begin countrywide in 1995, largely due to the lack of tourist revenues, no other park had in place a consistent revenue sharing program by 1998. Although tourism had increased steadily throughout the decade of NRM consolidation, the total arrivals and revenue generated was not nearly enough to run the parks, much less return a significant portion to neighboring communities.[49] Therefore, many policymakers now feel that benefit sharing will be more valuable in the Ugandan context (Moore, 1997; Tiyoy, 1997). Benefit sharing includes the potential for use rights and input into decision-making as substitutes for cash rewards.

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[47] The revenue sharing guidelines are detailed in UWA, 1994.

[48] The 12% figure was determined partly in response to Kenya's problems with publicizing an unattainable goal of 25%, which raised expectations to such an extent that when that figure proved unattainable, political outcries eventually forced the director of wildlife to resign.

[49] This characterization did not apply to the two gorilla parks, Bwindi and Mgahinga, which did receive enough tourist revenue to initiate revenue sharing. The two parks account for 75% of Uganda's tourism revenue.

Forest User Rights

Funding of community development projects, as per Uganda's revenue sharing program, fails to tie directly the benefit to forest conservation (Gibson & Marks, 1995). As individuals benefit from a school or health clinic regardless of whether they cooperate with park rules. Moreover, providing benefits involves local people in management and decision-making of the park only to a minimal extent (Pimbert & Pretty, 1995; Olthof, 1995). User rights link the benefits more directly to conservation of the forest as people participate directly in visiting the forest, harvesting and maintaining the site. However, in Uganda it was the realization of the impracticality of revenue sharing at most parks because of inadequate revenues, rather than a philosophical change favoring active participation that created the opportunity for user rights within national parks.

The CARE-DTC project initiated user rights on an experimental basis at Bwindi and Mgahinga in 1994. Selected individuals in three pilot parishes were allowed to harvest materials for basket making and medicinal plants from within park boundaries. Although these harvesting rights were formally against park rules, UWA allowed the project to experiment with them on a limited basis. As allowing local people inside the park goes against rangers' enforcement-oriented training, as well as complicates enforcement decisions for rangers upon encountering community members within the park boundaries. Unlike the previous two more commonly used initiatives, user rights contradict the philosophy of separating human activity from the park that underlies the national park model. Additionally, if limits on collection exist, monitoring of actual amounts collected is extremely difficult. Because of uncertainties of the ecological impact of sustained collection, as well as the poor record of national forests and other

multiple-use protected areas in Africa, conservation organizations have been reluctant to promote multiple use within national parks.

However, at Bwindi where rangers had been physically assaulted, they accepted these experiments as a means of trying to improve their relationship with local communities. UWA extended limited user rights to two parishes in Mount Elgon in 1996. In addition, negotiations have begun to develop similar programs at Rwenzori Mountains and Kibale Forest. All these parks experienced rampant illegal use and UWA agreed to experiment with user rights in the hopes that allowing some use would enable them to regain control and have the formal rules take precedence.

Collaborative Management

Systems of co-management, or collaborative management, involve moving beyond providing local people with some combination of use benefits to negotiating rights and management responsibilities between the park authority and local communities (Paulson, 1998; Borrini-Feyerebend, 1996; Fischer, 1995). The benefits of collaborative management extend beyond merely benefit sharing, but also include control over decision-making leading to development of a sense of ownership to the local community. However, it also entails the park authority voluntarily ceding a significant amount of control to local communities.

UWA signed collaborative management agreements with two parishes at Mt. Elgon in 1996, with plans to extend to three others in 1998. UNP also termed user rights agreements with the three pilot parishes at Bwindi as collaborative management agreements, although community responsibilities were limited to harvesting selected

resources from the park. By 1997, responsibilities at Bwindi had increased to include sanctioning offenders and participating in ecological monitoring of the multiple-use zone.

The inspiration for initiating collaborative management lay with the conservation NGOs active in Uganda, primarily IUCN. In contrast to its reputation internationally as being one of the most protection oriented NGOs, IUCN international began promoting collaborative management of parks and reserves worldwide in the mid-1990s (Borrini-Feyerebend, 1997; 1996; Fisher, 1995). As a result, IUCN's Mt. Elgon Conservation and Development Project, which had previously incorporated local involvement only in resource substitution, began organizing collaborative management with two pilot parishes.

UWA envisioned collaborative management as a means of enhancing its capacity to manage the parks (MTWA, 1997; 6). UWA was willing to give up some authority as Mt. Elgon was among the most difficult parks to patrol, and enforcement was almost non-existent. Thus paradoxically, the attempt to regain control over some parks became a rationale for ceding a portion of its authority by allowing collaborative management. That collaboration was seen primarily as a means to achieve conservation is stated clearly in the proposed collaborative management policy, "In reality, Collaborative Management will allow UWA to gain more control," (MTWA, 1997; 6). This conception enabled the idea to be supported by UWA personnel accustomed to viewing local people as enemies rather than partners.

Donor interest in the experiments at Bwindi and Mt. Elgon also encouraged both UWA and the Forest Department to develop an official policy for collaborative management. However, although UWA officials, in collaboration with donors and

NGOs, developed a collaborative management policy (MTWA, 1996), it was never approved by the UWA Board of Directors. That the Board failed to approve the policy, presents a strong indication of the reluctance of UWA management to give up formal authority and therefore meaningful commitment to the process. Nevertheless, new trial agreements are continuing at Rwenzori and Kibale/Semliki.

Formalizing Community Conservation Structures

These experiences indicate a gradual trend towards incorporating more active local participation and greater rights and responsibilities. The experiments initiated as NGO projects, operating in the absence of formal UWA policies, ultimately led to the development of formal community conservation policies. NGO representatives played a prominent role in the development and implementation of UWA's community conservation policies by organizing workshops and conferences and NGO staff have played prominent roles in coordinating, researching and writing the policies themselves.

The development of an official community conservation strategy reflected the general trend in conservation being established throughout the world and supported by donors and international conservation organizations (Western & Wright, 1994; McNeely, 1994; Carter & Lewis, 1993). Donors such as USAID[50], NORAD[51] and GTZ [52]have actively influenced the development of policy by funding not only NGO projects and community-based research, but also much of UWA itself. Therefore, much of the UWA

[50] United States Agency for International Development.

[51] Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation.

[52] German Agency for Technical Assistance.

community focus results from the financial support, and accompanying conditions, of international donors.[53] After initially supporting greater conservation restrictions, these international conservation organizations and donors altered focus and encouraged the development of community conservation programs.

USAID has extended its influential role in Uganda's economy to the conservation field as well. Since the late 1980s, USAID had made conservation a primary focus in its international agenda and has encouraged the development of National Environmental Action Plans (NEAPs) in recipient countries (USAID, 1996). USAID selected Uganda as a Biodiversity Priority Country and has played a major role in spearheading and funding both UWA's reorganization and developing national environmental policy guidelines. As with many of the SAP reforms, Uganda completed a NEAP in 1995, ahead of many other countries.[54] A primary component of these NEAPs was a formal, and typically vague, commitment to community conservation. A "key policy objective" of Uganda's NEAP is to, "Ensure individual and community participation in environmental improvement activities." As the document avoids specific guidelines of what exactly this participation entails, great latitude existed for the implementers of the policies to interpret participation in a way favorable to their interests.

However, the community focus did not originate solely from outside interests. The early experiments at Bwindi were in response to local demands, rather that donor pressure (Victorine, 1997). These outside organizations decided to adapt more community-oriented programs because of demands of local communities. That international organizations, rather than UNP, responded more quickly to these demands

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[53] Donor support of UWA's budget has been as much as 70%.

indicates more the unresponsiveness of UNP to local demands, than the adoption of a foreign agenda. As lamented by the country director of one international NGO, "All our efforts...are continually being frustrated by the failure of UWA to take the lead in whatever needs to be done," (Muhweezi, 1997).

Community Conservation Unit

UWA established a Community Conservation Unit in 1995 with the mandate to make conservation worthwhile for local communities by building relationships of *mutual interdependence and good neighborliness*[55] (MTWA, 1997; 8). To facilitate this mandate, the CCU is to encourage active community participation in protected area management and link its management to the economic development of the local community. The CCU has a number of tools available to achieve these goals including the posting of community conservation rangers as liaisons between the park and the communities and by providing incentives for conservation such as revenue sharing, benefit sharing and collaborative management. A community conservation warden and rangers work at each park whose duties involve acting as a liaison between the park and communities.

This community focus in part represents recognition of the hardships created by withholding access, and benefits serve as compensation for the opportunity costs of cooperating (MTWA, 1997). However, it also represents a realization that cooperation with local communities offers the potential for more effective long-term protection. Ideally, gaining the support of local communities will help decrease the costs of

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[54] Ministry of the Environment, NEAP.

conservation to UWA by reducing illegal acts and therefore reducing the necessity of patrolling. UWA directors hope that a reduction in conflicts and easing of patrol workloads provide incentives for UWA personnel to support the policy.

The CCU includes a separate system of rangers, with community rangers joining the existing enforcement rangers. Community rangers have different mandates, responsibilities and primarily work independently of the enforcement rangers. Unlike enforcement rangers, whose duties involve daily patrols under difficult and often dangerous conditions, community rangers' vaguely defined responsibilities are to serve as a liaison between the park and local communities. Community rangers come from the area near the park, can reside in villages rather than at patrol stations, often wear civilian clothing rather than the military uniform of enforcement rangers, and are not armed. They rarely accompany enforcement rangers on patrols and do not have the mandate to confront and arrest illegal users. For community members therefore, community rangers appear less intimidating than the enforcement rangers, thereby facilitating communication between the park and community. The divergent nature of the roles and responsibilities of the two different groups of rangers has created the potential for divisions between the two types of rangers. A significantly different number of respondents indicated trusting the community rangers to a greater degree than the enforcement rangers.

Community rangers can live at home, rather than at poorly maintained ranger outposts and have the opportunity to attend workshops and seminars. Therefore, they enjoy a more favorable working environment than do the enforcement rangers who must patrol under difficult physical conditions as well as confront frequently angry,

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[55] Emphasis mine.

occasionally armed, park intruders. Consequently, community rangers have a greater incentive to be diligent in their work than the enforcement rangers. However, unlike the clearly defined duties of daily patrolling, community rangers have a much more vague job description. Not having to be in a specific place at a specific time, and with little supervision, provides the opportunity for inactivity. The community conservation wardens and rangers still work under the Park wardens, who were trained in enforcement-oriented management. The locus of power at headquarters however, was still dominated by old-school enforcement oriented managers as evidenced by the head of law enforcement holding the position of assistant director. Thus, despite the development of the new policies, the people in charge of implementing them had been trained and working under the traditional enforcement-oriented approach, thereby understanding and belief in the new system was not very widespread throughout UWA.

Following the establishment of the CCU, Parliament revised the Wildlife Statute in 1996 to provide further legal basis for community participation. This revised statute altered the previous focus on restrictions and directed attention towards a people-centered approach towards wildlife and protected area management. This change of policy extends beyond the vague pronouncements required by the NEAP and is especially significant as it directs UWA to not only accommodate, but facilitate local community involvement:[56]

> There is insufficient support for wildlife and protected area conservation, because few communities are able to benefit from, or appreciate the value of, these resources. Without compromising its obligations towards the conservation of Uganda's biological diversity, Government will address this situation by putting into place legal mechanisms to enable local communities to participate in the management of wildlife resources, and to benefit directly from them. It will be the job of the UWA to make it as

[56] This focus is also evident in the revised Forestry Act.

straightforward as possible for local communities to do this." (MTWA, 1997; 5).

These formal structures reflect a substantial shift in emphasis towards including concern towards local people as a component of national park management. In contrast to previous legislation, the revised Wildlife Bill included provisions allowing the consumptive use of wildlife. Within national parks however, hunting remained banned (MTWA, 1996; 24). Although official policies often change markedly during implementation (Pressman & Wildavsky, 1973), they do provide a legal foundation for the individual programs already occurring. However, as the UWA is comprised of individuals trained and experienced in the enforcement-oriented approach, implementation will depend on the understanding and commitment of UWA personnel despite the clear mandate of the Wildlife Bill.

Conclusion

This chapter has shown that development of community conservation models incorporating more active local participation resulted from a gradual shift in policies, led by independent NGOs, rather than a major philosophical shift by UWA management. These changes followed the pattern in other countries towards community conservation. However, as the NGOs initiated these projects before the development of an official strategy, the eventual strategy reflected an integration of these local concerns. The support for use rights is the most prominent example of the influence of the ongoing projects on policy development.

Despite the leadership role of the NGOs, UWA directors did have incentives to go along with these community conservation measures as a means to regain control over the

protected areas. Thus, UWA allowed more active participation at the parks where they enjoyed the least control, where illegal use was most dominant. Moreover, despite any outside impetus, the allowance of user rights as well as the formalization of community conservation policies demonstrated a degree of commitment by the NRM government as well as UWA directors to local involvement. Creating a new system of rangers expressly devoted to community involvement further demonstrated to local people the park authority's attempt to change its adversarial reputation. These community conservation structures helped provide a formal basis for the encouragement of collaboration with local communities. The following chapter will explore the process of developing collaborative agreements at two national parks, Bwindi and Mt. Elgon.

CHAPTER 6

CONSTRUCTING COLLABORATIVE MANAGEMENT AT BWINDI AND MT. ELGON

Introduction

The previous chapter described the development of different community conservation programs in Uganda. Both UWA and the involved non-governmental organizations, IUCN and CARE, have promoted internationally their initiation of collaborative management of Bwindi and Mt. Elgon National Parks (See Borrini-Feyerebend, 1997; 1996; Nowak, 1995). This chapter will examine the construction of collaboration in communities bordering two national parks. Collaboration at the two parks follows the pattern established by the general community conservation policies of passive participatory programs gradually giving way to more active participatory measures. Thus, although Bwindi and Mt. Elgon were the first parks to sign Memorandums of Understanding with UWA, they were initially simply the benefits of resource substitution schemes.

This chapter will describe the two national parks and the surrounding communities to show how the process of constructing the agreements is likely to influence outcomes. Thereafter it will describe the different community conservation schemes promoted to show that the development of collaborative management agreements represented gradual shifts from primarily passive approaches to community conservation. Finally, this chapter will explore the differences between the collaborative management agreements at the two parks to show the level the influence of the non-

governmental actors in the creation of the policy. The extent of responsibilities turned over to local communities correlates with the extent of influence local people enjoyed in the negotiation process.

This chapter will show that both CARE and IUCN projects initially maintained the restricted national park rules reflecting their preferences for conservation. Both altered their approach due to the hostility of local communities as well as the interests of the international donors funding the projects. CARE's policy ended up with a restricted access, gradually allowing more responsibilities, representing the increased control of the park as well as the demands of the international community for protection of the gorilla. By contrast, IUCN's policy allowed widespread local use, reflecting the strength of the local community members vis a vis the park authority. Moreover, the development of UWA's collaborative management policy allowed for more active community influence during the construction of the policies.

The Case for Collaboration

Systems of co-management, in which local communities and the central authority share rights and responsibilities for the park, address the dilemma of encouraging more active participation, while maintaining the goal of conservation. Such arrangements of joint forest management (Fischer, 1995; Arnold, 1993), collaborative management (Scott, 1998; Borrini-Feyerebend, 1997; 1996; Porter & Salveson, 1995) and co-management (Prystupa, 1998; Sunderlin & Gorospe, 1997; Pinkerton, 1992; 1989), represent efforts to move beyond passive participation and involve local people directly in the management of the protected area. As used in Uganda, I will use the term collaborative management,

defined as *the sharing of power and responsibility between the government and local resource users,*[57] to describe such partnership agreements. The centerpiece of collaborative management is the development of an agreement by all primary stakeholders that specifies their respective roles, responsibilities and rights in management of the protected area (Borrini-Feyerabend, 1997). Collaborative management differs from other forms of participatory conservation in that it entails an official distribution of responsibility and authority, although with the recognition that it is generally neither possible nor desirable to vest all management authority in the local community (Sunderlin & Gorospe, 1997).

This conception of collaboration representing an improvement over the more common passive approaches relies on the assumption that people desire and value greater rights and responsibilities. Participation, however, is often costly. The time and energy spent negotiating, monitoring and sanctioning, or the transaction costs of participating can represent substantial barriers (Ostrom, Schroeder & Wynne; 1993). Under what conditions are people likely to take the time and effort necessary to achieve such working agreements? Scholars recognize that communities are comprised of individuals with different interests and power. However, how these competing interests can combine to obtain an acceptable collaborative agreement is not well understood.

Despite an emerging growth in practitioner literature (Scott, 1998; Borrini-Feyerebend, 1997; 1996; Fisher, 1995), the academic literature on collaboration is still evolving. The bulk of the literature either discusses the merits of co-management or

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[57] From Berkes, George & Preston (1991), 12.

examines examples of co-management and their successes and failures (Prystupa, 1998). Research on the process of how co-management institutions develop is limited.

Pinkerton (1989; 1992) has developed insightful theoretical propositions regarding the likelihood of the interested parties developing and negotiating collaborative agreements. She places particular emphasis on factors including multiple source of power such as fair and accessible courts, legislature and public boards, large power differential between parties, which are more relevant in developed regions with diversified economies and stakeholder groups than in developing regions (Pinkerton, 1992; 339-340). These factors apply more to the literature on collaborative efforts in the U.S. and other developed nations, which are dominated by community-led, rather than agency-led, efforts at developing collaborative agreements (Selin & Chavez, 1995; Porter & Salveson, 1995). The opportunities to overcome the barriers she hypothesizes, such as unequal sources of power, access to fair courts, existence of previous co-management agreements (1992; 339-340), exist primarily in developed societies and thus are less applicable to Africa. Additional obstacles include an institutional culture of rational planning and organizations that have been previous adversaries (Selin & Chavez, 1995). All of these unfavorable conditions exist in Ugandan rural communities as well as its conservation authority.

Encouraging Collaboration through Credible Commitments

Thus, collaboration depends on incentives for participants to realize that the benefits from participating are greater than the costs. However, incentives alone are insufficient. Assurance mechanisms are also necessary to reduce the uncertainty and

risks associated with the collaboration (Eggertsson, 197; Levi, 1997). Successful assurance mechanisms will improve trust, promote ownership in the outcomes and create the political space necessary for meaningful negotiating (Weber, 1998). Of specific importance is for the government and the agency involved to incorporate mechanisms that demonstrate a credible commitment to the collaborative strategies.

These propositions refine the contributions of other scholars indicating the importance of the negotiating process (Borrini-Feyerebend, 1996) and of the government authority demonstrating a credible commitment to reform (Levi, 1997). Especially in developing countries, collaboration is less a result of organized local communities demanding inclusion into the management of their resources, than government agencies, frequently in concert with international conservation organizations, changing their policies and inviting local communities to share rights and responsibilities over natural resource management. This approach transfers the method of analysis from identifying how communities can overcome the collective action problem and organize to represent their interests to identifying how the powerful government agency can entice historical antagonists to cooperate with them. Experimental co-management of one function (Pinkerton, 1992) is one method of encouraging interactions and developing the trust hypothesized to demonstrate credible commitment (Levi, 1997; North, 1995; Milgrom & North, 1989). The following sections will examine these propositions in the development of two collaborative management agreements in Uganda. In contrast to many co-management agreements in Asia, the government is organizing collaboration not towards conservation of private or communal land, but in federally owned national parks. Unlike many of the collaborative experiences in the United States, the impetus for collaboration

came from outside the community, the national park authority and international conservation NGOs. Therefore, this study will extend these propositions to the development of collaborative agreements led from outside the community.

A defining characteristic of successful common-pool resource arrangements is that individuals overcome the assurance problem and convince individuals that others are contributing, thus overcoming the incentive to free ride. Transferring this logic to collaborative agreements, government authorities must convince community members that it will meet its obligations, as well as provide assurances that other citizens will in fact contribute. The less credible the policies, the less likely that individual community members will agree to alter their behavior and work with the formal government authority. Policies most likely to demonstrate the government's commitment to reform include short-term economic benefits and repeated interactions. Including local people is substantially different than allowing them influence. The greater the influence accorded local community members, the greater the likelihood that communities will agree to continue the process.

Exploring Collaboration in Uganda

This study examines collaborative agreements in communities bordering two Ugandan national parks, Bwindi Impenetrable and Mt. Elgon. I selected these two parks because they were the first two to sign collaborative agreements and therefore provide the best indications of preliminary outcomes. Both parks also have comparable physical characteristics, management histories and socio-economic characteristics that will facilitate comparability. At Bwindi Impenetrable National Park, Mpungu is the pilot

parish promoting collaborative initiatives, with *Mutushet* the corresponding pilot parish at Mt. Elgon National Park.

Bwindi Impenetrable National Park

Conservation Significance

Bwindi Impenetrable National Park (BINP) is located in the southwest of Uganda, bordering Congo (Zaire) to the west and 50 kilometers north of the border with Rwanda (See Map). The park rests in the northwest of the Kigezi Highlands on the edge of the Western (Albertine) Rift Valley. Since the colonial period, Kigezi has been famous for its scenic beauty of rolling hills and lakes and is widely known as "The Switzerland of Africa." BINP covers 321 km^2 and borders three of the mostly densely populated districts in Uganda – Kabale, Rukungiri and Kisoro. Previously known as The Impenetrable Forest Reserve, the topography of the forest consists of extremely rugged hills and valleys lying between 1,190 – 2,607 meters above sea level.



Figure 6.1: Bwindi Impenetrable National Park (Source: MUIENR, 1997)

Howard (1991) suggested that Bwindi is the most important in Uganda for wild species conservation, being rich in both overall species diversity and in species endemic to the Albertine rift. Bwindi also represents the only tract of reasonably undisturbed forest at the altitude range of 1,500-2,250 meters above sea level. Bwindi is also home to six hundred mountain gorillas (*Gorilla gorilla berengei*), nearly one-half of total remaining in the world (Plumptre, 1998). The forest is one of the few that contain ten species of primates and the only one with both the mountain gorilla and the chimpanzee. Therefore, it holds tremendous potential for tourist interest. Bwindi is one of the few protected areas in which montane, medium altitude and lowland forest occur in a continuum. Therefore it is one of the richest forests in East Africa for species diversity of birds (336 species), butterflies (202), mammals (120) and trees (220) (BINP, 1995). The forest is also a vital water catchment area, containing the sources of several perennial rivers that serve the densely populated bordering areas.

Local Populations

Nearly one million people reside in the three districts surrounding the park with population density among the highest in Uganda averaging over 230 persons/km^2. Kisoro District to the south is the most densely populated district in Uganda at 301 persons/km^2 and Kabale District to the east is the nation's third-most densely populated at 246 persons/km^2. Rukungiri District to the northeast is somewhat less at 151 persons/km^2. About 90% of the people are ethnic Bakiga, with the remaining 9.5%

Bafumbira (concentrated in the South) and 0.5% Batwa or Abayanda (pygmies)[58]. The population is predominantly indigenous, although in the northern section there are recent immigrants from other areas of Kigezi. Forest clearance began about 5,000 years ago when the Abayanda arrived. Abayanda were the only residents of the area until about 1550 when Bantus started arriving (Kabananukye & Wily, 1996). Today, there are about 1,000 Abayanda living within two parishes of the park boundary and 50-100 living in the region bordering the national park (Kabananukye & Wily, 1996). No Abayanda permanently reside in the forest, the few remaining families were evicted in 1961 when the forest reserve also became a Game Sanctuary.[59]

Most land is under customary private ownership. Selling and leasing land is common and most people own small, fragmented plots.[60] Bwindi was one of the most exploited forests in Uganda with 90% of people surveyed claiming they had purchased something from the park in 1993. (Tukihirwa and Pomeroy, 1993). Educational attainment has been poor as only three secondary schools exist in the 20 parishes that surround BINP. Almost all wage employment derived from forest exploitation, primarily pitsawing. The majority of the population bordering the park relies on agriculture for subsistence with bananas, millet, beans and potatoes the major crops. As evidence of the poverty of these areas, people own very few heads of cattle. Therefore, people expressed their widespread local resistance to the creation of the national park by burning of the

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[58] The Batwa of Kigezi prefer to be called Abayanda, as the view the term Batwa derogatory (See Kabananukye & Wily, 1996). Thus I will refer to them as Abayanda, although they are more commonly described as Batwa in the literature.

[59] Gazettement as a forest reserve likely helped the Abayanda as it prohibited widespread destruction and cultivation, while still allowing access because of lax enforcement. Without gazettement there is "no doubt that Bwindi, Mgahinga and Echuya forests would not exist today," (Kabananukye & Wily, 1996).

[60] Kabale District has the highest amount of rented land in Uganda.

forest and stoning of park vehicles when they drove past. In addition to lost access, crop raiding is a serious problem for those residing nearest to the park. A recent economic study found that the costs to the communities from lost access and crop raiding were greater by US$ 750,000 per year than the limited gains from revenue sharing and employment (Small, 1996).

Local Institutions

The primary informal local institutions are the stretcher societies (also called ambulance groups). Stretcher societies are community organizations initiated to assist carrying people to hospitals,[61] as well as contributing towards funeral preparations and expenses. Every male head of household in a village belongs to the stretcher society[62]. These societies are relatively recent institutions, having arisen during the past two decades because people frequently tried to avoid volunteering. Each society has elected leaders and by-laws punishing members who shirk group responsibilities (Tumisiwerere, 1997). Groups do not administer punishments or settle disputes other than those related to evasion of stretcher group responsibilities. If so, the individuals are fined and the money is divided between the stretcher group and a village beer party. CARE modeled the forest society on the stretcher groups, as each group elected two representatives for the society. Other groups include: women's groups (primarily income generating groups), bee-keeping and herbalist groups. These groups are not formally registered and

[61] As vehicular transportation is rare, groups of four men take turns carrying the ailing person to the hospital. As the distance can be great over hilly terrain, this job requires many different people to volunteer in shifts. Establishing the stretcher societies facilitates this job by notifying which individuals are required to participate, as well as the sanctions expected if people fail to participate.

performance varies at different locations. Formal groups include the local council representatives (See Chapter Two) and the groups established for the purposes of conservation: the park management advisory committee (PMAC) and the park parish committees (PPCs).

Management History

In 1932, Bwindi became one of the first forests brought under systematic management by the colonial Forest Department. Ten years later, the FD established the present forest boundaries as the Impenetrable Crown Forest. For the next fifty years, the FD managed Bwindi as a forest reserve, with a portion declared a game sanctuary in 1961. Largely due to the rugged terrain that inhibits mechanical logging, Bwindi has never experienced intensive timber harvesting. However, the forest became an important source of local timber through the use of low-impact extraction methods such as pitsawing (Kamugisha et. al, 1997). Along with hunting, uncontrolled timber cutting had been the primary threat to the forest (Howard, 1991). Howard's survey estimated that at the time of park creation, only 10% of the reserve was essentially intact, with 61% heavily exploited by pitsawers and 29% creamed of the best timber trees by selective cutting (Howard, 1991).

Discussions regarding transforming the forest into a national park initially arose in the early 1970s and revived in earnest during the 1980s. Tom Butynski, an American biologist, initiated the Impenetrable Forest Conservation Project to research and document the ecological significance of Bwindi. Butynski (1984) estimated that between

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[62] Females from widowed or single-parent households represent the family if a male is absent.

500-1000 people entered the forest every day, almost half of whom were committing illegal acts. Illegal acts accounted for 80% of the timber felled and 90% of all acts of extraction (Butynski, 1984). This recognition of the project of the ecological significance of Bwindi, as well as the evident threats of widespread illegal use, created a movement by conservationists to change of the status of the forest into a national park. This set the stage for the battle between conservationists and the UNP against the FD for control of the forest depicted in Chapter Four. Since 1994, UWA has managed the park primarily for gorilla conservation and gorilla tourism, becoming the most prominent and economically viable national park in Uganda. According to the most recent management plan, the primary objective of BINP is to "safeguard the biodiversity and integrity of physical and ecological processes of BINP in perpetuity for the health, welfare, enjoyment and inspiration of present and future generations, (UNP, 1995; ii). Thus, the primary management objective is conservation, rather than conservation and development.

Since the initiation of the multiple-use program in 1994, BINP is currently managed in four different zones – high protection, multiple-use, tourism and sustainable development (outside the park). Collection of basket materials and medicinal plants in the pilot parishes is restricted to the multiple-use areas only.

Community Conservation at Bwindi

During the period as a forest reserve, local people enjoyed widespread use rights, both allowed under the Forest Act, and tacitly allowed due to ineffective enforcement (Howard, 1991; Butynski, 1984). During the late 1980s while the IFCP was detailing the

ecological significance of the forest as well as warning of the threats represented by the densely populated neighboring communities, CARE International initiated the Development through Conservation (DTC) project in the communities surrounding Bwindi and nearby Mgahinga national parks. The DTC project was intended to support the in-park research of the IFCP by focusing on the outside communities. The objectives of the project initially focused on environmental education, resource substitution, soil conservation and on-farm income generation. Promoters based these activities on the traditional logic of resource substitution that providing local people alternatives to the park resources would reduce the need for harvesting park resources. Improving local incomes would allow people income to purchase products previously collected from the park. Finally, environmental education programs taught people the value of the forest, both nationally and globally, but also locally by improving the quality of air, water, reducing erosion on their farms. The DTC planned education to gain local support for conserving the forest, while providing substitutes and improving local incomes would provide people a means of reducing their dependence.

Park Management Advisory Committees (PMACs) represented an attempt to involve local communities in the activities of the park. Initiated at Bwindi in 1992, PMACs were soon established at all Ugandan parks. One member from each parish bordering the park belonged to the PMAC. The PMAC serves as a liaison between the community and the national park. PMAC members were to represent the interests of their community to the park authority, while relaying information from the park back to the community. However, members have been reluctant to attend meetings unless they received a sitting fee. Additionally, as reflected by the lack of awareness of the general

community, PMAC members rarely shared the information with their communities. Thus, despite the objective of a forum for community-park interaction, the PMAC served largely as a forum to determine revenue sharing projects (Mugisha, 1997; Kjersgad, 1997). A primary reason given for the failure of the PMACs was that they were established to please a donor (USAID) and thus reflected neither true community nor UWA organizations (Moore, 1997; Mugisha, 1997).

In 1994, UWA formed Park parish committees (PPCs) in all parishes bordering Bwindi. Each village within the parish has one representative on the PPC. Unlike the PMAC, the PPC members receive no payment for attending meetings. Therefore, they are more of a community institution than the PMAC that is associated as a park institution. The PPC links the parish with the PMAC via the PPC chairperson, who sits on the PMAC. In 1997, UWA suspended the PMAC due to lack of enthusiasm from the members. Although not initially intended to replace the PMAC, the PPCs have usurped many of the duties of the PMAC, including selecting revenue sharing projects and serving as a liaison between the community and park management. By 1997, every parish around the park had had at least one project funded. Although the level of activity of the individual PPCs vary among parishes, a recent study found that in most parishes, PPC meetings are irregular, there is little contact between the PPC and the community as a whole and that members have lost enthusiasm after discovering they would not be paid (Kjersgad, 1997). Results from the two target parishes of this study support this depiction.

Revenue Sharing

In contrast to most national parks in Uganda, Bwindi is fortunate to have adequate tourism revenues to both improve enforcement capacity as well as initiate revenue sharing. Gorilla tourism opened in June 1994 and funding of revenue sharing projects began in 1995. Revenue sharing is organized through funding of a community project at the parish level. All parishes bordering the park are eligible to apply for project funding. Within each parish, the Park Parish Committees decide on which project to nominate for funding. Representatives then take these projects to the broader PPCs who decide on which projects will be funded based on their potential for sustainability and the extent to which they will assist the entire community. Due to the success of gorilla tourism, every parish bordering the park had at least one project funded by the end of 1997.

In addition to revenues earned from gorilla tourism, Bwindi has an additional source of income to finance community projects, The Mgahinga and Bwindi Impenetrable Forest Conservation Trust (MBIFCT). Initiated by a US$ 4 million grant from the Global Environment Facility/World Bank, it is the first GEF/World Bank trust in Africa. The Trust differs from revenue sharing in that funds come from the interest on the Trust rather than tourist revenues, and theoretically is stable. 20% of the Trust's disbursal revenue will go towards park management, 20% to research and 60% to local community projects. Projects funded are similar to those funded by revenue sharing except that the Trust funding range covers a two-parish zone around the park, rather than just the immediate neighboring parishes. The first project was approved in August 1996. The Trust expects to be able to provide US$ 100,000 to fund 15-20 projects per year in the fifty parishes in its project area (Oryema-Lalobo, 1997). Additionally, the Trust will

begin a separate fund, setting aside US$ 10,000 for projects exclusively for the Abayanda. As the Abayanda are minorities in every parish, as well as being at the bottom of the social hierarchy, it is unlikely that the entire parish for submission to the Trust would select projects benefiting them.

Developing Collaboration at Mpungu

When Bwindi became a national park in 1991, rangers began enforcing the new laws by employing harsh treatment of park neighbors. The new restrictions and harsh enforcement caused a tremendous outcry among park neighbors. Large sections of the park burned and park vehicles were regularly stoned as they drove through local communities (Tumisiwerere, 1997). The extremely hostile environment created an arena where working with park neighbors and attempts at reputation building became a favorable strategy for the park rangers. However, people were hesitant to attend meetings and interact with park officials. Residents also perceived the DTC to be involved in the creation of the park and therefore, untrustworthy. They could not call formal meetings because people would become violent. As a means of regaining local support, the DTC shifted from primarily resource substitution to organizing user groups to collect specified resources. Beginning in three pilot parishes, groups comprised of representatives from each village are allowed entry into the forest to collect species used for basket making and medicinal plants.

Mpungu was the first of the three original pilot parishes to initiate a collaborative agreement. Mpungu is a large parish with a 1991 population of 5,890 and has since been divided into two parishes, Mpungu and Muramba. This division occurred after its

initiation as a pilot parish and thus the entire parish is included in the memorandum of understanding although the Muramba section has since elected its own forest society and PPC. The population has been relatively stable with 90% of household heads were born in the parish (CARE, 1994). People were heavily dependent on the forest as 70% reported previously going into the forest at least once per week and only 12% stated that they had other sources for the plant that they previously collected within the forest (CARE, 1994). Consequently, animosity was very high at the time of park creation and the fires of 1991/92 among the most heavily damaged the areas of the park bordering Mpungu.

The DTC and UNP selected Mpungu to be a pilot parish based on criteria determined by the project management. Local communities were not able to influence their parish's opportunity for selection. Mpungu was selected as it had a long border with the park and it had severe conflicts with the park (Nyamagira, 1997). Most of the sixteen different patches burned in February and March 1992 after Bwindi became a national park were in Kayonza Sub-County (which includes Mpungu). DTC personnel organized numerous parish meetings and participatory rural appraisals (PRAs) to educate people about the importance of the park, tell them the new rules and determine what resources they would most like to collect from the park. The process belonged clearly on the left of the continuum, as being primarily consultative and educational. The primary results of this process were to indicate that the park was there to stay and attempt to stop local violence towards the park and park authority. At the outset of negotiations, UWA personnel clearly told that the park was there to stay. They promoted revenue sharing schemes and potential for direct income for tourists as a means of gaining support for the

park, but whose inspiration came from outside the community. After realizing that the shift to a national park was permanent, people joined in selecting the products that they would most like to be able to harvest within the park.

After nine months of PRAs and environmental education and sensitization meetings, DTC, UNP and Mpungu residents began negotiating the terms of the collaborative agreement. As a gesture of good faith, organizers allowed residents to choose the products that they desired to harvest. Mpungu residents ranked the following products as the most important during the negotiations process: medicinal plants, basket materials, beer boats and firewood (Mutebi, 1997). Thus, they received their top two requested products. However, extensive environmental education programs conducted throughout the parish by the DTC, successfully persuaded Mpungu residents that the activities determined to be more destructive to the forest, such as timber harvesting, pole cutting and hunting, would not be allowed. "We will not be allowed to use these [timber, gold] so why bother to talk about them."[63]

Thus, clearly the process of negotiations was driven externally, by the DTC and UNP. The schedule of negotiations, who was to be included and what could be discussed originated from outside the communities. Local people's roles were primarily consultative, being included in what was going on. However, once the local management group was selected, the group enjoyed significant input into its activities and methods of operation.

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[63] Anonymous Bwindi resident.

Local Rights and Responsibilities

UWA organized Forest Societies in three pilot parishes to manage the multiple-use program. Each stretcher society elected two members to represent them in the Forest Society. Forest Society members represent users of the two products collected: basket-making and medicinal plants. The agreement lists the allowable species and amounts (e.g.: one handful, one arm length.).[64] In order to allow regeneration of harvested species, collection of basket materials is restricted to two periods during the year, January to February and June to July. During these periods, they go into the forest about three times per month. Conversely, collectors of medicinal plants can go in at any time throughout the year. Only the nominated Forest Society members can collect these materials from the forest. The collectors then can sell the products to community members at a mutually agreed-upon price that is generally lower than the market rate. Committee members are to record the species and quantity being collected. The members do not patrol, but if they see someone, they can confront them themselves.

Although the memorandum of understanding is subtitled *An Agreement Concerning Collaborative Forest Management*, the responsibilities of the forest societies originally consisted primarily of collecting materials, rather than making decisions concerning management of the forest. The community has no authority to alter the amounts or resources allowed. In this respect, it resembled more passive reception of benefits, than active decision making responsibilities. Nevertheless, allowing even limited use signaled a cleavage in the separation of people and the park, as well as

[64] The Memorandum of Understanding (UNP/People of Mpungu Parish, 1994) details the harvestable species and quantities allowed of each.

allowing people to more directly benefit. These limited original responsibilities however have been gradually extended to incorporate the resource collectors to monitor forest condition (1997) and sanctioning of illegal users from the community caught in the forest by rangers. On several occasions, rangers have brought people illegally caught in the forest to the committee for punishment, rather than the established route of taking them to park headquarters. This has provided a measure of good faith to the local community as they all receive the benefits of the fine (commonly resulting in a community beer party) and thus have an incentive to look out for illegal users. These experiences at Bwindi, glowingly reported in glamour pieces and conferences,[65] provided the foundation for experiments at Mt. Elgon and the development of UWA's official collaborative management policy.

Thus, collaboration at Mpungu lies to the left of the continuum as local people participated in the creation of rules, yet enjoyed limited influence and little chance to change the rules. Operationally, only Forest Society members have any daily responsibilities. The primary duties of the majority of the parish are simply to follow the rules. Nevertheless, collaboration represents a substantial improvement in relationships. The UNP and DTC demonstrated several important reputation building actions including allowing user rights, a signed Memorandum of Understanding, organizing repeated interactions between UNP rangers and community members and allowing local people to punish people caught in the forest illegally.

[65] See for example, Nowak, 1995. Typically these articles will present the goals of the project (increased community involvement, collaborative management) as if they were actual outcomes.

Mt. Elgon National Park

Conservation Significance

Mt. Elgon lies along Uganda's eastern border with Kenya, approximately 100 km northeast of Lake Victoria (See Figure 1). At 24 million years, it represents the oldest extinct volcano in East Africa (Robinson, 1994). Mt. Elgon National Park encompasses an area of 1,145 km^2 and is contiguous with the Mt. Elgon National Park and Forest Reserve on the Kenya side comprising an additional 900 km^2. The park lies between 1,460-4,320 meters above sea level and contains the eighth tallest peak in Africa. Annual rainfall ranges from 1,500- 2,000 mm. The mountain is a solitary extinct volcano, with one of the largest craters in the world, 8 km. across. The Forest Department established about 1500 ha. of softwood plantations in the northern portion since 1957. Nearly 200 km^2 of the lower forest has been almost completely cleared of trees. Howard (1991) classifies most of the remaining 900 km^2 as 'undisturbed'.

Mount Elgon National Park and Surroundings



Prepared by RS & GIS lab, MUIENR, 1997

10 0 10 20 Kilometers

Mt. Elgon's primary significance is as a water catchment for about one million people, including supplying Uganda's primary eastern towns of Mbale, Kapchorwa and Tororo. Wildlife populations have diminished markedly over the past few decades largely due to poaching and cattle rustling. There are 296 known species of trees and shrubs, 296 species of birds and 30 species of small mammals (Howard, 1991). However of these, only a few represent regional endemics. Therefore, Mt. Elgon's diversity of species is low compared to other important forest ecosystems in Uganda.

The vegetation of Mt. Elgon can be classified into four categories based on altitude zones (from Howard, 1991):

Mixed montane forest	(48%)	<2500m
Bamboo and low canopy montane forest	(21%)	2400-3000m
High montane heath	(7%)	3000-3500m
Moorland	(24%)	>3500m.

Alpine and Ericaceous Zone (23%)
Afromontane Forest Zone – transition from heath land to forest
Afromontane Rain Forest – lower forest, much degraded

The moorland and heath land areas are considered the most significant area for species conservation due to the number of endemic shrub and herb species (Scott, 1998). Unique to other East African mountain ecosystems, Mt. Elgon contains vast stretches of tussock grasslands on the upper slopes, the result of a long grazing history. These are still utilized for grazing and little or no rejuvenation has taken place as the seedlings are immediately grazed (van Heist, 1994). The soils under forest cover are moderately fertile, but deplete rapidly when cultivated. The greatest threats to Mt. Elgon are agricultural encroachment, pitsawing and hunting (MNR & IUCN, 1996). Rapid population growth

in neighboring parishes, insecurity in the Kapchorwa plains and corruption within the forest staff has been the underlying causes of these illegal practices.

Local Communities

Two districts, Mbale in the south and Kapchorwa in the north, encompassing 57 administrative parishes of 15-20 villages each, share the 211 km. boundary of Mt. Elgon National Park. The population density in Mbale District is the second highest in Uganda at 355/km.^{2} In Kapchorwa District, the density is relatively low at 106/km.^{2} However, the parishes adjacent to the forest have much higher densities, at 494 /km.^{2} in Mbale District and 232/km.^{2} in Kapchorwa District. Two primary ethnic groups border the park, the Bagisu,[66] who reside primarily in Mbale District and the Sabiny,[67] who reside in Kapchorwa District. The Sabiny occupied all of Mt. Elgon until expelled from the southern end by the Bagisu in the mid-1800s. Both groups are primarily agriculturists as the historically pastoralist Sabiny have resorted to farming because of extensive cattle rusting in the plains. The primary crops grown are maize, beans and potatoes, with bamboo harvesting also forming an important part of the diet for the Bagisu. About 75% of families have land holdings smaller than one hectare indicating growing land scarcity outside the forest.

[66] Luhya speakers referred to as Bukusu on Kenya side of Mt. Elgon.

[67] Kalenjin speakers sometimes referred to as Sebei and referred to as Sabot on the Kenya side of Mt. Elgon.

Sabiny-speaking forest dwellers known as Benets or Ndorobos[68] reside within the grassland and moorland areas of the forest. Their populations increased during the 1970s, when they also began taking up potato and maize cultivation within the park to supplement their traditional activities of hunting, honey and vegetable collection, and trading of baskets with the Sabiny in return for maize. Therefore, the government decided that they had become too destructive to the park and all Benets were directed to vacate the forest in 1983 when the FD excised a portion of the reserve in Kapchorwa District for their resettlement. However, implementation of this excision experienced numerous problems, among them that not only Benets, but also people displaced from the plains by raiding as well as other landless people received plots as well. 2,872 people received plots, of which only 1002 were Benets (Benet study, 1996). Additionally, major inconsistencies with the boundaries resulted in several hundred families living in over 1500 ha. of misallocated land outside the excision boundaries (and therefore within the national park). In addition, at least 30 families still reside in the upper forest, having never left for the resettled area. Despite occasional harassment from rangers, they have been recently been tacitly allowed to stay as UWA develops a policy on them.

Local communities rely on the forest for important economic and cultural reasons. Most areas adjacent to the park are isolated, without all-weather roads. Therefore, there is limited access to educational facilities, job opportunities and markets. Only 50% of the people in Kapchorwa District had attended school at any time, with only 7% having attended secondary school (Kayiso, 1993). Therefore, collecting resources from the forest is an important complement to on-farm production. A 1993 study found that

[68] Benets were previously referred to as Kony (pronounced *cone*) and the name Mt. Elgon is thought to be derived from 'ere Kony' – the place of the Kony (See IUCN, 1990).

households from the villages bordering the park spent up to 20% of their productive labor time collecting over 20 different resources from the park with an annual subsistence value of US$ 60-100 per household (Scott, 1994). In Kapchorwa, where the park is used for grazing, this figure may rise to nearly 50% of productive labor time.

The bamboo collected from the forest is used widely by the Bagisu to supplement their diets as well as during ceremonial activities, such as circumcision (Scott, 1994). The Sabiny also go into the forest for circumcision during which they use a type of clay found in the grasslands. Mt. Elgon's caves historically were used during religious rituals, however these traditional religious practices are rarely followed anymore (Cherop, 1997). The forest also serves as a place of refuge for people and cattle for the Sabiny, by protecting them from Pokot and Karamojang cattle raiders who come up from the plains. Raiding was only sporadic until the 1970s when the Karamojang gained access to guns that has helped maintain the importance of the forest for the Sabiny. However, there are also major cattle rustling trails between Kenya and Uganda that pass through the park.

Local Institutions

Although there does not appear to have been active traditional controls over forest use prior to gazettement, traditional systems of user rights existed in many areas (Scott, 1998). Traditional management was based on *rorokets*, forest zones divided by rivers or ridges. Families had ownership rights over the strips, including the forested land above that they farmed. Individuals received rights through residence in an area and newcomers could request use rights from the local elders. Although these ownership rights established who could reside and cultivate in an area, they did not prohibit outsiders from

collecting forest resources or grazing their cattle. Low populations ensured that scarcity was generally not an issue. Despite the lack of restrictions on who could harvest resources, there were restrictions on the manner of which resources could be harvested. Scott (1998; 16) details several examples of such restrictions, including the prohibition of killing of young or pregnant animals, carrying fire from one area of the forest to another and harvesting more bamboo shoots than a person could carry.

These traditional rules therefore delineated how resources could be collected, rather than who could collect them. Gazettement as a forest reserve altered this indigenous system by limiting both who was allowed to collect and what uses were allowed. Moreover, it removed rights to make decisions over the forest from local people to the central government authority. Over the succeeding decades, neighboring communities no longer have an identifiable indigenous management system for the forest.[69] Moreover, as there are no associations for collectors,[70] the forest resembled an open access resource.

Management History

The history of Mt. Elgon as a protected area represents frequent changes in status, rules and boundaries, most with minimal input from or awareness of local people. The colonial government established Mt. Elgon as a forest reserve in 1938. During the succeeding years, the Forest Department made several excisions to accommodate

[69] This finding mirrors those of previous studies. See Scott, 1998; IUCN, 1997.

[70] At Mt. Elgon, traditional healers operate independently as it is considered unethical to share knowledge about traditional medicine.

families of Benets (or Ndorobos) living within the moorland areas of the forest.[71] In 1951, the government regazetted the area as Mount Elgon Central Forest Reserve. Between 1951-1968, there were numerous boundary disputes, excisions and mapping exercises until the FD confirmed the present boundaries. Mt. Elgon Forest Reserve was primarily managed as a protection forest given its importance as a water catchment area. Two softwood plantations, initiated by the Forest Department in the Kapchorwa sector during the 1950s, have provided the majority of marketed timber from the forest. *Taungya* systems, in which the FD permitted cultivation within the plantation after timber harvesting, provided local people with an additional source of land. As Asians owned both sawmills, they were therefore appropriated by the Forest Department following the expulsion of the Asians in 1972. Ineffective management caused the sawmills soon after to cease operations and pitsawing took their place in supplying the demand for local timber. Although limited pitsawing was officially licensed until 1992, illegal cutting accounted for 95% of the sawn wood from the forest (IUCN, 1997).

A combination of flawed regulations and illegal activities contributed to the degradation of the forest reserve. The breakdown in management capacity was particularly intense at Mt. Elgon as over 31,000 hectares were cleared for agriculture between the late 1970s and early 1980s (van Heist, 1994). Much of this land was allocated or leased to people by forest department officials due to a loophole in the Forest Act that allowed any senior forest officer to issue a license of residence, grazing and cultivation (See Kamugisha, 1993). Until 1993, Mt. Elgon was a forest reserve and under the Forest Act, local communities were allowed to take and use for their own personal

[71] Nevertheless, Benets have continued to reside in the forest throughout its gazetted history.

use and in reasonable quantities any forest products that had not been planted or which had not been declared reserved forest produce (Kamugisha, 1993). During the 1970s, local resource restrictions in many areas broke down due to cultivation increasing the value of the land, and increased cattle rustling and attacks as the warrior tribes in the plains (Pokot and Karamojong) gained widespread access to guns.

In 1983, the FD excised 6000 hectares in Kapchorwa District from the park for the resettlement of the Benets residing within the forest boundaries.[72] In 1992, the Forest Department declared Mt. Elgon a Forest Park and prepared an interim management plan. However, in 1993, before the plan was finalized, Mt. Elgon, along with two other forest reserves, Kibale and Semliki, was declared a national park and management authority transferred from the Forest Department to UNP. This history of different management regimes and shifting boundaries continues to play an important role in how local people perceive the sanctity of park boundaries.

The sawmills resumed operation in 1994, but are currently operating at only about 1/3 capacity. The park budgets the sawmill concessionaires to provide about 13 million Uganda Shillings quarterly, about five times the amount estimated to come from tourism revenues. However, the concessionaires have not been paying the park regularly,[73] and UWA has not proven successful in ensuring collection. Tourism has not been a large income earner either. Trekking routes and tourist facilities were developed in 1994 and tourism has increased steadily from just over 100 visitors in 1994 to over 500 in 1997 (Weltzen & Obua, 1997). Nevertheless, this represents only about 1% of Uganda's total

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[72] See (Report) for detailed report of the history of the Benets living within the forest reserve and the numerous resettlement efforts.

[73] In the three year period 1994-1996, the sawmills paid to the park only Ush 26 million.

tourist arrivals and Mt. Elgon's potential for future tourism development is thought to be only marginal (IUCN, 1997).

Community Conservation Interventions

During the 1970s and 1980s, Mt. Elgon Forest Reserve became heavily degraded due to rampant illegal use including widespread hunting, pitsawing and cultivation. In 1987 IUCN, in conjunction with the Ministry of Natural Resources, initiated the Mount Elgon Conservation and Development Project. Initially, project activities concentrated on protection measures, notably improving enforcement capability of the then-forest reserve staff and demarcating the official park boundary. In 1991, community conservation measures were included, primarily promoting resource substitution and on-farm income generating activities. As the park boundary is so large, the project initially focused extension services in seven of the fifty-seven bordering parishes. In 1993, a project evaluation concluded that the project's sustainable development focus was unlikely to reduce pressure on the forest resources, nor increase the communities' interests in its conservation (IUCN, 1997). By the beginning of Phase III of the project (1994/1995), the project began focusing primarily on the needs of local communities, including goals to initiate more active community involvement. Representing this new focus, in 1995, the project initiated programs of collaborative management in two pilot parishes, one in each of the two districts that border the park. Mutushet became the pilot parish in Kapchorwa District, while Ulukusi represented Mbale District.

Given the situation at Mt. Elgon, characterized by rampant illegal use, general inaccessibility and limited capacity for enforcement, park authorities determined that

allowing limited use was the only option to retain some level of authority over the park. IUCN's Social Policy Group had been developing ideas about collaborative management as a new conservation strategy (See Borrini-Feyerabend, 1996; Fischer, 1995). However, these ideas had been based primarily from experiences with joint forest management in Asia and they were eager to expand experiences to include different geographical locations as well as large protected areas. Therefore, altering the focus of the Mt. Elgon project to experiment with collaborative management served as a useful vehicle to gain experience to develop further their theory of collaborative management. The underlying goal of collaboration was to exchange rights of use for responsibilities of management.

In Kapchorwa District, cultivation, grazing and pitsawing in addition to widespread collection of minor forest products represented the primary threats to the forest. By the mid-1980s, about 9500 ha. (more than three times the planned area) of natural forest had been replaced by cultivation by farmers having temporary cultivation permits (IUCN, 1997). Local people opposed the conversion to a more restrictive status, but in part due to limited organization and irregular enforcement, widespread protests or sabotage never occurred. By contrast, in most cases people continued using the park as if still under the unenforced forest reserve rules. IUCN selected four parishes as pilot parishes for the sustainable development initiative including Moyok. The goal of the sustainable development program is to reduce pressure on the park by having people produce the resources on their own land. The primary activities include resource substitution and income generation schemes such as promoting fuel-efficient stoves, tree planting, agroforestry and beekeeping.

Developing Collaboration at Mutushet

Mutushet Parish lies in Kebei sub-county, Kapchorwa District about halfway between Kapchorwa town and the Kenya border. The parish covers 18.6 km^2 with 459 households and a total population of 2,079 people identified in the 1991 census. The population density is relatively low at 112/km^2. The forest bordering Mutushet parish is the most complete in Kapchorwa District with about 50% canopy cover at the edges, and a relatively closed canopy after the first few hundred meters (Tiyoy, 1995). The population is exclusively Sabiny, with the vast majority of people relying on cultivation for subsistence. Although the main road linking Kapchorwa to the Kenyan border at Suam runs through the parish, its extremely poor condition makes the area inaccessible during periods of rain, which include large portions of the year. Consequently, Mutushet has remained largely isolated, with few people being able to market products to amass some degree of wealth.

Although the physical and socio-economic environments are similar at the two parks, collaborative management at Mt. Elgon was conceptualized much differently than at Bwindi. As at Bwindi, Mt. Elgon experienced widespread illegal use at the time of park creation. However, unlike Bwindi, the park staff did not possess the resources necessary to limit this illegal use. Therefore, collaboration was initiated as an alternative means of reducing illegal use, rather than at Bwindi where it was initiated to try to reduce violence and negative attitudes towards the park and park officials.

The community focus began with resource substitution promotion, only later incorporating more active local involvement. The Mt. Elgon Conservation and Development Project (MECDP) began while the forest was still a reserve and initially

involved a minimal community focus. The process of developing a collaborative agreement began with an assessment of forest use by local communities carried out by a consultant in six parishes bordering the park during late 1993 and early 1994 (See Scott, 1994a; 1994b). UWA later selected two of these six parishes, Mutushet in Kapchorwa District and Ulukusi in Mbale District, as pilot parishes for collaborative management. Mutushet was selected as a form of most likely case as it was the only parish directly bordering the park where there had not been significant encroachment. Scott's study determined that the people of Mutushet took pride in maintaining the forest and expressed interest in participating in a forest management group. Mutushet contrasted to Ulukusi, where serious conflicts existed over land cultivation and pitsawing. Thus, as at Bwindi, the idea for collaboration as well as which parishes would be included, were decided from outside the communities.

The park staff and IUCN extension workers arranged parish meetings. A local committee was elected to serve as village representatives throughout the negotiation process. The process of awareness and consultations took about four months (IUCN, 1997). Several aspects of the negotiations influenced directly the outcomes of the negotiations. First, before substantive policy options were discussed, both parties agreed that "the main objective of collaborative management was to allow the encroached forest to regenerate and to ensure that the existing forest would not be further encroached." (IUCN, 1997). Thus, from the start of the exercise, the conservation values represented by UWA and IUCN were sacrosanct, which limited the range of policy options open for discussion. Consequently, activities that were considered the most damaging ecologically such as cultivation, pitsawing and hunting were not open for discussion.

Two major contentious issues arose concerning grazing and pole collection within the park. Local people requested grazing rights for security reasons as well as matter of tradition. Members of the negotiating team agreed that grazing did not seem to be a major threat to forest regeneration (IUCN, 1997; 30). Nevertheless, as UWA policies banned grazing in parks, no agreement was reached. Local people also requested the permission to collect poles, however park authorities refused to allow pole wood collection. Thus, the parties signed the agreement despite lack of agreement on two major resource uses. In January 1996, one and a half years after the initiation of the process, the committee and the park authorities signed the collaborative management agreement.

These aspects of the negotiations indicated limited potential for full collaboration. First, the agenda had largely already been determined before the negotiations had started with several potential activities declared non-negotiable. Secondly, the community did not receive access to two highly valued resources, grazing of cattle and collection of poles. This problem notwithstanding, the negotiations did provide an arena for both park staff and local people to communicate and negotiate and it resulted in the legitimization of numerous common illegal activities. Although park staff and community rangers have held meetings in other parishes as well, they have been limited and often without follow-up. These negotiations allowed for continuous discussion and contact. Perhaps the most important incentive to the communities of participating in the agreement was the assurance that rangers would no longer be enforcing in their parish. This brought a sense of ownership back to the community, in that somewhat the park was being returned to them.

The local committee received the mandate to control illegal use through awareness raising and persuasion, but not by patrolling and sanctioning offenders. The local committee argued for greater authority to sanction and enforce and for personal items as uniforms and identification cards. The community ranger continually reminds them that they are supposed to be representatives of the community, rather than rangers. This demonstrates the ambition of the committee members as well as misperceptions about rural villages. While the outside facilitators envisioned the committee as representing the interests of their fellow community members, the individuals on the committee saw it as a way to gain a small advantage over other their neighbors.

The park staff, as well as UWA headquarters, expressed trepidation about relinquishing too much authority, in essence having a portion of the park beyond their control. Analysis of the process indicates that local people did participate in the negotiations somewhat, but not in the production of the final document. According to local reports, the IUCN representative came to the parish for three weeks holding numerous meetings with the community. He then returned to project headquarters and returned three weeks later with the completed Memorandum of Understanding with the expectation that it would be signed.

Resource Use Committee

The Resource Use Committee represents the parish members in the collaborative agreement. The committee is comprised of twenty members, voted on by members of their respective villages. Therefore, most of the original committee members were local leaders and not necessarily individuals interested in the forest or users of forest resources.

Villages closest to the forest receive more representatives on the committee. The committee is divided into four zones, based on traditional resource management areas, or *rorokets*. Six trails exist into the forest and sub-committee members are responsible for ensuring that community members follow park rules along their roroket zone.

The committee's responsibilities are vaguely defined, but they are expected to represent the concerns of the parish to the park staff and to report illegal forest use. Although they are not specifically required to patrol, committee members perceive organized patrolling to be their primary responsibility. UWA denied the committee's request for the authority to arrest people. Instead, they are supposed to call for the rangers to come down and deal with a large problem, such as pit sawing, or simply reprimand and persuade local people they meet performing illegal activities.

Many original committee members have dropped out after seeing that there would be no financial benefit to them. They have been replaced by volunteers, who are generally more interested in performing the tasks than many of the local leaders who were originally selected. Committee members clearly see their duties as pseudo-rangers, with a primary responsibility to patrol like rangers and receive compensation for their work. UWA has made it clear that salaries will not be forthcoming, but committee members still hope for at least some token support, such as boots or jackets.

Thus, collaboration at Mutushet represents much more active responsibilities for local communities than at Mpungu. Residents are allowed to access the park and a wide range of resources and responsible for monitoring and confronting or reporting illegal users. However, as at Mpungu, IUCN and UWA dominated the process of rule creation. Mt. Elgon residents did successfully win one important concession in reversing (at least

temporarily) the prohibition of grazing. This change and the responsibilities for controlled harvesting and monitoring has clearly demonstrated to Mutushet residents that they are active participants in the management of the forest.

Comparing Bwindi and Mt. Elgon

Although the physical and socio-economic conditions are similar at the two parks, the collaborative agreements, or Memorandums of Understanding (MOUs), eventually signed at Mutushet and Mpungu differ substantially both in the process of rule creation and in the rules themselves. Although both documents employ the term *collaborative forest management,*[74] the extent and organization of local participation differ markedly (See Table 6.1). At Bwindi, the MOU resulted from a long process involving dozens of meetings over several years. Local rights and responsibilities evolved gradually, after enforcement of access restrictions had been effectively increased, therefore local expectations for widespread changes in rights were low. The organizing NGO carefully guided the process and therefore despite numerous meanings, local people's role was primarily consultative. By contrast, at Mt. Elgon, the collaborative process was much shorter and conceived from the outset at producing a collaborative agreement. Therefore, expectations were higher. Moreover, as enforcement was relatively ineffectual, local people had a more powerful position in the negotiations process. This difference in power as well as the expressed desire of the NGO to achieve an agreement allowed local people to have greater influence into deciding the eventual harvesting rules.

[74] Both documents are subtitled, "An Agreement Concerning Collaborative Forest Management."

Table 6.1: Local Rights and Responsibilities Specified by Collaborative Agreements

Mutushet (Mt. Elgon)	Mpungu (Bwindi)
Access	*Access*
• Harvesting of many minor forest products allowed	• Harvesting of specified species for basketry and medicinal plants only
• Entire parish can harvest	• Committee members only can harvest
• No limits on amount harvested	• Specified limits for each species
• No temporal restrictions	• Specified times only for basketry materials, no restrictions for medicinal plants
Monitoring	*Monitoring*
• Active monitoring by committee expected	• Monitoring by committee while collecting only
Sanctioning	*Sanctioning*
• No sanctioning authority	• No formal sanctioning authority[75]

The first primary difference between the two agreements involves rules of membership, who is allowed to participate in the local resource management committees. In Mutushet, the committee was comprised of local leaders, not necessarily resource users. Rules regarding membership differ as well as all residents are allowed to enter the forest to collect the resources allowed under the MOU. The absence of harvest limitations by species or quantity has made monitoring, for both compliance and ecological impact, difficult. Moreover, the absence of incentives for the committee members themselves to actively monitor has created a situation where only the committee members who themselves are resource users actively monitor. At Mpungu, only resource users can enter the forest to collect the products and then only allowed to collect specified plant species. These users make up the management committee (Forest Society). As the users themselves comprise the committee, individual Forest Society members have greater incentive to maintain the activities of the Committee. Moreover, that local people

[75]Occasionally, rangers have brought people caught in the forest illegally to the local councils for sanctioning, rather than applying the formal punishments specified by park rules.

are required to obtain materials from the committee members to obtain their goods facilitates interaction between the committee and community members.

The second major difference refers to the responsibilities of the two committees. At Mutushet, the agreement stipulates daily monitoring by the Committee, yet contains no enforcement responsibilities for the community members. The Committee has no power to arrest or punish, but can only notify park authorities if not able to compel voluntary compliance. The Bwindi agreements detail specific monitoring and record keeping requirements for resource users to perform while in the forest. Both agreements stipulate that changes can be made if both parties agree, but do not specify the manner by which change could be facilitated.

Finally, at Bwindi, the Committee is also responsible for selecting revenue sharing projects. This has provided members an additional opportunity for interaction with the community as a whole as well as provided an economic benefit beyond the limited resources that are allowed to be collected. As Mt. Elgon experiences minimal tourism, no revenue sharing profits exist or are anticipated in the near future. Thus, the expected responsibilities, as well as the corresponding benefits for the Committee remain minimal as well as vaguely defined.

Thus, the rights and responsibilities specified in the two collaborative agreements differ markedly. The Mpungu agreement involves an extremely limited user rights scheme, limited in both the people allowed the use rights, as well as the species allowed. At Mt. Elgon, the user rights scheme is more widespread, and greater community responsibilities expected (although vaguely specified), monitoring and stopping (by persuasion) illegal use.

Conclusion

Collaboration, or systems of sharing rights and responsibilities between the park authority and local communities, are being promoted as more effective means of encouraging local participation than passive participatory approaches focusing on provision of benefits (Pimbert & Pretty, 1997; 1995; Borrini-Feyerebend, 1997; 1996). This chapter has shown that organizing collaboration at two Ugandan parks, Bwindi and Mt. Elgon represented a gradual shift from passive to active strategies. The inability of UWA to control the two parks provided the opening to experiment with ceding some rights to local communities. Nevertheless, collaboration has been organized much differently at Mt. Elgon than at Bwindi. At Bwindi, local people have fewer responsibilities and less input into decision-making. However, because of the revenue sharing program, Bwindi communities are receiving more material benefits than at Mt. Elgon.

In both sites the negotiating process was led and dominated by the interests of the park authority, demonstrating little commitment to incorporating local participation by UWA. However, the revenue sharing at Bwindi and widespread use rights at Mt. Elgon indicated a commitment to providing benefits, if not decision-making authority. The following chapter will examine the extent to which these different institutional arrangements successfully alter local behavior towards conservation of the forest.

CHAPTER 7

EXPLORING OUTCOMES OF PARTICIPATORY CONSERVATION: DOES COLLABORATION IMPROVE PERFORMANCE?

Introduction

This dissertation addresses the policy paradox concerning the widespread promotion of participatory conservation strategies (Pimbert & Pretty, 1997; 1995; Borrini-Feyerebend, 1997; 1996; Western & Wright, 1994; Carter & Lewis, 1993; Kiss, 1990) despite little evidence of success in practice (Oates, 1999; Brandon, 1997; Gibson & Marks, 1995; Barrett & Alcese, 1994; Wells & Brandon, 1992). This chapter will examine operational outcomes of community conservation to examine the effectiveness of different methods of participation at encouraging the participation of local people in the conservation of two national parks in Uganda. I will examine these policies to assess how different policies create incentives or disincentives for park staff and local communities to engage in behavior that facilitates conservation. By focusing on how individuals are likely to respond to the incentives created by these policies, this chapter will help explain why the dominant participatory conservation strategies frequently have been ineffective at encouraging local people to cooperate in conservation.

The previous chapters have detailed why Ugandan policymakers and conservationists selected participatory conservation policies that allow for more active participation of local people. Following the lead of international donors and non-governmental organizations, UWA officials promoted these policies in an attempt to gain control over the protected area. Local people took advantage of this opening by participating in pilot projects allowing various degrees of active responsibilities including

collaborative management. These collaborative arrangements were developed under different processes and specify differing degrees of shared rights and responsibilities. This chapter will link policy processes to outcomes by examining the extent to which the different collaborative institutions at Bwindi and Mt. Elgon influenced local communities to cooperate with UWA in forest conservation.

In situations characterized by severe mistrust, is collaboration likely to improve outcomes of participatory strategies? This study will contrast community conservation strategies promoting collaboration with more passive strategies to determine whether collaboration does indeed improve upon the frequently poor performance of participatory conservation strategies in Africa. For collaboration to be an appropriate incentive, in the absence of effective enforcement, local community members must perceive cooperation to represent their best interest. Therefore, comparing strategies offering different mixes of benefits and responsibilities will entail examining the extent to which these strategies promote compliance.

Assessing Participatory Conservation

Scholars and practitioners have recognized that the creation of national parks often creates hardships for local community members. Restricting access causes economic hardships to families dependent on park resources for their livelihood. Additionally, the imposition of an external management authority diminishes the role of local institutions and management structures. Therefore, advocates of participation suggest that compensating for these material and socio-political costs will encourage park neighbors to support conservation. Such incentives have commonly taken the form either

of providing economic inducements, or in transferring rights and responsibilities to local communities. As economic benefits have frequently been unsuccessful, systems of sharing rights and responsibilities between the national park authority and local communities are becoming increasingly promoted in the literature. Such programs of collaboration involve a complex set of interactions fundamentally different than organizing economic incentives such as revenue sharing or income generation activities.

Supporters of collaboration claim that offering rights in exchange for responsibilities will be a more effective means of gaining local support than simply providing benefits (Prystupa, 1998; Weber, 1998). Frequently, however community members may not be interested in participating or may want to participate for reasons that are antithetical to conservation (Porter & Salveson, 1995; Pinkerton, 1992; 1989). Moreover, the park authority may not truly be committed to allowing local people to participate. For collaboration to be successful, both community members and rangers must have incentives to cooperate as well as incentives that direct participation towards behavior that facilitates conservation.

Given these realities, this chapter analyzes how different participatory initiatives provide incentives or disincentives for local people to participate in conservation. This chapter will examine participation at the collective-choice and operational levels to examine whether institutions that encourage participation that is more active will be more effective. I hypothesize that collaboration will be more successful the extent that the government agency demonstrates a credible commitment to reform, that incorporate meaningful local influence in decision-making and adequate monitoring and enforcement exist to ensure that other people are cooperating.

Research Sites

Collaborative management agreements are predicated upon conservation outcomes improving as local participation becomes more active and meaningful. By comparing sites with collaborative agreements to those without, gaining insights into the potential for active local participation in Africa will be possible. What incentives are effective at encouraging local people to participate and how is this participation affecting conservation outcomes? To examine these questions, I selected community conservation programs outside two Ugandan national parks: Mt. Elgon and Bwindi Impenetrable.

These two parks were selected because their participatory programs are the most advanced among Ugandan national parks and therefore likely to provide the best indications of preliminary outcomes. Both parks also have comparable physical characteristics, management histories and socio-economic community characteristics that will facilitate comparability. Both were forest reserves until the early 1990s, when they were designated national parks.[76] Both parks are montane forests, surrounded by communities with high population density and a history of high levels of illegal use. Each park has an international conservation organization that has been active since the late 1980s implementing community conservation programs. At each park, pilot parishes exist that have initiated collaborative management and are sharing decision-making and managerial responsibilities with the park authority. At each park, I selected one pilot parish and one non-pilot (to serve as a control) parish for analysis. This design will allow for comparisons both within the parks between the pilots and controls and across

[76] Bwindi Impenetrable National Park was created in 1991, while Mount Elgon became a National Park in 1993 (See Chapter 4).

parks, to examine differences in effectiveness of different forms of participatory incentives.

At Mt. Elgon National Park, *Mutushet* serves as a pilot parish experimenting with collaborative management while *Moyok*, in the absence of any local management responsibilities, serves as the control parish. At Bwindi Impenetrable National Park, *Mpungu* is the pilot parish promoting collaborative initiatives, with *Bujengwe* serving as the control.

Table 7.1: Research Sites

National Park	Pilot Parish	Control Parish
Mt. Elgon N.P.	Mutushet	Moyok
Bwindi Impenetrable N.P.	Mpungu	Bujengwe

Both Mutushet and Mpungu signed collaborative management agreements with the park authority outlining local rights and responsibilities (See Chapter Six). At Mutushet, the community is allowed access to minor forest products, such as collection of honey, firewood and vegetables, in return for electing a local management committee to ensure that park rules are being followed. At Mpungu, specified community members can access to the park to collect medicinal plants and basket materials. In return for these use rights, both committees are responsible for ensuring that park rules are followed, serving as a liaison between the park and community members and monitoring illegal use and forest condition. Both Bwindi parishes have also received community projects paid for in part by park revenues. The lack of significant tourism at Mt. Elgon has delayed the initiation of such revenue sharing schemes. The two control parishes have no legally established user rights or decision-making responsibilities.

Bujengwe, with a population of 3,360, lies to the west of Mpungu, separated only by the narrow neck of BINP. As in Mpungu, the majority of the population previously relied heavily on the forest for subsistence needs as well as employment. However, unlike Mpungu, residents have not been able to access the resources within the park since 1991. Socio-economic conditions are much the same as in Mpungu, although a greater percentage of people have begun growing tea as a cash crop. A parish committee exists primarily to select revenue sharing projects, but as with other committees, they also see it as their job to teach about the importance of the forest. By the end of 1997, Bujengwe had received one revenue sharing project; an addition to a primary school.

Moyok parish occupies 14.8 km^2 of Kaproron sub-county, Kapchorwa District. The 1991 census revealed 3,215 people residing in 702 households. With 217 people per km^2, population density is higher than the district average. Being near the Kapkwata softwood plantation and sawmill, Moyok residents have easy access to sawn timber. Its proximity to the sawmill also signified that the FD permitted people to clear the forest and cultivate under the *taungya* system (although seedlings were never actually planted in the Moyok area). Most parish residents cultivated inside this area until 1986 when the FD evicted the last people (excluding the Benets whose cultivation has increased steadily). However, most people, if not all, had land outside the park as well so few if any became landless after being expelled from the park. Although, the FD discontinued cultivation in 1986, continual livestock grazing has ensured that the entire boundary with the park has remained grassland with minimal forest regeneration.

Moyok was one of the original parishes selected by IUCN in 1992 to pilot their sustainable development initiatives. Until the initiation of the MECDP, few people were

actively practicing soil conservation techniques, such as tree planting, terracing and agroforestry. Officially, people are not allowed to harvest any resources from within the park. However, in actuality, the extent of use is about as widespread as in Mutushet. Due to their proximity to Kapchorwa town, the people of Moyok are marginally better off than those of Mutushet as they have access to a greater amount of goods and more able to market their own goods. Several parish residents have become wealthy enough to own their own vehicles by selling maize. Additionally, being closer to the Kapkwata sawmill gives them an alternative source of wood products not available to the people of Mutushet. As Moyok residents are therefore slightly wealthier and enjoy greater access to substitute wood products, it may be expected that they would be more supportive of the park and engage in fewer illegal activities than the people of Mutushet.

Survey Results

To what extent is the opportunity to collaborate and participate in park decision-making meeting the objective of encouraging local support for conservation? This study employs several different indicators to measure conservation performance: attitudes, participation of the community, knowledge of park rules, trust and levels of illegal use[77]. This study will compare the pilot parishes to the control parishes to examine the extent that these indicators of success have improved as responsibilities have increased. If the lack of incorporating meaningful participation has been one of the primary failures of participatory initiatives, do we see improved outcomes the more active the participation?

[77] These indicators are employed by scholars evaluating co-management agreements. See Kruse, et al, 1998; Sunderland & Gorospe, 1997.

The primary objective of community conservation is to encourage local people to support conservation by enabling park neighbors to realize that conservation can be beneficial to them (Wells & Brandon, 1992; Kiss, 1990). Successful collaboration produces more equitable rules and rules that are more likely to be followed (Prystupa, 1998). Local people often have extremely negative attitudes towards the park, and these attitudes cause them to oppose conservation restrictions. Therefore, this chapter will examine how effectively different community conservation incentives improve local attitudes towards the park. In addition to examining attitudes, policymakers are interested in examining the extent to which any attitudinal changes are translated into actions. This encompasses therefore not simply the impacts of the different policy incentives towards influencing attitudes, but the linkages between attitudinal change and behavioral change.

Attitudes

As local communities often suffer the costs of conservation, while the benefits accrue elsewhere, park neighbors commonly hold negative attitudes towards national parks (Borrini-Feyerebend, 1996; Pimbert & Pretty, 1995; Kiss, 1990). This animosity is especially strong when people lose access to resources once previously enjoyed. Both Bwindi and Mt. Elgon were forest reserves until the early 1990s. Once they became national parks, local communities lost lawful access to many park resources enjoyed during the regime as a forest reserve (Kamugisha et al, 1997). Not surprisingly, at both parks, people were greatly opposed to and angry about this regulatory change (Scott, 1997; 1994; IUCN, 1997; Mugisha; 1997; Tumisewerere, 1997; Docherty, 1993). Lacking the desire to cooperate, as well as an established arena for expressing their feelings, local people showed their resentment by ignoring the new restrictions and

continuing to use park resources. This powerlessness of UWA forced the initiation of community programs in an attempt to gain their support. Thus, these programs were developed as responses to the rules in use being practiced by local communities, as well as the recognition of the powerlessness of the formal park management authority.

How effectively have different community conservation initiatives altered these negative attitudes of park neighbors? More significantly, to what extent has attitudinal change been translated into behavioral change? Survey results indicate that attitudes towards the park do not vary significantly across the two parks (See Table 7.2). As expected, they do vary significantly between parishes, however not in the pattern expected. Rather than consistently more positive attitudes occurring in the two pilot parishes, significantly more positive attitudes are reported in Mutushet and Bujengwe than in Moyok and Mpungu. Although the absence of a pre-test limits the comparability of the impacts of the community conservation policies, combining survey data with other data sources allows identification of several important preliminary outcomes.

Table 7.2: Attitudes Towards the National Park

National Park	Parish	Positive Attitude	Negative Attitude	χ^2
Bwindi	Mpungu*	29	21	5.66
Bwindi	Bujengwe	40	10	$p<.02$
Mt. Elgon	Mutushet*	47	5	28.7
Mt. Elgon	Moyok	20	30	$p<.01$

n=202 *pilot parish

Although the positive attitudes reported at Mutushet are as expected as earlier studies indicated a more positive attitude than in other parishes (Scott, 1994; Docherty, 1993), the Mpungu results are perhaps more insightful. Changes in attitudes since the

collaborative programs, vary significantly across parishes as well (See Table 7.3). Examining the results of attitudinal change by parish highlights the poor pre-intervention attitudes at Bwindi. Both Bwindi parishes show substantial improvements in attitude towards the park over the past year. However, over this period attitudes have improved to a significantly greater degree in Bujengwe than in the pilot parish, Mpungu. Mpungu's user rights program has been active for three years, and 60% of respondents indicated a positive attitude towards the park. Although much lower than Mutushet, park and NGO officials confirm that this is undoubtedly a higher percentage than before the initiation of the user groups, indicating that the programs are having a positive impact[78]. However, it is substantially lower than that of Bujengwe, which demonstrated similarly negative feelings towards the park at the time of park creation[79] and has not had the benefit of user rights nor has had as many revenue sharing projects funded as had Mpungu.

Table 7.3: Change in Attitudes Towards the National Park

National Park	Parish	Positive Change
Mt. Elgon	Mutushet*	13 (25%)
	Moyok	21 (42%)
Bwindi	Mpungu*	31 (62%)
	Bujengwe	40 (80%)

n=202 *pilot parish

Unlike the Bwindi results, the two Mt. Elgon parishes demonstrate much smaller attitudinal improvements. However, these similar outcomes occur for different reasons. The lack of positive change at Mutushet reflects the generally positive views prior to the

[78] These figures are likely inflated as respondents may have a bias towards saying anything critical of the park especially due to the history of harsh treatment by rangers. Bwindi's Law Enforcement Warden estimated the percentages to be 40% positive, 60% negative (Echodu, 1997).

[79] Interviews with rangers, CARE officials and members of both communities indicated that attitudes in the two parishes were similarly negative at the time of park creation.

intervention. Thus the positive attitudes reported in Table 7.2 reflect these high pre-intervention attitudes, rather than being a result of collaboration. At Moyok meanwhile, people are not satisfied with the incentives being offered them. Although they can legally collect minor forest products, they view this as insufficient compensation for the loss of cultivation rights. Therefore at neither parish, can the community programs be said to have significantly altered attitudes towards the park.

Do the individuals that receive the benefits, primarily those on the management committees, have the most positive attitudes towards the park? Twenty-three of the twenty-six members (88%) of user committees (either elected or local government representatives) recorded positive attitudes, a figure substantially higher than the population as a whole (67%). As most people were elected to these positions, rather than joining voluntarily, it is unlikely that this figure merely represents that those people with positive attitudes were more likely to join the committees. [80] Therefore, it seems likely that the benefits of being on the committee are helping improve attitudes. Although members of all committees regularly complained about the lack of material compensation, they nevertheless do receive benefits. In rural areas with little paid employment, being recognized as a member of such a committee provides a degree of community status. In addition, committee members are allowed direct access to the resources. In Mpungu, only Forest Society members can enter the forest to collect the materials required for baskets and medicines. Thus, they alone are guaranteed permanent access to whatever amount they desire. In Mutushet, committee members never have to worry about confrontations in the forest for any reason as well as have the potential to

[80] Although at Mutushet, over half of those originally elected have left the committee, many at least in part because of the lack of personnel benefits.

negotiate for personal favors with neighbors discovered illegally in the park. Finally, both user committees as well as members of the PMAC and PPC receive benefits of attending meetings in different locations, often providing sitting allowances.

The Mutushet Committee has experienced almost a fifty percent turnover in its two years of existence compared to the Mpungu Committee whose membership has remained steady. This variation can be explained because the Mpungu Committee was by definition comprised of resource users, while the Mutushet Committee was comprised of local leaders, many whom rarely used the forest. The non-users on the Mutushet Committee, disappointed over lack of payment, represent the majority of those whom have left the committee. Those who regularly enter the forest to collect products have remained as active members. Thus, user rights only serve as an effective incentive to those individuals who value use. From an institutional sustainability perspective therefore, it is necessary to include people who have a direct interest in the end objective (conservation of park resources) rather than community members as a whole.

Community Participation

Does negotiating a collaborative agreement lead to greater participation by community members as a whole? As measured by the percentage of respondents that had attended meetings concerning park management or rules, the levels of community participation are relatively similar across the four parishes, ranging between 48-57% (See Table 7.4). These figures do not vary significantly by parish indicating that organizing collaborative management groups does not seem to have increased the level of participation of the community as a whole. Although members of the Forest Society in

Mpungu and the Resource Use Committee in Mutushet meet at least occasionally, they have not regularly been calling community meetings to share their decisions or ask input from the community at large. Thus without incentives for the committee to communicate with the community, empowering a committee does not necessarily lead to greater participation by the community at large.

Table 7.4: Attendance at Meetings Concerning Park Management

National Park	Parish	# Have Attended	# Never Attended	χ^2
Bwindi	Mpungu*	24	23	.08
Bwindi	Bujengwe	24	26	
Mt. Elgon	Mutushet*	29	22	.09
Mt. Elgon	Moyok	27	23	

n=202 *pilot parish

Why do people choose whether or not to participate? Of the 104 people who had attended meetings, only nine indicated going for a specific purpose, such as to voice their opinion on a particular issue or to have a dispute resolved. The vast majority attended passively, simply because a community meeting had been called. Tellingly, over half of those who had never attended any park meetings claimed either that they had never been informed of any meetings or that the meetings were for committee members only. Even in Mpungu, where selecting revenue sharing projects offers the potential for community members to have meaningful input into decisions, individuals claimed that there was "no communication, the committee itself makes decisions about spending the money."[81] Thus, although local people recognize that the committee has some decision-making power, there have been little formal attempts to participate in influencing their decisions. The level of active participation of the community is low. That we do not see a

significant difference between the pilot and control parishes highlights the need for greater linkages between the committee and the community.

These results highlight that attending meetings called by others generally reflects a passive form of participation, with most attendees offering limited input to the proceedings. If participation is primarily passive, local people may not consider it participation at all. A measure of more active participation is the extent to which community members have adopted active responsibilities, such as reporting illegal users. A prominent rationale for extending management authority to local communities is the assumption that community members will serve as permanent "eyes", thereby reducing the need for official enforcement (Aruna, 1997). If offering people user rights in exchange for managerial responsibilities are achieving their goal of providing people a stake in the resource, then people should be motivated to protect their stake in the park resources.

Although reporting illegal users is intended to be a primary responsibility of community members, people are understandably hesitant to do so as personally confronting illegal users can be dangerous or lead to social ostracism. Therefore, although 75% of respondents claimed that they would agree to report illegal users (either to the local administration or to park rangers), only 8% had actually ever done so. Even in Mutushet, where people publicize how they actively protect the forest, the figure is comparable to those in the other parishes except Bujengwe. Comparing the two Bwindi parishes produces the expected pattern of greater reporting in Mpungu than Bujengwe. However, Mt. Elgon depicts a different pattern as the two parishes have almost identical

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[81] Anonymous Mpungu resident.

records of reporting. Rangers at Bwindi claimed that people in Bujengwe did report occasionally, but less frequently than in Mpungu. The low survey response total at Bujengwe can possibly be explained as unlike the other three parishes, people have no legal access rights to the forest and therefore risk implicating themselves if they report witnessing illegal activity. These results indicate that receiving benefits does not necessarily lead to more active forms of participation.

That people are discouraged from reporting illegal users is unsurprising as many respondents indicated the fear that it would foment hatred or lead to social ostracism. Some respondents also indicated that they could not report others because they enter illegally themselves, "By reporting, I will be putting myself in jail."[82] Thus, despite the intention that allowing use rights would motivate people to protect their stake from outsiders, if local illegal use is common, it may actually serve as a disincentive to report. As individuals receive no benefit from reporting, yet risk social ostracism, this result supports our hypothesis that direct individual benefits will be necessary. That people in the pilot parishes are not reporting to a significantly greater extent than in the control parishes is another indicator of the failure of the committee participation to motivate community participation. Only one-third of the respondents in the two pilot parishes was even aware of a signed agreement between the community and the park. Of those who had heard of it, not one respondent felt that they had any personal responsibilities beyond simply following the rules themselves. Any further responsibilities were for the committee members, the people elected to do so. Thus, the results indicate those

[82] Anonymous Mpungu resident.

individual decisions whether or not to report illegal users have not been influenced by the collaborative agreements.

A second measure of the level of active participation is the extent to which local people have successfully influenced rule formation and change. In Mpungu, although the process of negotiations involved numerous meetings over a nine-month period, most people perceived these meetings as largely informative as 60% of respondents claimed that at the meetings, local people were mainly just taught the rules. One resident described the purpose of the meetings as, "People were told what the rules were and to agree with them."[83] Only three people reported that local people had any input in determining the rules of access. CARE records of these meetings show that they undertook numerous participatory rural appraisals (PRAs) to gain local input and local people ranked basket materials and medicinal plants as their top two choices. However, locals' realm of influence was severely limited, as UWA deemed non-negotiable the resources that people valued the most – gold, timber, hunting. Table 7.5 shows that the resources that Mpungu residents felt were most important to their family before the park were gold, timber and poles. Basket materials and medicinal plants ranked only fifth and sixth.

[83] Anonymous Mpungu resident.

Table 7.5: Products ranked most important before park creation[84]:

Product	Mutushet	Moyok	Mpungu	Bujengwe	Total
Timber	3	8	27	19	57
Poles	9	29	11	5	54
Medicinal Plants	20	2	1	23	46
Firewood	25	3	11	6	45
Cultivation	0	36	1	0	37
Gold	0	0	22	9	31
Bamboo	16	5	0	0	21
Grazing	9	7	0	0	16
Hunting	0	4	11	1	16
Basket Materials	0	0	5	10	15
Honey	3	2	2	4	11
Vegetables	8	0	1	1	10
Rafters	3	4	0	0	7
Security	2	0	0	0	2
Employment	0	0	0	1	1
TOTAL	98	100	92	79	369

It is more insightful to divide these responses into two categories: products which harvesting is deemed less destructive and which have been allowed in at least one of the user rights schemes: medicinal plants, firewood, bamboo, basket materials, honey, vegetables, rafters, security and employment; and products which are commonly deemed too destructive to be allowed: timber, poles, cultivation, gold, grazing[85] and hunting. Table 7.6 depicts these results:

[84] Nineteen respondents (8 from Mutushet, 2 from Mpungu, 9 from Bujengwe) reported never having received products from the forest.

[85] Grazing occurs in the prohibited category because although it is being allowed temporarily in Mt. Elgon, both park officials and conservationists feel that it is too destructive to be allowed permanently. Incorporating grazing into the less-destructive category does not alter the significance of these results.

Table 7.6: Products Ranked Most Important Prior to Park Creation

Desired Product Type	Mutushet	Moyok	Mpungu	Bujengwe	All Parishes
Major (Not allowed)	21	84	72	34	211
% of total	21%	84%	78%	43%	57%
Minor (Allowed)	77	16	20	45	158
% of total	79%	16%	22%	57%	43%
Total	98	100	92	79	369

χ^2=103.69, p<.01, df=3

Table 7.6 shows that 57% of the forest uses deemed most important by local communities are not available in any of the user rights schemes. This table depicts a large difference in the value of minor products in Mutushet and Bujengwe than in Moyok and Mpungu. These results support the attitudinal results reported earlier. Thus, although Bujengwe residents are not yet benefiting from participatory incentives, they are less desirous of products that are allowed. By contrast, although Mpungu residents benefit from this scheme, the products which they are allowed to collect, medicinal plants and basket materials, were named as one of the most important by only six (12%) of the respondents. Similarly, although Moyok residents are allowed access to a relatively wide array of products, the few products that are banned are the ones that they overwhelmingly feel are the most important. This indicates that although people did participate to a limited extent in selecting the rules of access, that the outcomes were so different than if locals had complete control has caused people not to perceive their limited input as actual input.

The perceptions of the effectiveness of local input into rule making are similar to Mutushet, even though at Mutushet people had much greater influence in actually

selecting what was to be allowed as there were fewer restrictions. However, a significantly different number of respondents from Mutushet and Moyok reported that some negotiations did take place at the meetings indicating that the general community participation is more active in the pilot parish. More significantly, people from Mt. Elgon have witnessed the success of their input by successfully having the policy on grazing changed. Although UWA originally declared grazing, along with hunting and pit sawing, to be non-negotiable, continual lobbying, as well as widespread illicit grazing, forced park managers to accept grazing within the park.[86] As both residents of Mutushet and Moyok have benefited by this rule, the difference in perceptions between the two Mt. Elgon parishes indicates greater community involvement at Mutushet. People at Bwindi have not had the experience of local support successfully overturning a prominent previously determined park rule.

This evidence suggests that participation has been slightly more active in the pilot parishes. However, if community conservation programs are to achieve their goal of reducing pressure on the forest then they must influence the people most likely to disturb the resource. To examine to what extent these programs are doing so requires moving beyond aggregate levels and examining whom is participating. Numerous studies have shown that people residing closest to the park commit the majority of illegal acts. Are the people with the poorest attitudes and those most likely to enter the park the ones that are participating?

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[86] The Minister of Tourism, Wildlife and Antiquities visited Kapchorwa in 1996 and heard so many complaints of hardships that he decreed that it be allowed until security is restored in the plains. Although still officially banned, UWA has temporarily agreed not to enforce it.

Results of this survey show that the closer people live to the park, the more that they have been attending meetings. Analysis indicates a negative relationship between distance and attendance indicating that residents who live farther away from the park border are less likely to attend meetings than those who live closer. Thus in this instance, the people most dependent on the forest are most likely to participate. Similarly, those who live closest to the forest are more likely to witness people entering the park illegally. Are the people who use the park the most taking up their responsibility by reporting the most? Eleven of the sixteen people who admitted reporting illegal users live less than one kilometer from the park boundary. As only 40% of respondents reside within this area, residents nearer to the park have reported at a higher rate than the population as a whole (However this figure is not significant: p=.204).

Trust

The results regarding the trust of rangers are similar to those regarding attitudes: overwhelmingly positive for Mutushet and Bujengwe, substantially less so for Moyok and Mpungu. These conflicting results show that repeated interaction does not necessarily improve levels of trust as the trust is higher in Bujengwe where there has been much more limited interaction with the rangers than in Mpungu. These results are highly correlated with the attitudinal results. As with attitudes, the tremendous mistrust existing from the time of park creation explains the low score for Mpungu. However, after four years of meetings, that the number is still so low is an indicator that relationships of trust are very difficult to develop. Again, the comparison with Bujengwe shows that more active participation and interaction has been less effective at changing

attitudes than simply leaving people alone. Bujengwe residents are beginning to trust the rangers simply because they have refrained from harassing people. Committee members are even more likely to distrust the rangers than the regular community members (χ^2=2.0, p=.15). Promoting community involvement has the danger of raising expectations beyond achievable levels (Esman & Uphoff, 1984). Ironically, communities that are not involved in the process do not suffer from increased expectations that can later cause resentment if unmet.

Knowledge of Park Rules

Has more active participation improved people's knowledge and understanding of park rules? A measure of the quality of participation is that the greater the local participation, the greater will be the knowledge of the rules. Survey results show that except in Bujengwe, there was great confusion as to what was and was not allowed. In Mutushet, the parish with the most active participation, not a single person knew the rules correctly. Clearly, in Bujengwe the high score is due to the simplicity of the rules, people are only allowed to walk on paths. In the two Mt. Elgon parishes, the primary culprit has been the lack of consistency of the rules. The rules have changed, actions that are officially banned are tacitly allowed, and therefore people do not know what is and is not allowed. It also indicates that participation at Mutushet has primarily been by the committee members, not the community at large (although even the committee members interviewed could not identify all the correct rules).

Conservation Outcomes

A final measure of the impacts of these programs is the effectiveness at conservation of the national park. Conceiving community conservation as a means to improve conservation necessitates that analysis of program impacts must include not only the extent of participation, but also the extent to which participation is translated into improved conservation. Are the initiatives encouraging people to comply with park regulations and reduce illegal use of the park resources?

The original design of this study called for systematic measurement of the extent of illegal resource use within park boundaries as per the IFRI research protocol used effectively in other Ugandan forests (See Gombya-Ssembajjwe, 1996; Ostrom & Wertime, 1995). Although systematic measurement within the park proved logistically impossible, evidence gained from interviews and direct observation provided anecdotal information of the extent of illegal resource use within the national park. Remote sensing (van Heist, 1994) supports the reported and observed evidence clearly demonstrates that the level of illegal use is much lower at Bwindi than at Mt. Elgon.

At Bwindi, the most prominent indicator of conservation success is the status of the mountain gorillas. Poaching has been extremely rare, with only four gorillas reported killed in a non-poaching incident through 1997 (Echodu, 1997). Populations and overall health of the species have experienced a steady increase (Plumptre, 1998). In addition to the gorillas, Bwindi's flora has experienced widespread regeneration of the previously degraded areas near the park boundaries. Comparing Mpungu to Bujengwe yields very little difference in levels of illegal use and forest condition. Although limited use has been allowed at Mpungu, this has not extended into widespread illegal use as well.

Residents of Bujengwe have generally refrained from illicitly gathering the resources lawfully collected by the Mpungu user group.

At Mt. Elgon, the agreements allowing widespread limited use have created a continuous stream of people within the park. In many areas of the park, this use is widespread and involves more destructive activities, including settlement, cultivation and pit-sawing. The forest bordering Mutushet is in much better condition than in many other areas, including Moyok. Although there is widespread use, much of it legal, including occasional incidents of pit-sawing, Mutushet has avoided the forest clearing witness at other locations. Moyok residents cleared the forest line for cultivation during the 1980s and it has yet to recover. Although Moyok residents have ceased cultivating within the park, widespread grazing, pit-sawing and pole cutting have resulted in the park being denuded of forest cover over wide areas (van Heist, 1994). Comparing Mutushet to Moyok therefore shows frequent levels of use at both locations, but with more widespread major destruction, less regeneration and absence of forest cover at Moyok.

In the absence of reliable biological data, rule compliance serves as a more useful indicator of the amount of illegal resource use occurring within the parks. For the purposes of this study, both arrest records and household surveys provided inadequate indicators of illegal use.[87] However, as the same rangers patrol both research areas, interviews with rangers provided more reliable information. Analyzing reported levels of rule compliance, rangers reported little difference between Mpungu and Bujengwe, with

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[87] For example, a typical month in Mt. Elgon showed two to four people being arrested *in the entire park.* The author typically viewed at least that number of illegal users every time he entered the park. Very few survey respondents were willing to report that illegal use was occurring in their parish, even though the question asked specifically if *others* (rather than the respondent) went into the park illegally as well as assurances of confidentiality. Therefore, neither measure adequately reflected the levels of illegal use described by rangers and visible by observation.

poaching and firewood collection being the most common illegal uses. At Mt. Elgon, as is evident from a cursory visual inspection, rangers confirmed that illegal use is much more common in Moyok than in Mutushet. In addition to being much more common, the activities are more destructive and the people less cooperative. Table 7.7 summarizes the relative levels of illegal use.

Table 7.7: Levels of Illegal Use

Park	Parish	Minor offenses	Major Offenses
Bwindi	Mpungu*	Low	Low
	Bujengwe	Low	Low
Mt. Elgon	Mutushet*	Medium	Low
	Moyok	High	High

*pilot parish

Explaining Participatory Outcomes

In failing to demonstrate a consistent pattern of improved performance the more active the participation, these results provide further empirical evidence depicting the barriers to effective collaboration (Prystupa, 1998; Sunderlin & Gorospe, 1997; Pinkerton, 1992; 1989) and lack of success of participatory conservation in general (Oates, 1999; Brandon, 1997; Wells & Brandon, 1992). This study has however highlighted several likely determinants of the potential success of community conservation programs. Altering the formal rules towards allowing more active participation is insufficient to compel greater community cooperation. The factors hypothesized to improve outcomes include incorporating meaningful local influence, effective monitoring and sanctioning and demonstrating assurance mechanisms. The divergent results exhibited at Mutushet and Mpungu indicate support for these factors as well as the importance of a non-institutional factor, the values of local communities.

Local Influence and Credible Commitments

Successful collaboration hinges on the demonstration of assurance mechanisms, such as credible commitments (Weber, 1998), reputations (Milgrom, North & Weingast, 1989) and legitimacy (Levi, 1997; Lowndes, 1996). The widespread changes initiated by the Museveni governments towards reestablishing civil society helped to set the stage for changing the hostile reputation of previous Ugandan governments. Moreover, UWA directors demonstrated a national commitment to changing reputations through formalizing community conservation structures, establishing community rangers and (in some parks) reinforcing park rules. Attitudinal results indicate that these measures successfully improved the reputation of UWA at both Bwindi and Mt. Elgon. Although attitudes at Bwindi are still low, they represent vast improvements compared to before the initiation of community conservation. The repeated meetings with park authorities and deployment of community rangers has gradually served to increase reputations and eliminated the widespread violence towards the rangers exhibited at the time of park creation. Moreover, enforcement rangers are less harsh and even working with community members by occasionally letting community members select the punishment for people illegally caught in the park.

However, reputations alone are unlikely to influence to produce successful outcomes. Government agencies can demonstrate their commitment to collaboration by allowing meaningful local influence, rather than simply involvement, in decision-making and managerial responsibilities. This discussion will focus on local involvement at the collective-choice and operational levels, as local participation at the constitutional choice

level of developing national policies is negligible in all cases. I define the quality of participation as the extent of local influence at the collective-choice and operational levels and depict the results in Table 7.8 for the two collaborative parishes.

Table 7.8: Quality of Local Participation

	Quality of Local Participation	
	Mpungu	Mutushet
Operational Activities		
Access	M	H
Harvesting	M	H
Monitoring	M	H
Sanctioning	M	L
Collective-Choice Level		
Selecting Projects	H	n/a
Designing Rules	L	M
Changing Rules	L	M

Examining the quality of participation demonstrates a sharp difference in the extent of local involvement at both the operational and collective-choice levels. In Mutushet, a wider range of people has access to a wider range of resources from the forest, than the limited rights allowed at Mpungu. This divergence in rules of access is directly related to the extent of local influence at the collective-choice level. Local people were involved in the rule formulation and the development of the Memorandum of Understandings at both sites. However, attending the meetings and being consulted does not reflect extent of influence. By examining outcome measures of the operational rules allowed, one can obtain an improved estimation of the level of local influence. Two indicators of the degree of local influence at the collective-choice level include the extent to which the rules integrate local values and success at changing the rules. Allowing a

greater degree of local influence in crafting the formal rules demonstrate a credible commitment to the policies by UWA which has improved relationships and indicated a greater likelihood of sustainability of the collaborative institutions. The feeling of pride and empowerment gained by Committee members in Mutushet has helped outweigh the costs of monitoring for many individuals. These psychic benefits have translated into improved community-wide pride in the forest.

The provision of revenue sharing and limited user rights at Bwindi represent efforts by UWA to demonstrate the credibility of their commitment to local communities. However, the collaborative agreement indirectly has influenced the differences in attitudes between the two Bwindi parishes. Collaboration has continued to focus Mpungu residents' attention towards the forest. Thus although people appreciate the products they are now allowed to access, they would nevertheless prefer to collect timber and gold and hunt wildlife. By contrast, Bujengwe residents have largely accepted the loss of access and have moved on to planning lives without access to the forest:

> Two years ago, attitudes were not so good. At first people thought they still might be able to sneak in, now they know they cannot. At first, people thought they might be given some small piece of land or it might go back to a forest reserve, but now they know it won't.[88]

Moyok reflects a similar pattern to Mpungu. Only 40% of respondents expressed a positive opinion of the park even though more people are allowed to collect a wider range of products than the people in Mpungu, and just as much as those in Mutushet. By promoting a continued connection to the park, while denying the use most stridently desired, Moyok residents have continued to be fixated on access to the park. In contrast

[88]Member, Park Parish Committee, Bujengwe parish.

to the sentiments expressed in the above quotation by a Bujengwe PPC member, Moyok residents are still hoping that the park rules are not permanent; that people will be given some land or the park will return to being a forest reserve, rather than moving on and developing alternatives. As long as the hope exists that cultivation may be allowed again, people in Moyok will not be satisfied with petty use rights. Comparing Bujengwe to Mpungu and Mutushet to Moyok indicates that unless accompanied with appropriate responsibilities, allowing user rights may be counterproductive towards conservation.

Despite this increased influence of local participation at Mt. Elgon, attitudes towards the park do not vary significantly from Bwindi. Neighbors of Bwindi have been taught to understand the benefits of the park, and that the park is there to stay. The degree to which people accept that the park rules are permanent seems to influence more how they act towards the park than does the extent of participation. Thus, reported attitudes and relative law-abidance may be irrespective of the extent of input. By contrast at Mt. Elgon, the influence of local people in changing the rules of access both officially and unofficially (because of lack of enforcement), has given the impression that locals can have influence. Therefore, especially in Moyok, park neighbors have not accepted that the transformation to a national park is a permanent change and are still lobbying for change of park boundaries and rules. In this case, having some degree of influence, rather than serving as an incentive for cooperation, has had the opposite effect.

The Importance of Enforcement

The measuring of attitudes at best is an imperfect indicator of policy success. Many policymakers and practitioners doubt the utility of attempting to measure them, believing that they are highly susceptible to change.[89] Rather than simply measuring attitudes, a more useful indicator for analyzing policy outcomes is identifying the extent to which the institutions translate attitudes into action. Does the occurrence of negative attitudes increase the likelihood that illegal use will be common? Conversely, where positive attitudes exist, are people more likely to cooperate? At Mpungu, for example, the generally poor attitudes have not translated into widespread illegal use. By contrast, attitudes at Mutushet are overwhelmingly positive, yet illegal use is still relatively high and few people outside the committee have taken active roles in reporting illegal users. These results indicate that the significance of enforcement can at least partially explain these anomalies. The similar compliance levels at the two Bwindi parishes, in spite of their widely varying attitudinal levels highlights the importance of strict enforcement. Although consistent enforcement at Bwindi may have initially negatively affected attitudes, it has influenced individual decisions to abide by park rules to a greater extent than has promoting positive attitudes at Mutushet. As Hannah (1992) describes, that community conservation programs are intended to replace official enforcement is a common misnomer. Both mechanisms must go hand in hand.

Measuring enforcement proved difficult as official arrest records were not only incomplete but reflected very little the level of illegal activity. For example, each time I entered the park at Mt. Elgon, I witnessed numerous illegal acts, yet the forty rangers are

[89] Most conservation policymakers interviewed felt that attitudinal surveys were extremely unreliable and didn't place much faith in them as a basis for evaluating policy impacts.

able to arrest only a handful of people each month. Official records simply do not reflect whatsoever the amount of illegal use going on. I attempted to use reported evidence from the surveys, but the results were unsatisfactory, as people were hesitant to report any knowledge of illegal use. Especially problematic was Bwindi where not a single respondent reported significant illegal use of any category. Although admittedly the level of illegal use at Bwindi is much lower than at Mt. Elgon, even rangers admit that it still exists. The survey results likely represent a fear of the consequences of indicating they might have knowledge of illegal acts, as the rangers have had a history of harsh behavior towards community members.

Because of these problems with official records and survey responses, this study used people's perception of the likelihood of capture if in the park illegally as a proxy indicator of the level of success of enforcement. It is assumed that the greater that people fear being caught, the less likely they will be to commit illegal acts. In addition, unsystematic park walks provided anecdotal evidence of low levels of illegal use in Bujengwe and Mpungu and high levels at Mutushet and Moyok. Reports from rangers and conservation workers were also used to compare levels of activity at the different sites within each park. At Bwindi, rangers reported no substantial difference between Mpungu and Bujengwe, although there is concern about damage along the routes used by the resource users in Mpungu. This reflects the trend in the park as a whole, where illegal use is down in all areas of the park (Wagaba, 1997; Akunda, 1997). At Mt. Elgon, rangers reported that since the permission of grazing, cultivation by grazers had increased in the forest above Mutushet. Major illegal acts, especially pit-sawing, had been noticeably reduced.

Survey results show that citizens at Bwindi perceive a significantly higher threat of being caught if entering the forest illegally than do citizens at Mt. Elgon (χ^2=22, p=0). The corresponding lower levels of illegal use at Bwindi indicate that a credible threat of capture is a more effective deterrent than encouraging voluntary compliance. Participatory conservation schemes therefore need to be careful not to overlook the necessity of maintaining effective enforcement. Especially interesting is the high number of respondents from Mutushet who perceived the likelihood of being caught to be very low, especially since it is the only parish with an active local patrol group. Comparing both Mt. Elgon parishes to both Bwindi parishes, one sees a clear pattern of greater threat of enforcement at Bwindi. However, perhaps outcomes that are more interesting can be found by comparing the two Mt. Elgon parishes. Residents of Moyok represented a significantly higher percentage of responses indicating a very high likelihood of being caught, and four times as many Mutushet residents as Moyok residents indicated that the chance of being caught was very low.

Paradoxically, the parish with the most active local patrolling is also the parish where individuals perceive the chance of being caught to be the lowest. This seeming anomaly shows that although some people feel that local people will be more effective than rangers in that they know better what is going on, for the same reason, they also know the times that it is easier to sneak into the forest without being detected. Several people at Mutushet indicated comments similar to the following, "Find the time when Siwa's Group[90] has gone to church, then sneak into the forest."[91] This lack of fear also

[90] Commonly used term in Mutushet to refer to the Forest Management Committee.

[91] Anonymous Mutushet resident.

represents the leniency of committee members when they meet people in the forest. The committee does not have the capacity to arrest or to punish offenders, although they have repeatedly asked for it. Instead, their mandate is to control resource use by persuasion, warning people and educating them as to why illegal use will be detrimental to the community as a whole. Committee members expressed differing opinions of the proper procedure for confronting illegal users, but generally they warn and *educate*[92] people the first few times. Repeat offenders are to have their names sent to the park rangers who are then to have the responsibility of further punishment. However, in practice implementation of this policy involves people warned repeatedly, with little action ever taken against them.[93] Thus, as committee members have neither the authority nor the inclination to punish, people are less afraid of meeting them, which has therefore reduced the committee's impact on limiting local resource use.

By contrast, the fear of the rangers at Bwindi is evident from the responses of what people felt would happen if in the park illegally and confronted by rangers. Sixteen people reported that one would be beaten or killed, as compared to only one person from Mt. Elgon.[94] Although there were no reports of people actually killed by rangers, the harshness exhibited towards citizens at the time of park creation has left such an image ingrained in the minds and stories of park neighbors. Thus, it appears that this fear of

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[92] Term frequently used by committee members which in itself describes how the committee perceives itself as working for the park, protecting it from the community, rather than being part of the community.

[93] As an example, once when I accompanied a committee member on patrol, we came across a man carrying timber from a tree that had been pit-sawed. This was the seventh time that this particular committee member had caught this man, each previous time he had just been warned and educated. This time, likely because of my presence, the piece of timber was taken from the man and carried with great difficulty down the mountain to the house of the committee chairman as evidence of the offense. The offender was to report to the chairman's house for further action, but never did.

[94] A respondent from Moyok.

capture at Bwindi has been a more effective deterrent than giving people a stake by allowing use at Mt. Elgon.

Several factors explain why enforcement at Bwindi is more effective than at Mt. Elgon. Bwindi, being Uganda's showcase park, receives better supplies and support than at most other parks. More vehicles exist, so unlike Mt. Elgon, rangers at times are able to receive transportation. There is more supervision because of continual visitors and the staff of 40 enforcement rangers, represents 80% of the total at Mt. Elgon, which is four times larger. The intense international interest of the media and tourists gives the rangers something to conserve for to a much more direct extent than at Mt. Elgon, where very few people take notice of the effectiveness of their work. Perhaps the most important reason is that as Bwindi is earning its own money, rangers are paid directly. At other parks including Mt. Elgon, rangers are paid from headquarters where it is often delayed several months. The corresponding low morale of rangers is evident at Mt. Elgon where slacking of responsibilities and unethical practices are commonplace. However, if rangers can be assured of being paid even when headquarters is unreliable, morale and activity can be increased.

Integrating Community Values

In addition to the fear of sanctioning from effective enforcement, individuals are more likely to comply if they value the good being produced (Levi, 1997). Therefore, incorporating local values into the rules is an important means for the park authority to demonstrate that their commitment to local participation is credible. The results of this study highlight the importance of local values in determining the success of participatory

schemes, regardless of the incentives used. Rather than simply being willing participators, people will cooperate if they perceive it to be in their best interest. For people to perceive the relatively meager rewards available from participating in these schemes to be beneficial to them, either they must hold similar values regarding conservation or the forest must be of relatively minimal importance to them. Analysis of the goods most desired by local communities provides a useful indicator for determining the success of these participatory schemes.

Many community conservation projects provide subsistence use rights assuming that poor rural people desire these rights and if given, will therefore support the park. While the assumption people are angered at restricting local access is valid in many cases, the prescription nevertheless may still be flawed. People use forest resources for subsistence not because it is their most desired lifestyle, but because they lack alternatives. People desire a much better life than they are currently living. Not surprisingly, the overwhelming majority of people reported that conserving the forest was very important. From the policy analysis standpoint, a more interesting result than simply reporting that the forest is valued is identifying why people think it is important. Understanding why people value the forest is the key in determining the likelihood of different incentives to succeed. However, conservation policymakers often use such findings and extrapolate that local people will therefore support interventions that restrict most access to protected areas. This emphasizes the difference in conservation values between many policymakers and local people. While conservationists value the forest for existence value, preservation of biodiversity, regulation of climate and other ecosystem functions, local people often value the forest for its exploitable resources. Most survey

respondents who did not value the forest as very important, indicated that the low ranking was because they could no longer access the resources that they desired.

Survey results show that the overwhelming majority of people chose as most important products that were income generating, not for subsistence.[95] Even in Mpungu, where people previously had showed little interest in accumulation and improving their standard of living, they still valued activities that would provide them money, if for no other reason than allow them to drink. Thus, although people at Mpungu appreciate collecting basketry materials and medicinal plants compared to the alternative of completely restricted access, they are not content. Because the products they really demand – gold, timber, cultivation rights – are not likely to be allowed within a national park. The limited organized resistance in Mpungu is a result of people realizing that it is now a national park, and thus certain activities will be prohibited. At Mt. Elgon, the extension of activities that are being allowed to include usage beyond so-called minor forest products within the park has blurred the dimensions of whether it is a park or not, and has helped contribute to the difficulties faced by that park. The relative success of collaboration in Mutushet, thus is likely determined as much by the circumstances that have led the community to not cut the forest in the first place, as the process of collaboration or the specific incentives that have been provided.

This difference in values is best expressed by the words of a local leader of Moyok parish. He interpreted the word *reserve* (as in forest reserve) to mean that the government is reserving the land for the people. Therefore, people should be able to use

[95] This total for subsistence use even includes activities such as pole cutting and hunting that are deemed too destructive to be allowed anyway.

it as they choose. This interpretation differs markedly from the common conservationist definition of the land reserved for present and future generations.

This divergence in values has serious implications for the potential of community conservation that extend beyond merely the likelihood that limited resource use will not likely be sufficient to satisfy local people. Perhaps more importantly regarding the potential for including more active local participation in decision-making is this assumption that if locals value the forest, they will work to protect it. However, this assumption depends not simply on the value placed, but the reasons why people value the forest. Given the opportunity to make rules, people in Mpungu would sanction timber harvesting and people in Moyok would overwhelmingly sanction cultivation. Although timber harvesting could potentially be regulated so as not to be overly damaging, permanent cultivation is clearly incompatible with a protected area as it transforms the forest and prevents many ecosystem services from occurring. Thus, as in Mpungu, any collaborative process begins with an agenda of options already limited, which thereby reduces faith that the effort in collaboration is genuine. Under such conditions, the hopes of moving towards the complete local control end of IUCN's continuum are unlikely. If it were not, local control could just be given, regardless of outcome. Rather, the goal of collaboration is to give as much control as will satisfy the objective of conservation.

Do People Want Control?

The rationale for active local participation, such as collaborative management assumes that the origin of people's displeasure with the park is that control over the land has been taken away from them. Therefore, a return of some managerial responsibilities

will be welcomed by local communities and therefore an effective incentive to gain their support. However, results of the survey rankings revealed that people did not desire more participation in decision-making nearly as much as the material benefits reflected in access to park resources and development projects. If people desire material benefits, regardless of where control lies, the potential for collaboration is limited. People may be participating to obtain control for further exploitation or to guarantee the opportunity for individual benefit. Additionally, a close majority felt that local people protecting the forest would be preferred to park rangers indicating that almost as many did not want to give local people greater control.

Although perhaps a poor example of collaborative management because of inadequate linkages with community members, the committee at Mutushet has been relatively successful at existing in a functioning form for as long as they have. For two years they have been holding monthly meetings fairly regularly and more interestingly, have been physically patrolling the forest. Although most members admit to aspirations of future personal benefits, hoping that if they do a good job they will be rewarded with a future salary, equipment such as boots or jackets or employment with the park, they also have developed a sense of community pride and ownership in the forest. By taking over patrolling responsibilities from the rangers, they have gone a major step in regaining some control. The notoriety that they have received, from being selected as a pilot parish, to receiving several visitors and researchers, has helped instill a sense of pride as Mutushet being the community that has protected the forest. Results from both surveys and interviews confirmed that the transfer of responsibilities of patrolling the forest and

use rights of the forest has instilled, or re-instilled, a sense of community pride and ownership in the forest.

While the community has regained a sense of pride, it is unclear as to whether that will be enough for them to protect the forest. Members of the committee who patrol have been motivated primarily by the hope of future rewards from the park. As the park is not planning compensation, allowing use is expected to be an adequate reward. Therefore, it will be interesting to see how long the committee stays together. The committee at Mutushet has clearly become geared towards enforcement and is seen as part of the park management, by both committee members themselves and the local community. They perceive themselves as taking over the duties of the park rangers, and therefore act like rangers themselves. Their primary responsibilities are patrolling the forest, rather than educating the community, problem-solving or serving as a liaison between the community and the park. Committee members repeatedly request the park for payment, uniforms, boots, identification cards and other materials that would help identify them as rangers, rather than as community members. Community members meanwhile refer to them as "The Management".

This is another example of local aspirations being viewed differently by conservationists. The people on the committee are hoping for some form of individual reward. Whether some payment, the potential to be hired as a ranger, or just some boots or raingear, committee members are hoping to get something out of it. Local people see the committee as a stepping-stone towards a better life. In isolated rural areas, such as the parishes bordering Mt. Elgon and Bwindi, with few formal jobs and limited access to markets, it represents a rare opportunity for, albeit limited, economic improvement, as

well as a way to distinguish oneself from one's fellow community members. Rural communities are often full of individuals, who rather than looking for a way to help the community at large, frequently are looking for a way to gain an advantage over a neighbor. This individual competition, which gains greater importance the more enclosed a community, is often overlooked by the designers of projects expecting an idealistic vision of societies oriented primarily towards altruism.

Finally, these results indicate the difference between empowerment of a local committee and empowerment of a local community. Even a relatively active local committee, such as at Mutushet, can be quite inactive in respect to interacting with the community at large. As decisions whether or not to comply with park regulations are made on an individual level, it is essential that incentives be put into place to encourage the local management committee to interact with all community members.

Conclusion

Collaborative strategies that promote shared decision-making between local people and the park authority are being promoted as the next wave of participatory conservation (Borrini-Feyerebend, 1996). The results of this study indicate that providing more active local rights and responsibilities does not necessarily lead to improved outcomes. However, by examining different participatory initiatives through a framework for institutional analysis (Ostrom et al, 1994), this study has helped to improve understanding of likely responses to different initiatives. These preliminary results seem to support the research propositions that demonstrating credible commitments, incorporating meaningful local influence and effective monitoring increase

the likelihood of effective collaboration. Moreover, findings lend support to Levi's logic of contingent consent (1997) towards the importance of community values in determining behavioral decisions.

These outcomes represent preliminary results and further study is needed. Nevertheless, this examination of community conservation initiatives in Uganda demonstrates that collaboration, or active local participation, faces formidable barriers. Recognizing that environmental degradation occurs and that local people have been excluded from the decision-making process does not imply that giving them a voice will necessarily improve conservation outcomes. As the national park model has proven more successful in some situations than others, prescribing a universal participatory institution that can be effective in all situations is also unlikely. As evidenced by this study, the same rules can serve as incentives or disincentives depending on the values of local communities. Not all communities are interested in undertaking decision making and managerial responsibilities and not all individuals within communities are willing to participate. Moreover, individuals that do participate, do so for any number of reasons, which may or may not involve an interest in improved conservation. Therefore, collaboration is likely to be more effective when local community members value the collective good. Thus, in designing community conservation programs, it is essential to examine not simply the incentives generated by the particular set of rules, but to examine the convergence between the rules in use and the values of local communities. By extending these findings to other studies employing institutional analysis, scholars can gain a greater understanding of the likely interactions resulting from different institutional arrangements.

CHAPTER EIGHT

CONCLUSION: THE POTENTIAL OF COLLABORATION AS A CONSERVATION STRATEGY

This study examines the potential of collaboration as a strategy for participatory conservation in Uganda. To explore this issue, I ask two interrelated questions. *Why do policymakers select policies promoting greater local participation? How do these policies influence individual choices to participate?* To address the first question I examine why conservation policymakers in Uganda selected a strategy of collaboration with local communities, rather than relying on passive participatory strategies that maintain authority with the government agency. Employing an argument based on the new institutionalism literature, I suggest that these policy selections can be understood by identifying the benefits that policy makers receive from them, often not directly related to the specific policy choice itself.

To address the second question, I explore the extent to which collaboration, or more active local participation, improves performance. Scholars and practitioners are promoting collaboration to improve often disappointing participatory outcomes (Borrini-Feyerebend, 1996; Fisher, 1995; Pinkerton, 1992). This dissertation compares collaborative agreements with more passive participatory strategies to identify which institutional arrangements are most likely to encourage local communities to cooperate with the national park authority as well as most effectively direct local involvement towards activities that encourage conservation? Data gathered from two Ugandan

national parks indicates that successful collaborative arrangements must provide not only incentives for participation, but assurance mechanisms that increase trust and demonstrate the commitment of the government agency towards the collaborative process.

This chapter will briefly summarize the objectives of the study and summarize the empirical findings. This empirical examination of collaborative conservation is of interest to both academics interested in understanding the motivations behind individual decisions to participate and practitioners interested in improving outcomes of participatory conservation programs. I will conclude by revisiting the implications of this study in terms of the theoretical understanding of participation as well as their significance for conservation policymakers.

The Promise of Collaboration

Motivated by the widespread promotion, yet frequent lack of success of participatory conservation programs, this thesis critically examines the widespread promotion of local participation in conservation. In order to gain an improved understanding of how different participatory institutions influence likely outcomes, I suggest moving beyond traditional modes of policy analysis. Encouraging conservation agencies to select policies, although necessary, is insufficient to encourage local involvement. Despite government pronouncements and even formal policy changes promoting participation, local involvement is neither inevitable nor will inevitably improve outcomes. Analyzing participatory conservation therefore requires assessing the extent to which the policies change the existing pattern of perverse incentives and induce

local communities and park rangers to work together to support the park rules and objectives.

Among the frequently cited explanations for poor performance of participatory conservation, the failure to incorporate meaningful local influence as well as inadequate linkages of the benefits to changes in individual behavior stand out as being especially significant (Ghimire & Pimbert, 1997; Gibson & Marks, 1995; Wells & Brandon, 1992). Systems of collaborative management provide the ideal opportunity to improve upon these limitations by strengthening the link between participatory processes and outcomes. The meaningful sharing of rights and responsibilities can diffuse monitoring costs, provide a forum for interaction between the conservation agency and local people and allow for the incorporation of different values and local knowledge of the biological resources and human activity (Prystupa, 1998; Borrini-Feyerabend, 1996; Fisher, 1995; Pinkerton, 1992).

Despite these potential benefits, significant barriers to collaboration frequently exist. The transactions costs of participating combined with historical antagonism between the park authority and local communities make collaboration a costly and uncertain process (Weber, 1998; Sunderlin & Gorospe, 1997; Porter & Salveson, 1995). Moreover, participation itself may be counterproductive as people may choose to participate for strategic reasons, or for individual gain, rather than for the purpose of contributing to the collective good (Ostrom, Schroeder & Wynne; 1993; Pinkerton, 1992; Ostrom, 1990). These barriers highlight how participatory strategies involve the dual dilemma of encouraging local people to cooperate as well as directing the participation towards activities that improve conservation outcomes.

The sharing of rights and responsibilities between local people and the park authority provides an arena to encourage more active participation, while maintaining the goal of conservation (Paulson, 1998; Borrini-Feyerabend, 1996; Selin & Chavez, 1995; Pinkerton, 1992; 1989). New Institutionalist studies of successful self-governing communities indicate that communities are more likely to manage resources successfully over time if they have incentives to conserve as well as receive assurance mechanisms. As existing studies of collaboration are limited, this dissertation adapts this logic towards the study of successful collaborative arrangements. Existing studies of collaboration have focused on community-led collaborative efforts, where community members have already demonstrated interest in contributing to the process (Paulson, 1998; Porter & Salveson, 1995; Selin & Chavez, 1995). My study adds to this literature by exploring the potential for a historically antagonistic agency to lead efforts to encourage collaboration with park neighbors.

Summary of Findings

The empirical chapters examined the processes of developing and implementing collaborative management policies in Uganda. Recognizing the importance of government actors and formal policies in influencing citizen interactions, Chapter Three explored the economic and political changes in Uganda to discover the extent that the policies of the NRM government encourage or discourage local participation in conservation. The widespread changes in formal institutions provided the opportunity for changing the historical antagonism between Ugandan people and the state. Although Museveni's structural adjustment policies have not always been popular, NRM objectives

such as establishing the local council system and increasing service provision have helped reestablish civil society and reengaged Ugandans with formal state structures. This has greatly helped improve the credibility of Museveni's regime and provided the legitimacy necessary to gain popular support.

Chapters Four and Five examined the reasons why policymakers and conservation agencies support community conservation policies and the type of policies likely to be adopted. By demonstrating that conservation policy changes reflect political struggles for control of scarce government resources, as much as preferences for improved conservation, Chapter Four explained why the NRM government supported such seemingly contradictory policies as expanding the national parks and promoting active local participation. The expansion of the parks greatly strengthened the authority of UWA, however without a corresponding increase in the resources required for managing them. Faced with such a dilemma, the Uganda Wildlife Authority allied itself with groups that could provide the support it needed to attempt to manage its estate.

Chapter Five continues this theme to show that the development of community conservation models incorporating more active local participation resulted from a gradual shift in policies, led by experiences from NGO projects, rather than a major philosophical shift by UWA management. Despite the leadership role of the NGOs, UWA directors possessed substantial incentives to support these community conservation measures as a means to regain control over the protected areas. As a result, UWA allowed more active participation at the parks where they enjoyed the least control, where illegal use was most dominant. This analysis builds on the results of Chapter Four by showing that the

institutional changes regarding national parks represented as much struggles for control, as strategies for improved conservation.

This analysis of conservation policymaking in Uganda demonstrates that institutions matter – the set of rules in use influenced the development of formal rules by altering the structure of incentives and therefore, outcomes. Therefore identifying the benefits individuals and organizations receive from supporting these policies, as well as how decision-makers shelter themselves from potentially negative impacts helps explain why participatory policies continue to be supported irrespective of improved outcomes. The inability of UWA to enforce the regulations within the parks, exacerbated by the capricious actions of its rangers, necessitated that UWA demonstrate to local communities as well as donors that its commitment to allowing local involvement was credible. Therefore, although both the park authority and international conservation organizations preferred improved protection, the dominance of local rules in use compelled them to support policies formalizing active local participation.

Chapters Six and Seven link policy processes to outcomes to identify the extent that collaboration influences behavior towards conservation. The process of developing and implementing collaborative agreements at Bwindi and Mt. Elgon depicts how variations in the degree of local influence incorporated into the collaborative process have produced differing preliminary outcomes. At Mutushet (Mt. Elgon), the greater local influence in creating the rules is reflected in the wider range of resources that community members are allowed to harvest, including honey, firewood, grass and vegetables. Local involvement in managerial responsibilities consists of a locally-elected management committee monitoring illegal use and reporting to the UWA rangers.

Moreover, by successfully encouraging UWA to accept cattle grazing within the park, community members have demonstrated the ability to change the original rules. By successfully integrating local values into the formal rules, the collaborative process has not only generated rules that are more likely to be viewed favorably by local people but indicated a genuine commitment by UWA to share decision making responsibilities with local communities.

By contrast, at Mpungu (Bwindi), local involvement has been more limited in the process of developing the agreements as well as the operational activities. Despite dozens of meetings with parish residents, the process of developing the agreement involved primarily consultation, rather than collaboration. Although local people selected the resources included for harvest rights, their choice occurred from within a narrow range of options that did not include the resources most highly valued. Thus, the process of developing the collaborative agreement represented more of an attempt by UWA to encourage local acceptance of the park rules, than genuine interest in sharing meaningful decision-making responsibilities with parish residents. The resultant agreement permitted only specified community members to harvest resources from within the park. Moreover, the range of allowable products is limited to species used for medicinal plants and basket materials. The limited products included in the user rights system as well as relatively few people involved in the harvesting represent preferences of UWA and conservationists and therefore denotes the reduced influence of local community members on rule creation.

In return for these use rights, both Mpungu and Mutushet committees are responsible for ensuring that park rules are followed, serving as a liaison between the

park and community members and monitoring illegal use and forest condition. At Mpungu, the committee is also responsible for selecting community projects paid for in part by park revenues. Thus, the rights and responsibilities specified in the two collaborative agreements differ markedly. The Mpungu agreement involves an extremely limited user rights scheme, limited in both the people allowed the use rights, as well as the species allowed. At Mutushet, a wider range of community members receive user rights with the expectation that community members will take on greater responsibilities, including monitoring and curtailing (by persuasion) illegal use.

Chapter Seven links the differing agreements to outcomes. At Mutushet, the greater local influence in operational activities as well as demonstrated commitment to incorporating local influence by park managers has both improved attitudes towards the park and cultivated a sense of pride and ownership towards the forest by parish residents. By contrast, the greater compliance at Mpungu is more representative of the increased official enforcement than the collaborative agreements. At Mpungu, the limited, but gradually increasing, involvement in daily activities begins to incorporate a degree of sharing of rights. Nevertheless, local people enjoy only limited responsibilities as only a handful of parish residents are directly involved in operational activities. Thus, the collaborative agreements serve to gain local acceptance towards the existence of a national park, rather than involve genuine local resource management.

These preliminary results indicate that although sharing of rights and responsibilities does not always improve outcomes, given appropriate incentives and assurance mechanisms, collaboration can more effectively generate local involvement as well as direct that involvement towards activities that support conservation. These

findings have important implications towards both the theoretical understanding of participation as well as the implementation of participatory conservation policies. The following sections address these implications.

Theoretical Implications

This study moves beyond assessing the economic or empowerment rationale for participation to highlight several likely determinants of community conservation outcomes. Policies allowing more active participation are a necessary, yet insufficient, condition to generate greater community cooperation. Community participation must be enabled by formal rules that support participation as well as provide incentives to encourage individual interactions. The factors hypothesized to improve outcomes include incorporating meaningful local influence, encouraging effective monitoring and sanctioning and demonstrating assurance mechanisms. The divergent results exhibited at Mutushet and Mpungu confirm the importance of these factors as well as non-institutional factors, especially the values of local communities.

In Chapter Two, I introduced the three research propositions that guide analysis of the empirical portion of the study. My first research proposition addresses the paradox that participatory conservation continues to be widely promoted despite frequently ineffective outcomes in practice. Employing a structural choice argument (Gibson, 1999; Moe, 1990), I posit that government actors and policymakers support these policies because they receive benefits from their promotion unrelated to conservation. This argument helps explain why President Museveni supported such seemingly contradictory, and not always popular, conservation policies, as expanding the national parks and

policies ceding greater control to local communities. The Ugandan case supports this argument as despite ceding some authority to local communities, President Museveni received support for his regime by supporting policies favored internationally. Supporting such fashionable causes as conservation and local participation provided Museveni with the leverage to implement his political and economic reforms, while still allowing his government some independence in policy choices. The failure to establish a multi-party political system despite the trend throughout Africa and strident donor urging best exemplifies the independence gained by this strategy.

Examining why UWA directors favored a policy of collaboration further demonstrates this pattern of decision-makers selecting conservation policies for reasons other than improved conservation outcomes. UWA directors accepted participatory programs because of the foreign funding available to implement them, as well as a means to regain control over the protected areas. Thus, for both NRM policymakers and UWA officials, improved outcomes did not always represent the dominant rationale for policy selection. This logic explains why decision-makers continue to select participatory conservation policies despite frequently ineffective outcomes.

The second and third propositions involve examining how these participatory policies influence outcomes. Successful participatory conservation entails the dual dilemma of encouraging people to participate and if successful, assuring that the local participation improves conservation outcomes. To address the former component, my second research proposition states that to encourage reluctant people to participate, successful collaborative arrangements must provide not only incentives, but assurance

mechanisms that increase trust and demonstrate the commitment of the government towards the collaborative process.

Empirical findings support the importance of the government agency demonstrating assurance mechanisms, such as credible commitments (Weber, 1998), improving reputations (Milgrom, North & Weingast, 1989) and developing legitimacy (Levi, 1997; Lowndes, 1996). Mutushet residents perceive the park and UWA much more positively in large part due to improved perceptions of the extent of local influence. The ability of the residents to change rules as well as participate in operational activities has developed not only support for their park, but engendered a sense of ownership and pride in the community's role in conservation. By allowing greater local influence, the Mt. Elgon park authority has demonstrated, rather than simply proclaimed, a commitment to incorporating local influence. By contrast, despite allowing limited harvest rights and funding three revenue sharing projects at Mpungu, the seeming lack of local influence during the process of designing the collaborative agreement has limited the support of residents for the park and the agreement. Similarly, at the Mt. Elgon control parish, allowing Moyok residents extensive de facto use rights has failed to generate support for the park or quell illegal use.

My third research proposition links policy processes to outcomes by identifying how institutional arrangements for sharing rights and responsibilities with local communities are likely to improve conservation. I suggest that for collaborative arrangements to improve outcomes, institutional mechanisms must limit strategic behavior and direct the activities towards the intended objective. Direct individual incentives and enforcement mechanisms are common protections against opportunism.

In the absence of such mechanisms, even if successful at generating local participation, collaborative activities are unlikely to improve conservation.

Empirical support for this final proposition proved inconclusive. Support exists at Bwindi where increasing enforcement capacity has greatly reduced illegal activity. Clearly, the threat of arrest has influenced Mpungu residents decisions to refrain from illegal activities and participate in the collaborative agreements. Actions of Mpungu residents demonstrate that in the absence of suitable alternatives, individuals *satisfice* (Simon, 1980) and accept a course of action other than the dominant preference. However, findings at Mutushet fail to replicate this pattern of behavior. Parish residents largely support the agreement and refrain from widespread illegal use despite the lack of enforcement. Committee members actively monitor despite direct individual benefits from doing so. Mutushet residents demonstrate that community values, supported by specific components of the collaborative agreement, represent important influences on individual actions towards the forest.

In addition to an improved understanding of the determinants of participation, these findings lend support to an improved understanding of human behavior more broadly. Results support a version of bounded rationality in which individual behavior is purposeful, yet influenced by a range of factors, including both self-interest and cultural values. Examining the two Mt. Elgon parishes best represents this principal. At Moyok, people demand exploitative rights, rather than managerial responsibilities or return towards historical cultural traditions. However, self-interest alone cannot explain the actions of residents of Mutushet. Residents have historically refrained from widespread forest clearing to contribute to the community good of leaving the forest as a place for

hiding cattle from rustlers. Moreover, this tradition and the pride community members are currently receiving about their forest has proven a greater determinant of behavior for the committee members than existing local institutions.

Implications for Conservation Policymakers

Recognizing the dearth of empirical studies of collaborative management of national parks, these findings have important implications for the potential of collaborative resource management in Africa and conservation policymaking more broadly. Both state and communities have a role to play in conservation. With the growing trend towards reduced government involvement, sharing rights and responsibilities with local communities will continue to be an attractive policy option to reduce the costs of conservation for governments with limited managerial and financial capacity. However, that many such resource systems contain attributes of public goods and thus may be best provided outside the community, augurs for continued state involvement as well. The findings of this study will assist conservation policy makers and resource managers considering designing collaborative agreements with local communities.

Findings of this study indicate both promise and caution for collaborative conservation. Local communities have a number of strengths that state resource management agencies typically lack. In the absence of effective formal enforcement, local cooperation can reduce the costs of monitoring and enforcement by increasing the legitimacy of the system or rules. Local communities are also frequently better able to provide more detailed local information concerning both biological resources and human

activity. In Mutushet, this interest is evident as committee members are actively monitoring and providing information of major illegal uses such as pitsawing. Community members as a whole however have been less interested in monitoring and reporting information exemplifying the difference between successful committee participation and successful community participation. Nevertheless, sharing rights and responsibilities with the local community has successfully improved attitudes, reputation of UWA among the community and engendered a sense of pride and ownership towards the forest.

In Bwindi however, local cooperation has not been as forthcoming. Much of the practitioner literature on collaboration assumes that greater participation will improve outcomes and that failures of programs in practice are frequently attributable to the failure to transfer meaningful rights and responsibilities to local communities. (Scott, 1998; Borrini-Feyerabend, 1997; 1996; IUCN, 1997; MTWA, 1996). The Bwindi experience demonstrates the importance of providing appropriate incentives to encourage the local involvement necessary to realize the potential benefits of collaboration. In addition to being a difficult and timely process, collaboration entails risks. The limited collaboration has continued to focus Mpungu residents' attention towards the forest, while denying them the authority to influence the process. Although people appreciate the products they are now allowed to access, they would nevertheless prefer to collect timber and gold and hunt wildlife. By contrast, Bujengwe residents have largely accepted the loss of access and have moved on to planning lives without the forest resources. Therefore, although these improved attitudes at Bujengwe do not necessarily indicate successful participation, they do reflect how rigorous enforcement by UWA has

legitimized the park rules for Bujengwe residents. By inviting local participation at Mpungu, yet allowing only limited and carefully crafted influence, UWA has not been as successful at engendering legitimacy of its organization or the park rules for Mpungu residents. These results indicate that greater participation is not always better. Initiating a limited collaboration, and the corresponding failure to meet the raised expectations, can be worse than the traditional focus on enforcement.

These divergent outcomes confirm that participation as a policy prescription is not a panacea for conservation policymakers. This dissertation is concerned with the factors that influence whether local participation improves conservation outcomes. Surprisingly, results at times indicate an inverse relationship between compliance and participation. At Bwindi, despite limited local involvement, illegal use has decreased markedly with a corresponding increase in forest regeneration. Moreover, despite the collaborative agreement at Mpungu, Bwindi attitudes have improved more at Bujengwe than in Mpungu. These counterintuitive results indicate that the extent to which communities view the park rules to be permanent seems to influence more how they act towards the park than does the extent of participation. Evidence suggests that the improved compliance at Bwindi is due primarily to increased formal enforcement, rather than the limited collaboration. Moreover, at all four parishes, survey responses indicated that people did not desire more participation in decision-making nearly as much as the material benefits reflected in access to park resources and development projects.

These counterintuitive findings beg for further investigation. If traditional enforcement is still the most effective indicator of compliance and many people do not favor taking on managerial responsibilities, policymakers may need to reassess the

promotion of collaboration. However, by refocusing the examination from macro measures of project success to examine indications of success, a much more hopeful and useful picture arises. Therefore although these findings provide few clear policy guidelines, by examining the conditions under which participation does seem to be successful, can provide more useful policy implications. Although Mutushet residents as a whole may not be monitoring and reporting as expected, that the committee members do actively monitor in the absence of direct individual compensation demonstrates the importance of values. Likewise, at Mpungu, the aspects of the agreements that appear to be the most effective at encouraging interactions are the times that community members have joined in the sanctioning of people caught in the forest illegally. These findings thus indicate that greater interactions between the park agency and local communities can lead to improved outcomes.

Findings also caution about the effectiveness of user rights as an incentive for conservation (Barrett & Alcese, 1995). While recognizing that user rights remain an important component of a collaborative strategy, evidence from the four parishes indicates that unless accompanied by appropriate responsibilities, local user rights may be counterproductive towards encouraging conservation. At Mt. Elgon, Moyok residents enjoy similar (*de facto*) use rights as in Mutushet. However, the lack of formal community responsibilities has led Moyok residents to not coordinate their activities or follow established rules, producing both detrimental ecological impacts as well as continued negative attitudes towards the park.

One of the primary findings of this study is that local communities do not necessarily desire greater managerial responsibilities and therefore must be enticed to

participate if collaboration is to improve conservation outcomes. Although local communities and conservation agencies may both value the forest, they frequently value it for different reasons. Rather than preserving biodiversity or maintaining ecological health, local people frequently value the forest primarily for harvestable products. This difference in values is crucial because unless the formal agencies are willing to allow local people to access what they value, local communities are unlikely to support the process.

Therefore, not all communities are candidates for collaboration. Even in relatively small, homogenous communities, variations in interests towards collaboration exist that will influence how people are likely to respond to a collaborative process. Special attention must be placed on not just whether communities value the forest, but why they value the forest. If communities value a wider range of resources, they will be more willing to work towards its protection (Scott, 1998). If resource use is limited to a small number of controversial resources (such as timber), there is little to offer in way of negotiations. A cultural linkage to the forest also may increase the likelihood of collaboration. If people value the forest and its resources for cultural reasons, they will be less prone to overexploitation (Borrini-Feyerabend, 1996). However, with long-standing protected areas, frequently traditional linkages are no longer extant. This divergence in values has serious implications for the potential of community conservation that extend beyond merely the likelihood that limited resource use will not likely be sufficient to satisfy local people.

Conclusion: The Potential for Collaborative Resource Management

These divergent results present important lessons concerning the potential of collaboration in conservation. By highlighting the importance of identifying the nature of the forest goods that are valued and the effectiveness of the collaborative process at incorporating these values into the design of participatory conservation institutions, this study has potentially important implications for scholars examining the motivations for human behavior and practitioners interested in improving community based resource management.

These preliminary results support the research propositions that demonstrating credible commitments, incorporating meaningful local influence and effective monitoring increase the likelihood of effective collaboration. Moreover, findings lend support to Levi's logic of contingent consent (1997) towards the importance of community values in influencing behavioral decisions. Nevertheless, these results demonstrate caution concerning the future promotion of collaborative agreements. Recognizing that environmental degradation occurs and that local people have been excluded from the decision-making process does not imply that giving them a voice will necessarily improve conservation outcomes. If collaboration is to be of interest to park neighbors, it is essential that communities receive adequate incentives to participate. In many communities, allowing minimal use rights may not be valued highly enough to encourage their cooperation.

Developing collaboration is a gradual process and assessing the likelihood of sustainability takes a minimum of several years to evaluate. Therefore, these findings represent preliminary results and further study is necessary. Previous studies have

demonstrated the importance of local resource conditions (Ostrom, 1990). Findings from this study also highlight the importance of local characteristics, particularly local values towards the forest. As a result, prescribing a universal participatory institution that can be effective in all situations is also unlikely. As evidenced by this study, the same rules can serve as incentives or disincentives depending on the values of local communities. Therefore, generalizations about collaboration as a policy prescription will require integrating studies across numerous geographical regions. Through comparative long-term analysis, scholars can gain a greater understanding of the likely interactions resulting from different institutional arrangements.

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Curriculum Vitae

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Education

Indiana University Bloomington, Indiana
School of Public and Environmental Affairs and Department of Political Science
Joint Ph.D. in Public Policy, December 2000.

Dissertation Title: *Conservation, Development and Collaboration: Analyzing Institutional Incentives for Participatory Conservation in Uganda.*

Yale University New Haven, Connecticut
M.A. in International Relations, 1992.
Concentration: Development and Environment in Africa (8 courses taken at Yale School of Forestry & Environmental Studies).

Occidental College Los Angeles, California
A.B. Diplomacy and World Affairs, Economics Emphasis, 1986.
Thesis: *Ujamaa: Tanzania's Independent Development Strategy.*

Teaching Experience

2000 **St. Edwards University**, Austin, Texas
Adjunct Professor, Political Research and Statistics
Teaching undergraduate course introducing political research methods and basic statistical techniques.

1999 **Indiana University**, Bloomington, Indiana
1996 *Associate Instructor, Environment and People.*
Taught undergraduate course integrating basic principles of ecology, environmental management and policymaking to address crucial environmental issues at both the national and global levels.

1999 Summer — **School for Field Studies** Center for Wildlife Management, Kenya
Resident Faculty
Taught field course in *Community Wildlife Management* to American university students at school for wildlife management in Kenya. Taught social research methods and directed research project involving eleven students to develop a management plan for Kimana Community Wildlife Sanctuary.

1998-1999 — **Indiana University** Bloomington, Indiana
Associate Instructor, Statistical Techniques.
Taught two undergraduate courses introducing basic statistical techniques.

1992-1994 — **School for Field Studies** Center for Wildlife Management, Kenya
Associate Faculty
Taught *Socioeconomic Values and Environmental Policy* to American university students at a wildlife management school. Courses accredited by Northeastern University. Designed course introducing lectures on social research methods, community wildlife management and global and local environmental issues. Directed 12 research projects in the local communities; coordinated socio-cultural components of curriculum including leading field trips throughout Kenya. Average class size 32 students.

1989-1990 — **New York City Board of Education** Brooklyn, New York
Teacher of Mathematics
Taught 120 students and managed homeroom of 30 students in public intermediate school.

1987-1988 — **Bukaya Secondary School** Mumias, Kenya
Teacher of Agriculture, Math, Geography, Business
Taught 90 Kenyan students in rural secondary school. Expanded and systematized school library, initiated book loan program, coached soccer and debate teams.

Environmental Policy Experience

Summer 1992 — **The World Bank** Washington, D.C.
Research Assistant
Prepared environmental review of Sao Tome and Principe to initiate development of a National Environmental Action Plan. Document served as basis for environmental mission to Sao Tome and Principe.

Summer 1991 **World Wide Fund for Nature (WWF)** Nakuru, Kenya
Consultant
Three month consultation with Lake Nakuru Conservation and Development Project. Evaluated project by designing and conducting rural surveys and interviews with public officials. Presented findings to project manager and director of WWF-East Africa to be used in proposal for project extension. Planned and participated in environmental conference involving local representatives of government and non-governmental organizations, helped write proceedings and resulting environmental guidelines for area.

Publications and Professional Papers

2000 "Diffused Institutions or Imposed Values? Early National Park Creation in the United States and East Africa." Article in review.

2000 "Collaboration and Credible Commitments: Experiments with Forest Management in Uganda." Article in review.

2000 "Collaboration and Credible Commitments: Experiments with Forest Management in Uganda." Paper presented at the *International Association for the Study of Common Property* Biennial Conference. Bloomington, May 31- June 4, 2000.

2000 "Diffused Institutions or Imposed Values? Early National Park Creation in the United States and East Africa." Paper presented at *Western Political Science Association* Meeting. San Jose, March 24-26, 2000.

1999 "How Contrasting Environmental Worldviews Influenced Early National Park Creation in the United States and East Africa." Paper presented at the *Midwest Political Science Association* Annual Meeting. Chicago, April 15-17, 1999.

1999 "Does Participation Improve Conservation? Examining Community Conservation in Uganda." Paper presented at the *American Society for Public Administration* Annual Conference. Orlando, April 10-13, 1999.

1992 *Sao Tome and Principe: An Environmental Review.* Internal document. World Bank, West Africa division.

1991 Local Incentives for Conservation of Lake Nakuru National Park," *Tropical Resources Institute News.* 10(2).

1991 *Project Evaluation: Lake Nakuru Conservation and Development Project.* Report to WWF-East Africa.

Awards and Fellowships

1998	**Lincoln Institute of Land Policy, Dissertation Fellowship** Funding for dissertation analysis and writing.
1997	**Fulbright-IIE Doctoral Dissertation Fellowship** Funding for ten month dissertation research project in Uganda, "Analyzing Institutional Incentives for Participatory Conservation in Uganda."
1996	**Indiana University International Programs Pre-Dissertation Fellowship** Funding for pre-dissertation research in Uganda, summer 1996. Research culminated in preparation of dissertation proposal.
1994-1996	**Foreign Language and Area Studies Academic Year Fellowship** Indiana University. Language training in Swahili.
1991-1992	**Foreign Language and Area Studies Academic Year Fellowship** Yale University. Language training in Swahili.
1992	**Academic Excellence Award for Yale International Relations Class of 1992.**

Academic Service

2000	Volunteer Organizer, Eighth Biennial Conference of the *International Association for the Study of Common Property*
1999	Ph.D. Representative, Dean's Student Advisory Committee
1998-1999	Ph.D. Representative, SPEA Faculty Policy Committee

International Service

1985	**Operation Crossroads Africa** Kilifi, Kenya
1983-1986	**Project Amigos** Tijuana, Mexico

Languages and Skills

Swahili: Near Fluency, written and oral.
Spanish: Proficient, written and oral.
French: Working knowledge, written.
Statistics: Basic statistics, categorical data analysis.

Memberships

African Studies Association
American Political Science Association
International Association for the Study of Common Property