

DRAFT

The Ostrom Workshop and Its Contributions to a
Second Generation Research Agenda in Policy Studies ¹

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INTRODUCTION

A growing number of notable scholars are arguing recently that the policy studies literature has seen its “salad days” (Peters, 2013; John, 2012). Political science in particular, Peters argue, has not made significant theoretical and empirical contributions to the policy studies literature in the 1980s. Peters attribute this decline to “the dominance of methodological individualism and to a lesser extent with behavioralism” in the political science literature. He notes that policy scholars have been turned off by the “(seemingly) simple assumptions of rational choice models which are insufficient to capture the complex processes through which policies are formulated and then implemented.”

Reinvigorating Policy Studies

Attempts to reinvigorate the literature roughly fall into four categories: variations of the same theme, revival of old themes, synthetic grafting and borrowing. Variations of the same theme are typical in attempts to extend and tweak in the margins well-established frameworks and models such as the Advocacy Coalition Framework, policy sub-systems, the Institutional Analysis and Development Framework, Punctuated Equilibrium or network governance. Students of Sabatier, Ostrom, Howlett, Jones, Agranoff and other leading figures in the literature have carried on the work of their mentors and have sustained this “variations of the same theme” approach to reinvigoration.

A second approach involves a revival of old themes in the literature or what Peters (2013) refer to as “revisiting old friends.” This is the case for attempts to revive the policy design and instrument choice literature, which is still at its early stages of development (see for example Howlett and Ramesh, 2012). Attempts to revive the implementation literature in

the late 1990s has become moribund and has not produced interesting ideas that has captured the imagination of scholars. A third approach – synthetic grafting, for instance by Real-Dato (2009), attempts to bring together disparate policy frameworks – i.e. multiple streams and windows framework, punctuated equilibrium, advocacy coalition framework - and graft them (artificially) into Ostrom’s institutional analysis and development framework. A fourth approach described by Peters (2013) involves borrowing ideas from other disciplines such behavioral economics (Thalen and Sunstein, 2008) and incorporation of risk and uncertainty in policy analysis (Dror, 1986, 1993).

Aims of This Paper

We propose a fifth approach to reinvigorate the literature – through blood transfusion - by explicitly infusing institutional theory drawn from the Ostrom Workshop in Political Theory and Policy Analysis - into the policy studies literature. Our aim is to start a conversation towards a second-generation research agenda on policy studies (PS 2.0), which is explicitly grounded in political and institutional theory.

We note that much of the literature has relatively been institutions free or do not explicitly recognize the institutional foundations of public policies. For instance, of the 98 panels in the 1st International Conference on Public Policy, only 5 percent *explicitly* takes institutional context into account while the rest are more implicit or hardly takes institutions into account. In the political science / policy studies literature, little or no explicit distinction is made by scholars between policies and institutions (but see Howlett, 1994 on the judicialization of Canadian environmental policy).

Rather, the literature has been focused on a limited number of themes but do not explicitly address the issues that interest policy studies scholars (see for example March, J. G., and J. P. Olsen (1996) for an overview on institutionalism, Weaver and Rockman (1993)

on how institutions matter, (xx) on the implications of path dependency and Pierson (2000) on institutional origins and change, among others.

By institutions, we refer to the formal and informal rules of the game and their enforcement mechanisms (North, 1990). By public policies we refer to the outcomes of the game – efficiency, equity, sustainability, democracy, and other normative values. Policy instruments are the means to achieve these outcomes – taxes, subsidies, regulations, insurance, policies that facilitate markets such as deregulation, property rights, among others.

To achieve our aim, we explore some of the main ideas and contributions of the Ostrom Workshop namely political theory, politics as the art and science of association, polycentricity, methodological individualism and behavioral rational choice, the 10-I heuristics of institutional analysis, methodological pluralism and hard-nosed empiricism, public entrepreneurship and the implications of language, ideas and ability to communicate.

Collectively, these ideas provide the epistemological and ontological foundations of the more well-known (but often misunderstood)³ Institutional Analysis and Development Framework associated with the Workshop. We then suggest some of their implications for the reinvigoration of the policy studies literature including agenda setting, policy sub-systems, politics and policy, instrument choice, implementation, learning and isomorphism. Finally, we argue that the limitations of methodological individualism that so dominated the political science literature, which led to the waning interest in policy studies can be overcome with

³ The IAD Framework, notes Sabbatier (1998) is the probably the most widely used framework of its kind in the US and Europe. However, we note that perhaps because the ontological and epistemological basis of the IAD framework is not well understood, there has been a tendency to mechanically apply the framework. For an example of the appropriate application of the framework, see Gibson, Andersson and Ostrom (2005).

second generation approaches to methodological individualism following Araral's 10-I heuristics on institutional analysis and methodological individualism.⁴

The rest of the paper is organized as follows. First, we explore some of the main ideas and contributions of the Ostrom Workshop. We then outline some of their implications to the policy studies literature. We conclude – like Peters (2013) – on a hopeful note.

CONTRIBUTIONS OF THE OSTROM WORKSHOP

The Ostrom Workshop has been described by Aligica and Boettke (2009) as “one of the most dynamic, well-recognized and productive centers of the New Institutional Theory movement.” Its ascendancy is considered to be the result of a unique combination of interdisciplinary theoretical approaches and hard-nosed empiricism. Their research agenda is an attempt to revitalize and extend into the new millennium a traditional mode of analysis illustrated by Locke, Montesquieu, Hume, Adam Smith, Hamilton, Madison and Tocqueville. As such, the Workshop tries to synthesize the traditional perspectives with the contemporary developments in social sciences and thus to re-ignite the old approach in the new intellectual and political context of the twentieth century.” In the sections that follow, we explore some of these ideas.

Political Theory

The first major contribution of the Ostrom Workshop to the policy studies literature is to explicitly ground policy analysis with political theory, thus the name Workshop in Political

⁴ Araral's 10-I Heuristics of Institutional Analysis focuses on individuals (or organizations) which are in interdependent situations having rational interests, but also influenced by irrational aspects, like instincts, identities, ideals and ideologies, acting on information and constrained or facilitated by institutions”. This heuristics provide a short hand to the second-generation theories of behavioral rational choice.

Theory and Policy Analysis. Political theory refers to “all effort to understand the institutional foundations of governance (and public policy) particularly how to relate philosophical principles and normative values to the practical challenges of implementing these principles and values in real world political institutions” (McGinnis, 2011). For instance, how might the normative values of the Golden Rule (do unto others what you want others do unto you) or Rousseau’s principle “the greatest good for the greatest number” be translated into the real world of institutional and policy design?

The political theories underpinning the Ostrom Workshop can be traced to the old tradition of Hobbes, Hamilton, Rousseau, Madison, Tocqueville, Hayek, Hume, Montesquieu, Polanyi, Confucianism, among others. Of these, Hobbes, Tocqueville and the Federalist Papers occupy a central place in the Workshop’s intellectual tradition. Hobbes used a normative method of inquiry - based on the assumption that individuals are selfish and driven by their passions (state of nature) – to arrive at a conclusion that a Leviathan (or absolute sovereign) is central to establishing and maintaining a social contract to govern a society of self-seeking individuals.

Vincent Ostrom critiqued the Leviathan as problematic because an absolute sovereign implies little or no accountability. In contrast, the Federalists provide an alternative theory of sovereignty founded on the idea of limited constitutions such that multiple centers of power are established to serve as a mechanism for checks and balances. By implication, institutions should be designed such that “ambition should be made to counter act ambition” (The Federalist Papers, xx). This is the central idea of polycentricity – a system of governance with multiple and overlapping but formally autonomous centers of power, which are capable of mutual adjustment to solve social problems. We outline the implications of polycentricity to policy studies in the sections that follow.

Tocqueville and Democratic Theory

Tocqueville has a particularly important influence in the intellectual tradition of the Ostrom Workshop. In writing about “Democracy in America”, he wondered why democracy has flourished in North America but not in Europe. He concluded that democracy in America was made possible because of three factors: 1) the geographical characteristics of the continent (which made it less vulnerable to the intricacies of European power relations) and its rich natural endowments (to support the development of settlements); 2) the characteristics of its Anglo-American settlers – their “habits of hearts and minds”; and 3) the institutions they built – churches, juries, townships. These three variables eventually became the contextual foundation of the Ostrom Workshop’s Institutional Analysis and Development (IAD) Framework.

Politics as the Art and Science of Association

A central contribution of the Ostrom Workshop is to extend the theoretical and empirical implications of Tocqueville’s notion of politics as the “art and science of association” and thus the possibility of, the necessity for and the vulnerabilities of self-governance and democracies.

Tocqueville’s conception of politics as the “art and science of association” calls for a reexamination of the conventional focus on The State and The central government by political science, policy studies and public administration scholars. As Vincent Ostrom asked “can we conceive of political science without default reference to the State or The Government?” This question may sound heretic to many colleagues in the profession today but Vincent’s concern must be seen and understood in the context of his critique of one of the most catastrophic social experiments in history: fascism, imperialism, and socialism – all of which were grounded on a Hobbesian world view.

In addition, as a democratic theorist, Vincent was rightfully concerned with the vulnerabilities of democracy in the context of modernization and globalization and over reliance on government. He therefore wanted to encourage political theorists to equally pay attention to politics as “the art and science of association” rather than its conventional preoccupation on The Government and The State.

Tragedy of the Commons

One important test to Ostrom’s theory of democracy (understood as self governance) is Elinor Ostrom’s (1990) work on the commons. In summary, E. Ostrom overturned on its head the conventional wisdom of the tragedy of the commons (individual rationality can lead to the over use of the resource). She argued that there is more to markets and states and concluded that self-governance in the commons is possible contrary to theoretical expectations. This work represents the contemporary version of the earlier work of Tocqueville (democracy in America) and authors of the Federalist Papers who argued that it is possible to design human constitutions by “reason and choice” rather than be subjected to “accident and force” (i.e. the Hobbesian state of nature in which life is short, nasty and brutish).

Behavioral Rational Choice

Second, the Ostrom Workshop is known for a brand of institutional analysis grounded in the theory of behavioral rational choice, also known as *methodological individualism*. This approach focuses on individual behavior, which recognizes the assumptions of bounded rationality and opportunism as well as the possibility for reciprocity and fairness and the importance of language as an instrument to communicate, reason, understand and make commitments. Developing methodological individualism as an analytic approach is seen by

the Ostroms as a logical step in developing politics as “the art and science of association” and the foundation of the second-generation theories of collective action.

Ostrom’s take on methodological individualism as an approach to institutional analysis is founded on the assumption that institutions – the rules of the game and their enforcement mechanisms - are human constructs and therefore are as fallible as human beings themselves. The assumptions of methodological individualism - bounded rationality, opportunism, norms of reciprocity and fairness and the importance of language - have important implications in the reinvigoration of the policy studies literature from the perspective of political science.

For instance, Peters (2013) noted that the demise of interest in political science in the policy studies literature has to do with the narrow assumptions of rationality typical in the public choice literature. Araral has proposed the 10-I Heuristics of Institutional Analysis grounded on methodological individualism to address these narrow assumptions regarding the individual actor. The 10-I heuristics focuses on individuals (or agencies) which are in interdependent situations having rational core and non-core interests, but are also influenced by irrational aspects, like instincts, identities, ideals and ideologies, acting on information and constrained or facilitated by institutions”. This heuristics provide a short hand to the second-generation theories of behavioral rational choice. For an illustration of institutional rational choice analysis, see Araral (2008).

Polycentricity

Third, the Ostrom Workshop is closely associated with the theory of polycentricity – a system of governance in which authorities with overlapping jurisdictions or centers of power interact to determine under which these authorities as well as citizens in these jurisdictions are authorized to act for public purposes (McGinnis, 2011).

The key feature of a polycentric social order according to Vincent Ostrom, is the ability of many independent units (multi-level, multi-purpose, multi-sectoral and multi-functional units) capable of mutual adjustment for the ordering of their relationships with one another within a general system of rules. Vincent appropriately referred to this as the political theory of a compound republic. For Lindblom (1965), this is what he meant by the intelligence of democracy - decision Making through mutual adjustment.

Thus in a polycentric social order, we find multilevel organizations (local, regional and national organizations), multi-purpose organizations (general purpose, special purpose, cross jurisdictional units); multi-sectoral (public, private, community, voluntary, hybrid), and multi-functional (provision, production, financing, sanctioning, monitoring).

The multiplicity of organizational forms, argues Ostrom, is a necessary but not sufficient condition for the functioning of polycentric political order. For such an order to function well, there must also be polycentricity in the organization of 1) market arrangements; 2) legal community; 3) constitutional rule; and 4) the requisite political conditions (elections, checks and balances, among others) (see Ostrom, 1972).

Rather than seeing this in a negative light as a problem of “duplication of functions” and “overlapping jurisdictions”, Vincent Ostrom and his colleagues saw this as positive, allowing the different municipalities to work out their own problems (McGinnis 1999), while achieving efficiency and choice of public goods and services through a system of competition and complementarity among the different municipalities, and co-production between the producers and consumers of public goods (V. Ostrom et al. 1955). This notion of polycentricity was further elaborated by Tiebout (1956) in his famous model where residents “vote with their feet” and by Oates (1972) in his model of “fiscal federalism”.

Public Entrepreneurship

Fourth, in addition to the multiplicity of organizational forms, the emergence and functioning of a polycentric social order very much depends on the degree of public entrepreneurship – by public, private and voluntary actors. Public entrepreneurship has particularly important implications for the efficiency of polycentric patterns of social order because of the real problem of policy paralysis or gridlock, a subject that has not received adequate attention to scholars of policy studies.

Here, it bears noting that the Ostrom Workshop's focus on public entrepreneurs predates by two decades the literature on policy entrepreneurs in Kingdon's (1984) Multiple Streams and Windows Framework and Sabattier's (1988) advocacy coalition framework. In fact, the dissertation of Elinor Ostrom (1963) is all about the role of public entrepreneurs in solving the water crisis in Los Angeles in the 1950s.

Language and Ideas

Fifth, the literature on ideational turn in the 1990s mostly concludes that ideas indeed matter to the development of policies and institutions (Schmidt, 2008). However, ideas alone do not make policies or institutions. Institutions and policies are human artifacts that require communication, reasoning, understanding and making commitment if they are to be effective in influencing human behavior.

Vincent's Ostrom's attention to language, reasoning and ideas predates by three decades the so-called "ideational turn" in the policy studies literature that flourished in the 1990s which basically examined how ideas influence the development of policies, (Blyth, 1997; Brun, 1999; Hall, 1993; Howlett and Rayner, 1995; Chadwick, 2000). However, unlike this ideational turn, Vincent Ostrom was concerned with a more fundamental question of whether or not it is possible for self interested individuals to design institutions by reason and choice (the Federalist thesis) or are they consigned to the Hobbesian state of nature where

human constitution arise from accident or force (the Hobbesian view). Elinor Ostrom explored the same theme when she challenged the conventional pessimistic view of the tragedy of the commons metaphor and the Prisoners Dilemma.

The Ostroms conclude that the ability to *communicate, reason, contest, understand and commit* makes it possible to design institutions by reason and choice rather than be subject of accident, force, tragedies or dilemmas. By implication, language is central in the development of culture and diverse forms of governance (such as polycentricity), which in turn, has important implications for the politics of policy and institutional design, implementation, agenda setting, actors and coalitions, policy learning and change, and indeed the ideational turn in policy studies. Language has been central to the Ostrom's conception of politics as the art and science of association.

Methodological Pluralism, Hard Nosed Empiricism

Seventh, the Ostrom Workshop is not only known for its theoretical contributions but also for its contributions to advancing methodological pluralism and hard-nosed empiricism. To test its theories, the Workshop has contributed to the development of a repertoire of tools and approaches that the policy studies literature can draw upon for reinvigoration. These include comparative institutional analysis, critical case studies, Tocquevillian analytics, multi-level analysis, laboratory and field experiments, analytic narratives, historical and evolutionary institutional analysis, agent based modeling, game theoretic modeling, use of econometric analysis, neural networks analysis, Geographic Information System, and their various combinations, among others (see Poteete, Janssen and Ostrom, 2009). A review of the literature would suggest that most of these methods and approaches are not yet familiar to scholars of policy studies.

In addition to its tradition of theory building and methodological pluralism, the Ostrom Workshop is also steep in the tradition of hard-nosed empiricism. While the policy studies literature has largely lost interest in policy evaluation in favor of public management (Peters 2013), the Ostrom Workshop has kept the tradition of evaluation. For instance, some 35 empirical studies on polycentricity, decentralization and the IAD framework has come out of the Ostrom Workshop ranging from studies on common pool resources, banking, education, health care, local public economies, among others in dozens of countries worldwide.

The IAD Framework

Collectively, these ideas – political theory - Hobessian, Tocquevillian, Federalist Papers analytics - methodological individualism, behavioral rational choice, 10-I Heuristics, institutional analysis – provide the epistemological and ontological foundations of the well known (but often misunderstood) Institutional Analysis and Development Framework coming out of the Ostrom Workshop.

The IAD as a framework has been designed to analyze the outputs (in the form of collective decisions) of human interaction by looking at the context or inputs of such interaction, and the action situation and patterns of interaction among bounded rational actors (Kiser and Ostrom 1982, Ostrom 1990). Due to the complexity of the issues in understanding collective action, IAD is specifically identified as a framework, rather than a theory or model (McGinnis 2011), that lays out the various factors that help determine how a collective decision is made and what are its outcomes. Figure 1 lays out the major components of the IAD framework.




Figure 1. Major components of the IAD Framework

Source: E. Ostrom 2005

The IAD Framework dissects the working of institutions using a “systems” approach that looks at the input-process-output-feedback cycle. Inputs are defined as “exogenous variables” or “contextual factors”, which consist of three parts. First, the nature of the good/service i.e. private goods, pure public goods, toll goods, and common pool goods, etc. is central to the design of effective and efficient institutions.

Second, the attributes of the community include trust, reciprocity, common understanding, social capital, and cultural repertoire including factors such as group size. These factors help shape how collective decision-making and collective action will play out among members of the community.

Finally, the rules that are used by the community - be they formal or informal – contribute to the processes of institutional actions. There are seven types of rules that are particularly significant: position rules, boundary rules, authority rules, aggregation rules, scope rules, information rules, and payoff rules.

The processes in the IAD Framework are contained within an action arena, which is “where individuals in positions take actions, in light of information, the control they exercise, and the payoffs they face, to attempt to achieve outcomes and results” (Ostrom, cited in McGinnis 2012). Here, the actors are “individuals” trying to make rational decisions in a certain “action situation” which binds their rationality. What goes on in the action arena could be described by the “10-i Heuristics of Institutional Analysis” (Araral, 2013): “individuals who are in interdependent situations having rational interests, but also influenced by irrational aspects, like instincts, identities, ideals and ideologies, acting on information and constrained or facilitated by institutions”. The interdependency of actors and their action situations require a strategic analysis of the possible moves available to each interacting actors. This strategic analysis could be done, for example, by game theoretic models (E. Ostrom et al. 1994, Holzinger 2003), which were quite extensively used by Elinor Ostrom and her associates.

Outputs of the action situation are then compounded by outputs of other related action situations to produce outcomes at the community level. These outcomes are then compared with the community’s “evaluative criteria” to determine whether they satisfy the needs of the community. Such evaluative criteria include: efficiency, equity, legitimacy, participation, accountability, fiscal adaptability, resilience, fiscal equivalence, and consistency with moral values (E. Ostrom 1990). The outcomes of the collective decisions, and results of evaluations, in turn, feed back to the inputs (contextual factors) and influences the following round of institutional decision-making.

The workings of institutional analysis as explained by the IAD framework happen at “three world of action” (Kiser and Ostrom 1982): the constitutional level, the collective choice level, and the operational level. This highlights that an action taken at a certain, more

practical level is embedded in actions taken at higher collective and constitutional choice levels. Thus, an attempt to change the institutions at an operational level often faces challenges if the institutions at the collective choice and constitutional levels are ignored.

IMPLICATIONS

In this section, we explore the implications of infusing institutional theory into the policy studies literature. We explore its implications in terms of agenda setting, policy sub-systems, politics and policy, instrument choice, implementation, learning and isomorphism.

First, *determinants of agenda setting* conceivably vary with a country's political institutions but this is not explicitly recognized in the agenda setting literature. Kingdon's (1984) multiple streams and windows model may be an appropriate metaphor in mature liberal democracies given the important role of political parties, think tanks, interest groups, bureaucracies and the media in shaping the policy agenda. This may not be the case, however, for illiberal democracies where these players are weak or non-existent. In countries where agents of the state are subject to capture by vested interests, agenda setting would be predictable compared to countries with more pluralist political traditions.

Second, the *formation, dynamics and performance of policy sub-systems* likewise cannot be divorced from their institutional context. Liberal democracies and polycentric systems would produce different policy sub-systems and advocacy coalitions compared to a one party state such as China or Vietnam. It is no longer enough to make a generic argument

that politics affect policies and policies affect politics. Rather, scholars would have to take a step further to show how certain political institutions – for instance parliamentary democracy or a federal structure – matters to the policy process or in policy implementation, for instance.

Third, the *effectiveness or efficiency of policy instruments* cannot be divorced from their institutional underpinning. For instance, the efficacy of regulatory and market based policy instruments would differ from countries with neo-liberal as opposed to ordoliberal (balance of markets and government intervention) democracies. The efficacy of regulatory instruments would also depend on the monitoring and enforcement capacities of the regulatory agency and their autonomy from vested interests. Furthermore, the impact of fiscal and monetary policies would also depend on whether a country has a parliamentary or presidential form of government. Parliamentary governments tend to incur larger budget deficits as a result of electoral cycles and coalition politics.

Fourth, the *effectiveness of policy implementation* depends on its institutional foundation – i.e. whether or not the state is federal / polycentric or unitarian and centralized or decentralized. In federal states, federal policies are often enforced by states, which enjoy some degree of independence and thus pose implementation challenges. In particular, the following characteristics of a polycentric system of governance – described by McGinnis (2011) poses important implications for policy implementation: 1) multi-level (i.e. local, provincial, national, regional, global units of governance); 2) multi-type (i.e. general purpose nested jurisdictions (as in traditional federalism) and specialized, cross-jurisdictional political units (such as special districts); 3) multi-sectoral (i.e. public, private, voluntary, community-based and hybrid kinds of organizations) and 4) multi-functional (i.e. incorporates specialized units for provision (policy making), production (or co-production), financing, coordination, monitoring, sanctioning, and dispute resolution). Policy

implementation in such a governance setting therefore poses a different kind of challenge than would in a centralized, top down form of governance.

Fifth, *legal traditions* (i.e. common law or civil law) have different implications for the development of public policies. In common law countries, legal precedents create stronger path dependencies for public policies than they do in civil law countries. Also, courts play a more active role in shaping the regulatory frameworks such as contract and tort law in common law countries vs. civil law jurisdictions. Despite its importance, the role of courts in policymaking remains a relatively under studied aspect of the policy studies literature. Countries with weak rule of law likewise suffer from the problem of credible commitment and systemic corruption, which surprisingly has not been systematically studied in the policy studies literature despite their obvious importance. For instance, none of the 98 panels in the 1st International Conference on Public Policy tackle these two issues.

Sixth, *policy learning, isomorphism and policy transfer* can likewise be sensitive to the institutional context. Countries that allow competition among states or local governments or have open, competitive economies would also have incentives to learn or innovate faster compared to countries where there are no similar competitive pressures. Countries with strong, professional bureaucracies are more likely to learn better and faster than countries with weaker bureaucracies. Countries where transaction cost is relatively low – for instance because of a strong rule of law – are more likely to adapt and learn faster and more effectively than in countries with high transaction costs.

Seventh, to evaluate the *effectiveness, efficiency, fairness and political feasibility* implications of a polycentric social order, several questions are warranted. First, to what extent is the correspondence of different units of government to the problem of externalities? Put differently, can externalities be internalized through institutional design? For instance,

negative externalities from individual EU member's trade, fiscal, labor and monetary policies in the EU has been internalized and harmonized in Brussels. The politics of a common fiscal policy has proved to be more difficult because it has been framed as a question of sovereignty. In Southwest United States, the politics and conflict of water allocation in the Colorado Riverbasin has been addressed through a regional body formed by and representing the interests of various stakeholders.

A second important question on the efficiency of polycentric arrangements pertains to the extent to which cooperative arrangements exists among units of governments to undertake joint activities of mutual benefit. Third and similarly, are there other decision-making arrangements for processing and resolving conflicts among different units of government? In many other cases where conflicts are intractable, the likely problem is that there is no effective correspondence of different units of government to regulate the problem of negative externalities nor are there established cooperative arrangements among units of governments to undertake joint activities of mutual benefit.

Finally, policy studies scholars should broaden their concerns beyond efficiency, equity, effectiveness and political feasibility to explicitly consider normative communitarian values such as *legitimacy, fairness, accountability, self-governance and citizenship*. To the Ostroms, these values were important in of themselves. However, they were also concerned with the larger issue of the feasibility, robustness or vulnerability of institutions of democratic governance. Indeed, Vincent Ostrom's classic works – *The Meaning of Democracy and its Vulnerability; The Political Theory of a Compound Republic; The Intellectual Crises of American Public Administration* – were all concerned at their core with the feasibility and vulnerability of democratic governance broadly defined in terms of polycentric governance. Likewise, Elinor Ostrom's work on the evolution of institutions governing the commons, the

second-generation theories of collective action, social capital, trust and reciprocity, institutional diversity among others, represents the micro-mirror of Vincent's work.

At the heart of the Ostrom Workshop's research program – to paraphrase Tocqueville - is question of whether or not societies of boundedly rational individuals are capable of designing human constitutions through reflection and choice (The Federalist argument) or they are forever destined to become the Hobbesian victims of force, accident, tragedies and dilemmas or Faustian bargains.

CONCLUSION

We have argued in this paper that the policy studies literature – at more than 50 years old – has seen its “salad days” (Peters, 2013) and is in need of reinvigoration. There are currently at least four ways the literature is being reinvigorated - through variations of the same theme (more of the same), revival of old debates (revisiting old friends), synthetic grafting and borrowing from other disciplines.

We argue for a fifth approach in the form of a blood transfusion – by explicitly infusing institutional theory in the policy studies literature. We suggested that the Ostrom Workshop in Political Theory and Policy Analysis – with its rich tradition of theoretical and empirical institutional research and methodological pluralism – can help reinvigorate the literature by bringing together institutional and policy studies research.

At its core, the Ostrom Workshop has made a considerable contribution to the development of democratic theory (i.e. self governance and the vulnerabilities of democracy,

politics as the art and science of association). Along the way, it helped develop associated theories to reinforce this notion of democratic theory. These include: 1) the theory of the commons (there's more to markets and states, self governance in the commons is possible); 2) behavioral rational choice (focus on individual behavior, assumption of bounded rationality, importance of norms, heuristics, language; homo economicus assumption depends on context); 3) second generation theories of collective action (cooperation is possible, tragedy of the commons and prisoner's dilemma are special and not general cases); 4) theory of polycentricity and institutional diversity (multi-level, multi-purpose, multi-sectoral and multi-functional) and the role of public entrepreneurs; and 5) theories about the evolution of spontaneous social orders and the resilience of institutions.

We explained the implications of explicitly infusing institutional theory into the policy studies literature in terms of agenda setting, policy sub-systems, politics and policy, instrument choice, implementation, learning and isomorphism. We also argued that the limitations of methodological individualism that so dominated the political science literature, which led to the waning interest in policy studies can be overcome with second generation approaches to methodological individualism following Araral's 10-I heuristics.

The Ostrom Workshop is not only known for its theoretical contributions but also for its methodological pluralism and hard-nosed empiricism. Because of the importance of contextual analysis to policy and institutional analysis, there is a need to develop to a set of diagnostic tools. To this end, the Workshop contributed in significant ways to the development of a repertoire of tools and approaches that the policy studies literature can draw upon –comparative institutional analysis, critical case studies, Tocquevillian analytics, multi-level analysis, laboratory and field experiments, analytic narratives, historical and evolutionary institutional analysis, agent based modeling, game theoretic modeling (public goods, common pool goods, evolutionary models), institutional econometric analysis, neural

networks analysis, Geographic Information System, among many others (see Poteete, Janssen and Ostrom, 2009).

Indeed, the Ostrom Workshop is a leading example of a form of scholarship involving artisanship (thus the name Workshop) and the contestation of ideas (the Weekly Colloquia). It has been explicitly comparative and multidisciplinary and collaborative in nature in nature - bringing together within a coherent research agenda scholars of politics, economics, mathematics, ecology, sociology and environmental science. This is the reason why the Workshop overtime has generated a considerable body of work and ideas, many of which were cutting edge and ahead of their time and the reason for the durability of and widespread appeal of ideas from the Ostrom Workshop. Whether it is in political theory, public choice, institutional economics, political economy, ecology, sociology, social psychology, game theory, evolutionary biology, environmental and natural resource studies and in policy studies, the contributions of the Ostrom Workshop are well known and used.

Hopefully, the Ostrom Workshop's salad bowl – a coherent set of framework, theories, models and methods - can help start a conversation in the policy studies literature so that we can have our “salad days” and eat it too.

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