

Enclosure of an Important Wildlife Commons in Zambia¹

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Abstract:

Begun under colonialism, enclosure of communal land in protected areas and restrictions on “traditional” rights in wildlife have become more pervasive under the Zambian state. Both the boundaries inscribed on the land and the legal borders to wildlife access have affected adversely the welfare of residents within the Luangwa Valley’s Munyamadzi Game Management Area (MGMA), an important safari concession surrounded on three sides by National Parks. This case study examines the history of these enclosures and their effects upon the livelihoods of rural residents.

In the 1930s, the colonial administration declared large sections of land as game reserves followed in 1945 by the establishment of Controlled (hunting) Areas, the latter under Tribal Authorities. Colonials also restricted firearms in Africans’ hands and instituted game licenses to control legal access to game.

After independence in 1964, the Zambian state re-designated these game reserves as national parks while unilaterally incorporating additional land into the South Luangwa National Park. In addition, the state has withdrawn progressively many earlier concessions on local wildlife uses and on protection of residents from depredation by large mammals. Since its inception in 1988, a donor-sponsored “community-based” wildlife program (ADMADE) further restricts “traditional” land and wildlife uses as the state seeks to maximize revenues from the added-value of the wildlife-tourist and safari hunting markets. Structural adjustments, neo-liberal economic policies, and the transformation of the national wildlife agency into a semi-autonomous authority (ZAWA) in the 1990s have resurfaced for MGMA residents the litigious issues of land and wildlife access.

Information from a questionnaire administered to 460+ MGMA residents during 2006 describes some local activities about the land issue, about the high costs of living with wildlife without an agency committed to protecting human life and property, and about the persistence of and high percentage of local residents arrested for “poaching.”

Key Words: *Wildlife access, land enclosure, impacts local welfare, cultural change, Zambia*

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Introduction

As in most African rural societies, land and its products are critical components in the life and livelihoods of Valley Bisa residents in Zambia's central Luangwa Valley. At different times during the past 150 years, other groups and agencies have sought this land and fought over access to its products, particularly wildlife. This case study describes the most significant of these engagements with outsiders from the perspective of Valley Bisa residents. The references for this exercise are reviews of archival and published documents filtered through four decades of field studies including, more recently in 2006, an open-ended questionnaire administered to 460 residents.

Pre-colonial (1850-1890)

Before 1890, the Luangwa Valley was an open commons to predatory warlords and mercantile traders seeking wealth in human captives and natural products. Residents were few, mobile, and associated with these powerful outsiders in various ways that provided them important trade goods and different strategies for coping within this open and chaotic environment. Slaves, skins, ivory, cloth, iron goods, and salt, separately and together, provided the wealth that stimulated trade and warfare between various groups. Gangs of enslavers and elephant hunters supported by foreign (Yao, Arab, Swahili, Chikunda) and by neighboring more powerful groups (Bemba, Ngoni) preyed upon this region for decades. Prior to the assumption of colonial hegemony, some historians have characterized this landscape as a "rising tide of violence" as the demand, both internal and external, for slaves and ivory increased. On such a "scourged frontier," political and social orders were frequently challenged and created while the status of most persons remained nebulous and fluid (Alpers, 1975; Birmingham, 1976; Langworthy, 1983).

The reasons for mentioning these tragic and chaotic circumstances are two-fold. First, several community-based wildlife programs within the Luangwa Valley, conceptualized during the 1980s, were premised upon the presumption that residents during this pre-colonial period had well-established "traditional" means of wildlife management. Further these relationships were ignored and destroyed by the incoming colonial administrators (Mwenya, Lewis, and Kaweche, 1990) Whereas there might have been customary norms relating to wildlife uses in these decades, more likely these were parochial, contingent upon the whims and the political agenda of the next passing warlord. At this time, conditions were not conducive for laying down the basic principles for "traditional conservation" which wildlife planners claimed existed and upon which they based their project and program narratives. Yet, such "traditions" can begin, innovate, flourish, and dissipate within shorter or longer frames, contingent upon a host of influences. Such a "traditional" efflorescence of wildlife management occurred

later (1940-1980s), at the very time planners were busy implementing their own “top-down” and outside driven schemes.

Secondly, Valley Bisa survivors of these times assimilated and passed on much from what they learned from these successive waves of protagonists and warlords. From the elephant hunters (particularly the Chikunda) and slavers (Swahili and Yao), they learned new techniques and technologies for hunting and warfare, participated in wide ranging trade networks, incorporated novel products and plants, while studying innovative strategies for survival and their placement within other-directed political structures (Isaacman & Isaacman 2004). These exposures gave them new information and the means to interact within their environments and with others.

Early Colonialism- under the British South Africa Company (BSAC) 1890-1923

In his struggles during 1894 to garner the resources and men to stop the slave trade, BSAC Commissioner Harry Johnston reported that the “constant hunting of man by man keeps the whole country in a state of unrest.” Yet it was the nature of this newly claimed territory (British Central Africa) as “one of the finest hunting grounds in the world” which attracted his interest, for Johnston made significant contributions to regional natural history. During 1893, this protectorate exported 1912 tons of ivory, which then was its most valuable export. Johnston expected this export to grow once he established control over the Arab traders and the protectorate’s people. He was convinced that “natives armed with guns ...indiscriminately shoot every elephant they come across,” therefore every firearm must be controlled, registered and licensed.¹

Beginning with the BSAC, every successive government has expressed alarm over the numbers of firearms in African hands and sought to control these weapons. Initially, these officials expressed their anxiety over a possible insurrection, but a basic concern was always that of Africans hunting and their devastating effects on game.² Beyond restricting firearms, the BSAC established several game reserves and licensing. European concern for the survival of wildlife in Africa, including their concern over the numbers of firearms, found expression in the first international wildlife convention held in London during 1900 (Astle, 1999).

In the earlier stages of its administration, the BSAC contributed to the breakdown and change in the role of chiefs. Chiefs were canny competitors, yet the company needed their local authority to control the distribution of people, manage labor, and collect taxes. Government agents sought to legitimize chiefs, to establish their ranks, and to delineate (often arbitrarily) their territories thereby establishing a stable hierarchy of “tribes,” “chiefs,” and “headmen.” Company agents changed dramatically the “traditional” role of chiefs by institutionalizing their positions within a fixed colonial chain of command. The chief was an agent of the state and his scattered headmen turned into monitors for compliance. Later, the administration reduced, somewhat subjectively, the numbers of recognized chiefs, a decision with long-term consequences (Marks, 2004).

The advent of colonialism brought different circumstances and established new boundaries some of which were restrictive while others opened opportunities for residents. The BSAC established an administrative center at Nabwalya and stationed a commissioner there from 1900-1908, then shifted this district center to Mpika, a more favorable site on top of the escarpment. These officers changed village life and livelihoods in many ways. Their new rules included villages (size, placement, number of residents), agricultural practices (prohibitions on shifting cultivation), and means for taking wildlife (prohibitions on guns, poisons, game pits). Residents resisted these bans forcing the administration to rescind or modify them. Pressed into new roles as various laborers for European enterprises, men learned new skills, spent months or years away from their families and established a pattern of labor migration for younger men.

Tsetse flies, hosts to the trypanosomes deadly for domestic stock and to humans, precluded the keeping of livestock by valley residents. Consequently, the Valley Bisa depended upon hunting of wild game as an important source of animal protein to complement their gathering and cultivation practices. Several rinderpest outbreaks during the 1890s, drastically reduced some species, yet wildlife populations recovered rapidly in the central valley and were important hunting targets for European sportsmen (Lyell, 1910). The spread of the tsetse flies following the recovery of wildlife populations together with many human cases of sleeping sickness caused the BSAC to close the valley to outsiders for portions of several decades beginning in 1912. These restrictions on outside movements in the valley heartland and their comparatively small numbers enabled the Valley Bisa to develop their own cultural practices and obtain a level of autonomy unlike many of their neighbors.

Later Colonial (1924-1963)

In 1924, Northern Rhodesia changed administrative status from that of a commercial company to that of a British colony. With the conclusion of the First World War, the era of settlers demanded new concerns about wildlife, including measures to control tsetse flies and other pests as well as wildlife damage to their stock and crops. Sportsmen and empire-minded individuals wanted extensive game reserves and protection for certain wild species. The Northern Rhodesian government responded by passing the 1925 Game Ordinance, which limited hunting to the purchase of licenses and created game reserves. During the late 1920s, the colonial government experimented with various elephant control schemes on tribal and commercial lands. In 1931, the Colonial Office employed Captain Charles Pitman, the game warden of Uganda, to make a game survey and report on elephant control for Northern Rhodesia (Pitman 1934).

Noting the “fairly progressive destruction of game,” Pitman adamantly wrote that it was “the indiscriminate harrying...without respite” by the Africans with muzzle-loading guns, day and night, that were to blame. Since elephants and buffalo were increasing apparently in numbers, he considered these

pugnacious beasts largely immune to this African onslaught. His report became the foundation upon which the colony eventually established elephant control, its game reserves, and, much later (1942), a game department.

Under Indirect Rule, chiefs and Native Authorities increasingly assumed responsibility for their subjects within their designated territories. Reifying differences between European and Africans, colonial administrators created different legal codes for each identity, systematizing African customs and denying them the fluidity they previously possessed (Mamdani, 1996). Yet, the fluid, fractured, and often violent cultural landscape found by the BSAC was not the fictive bedrock of “customary law” used by colonial reformists to construct and sanction their own rule (Chanock 1998). Even Pitman’s proposed schemes to curb African hunting resonated within this codifying frame. Transforming the African into a good citizen and the Native Authorities into colonial confederates were among Pitman’s recommendations for a game department.³ As the “traditional” rulers in Pitman’s view, the chiefs were the logical authorities to implement this policy provided they possessed increased powers catering to their “traditional” interests and hunting prerogatives. A provident administration, he noted, must show concern for its citizens’ meat supply, specially in “fly areas” where there was no domestic stock.

The colonial administration followed Pitman’s proposal to create extensive game reserves in the Luangwa Valley. The Valley Bisa lay claim to much of this land and many had settled along the two perennial streams in the middle of the valley. Pitman recommended that these villagers remain although their presence separated the two large game reserves west of the Luangwa River. This inhabited strip became the Munyamadzi Corridor. Other villagers living within the proposed reserve boundaries were required to resettle elsewhere. Defined as the course of the lower Mupamadzi River on the shifting sands of the Luangwa floodplain, the northern boundary of the south reserve became a perennial problem when the river shifted alienating some residents from their water supply. This shifted boundary was ground for persistent altercations between the district commissioner, residents, and the chief, against an intransigent game warden at Mpika beginning in 1947.

In 1936, an acting Game Warden formulated policies and planning. A minimally staffed Department of Game and Tsetse Control (DGTC) began in 1942 and expanded rapidly its European and African personnel after World War II. With no vehicle track into the Munyamadzi Corridor until 1960, all administrative and game visits into the valley were on foot with carriers lasting up to six weeks. The arduous foot journeys made these itinerant officials vulnerable to the discretions of local residents, circumstances that mellowed some officials, antagonized others, particularly wildlife officers. The missions and queries of game officers were often at loggerheads with local activities and livelihoods, and their institutional culture remained largely contentious and confrontational to residents.

Beyond protecting the game reserves, the DGTC declared large spaces around the reserves as Controlled Areas, thereby restricting hunting to residents on Native Trust Lands and expecting their chiefs to become proxy managers.

The stated intent behind these new areas was that residents learn “practical” wildlife conservation and restraint by husbanding their wild meat supply. When the department began sponsoring safari hunting (1950), these areas were further differentiated (1954) as First or Second Class Hunting Areas, with the issuing of all hunting licenses, for residents and others, in the former areas controlled by the DGTC. After independence, these zones became the Game Management Areas (GMAs) designed under the National Parks and Wildlife Act of 1968.

During these decades of Indirect Rule and distance from colonial authority, the Valley Bisa cult of the subsistence hunter emerged, flourished, and persisted into the late 1980s. These hunters incorporated many elements of their exposures to other cultures, built upon the economic and social dynamics of the times, managed weapon use, and developed under the patronage of a long-lived chief, its major cultural broker. This chief with a few elders constructed this cultural complex that epitomized the masculine virtues of potency, patronage, protection, and political savvy while subordinating women and younger men. Based in their management of firearms, rituals of authority, and access to wildlife, their patronage system depended upon a lineage currency of hunting and bush meat, distributing its benefits among clients by protecting their properties and lives while also providing animal protein. In activities and rhetoric, its practices complemented the roles of women in agricultural production and in human reproduction. Younger men became the labor migrants, bringing in cash for their lineages, and later some served as subordinate hunters (Marks 1976, 1979, 1984, forthcoming). The creative dimensions of this local institution was overlooked by the biologically oriented and external planners, who later scrambled to construct their own top-down wildlife management based in neo-liberal economics, premised upon continued centralized control, armed patrols, and propelled by massive donor contributions.

In the 1950s and after, the DGTC attempted to join the two sections of the large Luangwa Valley Game Reserves by enticing the Valley Bisa to resettle within or outside of the Munyamadzi Corridor. These attempts failed; under financial stringencies in 1958, DGTC staff retrenched and became a part of the Ministry of Native Affairs.

Post-Colonial- Independence (1964-1987)

Upon independence in 1964, the Department of Game and Fisheries (DGF) emerged as part of the Ministry of Lands and Natural Resources with increases in staff and funding. The department quickly revived its plans to resettle the Valley Bisa from the Munyamadzi Corridor within the context of the UNDP’s technical assistance program. In 1965, the Zambian Government approved a large-scale land and ecological survey of the Luangwa basin. The Luangwa Valley Conservation and Development Project operated between 1969 and 1973. This wide-ranging international project failed to achieve many of its goals, yet it helped rewrite legislation, reorganized the DGF as the National Parks and Wildlife Service (NPWS), and produced a number of large reports. The project and the new NPWS failed to resettle residents from the Munyamadzi

Corridor, a plan backed by many expatriates, as their strategy failed to gain political muster in other ministries where access to wildlife had become important in national political patronage (Gibson 1999). Yet these many years of political limbo further marginalized the Valley Bisa from developments that took place elsewhere in Zambia.

The DGF/NPWS was among the last Zambian agencies to divest itself of expatriates in its main administrative positions. These top roles became subject to nationalization in the mid-1970s as domestic funding and international assistance became scarce. Consequently, NPWS reduced all its operations and was unable to patrol the National Parks or to service its field staff. These reductions in operations coincided with widespread domestic financial strife and massive assaults on wildlife for ivory, rhino horn and for bushmeat. NPWS combated these dramatic increases in extra-illegal hunting and encroachments in its National Parks with help from international donors and non-governmental organizations. Four externally financed conservation and research projects materialized to save the Luangwa Valley's wildlife and divided the terrain into their respective spheres and projects.

These global engagements began with lodge owners, who witnessed these wildlife slaughters within the national parks that affected their enterprise personally. They founded "Save the Rhino Trust" with international funding with which they outfitted and trained para-military anti-poaching units. Although this group failed to protect rhinos, it focused world attention on what was happening and mobilized broader international support. Three internationally funded wildlife projects emerged, each with a different international sponsor, and each in a different region of the valley. These were the 'Luangwa Integrated Rural Development Project' (Norway), 'Administrative Management Design for Game Management Areas' (USAID, WWF, and WCS), and 'North Luangwa Conservation Project' (Germany-Frankfort Zoological Society). The former two programs operated within a neo-liberal framework combining conservation with development; the second, housed within NPWS, became Zambia's national "community-based based wildlife program" (ADMADE).

Post –Colonial (1988-2006) – Community-based Wildlife Program

Although NPWS personnel and expatriates in the Luangwa Valley may have developed some initial views about ADMADE, more powerful, international concerns soon over-shadowed and dominated their schemes.⁴ Began in 1987, ADMADE anchored its program in rural areas by "reinvesting" in the "colonial" chief embedded within the district political structure; yet NPWS headquarters remained the main decision-making body and power base.

In promoting "good governance" and "democracy" as the solution to the development crisis in Africa, the World Bank and European Union (EU) tied their financial assistance to neo-liberal funding policies and democratic practices (Easterly 2006). With more than 50% of its national budget dependent upon donor finances, Zambia had little space to negotiate with the mandated structural adjustments of donors. Neo-liberal policies mandated the reduction of state

power, the removal of welfare and subsidies, and the creation of “free markets” within which enterprise and democracy were expected to flourish. Seeking donor support after the political change of the 1991 Zambian elections, ADMADE enthusiastically embraced neo-liberal policies and community participation (Rakner,2003). Throughout the 1990s and into the 2000s, the EU struggled with the Zambian state to establish what it considered “good governance” for the wildlife estate under an autonomous, accountable and devolved wildlife authority. Consequently, the EU and donors played an active role in the creation of the Zambia Wildlife Authority (ZAWA) and the new Zambia Wildlife Act (1998).

The transition from NPWS to ZAWA has been a protracted, contentious, and an on-going process (Mwape, 2002; Changa Management Services, 2006). Since its implementation ZAWA has proceeded through a series of crises including numerous reshufflings in its leadership and within the Ministry of Tourism, lack of appropriate skills and resources within its ranks, inconsistent policies and directives, and the closure of hunting safaris (2001-03) by Presidential decree in which Community Resource Boards (CRB) received no payments. Whereas the new Wildlife Act provides the current concepts and appropriate language, there are no precedents for many regulations making it difficult to implement (Zambian lawyer, personal comment in June 2006). Intended as an autonomous body with wide-ranging functions, ZAWA’s main obstacles have been with finances, leadership, vision, and power.

Given its multiple constraints, neo-liberal underpinnings, unstable recent history and leadership, it is doubtful if ZAWA will be more likely than its predecessors in reconstructing rural livelihoods by combining conservation and development. The Zambia Wildlife Act (1998) followed donor prescriptions by predicating its structure upon building cooperative partnerships between businesses (tourism, including safari operators) and an elected Community Resources Board from the “local communities” within GMAs (“civil society”) under the guidance of a devolved and independent ZAWA. The chief serves “only as a patron” of the CRB, receives a designated stipend, and is represented within it by a counselor. The guidelines anticipate that “locally elected” CRB members will act on behalf of those who elected them in their respective Village Area Groups (VAGs), and, in conjunction with ZAWA, will negotiate beneficial co-management agreements with safari outfitters and tourist operators. It also expects the CRB to use its revenues equitably in development projects, assume the costs for anti-poaching, wildlife management together with some social services, and reassure its partners that GMA residents do not engage in unlawful wildlife transgressions (“poaching”). ZAWA discourse presumes that “capacity-building” remains THE community endeavor (rather than applicable also to ZAWA and tourist outfitters) and that “accountability,” “transparency,” and “good governance” are CRB attributes that must be validated upwards to ZAWA and thereby “accountable” outwards to the other contributing partners (tourist and hunting operators). Economic wildlife values are supposedly the engine, control, and the transformer in this enterprise.⁵

The initial “community-based” participation rhetoric of NPWS, allowing rural residents to “re-establish severed links with wildlife” and for “empowerment,”

has shifted to the CRB's mandate of "responsibility," "accountability," and "ownership" dictated by ZAWA assessments. In the conclusion of this paper, we present recent evidence on the resurgence of the land issue, the high costs to Munyamadzi GMA residents sustaining their livelihoods and property "unprotected" from large mammals, and for coping under a non-negotiated regime of legal wildlife endowments and extra-legal customary wildlife entitlements. At least in this valley and within this GMA, "wildlife conservation" is driven (underground) by force (anti-poaching) and by external funds rather than by the "incentives" and benefits so prominently boasted by its proponents.

Land and the Current Costs of Living with Wildlife (2006)

For four months in 2006, one of us and a local team of Munyamadzi GMA residents administered an open-ended questionnaire to 460 other residents. We sought their assessments about changes in their lives particularly after eighteen years under ADMADDE. In addition and separately, we interviewed past and present members of the CRB, wildlife scouts, safari workers and others to obtain their insights into the same program. As much of this information is still being analyzed, we report on a small subset that is linked to the earlier information on land and on wildlife presented in this paper.

Land

The issue of the "un-negotiated" land boundary between the South Luangwa Game Reserve (1930s), the South Luangwa National Parks- embracing Chifungwe Plain (1972), and the Munyamadzi GMA re-surfaced on the local scene in 2001. Both demarcations of protected area boundaries, by the colonial and independent governments involving large chunks of land claimed by Valley Bisa chiefs, occurred at the beginning and towards the ending of the late chief's reign (Astle, 1999: p.40). On both occasions, local allegations went unrecognized and as long as the recent boundary including Chifungwe Plain into the National Park remained ill-defined, the issue remained in Bisa cultural memory. The topic surfaced as a volatile issue as ZAWA sought to define this boundary with permanent beacons without consulting residents and to marginalize the new chief by constituting the CRB as the "decision-making body" for the "community." 2001 was also the beginning of the Presidential moratorium on safari hunting when ZAWA apparently used funds designated for GMA communities to sustain itself. In defending local interests, the chief has written numerous documents and letters, organized local meetings, registered a local NGO to receive funding, and made trips to Lusaka to protest these land claims and to present his case against ZAWA (see Figure 1). There has been at least one attempt by ZAWA and the Land Commission to settle the boundary issue (2004), but this mission met with a hostile local reception. In 2007, ZAWA allegedly arrested and retained several residents over this boundary problem. To my knowledge, this land and lack of trust between ZAWA and residents remains contentious and unresolved.

Loss of Life and Limb

Living with wildlife, particularly the larger mammals and predators, has high costs for residents. All wildlife incursions on human life and welfare within this GMA are highly charged representations of ZAWA's neglect and repression, particularly since it and its predecessors were responsible for disarming residents rendering them dependent upon bureaucratic and ineffective responses for these challenges. Elders remember the years when they were armed and capable of defending lives and property as well as those when the state provided villagers with receptive Elephant Control Guards for their protection. A common complaint for many years is that ZAWA, together with the community scouts under their command, refuse to investigate or respond to local requests for protection against marauding animals.⁶ Scouts argue that lack of ammunition, compelling patrol duties, disbelief in the indicated destruction, or lack of manpower are their reasons for not assisting.

Each year, some residents experience fatal or maiming encounters with wild animals. For an 18- year period (1990-2007), we assembled a minimum of 90 deadly and 124 injuries between residents and wildlife within the Munyamadzi GMA (Table 1). Crocodiles killed or maimed the most victims, mainly women and young people, who spend considerable time each day at the rivers washing, bathing, or collecting water. Elephant, buffalo, and lions also caused numerous casualties.

ZAWA expresses its interests in wildlife by progressively reducing the endowment and entitlements of residents through restrictive licensing quotas and through close surveillance in law enforcement ("anti-poaching"), which theoretically increase revenues from those more privileged to purchase access and licenses. ZAWA passes on a fraction of these revenues to the CRBs. Concession operators also restrict resident activities such as fishing, collecting and constructions in places where they search for game trophies. An outcome of these policies for the Valley Bisa, now restricted within a narrow corridor of land marginal for agriculture, has become an increased dependency upon outside agencies for relief aid and for employment, and for others, morbidity and despondency amid mounting uncertainties.

Cultural Protest and Continuous "Poaching"

Until the advent of ADMAD in 1988, Munyamadzi resident hunters experienced comparatively few and intermittent challenges to their locally assumed entitlements in wildlife. Given the dismal state of financing and staffing by NPWS, plateau outsiders, some of whom acting in consort with few locals, assumed valley wildlife was an "open-access resource" and came in droves to slaughter wildlife on a commercial basis. Yet for most residents, wildlife was never an open-access asset for comparatively few local men had the means and legitimacy to make its pursuit plausible. When local hunters took wildlife, their motivations were largely cultural and parochial, for protection and for animal protein, social processes grounded in patron-client relationships within a "wealth

in people” system (Marks, 1979, 2005, forthcoming). The perceived unfairness of the present wildlife management system, perceived as high personal costs together with meager and unfair distribution of benefits, lends social legitimacy to hunters and trappers based in memory, cultural identity, and entitlements even as these endowments remain unsanctioned by the state.

A plausible assumption is that after 18 years, a successful and accepted “community-based” wildlife program would accumulate significant legitimacy and local reputation to deter community members from taking the assets of which they were designated “the primary beneficiaries.” Given the acknowledged bias and “unfairness” of the current allocation of licensing and wildlife quota⁷, residents generally find surreptitious ways to get around the licensing protocols even as many endure prosecution and stiff sentences for non-compliance with the state’s formal regulations. The following tables from the 2006 dataset provide some dimensions to these cultural proclivities.

The percentages of those reporting their own arrests or that of close relatives in each Village Area Group (VAG) varied from 51 to 19 percent (Table 2). The highest response was in Nabwalya VAG, the headquarters of the resident head wildlife police officer. In this the most populated VAG, residents encountered wildlife scouts at any time returning from patrols, from other camps, or attending meetings. Yet with its high employment, Nabwalya offered a tempting local market for those with game meat, especially for those without other means of raising cash. In contrast, Chilima VAG was a string of villages close to safari camps where men competed for jobs and recognized that infractions of game laws were a liability to their chances for employment.

The team recorded 174 different arrests spread over several decades. The high percentage of arrests recorded, 38 percent (174/460), among respondents or their kin, is deplorably high; moreover, this rate hasn’t varied much over the years.⁸ Men report vivid accounts of their confrontations with wildlife scouts together with the beatings and humiliations suffered at the hands of younger scouts or while in prison. Few said that these experiences had changed their views on wildlife entitlements or reduced their own hunting or snaring activities, only that they used techniques that were harder to detect. Older accounts of arrests were less robust than recent ones; women generally remembered fewer details than did men. Arrests of uncles, nephews, brothers, sons, and cousins indicate that social relationships and lineage affiliations⁹ remained important in taking wildlife and in sharing (Table 3).

The most numerous wildlife species cited in a resident’s arrests (n=72) were buffalo (21), impala (20), elephant (11) with the latter species linked mostly with outsiders. With ZAWA retrenched and with few (5) police officers in the MGMA, community scouts have assumed major responsibility for law enforcement. The main “poachers” in 2005-06 were well-armed large groups (3-5 hunters, 20-40 carriers) from the plateau, who descended to the valley to kill, flay the carcasses, and leave as quickly as possible. They count on killing several larger and small mammals each trip mainly for the meat. The smaller patrols of ill-armed community scouts fear these larger, better-armed groups and rarely confront them (Brown & Marks, 2007). Years earlier, most residents

switched their sights from larger to smaller prey (Table 4) as these were easier to hide and the silence of snares gave little indication of site (Clark & Marks, 1995).

As a criminal violation, scouts took many violators to the tribunal at Mpika (district headquarters) where, if convicted, judges gave choices of either a fine or imprisonment. Imprisonment became the more probable sentence as fines increased with inflation and rose beyond the means of relatives or dependents (Table 5). The latter, who remained in the villages, suffered their losses in other ways. Judges sometime released first offenders or suspects, if scouts produced insufficient evidence. An option, often insisted upon by the chief, was to review each case prior to its dispatch to the district. An informal sentence of labor or dismissal was always an option for those with important connections.

A Conclusion

Language and the “cultural lens” through which outsiders describe, learn about, or plan policies intended to shape the lives and livelihoods of others may deflect closer scrutiny as to what might be happening on the ground. This case study shows that attempts by state officials and outside experts to manage the natural resources, upon which other smaller groups depend, has led to counter-productive outcomes and to inimical results for the supposed “beneficiaries.” In the recent past, the Valley Bisa constructed their own institutions and means to sustain themselves with animal protein and to protect their lives and properties. None of these values or functions find valence within the current “community-based” wildlife programs under ZAWA’s current tutelage or in neo-liberal doctrines. Enforcement alone converts few, particularly when these rules blatantly privilege others. “Governance,” “elections,” “community-based,” along with “poaching” and “traditions” include a host of normative assumptions that deter closer looks into their range of effects on others’ welfare.

Insiders and outsiders know that the persistent use and strength in local wildlife entitlements are products of many causes, including people’s close proximity to wild animals, various uncertainties, and powerful cultural traditions backed by social legitimacy. Time and circumstances will tell whether the current alignment of outside conservation and business forces have the wherewithal in plans and resources to transform into their own images the lives and livelihoods of residents now within the central Luangwa Valley.

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Figure 1
Chief Nabwalya's Conference on the Land Issue and
Relations with Zambia Wildlife Authority (ZAWA) June 2006




TABLE 1

**NUMBERS OF PERSONS KILLED OR MAIMED BY WILD ANIMALS
MUNYAMADZI GMA, CENTRAL LUANGWA VALLEY, ZAMBIA
1990-2007**

NUMBERS OF PERSONS PER TWO YEAR INTERVAL

Killed/ Wounded	By Animal	1990- 1991	1992- 1993	1994- 1995	1996- 1997	1998- 1999	2000- 2001	2002- 2003	2004- 2005	2006- 2007	Total
Killed	Elephant			1	4	1		3	3	2	14
Wounded	Hippo						2	1	1		4
Killed	Buffalo			1				2	1	4	8
Wounded	Buffalo	3	3	2	2			3	4	6	23
Killed	Lion			1	2			2	1	1	7
Wounded	Lion		1		2		1		2		6
Killed	Hyena	2									2
Wounded	Hyena	2	3		1						6
Killed	Crocodile	5	10	6	7	8	3	5	6	9	59
Wounded	Crocodile	22	10	5	9	12	1	10	8	8	85

Sources: Clinic and Wildlife Records in addition to Local Diaries, Letters, Personal Notes and Observations

Table 2

Numbers of Respondents Interviewed and Percentages Reporting Arrests for Wildlife Violations in each Village Area Group (VAG), Munyamadzi GMA, Zambia (2006 questionnaire)

Arrests by	Village Area Group (n= number of respondents)				
	Pelembe (n=124)	Chilima (n=100)	Nabwalya (n=116)	Kalimba (n=56)	Kazembe (n=64)
Self/close relative	28%	19%	51%	41%	39%
<i>Recording by gender of respondent</i>					
Men- self, relative	35%	16%	52%	41%	44%
Women- relative	20%	22%	48%	42%	29%

Table 3

**Relationship of Person Arrested to Respondent by Gender
Munyamadzi GMA, Zambia (2006 questionnaire)**

Relationship	Men		Women	
	Number	%	Number	%
Self	40	33%	-	-
Uncle/nephew	33	27%	8	15%
Brother	27	22%	16	30%
Husband	-	-	9	17%
Cousin/unspecified relative	15	12%	6	12%
Father	4	3%	3	6%
Son/grandson	1	1%	7	13%
In-law	1	1%	2	4%
Mother/friend	-	-	2	4%
Totals	121	99%	53	101%

Table 4

**Types and Numbers of Wildlife Offenses by VAG
Munyamadzi GMA, Zamiba (2006 questionnaire)**

Offense	Pelembe	Chilima	Nabwalya	Kalimba	Kazembe
Hunting	9	2	18	8	10
Suspected of Hunting	13	-	14	-	3
Found with Meat	2	5	14	3	4
Meat in Home	4	-	6	4	3
No weapon license	4	2	3	5	2
Suspected owing gun	-	6	1	1	-
Stealing wires (for snares)	1	-	4	-	-
Fishing offense	3	1	-	-	-
Selling ivory	1	-	-	2	-
Assault	1	-	-	1	1
Other*	-	1	-	-	1
Totals	38	17	60	24	24

* includes 1 count of protecting poachers; 1 count of digging for emeralds

Table 5

**Years of Arrest and Types of Punishment Given
Munyamadzi GMA, Zambia (2006 questionnaire)**

Sentence Taken	Groups of Years			Totals
	<1989	1990-1999	>2000	
Prison (Mpika)	7	13	39	59
Fine	6	5	6	17
Release	3		17	20
Labor (in valley)	1		9	10
Suspended Sentence			5	5
Gun Confiscated			2	2
Totals	17	18	78	113

¹ Quotes for Johnston are from ‘Report of Commissioner Johnston *Report on the Eastern Portion of British Central Africa*, dated 31 March 1984, Public Record Office, FO2/66.

² Unlike Astle’s (1999: p86) claim that “there is no evidence” that BSAC were “unduly concerned about hunting by villagers” in controlling guns and munitions, this information and other BSAC actions indicate that “saving the game” , or at least outside access to wildlife, was very much at the heart of these efforts.

³ Pitman considered a game license essential for Africans for it would discourage licentiousness in shooting whatever and whenever they pleased. Citizenship was the ideal Pitman had when he wrote, “the game license...should gradually teach (the African) not only to exercise self control, but also to realize that he must take his share in shouldering the burdens of the community, and for the privilege of killing ‘game’ animals- the state ownership of which must be recognized- he should pay a fee.” (Pitman 1934 p.133). His concern for citizenship carried some of the same baggage and bigotry as the English Game Laws (*Ibid*, p. 108)

⁴ Gibson (1999) describes the history and political background for the Zambian transition to a “community-based” wildlife program, while Manspeizer (2004) details the more recent change from NPWS and the chaotic beginnings of the “autonomous” Zambia Wildlife Authority (ZAWA). For other views on these changes see (Lewis & Carter, 1993) and numerous papers published by the African College for Community-based Natural Resource Management.

⁵ Under the Zambia Wildlife Act (1998) the re-distribution of revenues from hunting licenses and fees are set by the Minister of Tourism ; some have expressed concerns that the CRBs and GMA communities may be receiving less funds than under the earlier ADMADE program. For example, now CRBs receive 45% of hunting fees but only 15% of concession fees. ZAWA retains 40% of the former and 80% of the latter. Concession fees are important symbolically and perhaps in revenues. See www.zawa.org.zm/cbnrm.htm (accessed 12/5/2007). Also under the Zambia Wildlife (Licences and Fees) Regulations, 2003 can charge research fees for any research in rural areas where there is wildlife, including GMAs and Open Areas.

⁶ Numerous observations, written accounts, even local ZAWA dairies support these vocal complaints.

⁷ In 2007, ZAWA allocated 108 major game species licenses (buffalo, hippo, impala, puku, warthog) to MGMA residents and 152 licenses of the same species to safari operators. In addition, safari operators received licenses for a total of 291 licenses. Some of the meat taken by safari clients were also distributed to residents. As some local residents are privileged in their access to purchase local licenses, many resident licenses end up in the hands of the safari operators as well.

⁸ Earlier records, including a more recent survey in villages around Nabwalya indicate that arrests in some areas were even higher.

⁹ Husbands, fathers, and in-laws were fewer and from different lineages than those of respondents.