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Fishnets, Internets and Catnets:  
Globalization and Social Movements<sup>1</sup>

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#### A Fishy Story

Hidden behind the headlines on the struggles in Haiti and the former Yugoslavia in the summer of 1994, a conflict was roiling the waters of the Bay of Biscay. As The European described it:

Spanish tuna fishermen sailed home ... after a two-day battle with their French counterparts some 700 km. off Spain's northwestern coast of Galicia. The Spanish brought back a captured boat [the Gabrielle] they claim will support allegations that the French violate fishing quotas and methods.<sup>2</sup>

The Spanish tuna men accused the French of using nets bigger than those permitted by European Union regulations, but the French insisted their nets were legal. In Paris, the government responded by demanding the immediate restitution of the Gabrielle, backing up their demand by capturing a Spanish ship and towing it to the harbor of Lorient.<sup>3</sup> In Madrid the government wrung its hands about its uncontrollable fishermen. As the ships of the two nations manoeuvred dangerously on troubled waters, a war of words heated up between their capitals.

Whatever its legal basis, the French manoeuver seemed to work. In Galicia, the tuna men who had made off with the Gabrielle were convinced by the Spanish authorities to return her; in Brussels, Spain's agriculture and fisheries minister met with his French counterpart, who agreed that EU inspectors would henceforth be allowed to initiate checks of the French nets;<sup>4</sup> and

on 26 July, the French tuna men agreed to limit the length of their nets to the 2.5 km set down in the EU regulations.<sup>3</sup>

But now a new storm blew up over the Bay. Not trusting their government's willingness to defend their interests, an armada of boniteros -- backed by their association -- blocked the ports of the Cantabrian coast and -- just for good measure -- blockaded the French port of Hendaye too.<sup>4</sup> By the first week of August, they were back on the high seas -- this time hacking off the nets of two British fishing boats and an Irish one with their propellers. Like the French ones, the British and the Irish ships were accused of using nets that were longer than the EU's statutory limit of 2.5 km.<sup>7</sup> (It is amusing that the British claimed that their nets were environmentally friendly: though longer than 2.5 km. they made up for it with huge holes designed to let the dolphin through, while the apparently less intelligent tuna got caught.)<sup>6</sup>

Now the environmental organization Greenpeace jumped into the act by sending a ship to inspect the British and French nets.<sup>9</sup> The French -- who have a long and violent<sup>8</sup> relationship with this movement -- attacked the vessel with water cannon and a stun grenade, accusing it of attempting to cut the nets of French trawlers. The Greenpeace activists denied it, claiming that they were only trying to record whether the French ships were taking endangered species, like dolphins, in their nets.<sup>10</sup>

Six months later, Spanish fishermen were again in the news, fishing for halibut in the Atlantic outside the Canadian 200-mile

limit. The Canadians had called for a ban on fishing off the Grand Banks to allow badly depleted fish stocks to be renewed, but the Spanish paid them no heed. Finding a Spanish vessel, the Estain, just outside their 200-mile limit, the Canadians seized it and towed it into the harbor of St. John's, to the cheers of assembled fisherfolk. As the Spanish captain and the Ambassador walked into court to be charged with overfishing, they were pelted with garbage. The Spanish responded by sending two warships to the area, while the European Union voted to break off all political contacts with Canada and threatened trade sanctions if the Canadians did not desist.<sup>11</sup>

Given coverage in all four national media, the story of the tuna wars was redolent with folkloric images: sputtering French officials, archaic Spanish armadas, tight-lipped British sailors, jeering Newfoundland fishermen. One British columnist even evoked the image of Sir Francis Drake calmly playing bowls on shore as he waited for the Spanish fleet to arrive.<sup>12</sup> But beneath the folkloric surface of the tuna wars there were serious issues at stake. The Spanish tuna men in the Bay of Biscay might evoke hilarity as a latter-day Armada, but many of them are registered in Britain and sell part of their catches in Plymouth with impunity.<sup>13</sup> Conversely, the bigger British ships sell some of their catch to Spanish canners.

There were larger economic and social issues at stake too: the preservation of dwindling sea stocks, the protection of a

Spanish industry that directly or indirectly employs 800,000 people," the power of the European Commission to interfere in fishermen's and other people's lives. This tempest was not hatched in a teapot but in the cauldron of an increasingly integrated international economy. "This is not just about Canadian fishing interest versus EU fishing interests," editorialized the Guardian after the Canadian caper. "any more than last year's fishing conflict between Britain and Spain was just a little local difficulty between friends." "These conflicts must be seen as part of a global crescendo of warning that there is a global problem of overfishing, rapidly approaching crisis proportions."<sup>15</sup>

#### I. Globalization: A Collective Action Problem

For students of the history of collective action there are important questions here too.<sup>16</sup> Three aspects of the tuna story are reminiscent of the great tradition of social movements in the West:

First, though the site of the tuna war on the high seas was highly original, the Spanish sailors were using a well-known tactic from the modern repertoire of social movement contention by sequestering another social actor. They might have learned it from Spanish workers who sequestered their managers in response to their government's industrial restructuring policy in the 1980s.<sup>17</sup>

Second, like narratives of most social movements, the story involved organized networks of social actors from within professional and other social categories -- "catnets", in Charles Tilly's words (1978). Fishing communities are historically well-organized, integrated, and frame their claims powerfully around community and professional interests. The Spanish and the Canadian fishermen in particular profited from strong and community based social networks.<sup>18</sup>

Third, the Spanish used the strategy of targeting political institutions to advance their claims against other social actors. Since at least the rising parliamentarization of protest in Britain in the late eighteenth century, states have been the central target of collective action, even when the claim-makers aim at other social actors (Tarrow 1994; 71-3; Tilly 1995: ch. 2).

But alongside these tried and true artifacts of social movement theory -- the use of a modular repertoire, the involvement of pre-existing social networks and the targeting of the state -- there was an apparently new and disconcerting aspect to the Tuna War: it crossed national boundaries with deliberate collective action and was triggered by the acts of a transnational institution -- the European Union. It was a case of what scholars of contemporary social movements claim to be seeing more and more of as the world approaches the twenty-first century: transnational collective action.<sup>19</sup>

Not only that: the struggle was not only a direct clash between actors with competing claims. It was also a performance -- albeit taking place on the high seas -- for the benefit of an international media audience. For its combination of high risk and low comedy, the newspapers and television outlets of four nations gave the story great play. The tuna war is thus an example of a relatively new phenomenon that many think will become a fixture of collective action as the world approaches the next century -- movements across the internet.

But there is a puzzle in the tuna story too: about the relative role of transnational versus national actors and institutions. Let us return to the episode on the Bay of Biscay to illustrate the ambiguities. First, with the exception of Greenpeace, all of the actors in the story were national, from the tuna men on the high seas, to their associations on dry land, to their countries' representatives negotiating a peaceful end of the conflict in Brussels. Second, although the resolution was to allow the transnational EU to send inspectors onto the ships, it was the Spanish, French and British governments that ultimately agreed to allow EU inspectors onto their boats to inspect the length of their nets -- and that was exactly the outcome that the Spanish fishermen had sought. Third, these groups based their cooperation on pre-existing social networks and associations which are not usually available across national boundaries. It was indigenous movements and associations based on existing social networks who began the cycle of conflict and national

states that completed it. Transnational movements? Or only the transnational action of national movements triggered by global trends?

In the first part of this paper, I want to outline what I take to be the "strong" version of the transnational movement thesis and some of its implications for the future of social movements. I will then inject a few cautionary notes about the theory from the standpoint of both history and social movement theory, before suggesting a weaker -- but I think more plausible -- version of the theory. I will close with some questions that need to be answered before we can conclude that the national social movement has been buried by global networks of economics and communication.

## II. Globalizing Conflict

What are the forces that support the thesis of transnational collective action? To appreciate them, we should return to the world of the eighteenth century, when the national social movement was born. It was a world in which print capitalism and associational networks converged to provide a matrix for the diffusion and sustenance of collective action; in which modular forms of contention, like the mass petition, the march and demonstration, focussed on the expanding national state; and in which generalized collective action frames, like rights and equality, knit together coalitions of different social actors to

mount collective action in sustained interaction with the national state.<sup>29</sup>

#### A. The Sources of Globalization

Four structural factors and a cultural one have converged to change the world that produced those movements:

1. As a vast literature by economists and others has affirmed, the dominant economic trends of the late twentieth century have been towards international economic interdependence.<sup>30</sup> We saw some of this interdependence in the tuna story, where not only were the ships of all the states involved were producing for an international market, but their industry was increasingly being regulated by a transnational regime -- the European Union.

2. The economic growth of the 1970s and 1980s has brought citizens of the North and West and those of the East and South physically and cognitively closer, making the latter more aware of their inequality. As Giovanni Arrighi writes, the East and South have "internalized elements of the social structure of the West and North but have not internalized their wealth" (1990: 40). though both countries are part of the highly-developed West, we even saw this in the contrast between the Spanish fishermen, with their traditional rods and reels, and the French tuna fleet, with its floating factories of the sea.

3. Although it was not a part of the tuna story, global economic interdependence and international relative deprivation

have also contributed to spurring massive shifts of population from the South and East to the North and West. But because immigrants no longer lose touch with their country of origin and cannot hope for citizenship, they remain forever foreign. "The Filipino maid in Milan and the Tamil busdriver in Toronto," observes Benedict Anderson, "are only a few sky hours away" from their homeland and seconds away by satellite telephone communication (1992: 8).

4. Global communications structures are emerging that weave core and periphery closer together. Print capitalism, railroads and imperialism had a similar effect in the 18th and 19th centuries (Anderson 1991), but they worked infinitely more slowly and lacked the immediacy of television. Television, writes Michael O'Neil, through instant communications "joins people living great distances from one another in time and space by immediately shared experiences, expanding the number of vicarious interactions between people beyond all previous limits (1993, p. 35, 47). Decentralized and private communications technologies, such as computer networking, have accelerated the growth of globally interdependent communications structures (Frederick 1995; Ganley 1992).

These structural changes have a cultural concomitant: that we live in a culturally more unified universe, one in which young people dress the same, ride the same skateboards, play the same computer games and listen to the same rock music. One result is to "destroy the cultural isolation in which misunderstanding

ferments but, often at the same time, intensifies perceptions of difference that increase social antagonisms and promote social fragmentation" (O'Neil p. 68). But another is to create perceived chains of economic and social impact between different parts of the globe. Not only does what happens in Frankfurt or Tokyo have profound economic effects on workers and peasants in Bombay and Benin; the workers and peasants in Bombay and Benin know that it does and have the cognitive tools to attribute the causes of their dissatisfactions. The anti-IMF riots in the 1980s signalled what may be a growing wave of protests against global economic actors (Kowalewski 1989).

#### B. Transnational Collective Action:

##### The Strong Thesis

Transnational collective action is the final hypothetical impact of globalization. The argument goes something like this: When you see people like yourself from the other side of the world -- students, ethnic minorities, opponents of pollution or war -- engaging in successful collective action, this may be enough to show you how to engage in similar action in your own country.

Consider the Chinese students who organized resistance to Chinese communism in June 1989 so massive that it took an army to suppress them. On radio, television, through fax and videotape players they had learned of the collapse of communism in eastern Europe. If students in Prague could overthrow a regime by filling

a square, why couldn't they? Their protest soon had echoes in Taiwan and Hong Kong, on the part of students who carried the same banners and wore the same armbands."

Not only does global television propagate collective action: Just as people learn how to protest from television; they have become skilled at using it to project news of their movements to international centers of power. When American Civil Rights leaders used TV to force the Kennedy administration to take action against segregation, their efforts were centered on their own government and on American public opinion; But when the Beijing students built a statue of liberty and rolled it onto Tienanmen square, it was not to the peasants of rural China that they were appealing, but to a global audience.

These changes result in the strong version of the transnational social movement thesis, which has the following general characteristics:

1. In the age of global television, whirring fax machines and electronic mail, the national political opportunity structures that used to be needed to mount collective action -- and constrained it -- may be giving way." When insurgency mounted in Central Europe in 1989, it was not primarily because local opportunities were opening up to dissidents: it was because the Helsinki accords opened the normative possibility of supporting human rights and because Gorbachev had signalled the ruling Communist parties of the region that they could no longer depend on the Red Army to pull their chestnuts out of the fire

(Thomas 1994, 1995; Bunce 1991). The national state - incubator and fulcrum of social movements in the past -- may no longer constrain or stimulate movements the way it used to do.

2. The second putative effect is on the declining capacity of governments to disguise what is going on from their own citizens. As determined a scholar of state-building as Charles Tilly could write in 1991: "The increasing fluidity of capital, labor, commodities, money and cultural practices undermines the capacity of any particular state to control events within its boundaries" (1991: 1). The recent insurgency in Chiapas is a striking example: almost as soon as it broke out, fax, E-mail and television networks broadcast the news that the Mexican government was trying to suppress. Its international resonance almost obscured the military weakness of the insurgents and helped force the government to negotiate with their leaders. "Chiapas-Zapatista News" can still be accessed by gopher through three different sources.<sup>24</sup>

3. The capacity to mount new forms of collective action is probably increasing. Where electronic communication becomes a means for the propagation of movement information, there is also a low-risk form of empowerment of passive people all over the world -- what we may call "easy riding on the internet." Peaceful and virtually institutionalized forms of transnational collective action have accompanied this shift: from the spread of the New Left from the United States to Western Europe in the 1960s (McAdam and Rucht 1993), to the peace campaigns that spread

across Europe and America in the 1980s (Rochon 1988), to the global environmental movement which links Green parties and movements across national boundaries (Dalton 1994), to the non-governmental associations which provide resources to protect the rights and publicize the wrongs against indigenous peoples from Australia to Latin America (Brysk 1993; Yashar n.d.).

But where national states no longer constrain collective action, movements also spread through less benevolent tools: the letter bomb, the airplane hijacking and the political kidnapping. Consider the movement that Benedict Anderson calls "long-distance nationalism" (1992). For every nineteenth-century Mazzini and Garibaldi who fomented revolution at a distance from his home country, there are now thousands of easy riders: Egyptians in New York, Punjabis in Toronto, Croats in Australia, Tamils in Britain, Irish in Massachusetts, Algerians in France and Cubans in Miami who use long distance communication and can contribute to funding movements that work to undermine their former homelands (Anderson 1992:12). The phenomenon was symbolically and actually realized when a man with a bomb in his portable radio bought a second class air ticket from the Middle East to Frankfurt and exploded it over Scotland.

### III. A Stronger Case for a Weaker Thesis

But the rapid spread of information, immigration and even militancy across the globe does not in itself produce global

movements. Both history and social movement theory suggest a weaker paradigm, based on the undoubted integration of the world economy and international communications but on the continued importance of social networks and national states in structuring collective action.

#### A. What History Teaches

The historical reasons to be cautious about the strong version of the transnational thesis can be summarized in two points:

In the first place, the integration of the world economy is not exactly new. We need only look at Hobsbawm's Age of Empire to recall that, on the centenary of the French and American revolutions, the world had become "genuinely global" (1989: 13). The telegraph had recently linked Europe, America and Europe's overseas colonies with instant communications; colonialism was sweeping the furthest reaches of the world into a single integrated economy; and long distance transportation was becoming available to many. Hobsbawm gives us a dramatic illustration: in 1879, almost one million tourists visited Switzerland, 200,000 of them Americans; the equivalent of more than one in twenty of the entire US population at its first census (p. 14).

In the second place, the spread of capitalism, communications, and the waves of immigration that began in the 1880s helped to diffuse similar movements in very different parts of the world. It is enough to remember the Eastern European roots

of the clothing workers' movement that was created in the sweatshops of Lower Manhattan in the 1890s;" or of the Socialist, Anarchist and labor movements that were built on European models at the turn of the century by European immigrants in Chile and Argentina."

Paradoxically, it was nationalism that was the most transnational movement of all. The idea that states implied homogeneous nations -- however historically flawed and socially constructed that idea was -- spread from West to East and from North to South through print, steamships, railroads and colonialism. The paradox of Third World nationalism was that it was built on the new assumption -- fostered by imperialism -- that the world was A Single Place. If a Muslim notable, Hajji Misbach, could deduce from the little he knew about Austria after World War One that "the land belongs to no one other than ourselves," " then globalization was indeed fostering nationalism.

How different were these examples, taken, respectively, from a century and a half-century ago, from the trajectories of the most powerful transnational movement today -- militant Islamic fundamentalism? The latter movement began in Iran and Afghanistan; it moved on to Egypt, the Sudan, and Mindanao; and it ultimately led to the bombing of the World Trade Center and to the probable takeover of Algeria. Militant Islamic fundamentalism certainly spreads by the new inventions of transnational

communications and transportations: cassettes and videotapes made in Teheran and distributed in North Africa; urban guerrillas who fly out of Peshawar to Algiers and New York; fax machines and E-mail networks that fuel Anderson's "long-distance nationalism. But the mobilization of the movement depends on the development of neighborhood social networks around the institutional "halfway houses" of Mosques and religious schools that the travelling missionaries find in every Muslim country." This takes us to the insights of social movement theory.

#### B. From Internets to Catnets:

##### What Social Movement Scholars Have Learned

If we have learned anything from the last twenty-five years of social movement research, it is that movements do not depend on interest or opportunity alone, but must build on indigenous social networks in domestic societies." If for no other reason, this is because the "transaction costs" of building a movement are infinitely greater among people who lack ties with one another -- or whose ties are strictly categorical -- than among those who are part of pre-existing communities."

This is the thesis that Charles Tilly developed when he placed "organization" in a triangular relationship with interest and collective action in his "mobilization model" (1978: p. 57). Tilly never took this idea very far, but in examining what kinds of groups are likely to mobilize, he paid far more attention to the categories of people who recognize their common

characteristics, and to networks of people who are linked to each other by a specific interpersonal bond, than to formal organization (p. 62). The resulting idea of "catnets", which Tilly adopted from Harrison White (n.d.), stresses a group's inclusiveness as "the main aspect of group structure which affects the ability to mobilize" (p. 64).

Tilly wasn't alone. Although he took aim at "western" social movement theory, James Scott implicitly understood what Tilly had explicitly outlined when he chose the term "resistance" to designate the individual acts of peasant resentment he found in repressive landlord/peasant systems (1986). Anthony Oberschall put the same point typologically when he called attention to the links -- communal, associational or absent -- in a population (1973: 125-35), arguing that groups with a weak internal structure rarely mobilize at all. Doug McAdam advanced the same idea when he showed how the recruitment of Freedom Summer volunteers depended on their participation in pre-existing social networks (1988a).

The importance of interpersonal networks in movement mobilization has obvious implications for the "strong" version of the transnational thesis. For even if structural conditions like economic interdependence, North/South relative deprivation, immigration and a global media community produce the preconditions for the diffusion of movements to a variety of countries, what happens when these stimuli arrive in a domestic setting? The outcome depends very much on whether there are

indigenous social networks of trust and reciprocity with which to mount and sustain a social movement.

### C. Three Cautions about the Strong Thesis

There are thus at least three reasons to be cautious before we conclude that the national social movement has been transcended and is being replaced by transnational movements:

1. Not all prospective movements have the resources or the networks to respond to transnational forces with proportional activism. Consider the labor movement: If only because capital is more mobile than labor, labor movements have been unable to respond effectively to the global economic interdependence that has been restructuring labor all over the world (Tilly 1993). Even in Europe, where the international institutions and regulations of the European Union would seem to encourage transnational cooperation, organized labor has been unable to match the rate of multinational business growth with cooperation across national boundaries.<sup>11</sup>

2. Depending on movement organizations from advanced industrial countries is not the best way for activists in Third World countries to build indigenous movements. For one thing, their links with international NGOs are often fragile or intermittent (Macdonald, n.d.). Like the Greenpeace activists in the Tuna War, the latter go home to warm hearths while the fishermen return to the high seas and the peasants to their fields. For another, relations between the two sets of actors

almost always favor those with expertise and access to power over those they come to help. When the latter leave, their local allies may disperse and be more easily vulnerable to repression.

3. Global television can be dangerously deceptive for movements which depend on it. Remember how double-edged dependence on the media was for the anti-war movement in the sixties (Gitlin 1980? Because it specializes in projecting sound bites of dramatic action and foreshortened commentary, television provides viewers with encouraging images of the surging crowds, courageous leaders and colorful banners in the public square; but it leaves unseen the capillary work that has to be done to mobilize the consensus behind a social movement and sustain it once the first flush of public excitement has subsided.<sup>12</sup>

Moreover, transnational structures of opportunity and constraint develop far more slowly than domestic ones. It was 1975 when the [transnational] Helsinki Accords signalled to Eastern Europeans that they could hold their states accountable for human rights violations. But it was only in the late 1980s that the opportunities were ripe for them to take advantage of these accords, and this was dependent on political and strategic changes that went far beyond the paper-promises of Helsinki.

### V. Transnational Opportunities for National Movements

This is why a "weaker" version of the transnational social movement thesis has a more plausible ring than the strong one:

because it does not imply that transnational forces will automatically create transnational movements, but that they do provide new political opportunities and expanded resources to turn indigenous social networks into national social movements. Where domestic networks are lacking, neither global economic interdependence nor global television can create a social movement.

Here I mark myself an unreconstructed empiricist. For most of the examples we have to date of transnational movements are actually not cases of single movements with national branches, but of political exchange between allied actors whose contacts have been facilitated by global economic and integration and communication. These are not, strictly speaking, transnational movements, but contingent political alliances linking pre-existing domestic communities with actors from other countries -- non-governmental organizations, social movements, institutions -- which provide them with resources, information and international exposure. To adopt a term from electronics with Thomas Ohlemacher (1992), rather than forming transnational social movements, these domestic social networks are linked to one another through transnational "relays".

Consider the movement to stop the construction of the Grande Baleine dam in Quebec, where the indigenous tribes of northern Quebec found an ally in opposing the plans of the government in the US environmental movement.<sup>11</sup> Or consider the rubber tappers of eastern Brazil, who have been helped in their struggle against

the incursion of ranchers by an alliance with American non-governmental organizations.<sup>12</sup> Or the Catholic missionaries in Central America who linked up with indigenous resistance movements in the 1970s and 1980s and provided a network within which guerilla movements could organize a peasant vanguard.<sup>13</sup> None of these were transnational movements, but domestic networks -- often based on pre-existing communities -- activated and linked through political exchange to formal organizations from abroad.

There is some empirical evidence that the relays between the actors at each end of these exchanges are growing more dense (Keck and Sikkink 1994). But we need to look more closely at the kinds of linkages they develop; and how permanent they prove to be; and at whether they can solve the tremendous transaction costs involved in building transnational movements. For example, the growing web of E-mail networks that are traversing the world excite the attention of intellectuals with their obvious capacity to maximize our specialty in cultural capital; but they do not promise the same degree of crystallization, of mutual trust and collective identity that the interpersonal ties among the founders of Latin American socialism movements in the nineteenth century or Islamic fundamentalists today. Whether they will produce enduring social movements it is too soon to tell.

#### V. A Global Movement Future?

If I have betrayed some skepticism about the strong version of transnational social movement theory, it is not to dismiss it but to stimulate its adherents to research the phenomena they see more thoroughly. The world is changing very rapidly, and the trends that some have seen producing a world of transnational movements may be only in their infancy.\* So I want to close, not with a conclusion, but with a few questions that advocates of the strong thesis will need to confront if they are to turn their insights into grounded social scientific knowledge:

First, they need to tell us whether the new technology of global communications and cheap international travel are changing the dynamics of movement diffusion or only the speed of its transmission. If we think the world is entering an unheralded age of global movements, we will need to look comparatively at movements in the past -- and this is where comparatively bold historical studies are necessary. Otherwise, as Pizzorno once wrote, "at every upstart of a wave of conflict we shall be induced to think that we are at the verge of a revolution; and when the downswing appears, we shall predict the end of class conflict (1978: 291).

Second, can it be said -- as many of those who believe in the power of global media apparently think -- that social movements can span continents in the absence of interpersonal

face-to-face communities at both ends of their relays? And -- an even stronger claim -- that they can create such communities with resources and opportunities transferred from abroad? In the course of the 19th century and most of ours, local social networks were the essential armature of social movements. Those who are convinced of the strong thesis need to show that impersonal cyberspace networks can produce the same degree of trust and mutual incentives to activism that scholars of domestic social movements found in the interpersonal social networks of the civil rights movement of the 1960s (McAdam 1988) or in the European subcultures of the 1970s and 1980s (Kriesi 1988).

There was evidence for interpersonal diffusion in the 1960s, when a largely peaceful protest repertoire spread to West Germany from the American New Left. But Doug McAdam and Dieter Rucht saw as agents of this transition a group of West German students who had studied in the US and carried the message personally back to Europe in 1968 -- and not through impersonal diffusion (1993). Can their thesis be supported empirically and can it be generalized to the history of the New left in other European countries?

Third, will the new power of international movements lead to benevolent forms of "people's power," as writers like O'Neil seem to think (1993: ch. 4)? Or will it lead to the violent forms that Anderson and others have seen in "long distance nationalism" (1992). We need to remember that the most powerful global

movement of the early 1990s is not made up of western environmentalist linked benevolently with indigenous people's movements in the Third World, but of militant Islamic fundamentalists who shoot folk singers and beat up women who go unveiled. It spread using also radio and television, tape recorders and fax machines, but mainly worked through pre-existing religious institutions. Islamic fundamentalism bears further study for its capacity to merge transnational technology with indigenous social networks.

Finally, what of the role of the state? The more mechanical versions of state theory do not help us much, for they have reduced stateness into a few mechanical variables like state strength or weakness, capacity or incapacity, and neglected the strategic elements in state-building and state rebuilding. We need to remember that states developed in a strategic dialogue with social movements, ceding them the autonomy and opportunities to organize when they had to do so and when it was useful; reclaiming that territory whenever these movements faded or were co-opted (Piven and Cloward 1993).

In an early bow in the direction of the transnational influences on social movements, Charles Tilly wrote twenty years ago that states make war and war makes states (1975: 42). Is there a reason to think that states are less resourceful when threatened by transnational movements than when they were faced

by threats from other states? This seems to me the most crucial question to ask in the age of globalization.

Already, states are evolving transnational strategies and transnational organizations to trace and ferret out the most dangerous sources of international turbulence. And states are encouraging some movements -- like the European environmental movement -- to take their claims to transnational institutions like the European Union (Dalton 1994), while they prevent the EU from dealing with others, -- like the anti-nuclear movement. And while states negotiate within the framework of the European Union to solve the periodic protests of their farmers and fishermen, as we saw in the tuna war, these social actors have not yet organized significantly across national lines (Tarrow 1995).

States in the late twentieth century make more than war; they make transnational organizations and institutions in their interest to combat and socially control social movements. If this the case, then the national state and the national social movement will be with us for a long time to come. And social movements will continue to be "prisoners of the state" (Tilly 1991).

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Notes

1. This talk draws on a paper called "The Europeanization of Movements," to be published in West European Politics in June 1995; and on talks delivered at the University of Sidney, Binghamton University, the University of Wisconsin at Madison and the New School for Social Research. I am grateful to David Blatt for suggesting the title and for providing comments on the earlier version, along with Giovanni Arrighi, Doug Imig, Diarmaid Macuire, Jerry Marwell, Hector Schamis, Beverly Silver, Charles Tilly and Dan Thomas. None of these necessarily share my views but all offered penetrating commentary.
2. 'Spanish Fishermen Seize French Boat in Tuna War,' The European, July 22-28, 1994, p. 6. For a somewhat hysterical narrative from the French point of view, see 'Les pêcheurs de l'île d'Yeu témoignent de la violence de l'agression espagnole,' in Le Monde 21 July 1994, p. 18. For a surprisingly detached Spanish narration of the same affair, see 'La guerra del bonito: A puerto con el botín,' El País, 25 July 1994, p. 20.
3. See "La armada francesa captura un barco de Espana en repesalia por el conflicto pesquero," El País, 25 July 1994, p. 20 for the Spanish side of the story, and 'Le conflit entre pêcheurs espagnols et français semble s'apaiser,' Le Monde, 22 July, 1994. See 'La Guerre bleue,' Le Monde, 29 July 1994, p. 26.
4. Alberta Sbragia points out that the decision to allow EU inspectors to monitor net sizes was an important extension of the European Commission's authority. This politically sensitive step may have been taken because the dispute occurs (and can be expected to recur) outside of the territorial jurisdiction of any one country with explosive safety implications. I am grateful to Professor Sbragia for her comments on this case, which had still be resolved definitively as of this writing.
5. See 'Le conflit entre pêcheurs espagnols et français semble s'apaiser,' Le Monde, 22 July, 1994, p. 13 and 'L'accord entre les professionnels de l'île d'Yeu et Jean Puech n'a pas calmé les courroux des pêcheurs espagnols,' Le Monde, 28 July 1994, p. 17.
6. 'Atun contra Europa,' El País, 1 August 1994, p. 8; 'Des chalutiers espagnols bloquent le port d'Hendaye,' Le Monde, 27 July 1994, p. 17.
7. See 'Navy moves in to stop tuna war "wolf packs"', London Times, 5 August 1994, p. 1, and 'Los boniteros espanoles rompen redes ilegales a barcos británicos e irlandeses,' El País, 8 August 1994, p. 21.

8. See 'Navy moves in to stop tuna war "wolf packs"', London Times, 5 August, p. 1.
9. Neutral among the contestants, Greenpeace poured oil on troubled waters by reporting Spanish vessels in the Mediterranean whose nets were easily as long as the British and French ones in the Bay of Biscay 'Dos meses de tensión y de incidentes,' El País, 22 August 1994, p. 21.
10. Greenpeace took its complaint to Brussels, but it was never a central actor in the drama and was dismissed by most of the principals. A Cornish fishing representative summed up the feeling of all three sides about the pesky Greenpeace militants when he sniffed; 'I don't see what any of this has got to do with them. They've got rich parents so I suppose they can afford to waste time going out to Biscay Bay for no obvious reason.' See 'Rainbow warrior attacked,' London Times, 7 August 1994, pp. 1-2.
11. See "Canada Fishing Dispute Grows," Manchester Guardian Weekly, 19 March, 1995, p. 1.
12. See 'Net losses from the Battle of Biscay,' London Times, 5 August 1994, p. 14. The press coverage was peppered with pungent characterizations of each of the groups from the other participants. The Spanish saw themselves as men of iron sailing ships of wood, using their traditional 'artes' to catch their tuna, and defending the fish population from marauding drift netters. The claim would have more substance were it not that the Spanish, with 400 vessels to the 50 French and 11 British, take in more tons of tuna than all the other fleets combined. Thus sniffed the London Times in a self-righteous editorial of 5 August, 1994, p. 17.
13. 'Net losses from the Battle of Biscay,' p. 14.
14. 'Tempers run high,' London Times, 7 August 1994, p. 2.
15. Guardian Weekly, 19 March, 1995, p. 12.
16. It has gone curiously unrecognized in the context of European integration largely because scholars turning to the European Union do so from the standpoint of economic integration, legal integration, or international relations. To the extent that they focus on transnational conflicts, they are usually either between states or

European interest groups. For some of the best work in this tradition, see Greenwood, Grote and Ronit, eds. (1992) and Mazey and Richardson (1993a and b). For a critique of the exclusive focus on lobbying and bargaining, and the lack of attention to collective action, see my "Europeanization of Conflict."

17. See Lynne Wozniak, "Industrial Restructuring and Political Protest in Socialist Spain," Cornell University PhD Dissertation, 1991. The transfer of forms of collective action from one sector to another is one of the cardinal features of cycles of protest. On this point, see Tarrow, Power in Movement, ch. 2.

18. The most important theoretical work on the relationship between networks and communities has been done by Wellman, Carrington and Hall. See their 1988 article and the sources cited there for an introduction.

19. Among the newer approaches to transnational movements, a vast literature is developing. See Brysk, Jenkins and Schock, Keck and Sicking, Kowaleswski and Hoover, Pagnucco and Atwood, Pagnucco and McCarthy, the special issue of Peace Review in 1994, Rosenau, Smith (1994, n.d. and 1995), Smith and Pagnucco, and Smith, Pagnucco and Romeril. Also see the special issue on "Mondialisation et mutations politiques" in Etudes Internationales, 1993. An important sub-field in this development is communal, ethnic and nationalist conflict. See the contributions in Midlarsky, ed., and especially Ted Gurr's article, "The Internationalization of Protracted Communal Conflict" and his book, Minorities at Risk.

20. Even casual readers of the historical collective action literature will recognize here my debt to Charles Tilly, whose forthcoming Popular Contention in Britain, 1750 - 1824 condenses many of his teachings on the subject, and to Benedict Anderson's Imagined Communities, from which the concept of "modularity" comes. My own conclusions on the development of the social movement can be found in Power in Movement, Part One.

21. The sources for this assertion are legion. Those which make the strongest claim about the implications of internationalization for collective action are the Research Working Group on World Labor at Binghamton University (1986 and 1995), Rosenau and O'Neil. Among those who see the strongest challenge to the nation state in this development are Carnoy, et, al, Castells, Holm and Sorensen, and Ohmai.

22. I am grateful to Elizabeth Perry for this information on Taiwan.

23. The literature on political opportunity structures has grown too large to summarize easily. For a survey through 1987, see Tarrow (1988). For an attempted theoretical synthesis, see Chapter 5 of my Power in Movement. For an application to the new social movements of Western Europe, see Kriesl, et al, and to the peace movement, see Pagnucco and Smith (1993).

24. A personal example: In February 1995, I received an E-mail message from a correspondent in Italy, who had received it from a correspondent in South Carolina, who had a message from San Cristobel de las Casas in Chiapas that the Mexican army was attacking the city. I brought it to class to share with my graduate students. I found that two of them had the same message by a different route and had already forwarded it to friends around the country. For a discussion of the role of new computer technologies in the Zapatista insurgency, see Frederick (1995), pp. 7 - 8. For the electronic sources, see his notes nos. 17 - 21.

25. Two studies which trace this transference are Isaac Hourvich's Immigration and Labor and Steven Fraser's Labor Will Rule, ch. 1. I am grateful to my colleague Nick Salvatore for alerting me to the importance of the Jewish Bund in the founding traditions of the New York garment trades.

26. For an introduction to the Argentine case, see del Campo, Godio and Palamino, and Zorrilla. On Chile, see Ansell and Barria Seron. For a comparative analysis of the development of the labor movements in France and Chile, see Valenzuela (1979). I am grateful to Hector Schamis for calling the Latin American example of transnational labor movements to my attention.

27. Quoted by Anderson on p. 32 of his "Language, Fantasy, Revolution," from Shiraishi Takashi's "Islam and communism: An Illumination of the People's Movement in Java, 1912 - 1926", p. 360.

28. See the fascinating paper by Susanne Rudolf, "Religion, The State and Transnational Civil Society," which points out that religious communities are among the oldest of the transnationals" (p. 1). She goes on to argue that they are among the most enthusiastic creators of what she calls "transnational civil society." Note that the same term is used -- apparently independently -- by Frederick, in his paper on electronic communications.

29. The most accessible sources on the centrality of social networks to movement mobilization are: Emirbayer and Goodwin, Gould, Fernandez and McAdam, Jackson, Macy, McAdam (1982 and 1988), Morris, Oberschall, Pinard, Rosenthal, et. al, Wellman, Carrington and Hall and, for Latin American guerilla movements, Wickham-Crowley.

30. Discussions of the "collective action problem" based on Mancur Olson's work inevitably took a prisoner's dilemma framework for granted through the 1980s (see Hardin, 198, for the best example). Subsequent work has elaborated other models, such as the "assurance model" of Dennis Chong and the critical mass model of Marwell and Oliver, both of which build on network concepts -- the former implicitly and the latter explicitly. For a more historically-based approach which starts from transaction cost theory, see my Power in Movement, ch. 1.

31. See Lowell Turner, "Beyond National Unionism?" and Carl Strikwerda, "Between the Market and the Nation-State.". On the other hand, the Research Group on World Labor sees a growth in labor insurgency in the periphery and semi-periphery as the result of the displacement of capitalist production from the core to those areas (1995:181-2). These change are difficult to assess without taking account of the different periods of economic crisis in the West (the 1970s) and the South (the 1980s).

32. See the discerning work of Dan Thomas on the outcomes of the Helsinki accords in his unpublished paper, "the Helsinki Movement", and his forthcoming "International Norms and Political Change: The Helsinki Process and the Fall of Communism in Eastern Europe."

33. I am drawing on the current Cornell dissertation research of Lambert Gingras, to whom I am grateful for the information on which this comment is based. See his unpublished paper, "The Transnationalization of Protest: Eco-Aboriginal Politics in Hudson Bay."

34. See the thesis of Louise Silberling, "Social Movement Activity as a Factor in Successful Common Property Regimes: The Case of the Brazilian Rubber Tappers."

35. The contributions to Dodson and Montgomery, Van Vugt and Wickham-Crowley all touch on the role of Ecclesiastical Base Communities in the development of peasant empowerment in Central America, but we continue to need an integrated study of their relationship to the more militant networks which aided the guerilla movements.

36. As this essay was being completed, a national protest against Newt Gingrich's "contract with America" was being organized through the internet. See the New York Times, 29 March, 1995, p. A20, for a report.