

Conservation-related displacement: interrogating notions of the powerless oustee

K. Beazley¹

Abstract

This paper investigates the recent relocation of Botezari village from Tadoba-Andhari Tiger Reserve, India, and argues that it may illustrate the very early beginnings of a wider changing trajectory and politics of conservation-related displacement. Such displacement is largely presented, both in India and elsewhere in the Developing World, as indicative of a persisting lack of interest in seeking input from local communities on the management of natural resources. Indeed, most academic work describes conservation-related displacement as characterized by acute oustee powerlessness versus overwhelming state power. Drawing from empirical research conducted in Botezari's pre-relocation phase, I suggest that linking displacement with such extreme local powerlessness may increasingly need some qualification, at least in the Indian context. In the Botezari case, the majority of villagers, though not a cohesive group, were relatively open to being moved from the reserve, and had the confidence to push for their rights to be fulfilled and additional demands considered. The villagers were also fairly clear in their views on natural resource management and their potential role within such management, while the displacement authority, though ambitious, was socially-aware and, to a degree, responsive to local attitudes and perspectives. This, combined with lively NGO and press presence, facilitated some constructive dialogue, culminating in certain meaningful concessions and a limited, but still perceptible, power structure shift, which, I argue, provides some slight challenge to the conventional theory of the powerless oustee. At least in the Indian context, new displacement policies and legislation, a gradual deepening of civil society, and a growing emphasis on more 'bottom-up', participatory development and conservation strategies, could be starting to allow conservation-related oustee communities a slightly greater level of influence over both their destinies and those of the natural resources that surround them.

Key words

Displacement, participation, relocation, protected areas, civil society, conservation, India

Introduction

'Things...aren't good enough at...[the relocation site]...yet. We want irrigation...and the land levelled and...the houses to be plastered before we shift' (dg²19-Botezari)

'We have signed consent forms saying we will relocate, but it doesn't mean we have to. They can't force us...we have a right to stay' (po-Botezari; 5 May 2006)

¹ Department of Geography, University of Cambridge, U.K.

² 'dg' and 'po' are identifiers that refer to quotations from 'discussion groups' and 'participant observation' respectively.

'We are relocating because that will give the tiger more space for living and it will be good for the forests and also our animals get killed when we are here, but at the new site there won't be any tiger kills' (dg11-Botezari)

'We want to shift because the forests are thick here and there are not good roads so we can't go to city or get the good jobs and all. We only have job in the forest and that is not good for us... Yes, we could help with saving the forest, but we would rather move out' (dg28-Botezari)

'I am getting desperate. The villagers have a great village to shift to, we have spent much government money on it...but they aren't moving. In the past, they would have been forced to...but we can't do that nowadays. It would look too bad' (interview 55-officer 2)

These quotations encapsulate certain local storylines evident in the year prior to the relocation of Botezari village in April/May 2007 from Tadoba-Andhari Tiger Reserve (TATR or Tadoba), a protected area situated in Maharashtra, India. In this paper, I explore this pre-relocation phase in Botezari's recent history, and argue that it may, to some extent, illustrate the very early beginnings of a wider changing trajectory and politics of conservation-related displacement in India.

The continued displacement of villages from protected areas, both in India and elsewhere in the Developing World, is often presented as indicative of a persisting lack of interest in seeking input from local communities on the management of natural resources. Indeed, most academic work describes conservation-related displacement as characterized by acute oustee powerlessness versus overwhelming state power. Drawing from empirical research conducted in Botezari's pre-relocation phase, I suggest that linking displacement with such extreme local powerlessness may increasingly need some qualification, at least in the Indian context. In Botezari's pre-relocation phase, the majority of villagers, though not a cohesive group, were relatively open to being moved from the reserve, and had the confidence to push for their rights to be fulfilled and additional demands considered. The villagers were also fairly clear in their views on natural resource management and their potential role within such management, while the displacement authority, though ambitious, was socially-aware and, to a degree, responsive to local attitudes and perspectives. This, combined with lively NGO and press presence, facilitated some constructive dialogue, culminating in certain meaningful concessions and a limited, but still perceptible, power structure shift, which, I argue, provides some challenge to scholarly emphasis on conservation-related displacement as symptomatic of overwhelming local powerlessness and lack of local opportunity to influence the direction of natural resource management. At least in the Indian context, new displacement policies and legislation, a gradual deepening of civil society, and a growing emphasis on more 'bottom-up', participatory development and conservation strategies, could be starting to allow conservation-related oustee communities slightly greater influence over both their futures and those of the natural resources that surround them.

The primary field research, from which this argument derives, was conducted in three phases over the twelve months preceding the relocation of Botezari from TATR. Principal data was qualitative, attained using (1) participant observation in Botezari, (2) sixty semi-structured interviews with informants (mostly government officials and NGO

representatives) holding some 'professional' link to the displacement, and (3) forty-eight discussion groups with residents of Botezari, and two other villages: Rantalodhi, that is still situated in TATR, and Khatoda, that was displaced from the area in the 1970s.

The paper is structured as follows. I identify what I term the theory of the powerless oustee as a common theme existing in the conservation-related displacement literature. Having briefly outlined the case study, I detail four important features of the Botezari case which may cast some doubt upon this theory. I then position the Botezari case in the wider context of changing citizen-state relations in India. Before concluding, I identify potential caveats to the argument presented.

The powerless oustee

The term conservation-related displacement lacks definitional uniformity. In this paper it covers three interlinked processes: when, in the supposed interests of conservation, oustees are (1) moved from their original homes and lose assets ('relocation'), (2) deposited in a new location/s ('resettlement'), and (3) assisted, theoretically, in the restoration or, preferably, the improvement of their former living standards in the new location/s ('rehabilitation').

Particularly since the 1990s, research has begun to consider such population displacements, conducted to make way for protected areas (e.g. Brockington and Igoe, 2006; Neumann, 1998; Olivier and Goudineau, 2004), or natural ecosystem restoration (e.g. Rogers and Wang, 2006). A theme dominant in this conservation-related displacement literature is acute oustee powerlessness. Part of a wider exclusionary model of conservation that is seen to prevent local people from participating in natural resource management, or having their views regarding such management properly considered, conservation-related displacement is largely presented as plagued by severe powerlessness among the displaced and overwhelming state domination (e.g. Chatty and Colchester, 2002). Rugendyke and Son (2005) argue that village displacements from Cuc Phuong National Park, Vietnam were officially legitimized by the positive effects that such displacements would supposedly have on conservation and tourism in the area, but that ultimately, not only did the conservation objectives of the displacements fail, but the oustees themselves experienced considerable declines in socioeconomic well being at their new sites, while any subsequent increases in tourism revenue did not benefit them. Along related lines, Asher and Kothari argue that displacement from Indian protected areas is an integral part of the 'top-down bureaucratic approach' to conservation that plagues the country, and that the majority of conservation-related displacement efforts in India have been 'dismal failures, with human rights violations serious enough to make any conservationist cringe in shame' (2005: 40, 41).

Whilst acknowledging that conservation-related oustees often formally have the right to participate in displacement decision making, existing studies suggest meaningful participation in practice to be rare. Rather, displacement operations have usually been shaped and implemented by paternalistic government authorities (often together with conservation organizations), and have been indifferent to the concerns of the

communities to be displaced. Cernea and Schmidt-Soltau (2006) suggest that physical violence towards oustees is a more common strategy to facilitate local cooperation in conservation-related displacements in central Africa than any form of participatory approach. In the Indian context, Choudhary (2000) suggests that the 1970s and 1980s displacements from the Gir forest, Gujarat were conducted in a 'top-down' manner with very little concern for the welfare of those to be relocated, while Beazley reports that 'autocratic methods' were used to achieve the 1999 relocation of Ballarpur village from Madhav National Park, Madhya Pradesh 'including an absence of any adequate formal system to inform...[the villagers] about the relocation proposals, to glean their views and demands, and to facilitate any collective bargaining' (2006: 4688). Along similar lines, Shahabuddin et al. describe the relocation plan for the pending relocation of four villages from Sariska Tiger Reserve, Rajasthan as 'shoddy and incomplete', specifically because of a distinct lack of people's participation in its preparation (2005: 61). Finally, in 2005, the Indian government itself acknowledged that the quality of conservation-related displacement in the country had, in human terms, thus far 'verged on being disastrous' (2005: 94).

In such 'top-down' contexts, oustees lack institutional space to influence displacement operations, such that even positive outcomes are rarely attributable to them. Dickinson and Webber suggest that while conservation-related displacement of three Inner Mongolian villages facilitated some beneficial changes for villagers, they 'were not free to decide whether or not to move and felt less free than before to make their own decisions about land uses' (2007: 557).

Other commentators have traced the emergence of some subaltern resistance to 'top-down' displacement operations. Sharma and Kabra (2007), analyzing the 1998-2003 displacements from Kuno Wildlife Sanctuary, Madhya Pradesh, India, suggest that the impoverishment which displacement created led some of the oustees to reoccupy symbolically their original villages inside the Sanctuary, seeking to use this move as a means to force the Forest Department to attend to their most pressing problems at the relocation site. The role that external organizations, such as NGOs and even Naxalites (e.g. Awasthi, 2008), has played in fuelling this confrontation from 'below' has also been documented. However, even such works mostly conclude that oppositional activities largely fail to improve local outcomes of displacement operations, halt displacement altogether (when that is the aim), or facilitate any genuine local participation (e.g. Brockington, 2004).

In effect then, most research on conservation-related displacement adheres, in some way, to what I term the theory of the powerless oustee. This is the notion that a powerful state (frequently with conservation organizations) imposes displacement operations upon unwilling communities, who are compelled to succumb. The oustee communities are given no space to participate in, or properly voice their views on the management of the natural resources that surround them. Moreover, they are unwillingly shifted from these areas and excluded from having any say in the displacement process itself or its outcomes. Community members may mobilize, attempting to improve local displacement impacts, and form oppositional movements of various kinds, but, in most cases, inclusive participatory procedures remain derisory, communities are unable to

prevent state-led courses of change, give their input on natural resource management, or influence the displacement process in any significant way.

Three recent works on conservation-related displacement epitomize this widespread conception. Brockington argues that oustee failure to resist eviction (in the 1980s) from the Mkomazi Game Reserve in Tanzania, publicize their plight, or claim adequate compensation 'demonstrates the power of fortress conservation and the weakness of local opposition' (2004: 419). Kabra, based on her aforementioned work on displacement from Kuno Wildlife Sanctuary in India, concludes that it is a 'regressive tool', widely adopted because of a common 'lack of information, organization and social and political clout among the displaced' (2007: 305). Finally, Rangarajan and Shahabuddin depict conservation oustees in the Developing World as plagued by 'deprivation and social injustice' (2006: 369).

In the remainder of this paper, using Botezari village as a case study, I argue that this theory of the powerless oustee, though still important, may no longer be quite as absolute as it once was, at least in the Indian context.

Botezari village

Until April/May 2007, Botezari was situated in TATR, Chandrapur district, Maharashtra, central India. It is a revenue village, largely inhabited by Nagvanshi Gond *adivasis* (indigenous people). Table 1 provides a basic socioeconomic profile of Botezari pre displacement.

Table 1. Botezari's Basic Socioeconomic Profile in 2004, According to a Study by Mehra et al. (2004)

Population		Literacy	Total income from legal sources
Households (HHs)	Total	% of total population	
56	227	67	<US\$1 per person per day
Occupations	Dominant	- Agriculture, mostly paddy production, for both self consumption and sale. A minority of HHs are landowners, so the majority of villagers work as agricultural labourers. - Forest labour in TATR.	
	Other income-generating activities	- Sale of milk products. - Sale of bamboo and <i>moha</i> flowers (illegally). - Acting as tourist guides in TATR. - Gathering of fuel wood, bamboo, <i>moha</i> and various other minor forest products, such as <i>tendu</i> and <i>char</i> from TATR, for self-consumption.	

Government pressure to initiate the displacement of Botezari began in 1995 when Tadoba National Park and Andhari Wildlife Sanctuary were combined and declared as TATR under Project Tiger, a central government scheme to maintain a viable tiger population in India. Situated within the new tiger reserve, plans for Botezari's displacement, in the supposed interests of wildlife conservation, were instigated. The plans gained momentum in 2004 and finally, in April/May 2007, Botezari was relocated and is now situated outside TATR, in Tolewahi, also in Chandrapur district.

Existing research on displacement might lead one to suppose that the Botezari villagers were given no space to give their input on the management of TATR, were forcibly compelled to relocate, and that severely unequal power configurations in the pre-relocation phase prevented their ability to shape the course of their displacement or begin to influence its impacts in any significant way. Indeed, an interesting recent commentary on Botezari's relocation suggests this to have been the case (see Ghate, 2007). However, drawing upon detailed research conducted over the year prior to Botezari's relocation, this paper reveals a somewhat different and unexpected reality, characterized, at least in part, by (1) a local openness to displacement, combined with a lack of local interest in contributing to the area's natural resource management, (2) a socially-aware, if ambitious, displacement authority³, to some degree responsive to local perspectives, (3) lively NGO and press presence, acting as a disincentive to state/industry misconduct, and (4) a relatively assertive and astute (if not necessarily cohesive) village community. This facilitated some constructive dialogue, and culminated in meaningful concessions and a limited, but still distinguishable, power structure shift, to a certain degree exemplified by two village meetings in March 2007. At these meetings the displacement authority had to resort to pleading with villagers to adhere to their commitment and relocate, and attempting to utilize internal factions within the oustee community as a way to instigate the move. It is this story, perhaps illustrating the very early beginnings of a wider changing trajectory and politics of conservation-related displacement in India, to which I now turn.

A local openness to displacement, and a lack of local interest in natural resource management

Most policy and legislative frameworks discourage involuntary displacement. It is to be avoided where possible, or at least 'the free and informed consent of those to be displaced' (UN Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement, no.7 (3c)) should be obtained. However, consistent with the theory of the powerless oustee, conservation-related displacement scholars largely conclude that consent in such circumstances rarely reflects true volition (e.g. Schmidt-Soltau and Brockington, 2007): populations only 'voluntarily' move when those driving the displacement have engineered a situation that makes it impossible for them to remain.

One might be tempted to assume that this argument held true for Botezari, as restrictive protected area regulations were implemented, and external development assistance halted there (see e.g. Ghate, 2003; 2005) long before the villagers consented to displacement. It might be thought that their consent merely derived from lack of any alternative, with life in the protected area as 'encroachers' now impossible. However, my research pointed to a more complex reality involving some genuine local openness to displacement (see also Ghate and Beazley, 2007).

The three most common reasons provided by Botezari villagers for their consenting to displacement were neither exclusively related to the restrictions that they faced in TATR nor governmental duress, but rather (1) the geographical accessibility of Tolewahi

³ The 'displacement authority' describes the government body responsible for conducting the displacement.

(which Botezari's location could never match), (2) the facilities promised there (far exceeding those in other, otherwise comparable, local villages), and (3) the assurance of agricultural land for all post displacement. Quotations in box 1 further illustrate some true enthusiasm for displacement amongst an engaged and pragmatic population, conscious of the potential benefits of the move.

Box 1. Botezari Villagers' Openness to Displacement

- 'I...want to move because now I don't own any land. I work as a farm labourer, but when I go to Tolewahi the government will provide me with [2 acres]' (po-Botezari; 3 February 2007)
- 'We like our village here, but sometimes our animals are killed by tiger and all, so it will be better for us to shift' (dg34-Botezari)
- 'Even if the roads here were made into *pukka* [good, in this case tarmac] ones it would still take us a long time to reach the market...Tolewahi is much closer to Chandrapur and we will be able to get more jobs' (dg8-Botezari)
- 'We will have lots of facilities in Tolewahi like electricity. Hardly any villages in this district have electricity...I know it will be hard to leave my home, but I still want to go' (dg18-Botezari)
- 'We were not forced to move. We just saw that it was probably going to be better for us in the long term if we did...you see we were asked to sign the consent form but we didn't have to. We could have stayed like the people in Rantalodhi are' (dg45-Tolewahi)

To date, apart from Botezari, only one⁴ other (Kolsa) of the six villages within TATR has consented to be displaced. This also implies that life in TATR was not perceived as detrimental enough to force consent, and that state pressure to move out of TATR was not irresistible. Discussions with villagers from Rantalodhi, another TATR village, comparable in situation to those of Botezari, but refusing to shift, also indicate this (box 2). In addition, the other three villages in TATR (Navegaon, Palasgaon and Jamni), though expressing some interest in displacement during the period when Botezari and Kolsa gave their consent, are neither determinedly pushing for it, nor have they been forced by the state to act upon their interest and sign consent forms.

Box 2. Rantalodhi Villagers' Refusal to Move

- 'Yes, the officials want us to shift but we will not agree...We like our village, we want to stay here and we will stay here' (dg5-Rantalodhi)
- 'We may shift in the future but only if most of our charter of demands are fulfilled. At the moment the officials say the demands are much too high so we won't move or sign anything' (dg14-Rantalodhi)
- 'There is no way that we will move. There are problems that we face living here but we would still rather stay than be moved to another site' (dg1-Rantalodhi)
- 'Yes our crops sometimes get destroyed by wild animals here but in many ways it is better here than being in a new village far from the forest' (dg22-Rantalodhi)
- 'After some time we might agree to move but so far the other places they have shown us for a new village are not good enough, so we won't shift' (dg17-Rantalodhi)

Rantalodhi's decision to remain and associated reasoning, and the apparent lack of urgency surrounding Navegaon, Palasgaon and Jamni's interest in displacement, reinforces the conclusion that Botezari's willingness to shift was not solely induced by TATR restrictions or governmental pressure. Finally, the views of Khatoda villagers, displaced from the area in the early 1970s, provide additional support for the conclusion

⁴ I am referring here to the contemporary phase of displacement from TATR. Two other villages, Khatoda and Pandharpauni, were relocated from Tadoba National Park in the 1970s.

that the Botezari inhabitants were, at least to some extent, genuinely open to displacement (box 3).

Box 3. Khatoda Villagers' Views on Botezari's Displacement

- 'Well we were thrown out but...[the Botezari villagers] want to go and I can see why. We have heard their new site is very good' (dg4-Khatoda)
- 'The compensation that...[the Botezari villagers] are getting is better than the village they have now. If we had got what they are getting, we would have wanted to move too' (dg10-Khatoda)

In addition to this local openness to displacement, the Botezari villagers mostly displayed a very limited interest in actively participating in conservation efforts:

'Before the displacement plans had properly begun, we tried to get some community conservation going but the Botezari people did not show much interest. They were more interested in moving away from the forest' (interview 12-Forest Department official); 'You see, they [various Forest Department officials] asked us if we would rather stay in Tadoba and then make a committee to help with the conservation and all, or shift to outside, but we were mostly too busy for helping on that committee and all because we were working on our farms and we thought it was better for us if we shifted out' (dg23-Botezari).

More generally too, local attitudes towards the forests and wildlife were also often negative. Forest-dependent occupations were not viewed as particularly profitable, while the forest itself was often perceived as inhibiting villager access to larger settlements and the better job opportunities available there. Finally, many felt animosity towards the wild animals for persistently killing their domestic livestock and damaging their crops:

'There is not that much of work here, but when we shift, we will be able to get more work and all. Like we can go and find work in Mul if we want' (dg30-Botezari); 'It is very difficult here because my crops are always getting destroyed by the animals, and there is a danger that we will be killed by tiger when we go in the forest or are alone in the fields, so mostly the animals and forests are not good for us' (dg11-Botezari).

This is not to suggest that every Botezari villager was either wholly against any local participation in conservation policy, or actively desired to relocate without question or any governmental pressure. Indeed, some Botezari villagers were employed as tourist guides in TATR, and to that extent, were interested in the area's conservation. Moreover, had the state not proposed the relocation idea, it is unlikely that the villagers themselves would have considered it. In addition, most villagers articulated, at some time or other, their considerable emotional attachment to Botezari and for some, this also extended to the surrounding forest area:

'I think it is better if we move, but I will miss our village here very much. You see it is our home and we have always been in the forests and now we will not be, so that is very sad for us' (dg20-Botezari).

Finally, the majority of villagers, at various points, spoke of their apprehension about the new site in terms of the quality of its agricultural land, its irrigation potential or its proximity to sources of fuel wood for example. However, ultimately, on the condition that villager rights according to the Maharashtra Project Affected Persons Rehabilitation Act⁵ (1999, amended 2001) (MPAPR Act) were fulfilled, and additional demands considered, there remained a relatively consistent underlying local willingness eventually to move to Tolewahi, and a lack of interest in community conservation as the alternative if they

⁵ And subsequent government resolutions clarifying some of the specifics of the Act.

were to remain in Tadoba. Such local perspectives can be seen to render less absolute in this case, conventional notions of a powerless populace merely succumbing to relocation due to damaging conservation-related restrictions, overwhelming state coercion and governmental refusal to seek local input in conservation policy and practice.

A socially aware, if ambitious, displacement authority to some degree responsive to local perspectives

The Botezari case further diverges from the theory of the powerless oustee in the pre-relocation attitudes and actions of the displacement authority.

A principal Forest Department member of the displacement authority (officer 1), was notably compassionate towards villagers, and thus locally popular and trusted. Botezari inhabitants frequently singled out this officer as having been receptive to their day-to-day problems and needs since his arrival in the early 1990s (box 4). Officer 1's long-term attentiveness to the villagers in TATR is also alluded to in government records documenting privileges he ensured for them. According to the TATR Management Plan (1997-8), rights to graze, harvest bamboo, and collect fuel wood and minor forest produce were officially suspended in the protected area in 1990. However, the minutes of a displacement authority meeting in late 2005 state that, since at least 1997, 'a certain degree of subsistence use of the forests surrounding the six villages in TATR has been tolerated...[and]...in selected compartments the [TATR] villagers...have been allowed to graze and collect some fuel wood'. Government officials and members of local NGOs confirmed this, and officer 1's particular popularity among the villagers, as well as his belief in a participatory approach to conservation (box 4). While, as mentioned above, the Botezari villagers were largely not interested in taking an active role in TATR's management, officer 1 sought to incorporate their views into policy, and facilitate their daily requirements as residents of the reserve.

Box 4. Officer 1's Attitude and Actions

Botezari villagers

- '[Officer 1] has always been like a god to us. He always gave us extra supplies of wood when we needed it...[He] is unlike other officials. He understands us and we believe in him' (po-Botezari; 28 February 2007)
- 'We are not allowed to have our livestock graze in Tadoba but [officer 1] allows us to graze them anyway...Usually when we are caught in the forest we have to pay a fine of about 150 rupees. But...[officer 1] gives us permission to collect fuel wood and bamboo from the forest. He is always helping us. Other officials are not as good as him and he is wanting us getting a good deal when we go to Tolewahi' (dg2-Botezari)
- '[Officer 1] got some people to go to a meeting or something about looking after tigers and all but mostly we are not wanting to do that only. We just need to make sure that we can get our daily needs from the forest and [Officer 1] always made sure we could do this' (dg12-Botezari)

Local NGOs and government officials

- '[Officer 1] is a very dedicated officer who is not only attached to the wildlife but also the people of the forests...He listens to the villagers' concerns very often' (interview 8-displacement authority member)
- 'The villagers trust [him] in a way that is unusual in this area...He has always ensured that the villagers are given enough access to the forests so that they are able to survive. In fact he believes in giving the villagers a say in what they should be getting from the government' (interview 14-local NGO)

The attitude and associated work of officer 1 also provided a secure foundation for the emergence of a displacement operation relatively receptive to the villagers' views and demands:

'[He] listened to us and when we had a problem about the relocation he helped us with it. I was worried that the walls of the new houses were not strong enough or put deep enough into the ground, but he assured me that they are strong and showed me the picture of how they are constructed... Yes, I am satisfied now' (dg29-Botezari); 'I believe that the relocation will never happen unless the villagers support it so I am doing my very best to incorporate them into the planning process...It is important that I visit Botezari as much as I can and pick up and deal with the fears that the villagers have about the relocation' (interview 7-officer 1).

Officer 1 ensured that the villagers were taken to potential relocation sites, and given the freedom to choose their preference. Their feedback was sought on house design and the new village layout plans. They were frequently transported to Tolewahi to monitor construction, and officer 1 ensured that he visited Botezari every three weeks to discuss villagers' concerns. In addition, having witnessed a wildlife-focused local NGO fail to gain the villagers' trust and encourage them to express their views, officer 1 requested help from a more socially-concerned local NGO that seemed willing to assist in facilitating a participatory displacement. In a March 2006 letter, he wrote of this NGO's 'good rapport' with the Botezari villagers and asked it 'to organize awareness building workshops...This effort will help...remove any apprehension in [the villagers'] minds'. Ultimately, officer 1 gave the villagers space and confidence to vocalize their concerns, and assurance that these would be considered.

Another leading member of the displacement authority (officer 2), from the Revenue Department, was perhaps more typical generally of senior displacement officials than officer 1. Although he too wanted to achieve a sensitive and participatory displacement, this did not appear to be principally due to deep social commitment, but perhaps more because he perceived this as a means to enhance his career and secure a favourable transfer (box 5).

Box 5. Officer 2's Perspective

- 'As long as we continue to listen to the villagers, I am hoping that this relocation will be the best in the country. I want it to become the prototype...when it is finished I am going to invite the...Commissioner to come and see my work...I am thinking of setting up a little museum at the relocation site for tourists' (interview 38-officer 2)
- 'I believe that this could really become a model relocation in India. I would then be at the centre of it, as an expert in conducting relocations. I would constantly be being taken to other countries to make speeches on relocation' (interview 41-officer 2)
- '[Officer 2] is trying hard to make this a successful relocation...[because]...he is eager for publicity and praise, but that doesn't matter as long as he does a good job for the villagers' (interview 21-local NGO)

Officer 2 believed that implementing a displacement which is '*good for the people it involves*' (interview 20-officer 2) was a way to gain governmental recognition and promotion:

'Nowadays, policies taking into account villagers' views are seen as good and so it is important I make sure the schemes I am involved in do this. Otherwise my ability...is questioned' (interview 20-officer 2).

This contributed to a personal dedication to the project, an attention to detail and a willingness to listen to the oustees. For example, as the new village neared completion, officer 2 began to visit fortnightly to supervise progress. During one four hour visit on 25 March 2007, he tested well water quality, discussed with accompanying villagers how the land could be improved, and criticized workers for slow land levelling. Such visits were fundamental to progress being made at the site:

'If [officer 2] didn't visit, nothing would get done. When he is there, the workers work harder' (po-Botezari; 24 March 2007); *'I was in Tolewahi when [officer 2] came. I told him...the house that I had been given was not near my brother's...He got it changed'* (dg32-Botezari); *'[Officer 2] is the force behind getting things done here. When he doesn't come, the workers get lazy'* (interview 37-displacement authority member).

The nature of financial expenditure on Botezari's displacement is also indicative of a displacement authority seeking to fulfil villager rights and satisfy their demands (tables 2 and 3). It was quickly realized that the central government rehabilitation package, provided under the Beneficiary Oriented Scheme for Tribal Development (BOTD) (table 2), was not sufficient to fulfill the obligatory terms of the MPAPR Act, let alone the oustees' additional requirements. Thus, drawing on various state funds/schemes and individual donors, the displacement authority began incrementally to have allocated more and more money to the displacement operation, ultimately amounting to over US\$475,000, supplementing considerably the US\$197,500 central government provision (table 3). Yet, partly given increasing oustee demands, even these monetary sources proved insufficient. Therefore, the displacement authority obtained from the state government an additional allowance of US\$250,000 (approximately) in November 2006 (table 3). Compelled by the villagers' rights according to the MPAPR Act and, to some degree, their supplementary demands (table 3), the displacement authority spent over US\$900,000 on the displacement operation; more than four times the basic amount originally allocated for it:

'Responding to the requirements of the villagers, I have...put a lot of government money into...[this project]. I have stretched my limit...but I had to do it, because the villagers...[must be]...satisfied, otherwise I will get blame' (interview 50-officer 2).

Table 2. BOTD Central Assistance Funds Spent on Botezari's Displacement

Funds received*	Details of amenity provision			Reason/s for amenity provision
Central assistance, under BOTD, implemented by the Union Ministry of Environment and Forests: US\$197,500 (For the purposes of displacement, Botezari was divided into 79 HHs)	BOTD rehabilitation package			Fixed, itemized basic package dictated by central government (BOTD)
	Rehabilitation measures to be provided (per HH)	Amount received* (US\$/per HH)	Details of how the money was spent	
	Land development	900	Tree felling and land clearing	
	House construction	900	Main part of house	
	Community facility construction	225	Part of village tank	
	Fuel and fodder plantation	200	✓	
	Pasture development	200	✓	
	Transportation of HH goods	25	Diesel for trucks	
	Cash provision as incentive to shift	25	An additional amount of cash compensation was also provided (see table 3)	
	Miscellaneous expenses	25	Part of land levelling and development	
TOTAL: US\$2,500 (per HH)				

* these are figures based upon central and state government BOTD records. Conversion rate used: 40 Indian rupees = 1 US dollar.

✓ = no additional money required

Table 3. Additional Money Spent on Botezari's Displacement

Funds received*	Details of amenity provision		Reason/s for amenity provision
Additional money pooled by the displacement authority from various state funds and schemes under its control: US\$448,775	Water Scarcity Fund: US\$2,500	Three bore wells	A water supply of some form is listed as obligatory in MPAPR Act
	Water Scarcity Fund: US\$3,125	Temporary water supply scheme	A water supply of some form is listed as obligatory in MPAPR Act
	Food for Work Scheme: US\$3,000	One open well	A water supply of some form is listed as obligatory in MPAPR Act
	Tribal Sub-Plan: US\$50,000	Electricity pylons and electricity provision to tribal family HHs	Listed as obligatory in MPAPR Act
	Tribal Sub-Plan: US\$19,000	Second round of land ploughing and further clearance of remaining tree debris	Villager demand: After the first round of obligatory land clearing and ploughing had taken place, the villagers demanded a second round: 'The tractors they used to plough were not good so we have asked for them to plough again and also some roots of trees are still stuck in some fields' (po-Botezari; 24 March 2007)
	Mining Royalty Fund: US\$137,500	Approach road from Tolewahi station to village site	Listed as obligatory in MPAPR Act
		Bus stand for Maharashtra State Road Transport Corporation bus services	Listed as obligatory in MPAPR Act
	Maharashtra Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme (MREGS): US\$50,000	Approach road from Nagada village to Tolewahi	Villager demand: One approach road is listed as obligatory in the MPAPR Act, but the villagers also demanded a second one: 'We will not shift until they have started building a road to Nagada village also' (dg23-Botezari)
	Universalization of Primary Education Programme: US\$7,500	School	Listed as obligatory in MPAPR Act
	Food for Work Scheme: US\$95,000	Remaining part of village tank	A water supply of some form is listed as obligatory in MPAPR Act
		Part of micro irrigation facilities	Villager demand: 'It is important to have irrigation so we are demanding it for our new land' (dg19-Botezari)
	Zilla Parishad (District Rural Development Agency): US\$2,400	Financial assistance for latrines	Listed as obligatory in MPAPR Act
	MREGS: US\$35,000	Internal village roads	Listed as obligatory in MPAPR Act
MREGS: US\$43,750	Village employment provision post relocation, including: i) paddy bund construction work on the new fields and ii) pre-planting preparation and planting work on the fuel and fodder plantation	Villager demand: 'I think we will be needing some work when we reach the Tolewahi, so where will we get that only? Otherwise we will not be having so much of money' (dg2-Botezari)	

Table 3. Continued

Funds received*	Details of amenity provision		Reason/s for amenity provision
Individual donations secured by the displacement authority: US\$27,000	Merrill Lynch/Satpuda Foundation: US\$7,000	Additional cash compensation (US\$87.50 per HH)	Villager demand: The provision of US\$25 per HH is listed as obligatory in the BOTD rehabilitation package, however: 'That [US\$25 per HH] is not enough for us. We need money to buy food in the market when we first get there' (po-Botezari; 3 February 2007)
	Local MLA: US\$6,250	<i>Anganwadi</i> (primary school)	Listed as obligatory in MPAPR Act
	Local MP: US\$13,750	<i>Samaj mandir</i> (community hall)	Listed as obligatory in MPAPR Act
Additional money from the state government, applied for by the displacement authority and received on 24 November 2006: US\$250,000	<i>Khalwadi</i> (threshing floor)		Listed as obligatory in MPAPR Act
	Land for cattle stand with a water cistern		Listed as obligatory in MPAPR Act
	Land drainage		Listed as obligatory in MPAPR Act
	Open built-up gutters		Listed as obligatory in MPAPR Act
	Electricity provision to non-tribal HHs		Listed as obligatory in MPAPR Act
	Overhead tap water facility		Villager demand: A water supply of some form is listed as obligatory in MPAPR Act, however in addition to this provision being fulfilled in the form of a village tank, three bore wells and one open well: 'We want water to come to our houses in pipes. It is better if they give us that too' (dg16-Botezari)
	<i>Panchayat</i> (local government) building		Listed as obligatory in MPAPR Act
	Hospital		Villager demand: The provision of land for a hospital is listed as obligatory in MPAPR Act, however: 'We are wanting the hospital building too, then only we will move' (dg28-Botezari)
	School playground		Listed as obligatory in MPAPR Act
	Crematorium and burial ground		Listed as obligatory in MPAPR Act
	Market place		Listed as obligatory in MPAPR Act
Additional part of house (plastering, flooring and colouring)		Villager demand: 'The villagers don't like the houses as they are. They say they need to be plastered...and it will look better if they are...we will colour them all too' (interview 20-officer 2)	
Remaining part of land levelling and development		Listed as obligatory in the MPAPR Act	
Remaining part of micro irrigation facilities		Villager demand: (see above)	

* these are approximate figures based upon a compilation of sources including state government records and personal communication with various state government officials. Conversion rate used: 40 Indian rupees = 1 US dollar.

In summary, the displacement authority had been exposed to the notion of participation and sought to instigate it. One principal member was notable for his empathy with villagers and his belief in the value that true participation could have for achieving both conservation and development goals. He thus listened to the villagers and acted upon their views and concerns as residents of a protected area, as well as pushing for their active participation in the displacement operation. Another, perhaps more archetypal, senior displacement official was apparently less socially-concerned, but regarded the adoption of a genuinely participatory approach to the displacement as important for career advancement. Consequently, the Botezari villagers were given the opportunity to command a level of influence over their role in TATR's management, and their move, superior to the level that conservation-related oustees are conventionally assumed to enjoy.

Lively NGO and press presence

This oustee influence was further bolstered by the presence of the aforementioned, socially-concerned local NGO, not only willing to help the displacement authority bring about a participatory displacement, but also to combine forces with the local press partly as a way to monitor (mis)conduct:

'Press are an important dimension of the process. They can help us ensure that the villagers get what they have been promised' (interview 34-socially-concerned local NGO).

Representatives of this NGO regularly provided information concerning Botezari to the press and, particularly over the final six months pre relocation, the Botezari story was frequently documented, often critically, in local and state newspapers.

This NGO-press communication appeared to play a significant role in encouraging fairness in the state implementation framework. Indeed, officer 2 openly acknowledged his sensitivity to criticism by these actors:

'The press is interested in my policies and particularly ones that look controversial. They are very interested in this relocation and will be sure to report misgivings they have' (interview 20-officer 2);
'[The socially-concerned local NGO] is being a...nightmare for us at the moment. They have leaked ...information to journalists and some of the press coverage has not been good' (interview 50-officer 2).

Such NGO-press scrutiny helped progression towards a more 'clean' and socially-sensitive displacement operation:

'The press is a nuisance but we have ensured that they have nothing bad to report by conducting the relocation well' (interview 22-officer 1).

Other involved actors revealed similar forms of NGO-press related concern, which encouraged socially-responsible action. A while before the relocation site was inhabitable, various local industrial enterprises declined the displacement authority's requests to borrow trucks for use in the village move. These refusals were based on the villagers' then dissatisfaction with the relocation site. The industrialists feared that by providing trucks in those circumstances they risked implication in a forced displacement:

'At that point, it was widely known that the villagers were not ready to shift...so we didn't give them our vehicles...It would have been bad for our reputation if we had been seen to be helping to push the villagers out, especially as journalists and that [socially-concerned local NGO] would have been on to us like a shot' (interview 25-local industrialist).

The socially-concerned local NGO and the press, as a combined force, conscious of villagers' rights, had the potential to damage the reputation of state officials and industry and, accordingly, played an important role in inculcating in the displacement authority a belief in the need to implement a socially-sensitive displacement operation.

A relatively assertive, astute (if not necessarily cohesive) village community and indications of state weakness

During the research period, the majority of Botezari villagers displayed a firm belief in, and awareness of, their rights as residents of a protected area, citizens and oustees (box 6). Given officer 1's emphasis on participatory approaches to state-local interaction, and the open meeting format of *Panchayati Raj* (a decentralized system of local self government in rural India), some had gained prior experience in expressing their views on forest use, their community's development and so forth. Then, when the displacement operation began, certain displacement authority members, and later the socially-concerned local NGO, spent time explaining to the villagers their rights as oustees according to the MPAPR Act, and discussing with them their supplementary demands. Consequently, the villagers began to perceive the state no longer merely as an abstraction, but rather as responsible for ensuring a displacement to their satisfaction (box 6).

Box 6. Ideas about Villager Rights and State Obligations

Botezari villagers

- 'I have a right to the same amount of land as I have now, not any less' (dg8-Botezari)
- 'At the moment there is not enough water at Tolewahi. We can stay here until we are satisfied that Tolewahi is good enough' (po-Botezari; 28 February 2007)
- 'The land must be levelled before we move, and they must do the *ishwarchitthi* [land lottery]. Otherwise we won't shift' (po-Botezari; 24 March 2007)
- 'We use this old tree as our fan when it is warm. They must plant trees at the new site. We have a right to have them there' (dg6-Botezari)
- 'My family does not have any land now, but if we move the government has to provide us with land. We will get 0.8 hectares. We will also get a house plot...and a house' (dg11-Botezari)

Government officials

- 'The villagers know that we are responsible for making the relocation a success for them and they will make sure we do' (interview 7-officer 1)
- 'The Botezari villagers are good at persuading us to give them more. Every time I visit them they have a new demand' (interview 42-displacement authority member)

The villagers' rights as oustees, and in some cases, their additional demands, were acted upon (tables 2 and 3). For example, the report 'For Facilitation of Relocation of Botezari Village' by the socially-concerned local NGO, from a workshop it held in May 2006, documented villager anxieties, including a fear among women about a lack of fruit trees in Tolewahi. Accordingly, the displacement authority had three fruit trees planted in each kitchen garden. Similarly, while one approach road is listed as obligatory in the MPAPR Act, the villagers' demand for another was agreed to, as was their desire for an overhead tap water facility and a hospital building. Finally, in early April 2007, the villagers submitted a memorandum identifying 17 hectares of the new land that was 'not suitable for agricultural purpose'. After an inspection, the displacement authority replaced 10 of those hectares, and instead, '*we got an area that was much better land*' (dg32-Botezari).

As the villagers began to witness the tangible benefits of a displacement authority relatively responsive to their demands these increased in frequency and scale. At the same time, the villagers were able to threaten refusal to shift, and use this as a bargaining tool through which to encourage the state to fulfil its obligations and certain additional local demands (box 7).

Box 7. Increasing Villager Demands and Threatening Refusal to Shift

- 'It would be better for us if they gave us a second road too. We are requesting for one to go to Nagada...I also want them to give us taps. Then only we will move' (dg28-Botezari)
- 'The state has enough resources to provide us with houses that are plastered, not just open blocks. They are being selfish if they don't plaster the houses. Also we need more irrigation facility. We will not go until we get it' (dg18-Botezari)
- 'The rains came too late last year and we only got half the crops we usually get here, so we don't have much supply to take to Tolewahi. Because of this, we won't move unless they give us more money compensation than just that [US\$25 per HH], because otherwise we won't be able to buy food when we reach Tolewahi' (dg11-Botezari)
- 'We want paddy bunds and an irrigation tank and some ponds in our fields' (dg20-Botezari)
- 'Our new agricultural land is sandy red soil which is not very fertile compared with the fertile black soil that we have here. They need to make the land more fertile there before we shift' (dg20-Botezari)
- 'You see...they always have something to complain about. The more the government provides, the more the government gives, the more the villagers expect them to give and the more that they demand. This is a big problem that we face. We try to give a lot but they always complain and ask for more' (interview 42-displacement authority member)

The Botezari villagers initially agreed to start relocating in June 2006. However, by late May 2006 the displacement authority had acknowledged that the site would not be sufficiently close to completion by then, so the move was postponed to late December 2006. At that point, the displacement authority was eager for the shift to begin, but the villagers steadfastly refused; a refusal motivated largely by remaining problems with the relocation site, but also exacerbated by trusted officer 1's transfer in late November of that year (box 8). The next date set for the move was the end of February 2007, but then too the villagers refused to shift:

'We have tried to explain to the villagers that they have to shift now, but they are refusing' (interview 37-displacement authority member); 'Do you think they will ever move? We can't force them to but...the site is ready for them' (interview 38-officer 2).

Box 8. Villager Refusal to Shift during Late 2006 and Early 2007

- 'Now [officer 1] has gone, we are scared to move. We don't trust the other officials like we trusted him' (dg18-Botezari)
- '[A displacement authority member] keeps...telling us to move but he doesn't understand that we are not ready. If [officer 1] was still here, it would be much better' (dg23-Botezari)
- 'If they promise to provide irrigation tank after we move we will go. You see Tolewahi is dry place and we want two get two crops a year there' (dg8-Botezari)
- 'We are not willing yet to relocate because the houses have not been plastered and there is a water problem at Tolewahi' (dg19-Botezari)
- '[Officer 2] wants us to move now, and I will get land when I go, but I need to know which house and which land plot I am getting first' (dg11-Botezari)

By early March 2007, the displacement authority had become overtly uneasy⁶. In addition to the BOTD funds, a significant further amount (table 3) had been spent from other state sources on an uninhabited site:

'We have spent too much money now for the villagers not to shift, but we...can't make them. Nowadays we just can't compel them' (interview 55-officer 2); *'I am beginning to think they might not move at all. We need to think of ways to encourage them, but in the end if they refuse, they refuse...the money will be wasted...I am lost as to what to do'* (interview 50-officer 2).

Moreover, officer 2 was engaged in a race against time. Having completed three years in his current post, his transfer was looming and he was concerned that if the relocation took place subsequently, credit would go to his successor:

'We need to have a function at Tolewahi before I leave. I want to celebrate the part that I have played' (interview 55-officer 2); *'Before I go, I want to invite the...Commissioner to come here to see my good work, even if they haven't moved'* (interview 50-officer 2); *'If they do not shift before I am transferred, I will lose out. All my effort will be ignored'* (interview 50-officer 2).

Therefore, on 13 and 14 March 2007, two official meetings were held with the villagers. The presence at these meetings of the transferred trusted officer 1 was indicative of considerable unease within the displacement authority. It was perceived that he might assist in convincing the villagers to adhere to their initial commitment and relocate. The first meeting began with the displacement authority describing the opportunities of Tolewahi. This was followed by a heated debate in which villagers complained that certain facilities such as the overhead tap water facility and the two approach roads were incomplete and that the new agricultural land was still not suitably prepared. They also demanded an irrigation tank and some provision of non-agricultural employment at the new site. The second meeting the following day was a more overt attempt to pressurize the villagers to shift immediately, as indicated by the presence there of an imposing set of armed guards and the district Superintendent of Police. However, in spite of this more threatening atmosphere and the displacement authority's attempts to limit the space for participatory discussion, some villagers still asserted their demands and complaints, while the anxious responses of the displacement authority at both meetings indicated some level of state weakness (box 9).

Box 9. State Anxiety at the March 2007 Meetings

- *'Look...[officer 1] has come back to see you even though he has left this district, so you have to pay him a return favour. Think of Gurudakshina [offerings paid to a respected teacher]...you adore [officer 1] and he needs to be repaid. You don't have to give a limb or make any economic or emotional sacrifice to pay him back. The only thing you have to do is move...We have spent over two years on this project. We have provided so much for you. Don't destroy it now'* (meeting 1-officer 2)
- *'If you don't shift now, I will be transferred and the site may be given to another village so you will lose out and also my successor may not be interested in the relocation or willing to give you additional help when you first arrive in Tolewahi, but if you shift before I am transferred then I can give you that help. I...need you to shift. If you don't, it would be a terrible mistake. I am depending on you...to make the right decision'* (meeting 2-officer 2)
- *'God won't forgive you if you don't shift'* (meeting 1-officer 1)

⁶ An additional factor which *may* have further exacerbated the displacement authority's unease was the, then new, Scheduled Tribes and Other Traditional Forest Dwellers (Recognition of Forest Rights) Act (2006). At that time, the areas to be designated as 'critical wildlife habitat' under the Act, had not yet been specified. Had TATR not been designated as such, the Act's implementation could have either significantly supplemented the Botezari villagers' pre-relocation bargaining power, or even prevented them from relocating at all.

At the end of the second March meeting, the displacement authority resorted to attempting to utilize Botezari's internal power dynamics as a means to initiate the move. Previously, the displacement authority had identified a locally-prominent Botezari villager (respondent B) as potentially willing to operate as a catalyst for the relocation and had increasingly 'groomed' him for this purpose. He was often invited to sit with displacement authority members at tea breaks during their visits to Tolewahi, playing the role as honorary official, and was openly characterized by them as '*very loyal to us*' (interview 41-officer 2) and '*helping us greatly*' (interview 43-officer 1). He also frequently articulated the 'official' view to the villagers, and was dismissive of their concerns (box 10). Then, as requested by the displacement authority, respondent B relocated to Tolewahi with his family at the end of the second March meeting; the state tactic being that if he moved, the other families would promptly follow.

Box 10. Respondent B's Role as Honorary Official

An exchange between respondent B and another villager (in dg 23)
Respondent E: 'But it doesn't make much difference if we all get little wells by our fields as many will be dry. What happens if on our land we end up with a well that does not hit water?'
Respondent B: 'Well that will be your tough luck...and anyway you are just stupid. You don't understand what the Forest Department is saying'

However, again indicating a certain amount of local strength versus the state, the other villagers (with the exception of one family) did not entirely surrender to such official manoeuvring and refused immediately to move. In fact it was not until more than five weeks later that the next few Botezari villagers started to pack up their homes. In the interim period, the construction work in Tolewahi continued. By 25 March 2007, a displacement authority member had managed to obtain an oral guarantee from the villagers to relocate immediately after *Ram Navami* (a Hindu festival) on 27 March 2007, on the condition that, after relocation, the remaining work needed to complete the final amenities in Tolewahi, rather than being contracted out, would be given to the oustees themselves, thereby providing them with an additional avenue of income during the inevitably-turbulent first year post relocation:

'We have agreed to shift now because that temporary water supply scheme, the tank and those bore wells are completed now...also the rains were bad this year so we got...[limited]...crops in Botezari, so it is best for us to move to Tolewahi soon, because they are promising that we will get employment working on the roads and on that plantation they are making ...so we can get money for food to last up to next harvest, but here we won't get' (dg36-Botezari).

However after *Ram Navami*, the villagers again reneged, complaining that the land and houses had not yet been allocated:

'We are not ready to go yet. We don't know which houses we are getting and we need to make sure the land we get is good' (po-Botezari; 31 March 2007).

Accordingly, on 13 April 2007 the villagers were transported to Tolewahi, and the land and housing lottery was conducted, in an apparently impartial way:

'We put all the chits into a vessel and then chose a village child to take out the chits...This was to ensure that there was no tampering' (interview 57-displacement authority member); *'We were pleased with the land lottery. They did it fairly'* (po-Botezari; 8 May 2007).

It was then only on 20 April 2007 that the main move began.

This is not to suggest that the March meetings and respondent B's early relocation were entirely futile. Indeed, on the day that respondent B moved, certain villagers said that, as a result, they would also have to shift. However those giving this reason belonged to the minority group who owned land in Botezari and who would thus be gaining less by moving than those landless villagers who were to be transformed into landowners through the relocation. For those fewer landed villagers then, respondent B's relocation was seemingly an important factor pushing them to move. For the landless majority however, the prospect of becoming landowners and the need for sufficient time at the relocation site to prepare their new fields and sow their crops before the coming of the first monsoon rains were more central stimuli to them shifting when they did:

'[Respondent B] is a traitor to us and does not care about us. He is just going along with the Forest Department because he wants to benefit more than everyone else from the relocation. We are not standing for it though. We won't shift just because he is. I want to shift because I will get land at the new place, but only once I am ready to and once I know which land I will be getting' (po-Botezari; 14 March 2007); *'We are relocating now so we can have time to make our fields better and plant the seeds and all before the rains come'* (po-Tolewahi; 10 May 2007).

Also, interestingly, when the main move actually began, not only did all the landless families (who looked to benefit the most from relocating) shift first, but also many of the landed villagers suggested that their main reason for relocating now was that the landless were moving, and as a result, they were to lose the agricultural labourers which they had previously employed on their land. Given that a greater number of villages were located close to Tolewahi than to Botezari, at least by shifting too, they would be better able to find alternative sources of labour to work on their land if they so needed.

While the trauma of leaving was widespread during the course of the move, the majority, though hesitant, also seemed somewhat excited about the prospect of the new site, and fairly confident that the time was now right to relocate, as excerpts from the author's field diary illustrate (box 11).

Box 11. Field Diary Documentation of Botezari's Relocation

8 May 2007: We spent three hours this morning packing up [HH 31's] stuff, ready for the move...The vehicle arrived and we started getting everything into it. [The son] has a bicycle and even that went in. It was very distressing to see the state of the old house as we left. It has been ripped apart. All the materials from the roof have been removed and the family even took some of the mud from the walls. [Their six year old child] was very excited to ride in the truck and I sat up front with him. [His mother] had tears in her eyes as the vehicle began to move. During the course of the journey, she relayed to me her fear as she stepped into the unknown: 'We just don't really know what we are letting ourselves in for here. My daughter was very ill last year with Malaria. She is better now, but I really hope that she doesn't get worse again when we move. However, now we will have a hospital so that is good. Also when we settle in to the new place it will be good because we will have land now and the houses look good...and my son will apply for government job because we will have the [Project Affected Persons] certificate after we shift'.

7 May 2007: Today the kids are...positive about their new homes. The discussion groups held this morning were...optimistic: 'Yes, we love it! We don't want to go back, we really don't' (dg37-Tolewahi); 'We were worried about going but now we are here, we really like it and are glad we went' (dg38-Tolewahi). That evening I attended the village celebration in honour of the new village. There was...singing and dancing and...men with a drum going to different houses, lighting oil candles, beating drums and performing *puja* (a religious ritual). Then, as darkness fell, we...sat down for a village meal...Several of the conversations over dinner referred to the relocation: 'We like Tolewahi...but none of our memories are here. We miss our old house and the old village. It is very difficult, it really is...[W]e know we are better off here, but at the moment it is hard'; 'The land here is still dry and we will face problems with paddy growing, but we are happy here. The site is good now and there are lots of facilities'; 'We chose the right time to move. If we had moved earlier things would have been bad, but now things are good'; 'We are already getting [benefits here like] electricity...we are close to market and I work on the road now and get 68 rupees a day'.

The relief of displacement authority members when the villagers finally moved further confirms their fear that the villagers would ultimately refuse to shift, and their associated sense of powerlessness. At a celebratory dinner with various government officials after the move had begun, officer 2 did not hide his happiness:

'Those villagers...[are great]. I can't explain how happy I am that they are now moving. They can now see the opportunities we have given them. If they hadn't opened their eyes, we could never have forced them and where would any of us be then?' (field diary; 12 May 2007).

The wider picture

In summary, the Botezari case can be seen to challenge the theory of the powerless oustee in various ways. Though lack of developmental assistance and conservation-related restrictions in Tadoba induced some level of state-imposed villager suffering that may have contributed towards the consent-giving process, compulsion was not the dominant force. Rather, fairly limited villager interest in participating in conservation policy and practice as residents of Tadoba, and the positive lure of the relocation site, combined with the influence of a locally-trusted leading member of the displacement authority, facilitated some genuine local openness to displacement and a widespread feeling among the villagers that they had agreed to shift without overwhelming external pressure. Furthermore, whilst the initial displacement package was specified by central government and the MPAPR Act, the displacement authority saw value in engaging in participatory pre-relocation planning, and, consequently, the package was to some degree extended, according in part to villager demand. The presence of an active socially-concerned local NGO in regular communication with an often-critical press further served to facilitate a displacement process which gave the oustees space and

courage to vocalize their rights and concerns, and some power to ensure that these were considered.

As the displacement plans continued, and the villagers saw the positive consequences of a fairly responsive displacement authority, their demands escalated and they were able to bargain somewhat effectively, using the threat of refusing to shift as a mechanism through which to push the state not only to fulfil their rights but also to consider properly their demands. At the same time, the more the displacement authority invested in the new site, the more it was unwilling to accept that the villagers may never shift. So, knowing that force was no longer acceptable, the displacement authority was compelled into further negotiations with the villagers. It was forced to respond sensitively to the oustees' complaints and anxieties, and in doing so supplement investment in Tolewahi⁷; a policy which ironically served further to reduce state power versus an oustee community that had become slightly less weak than such communities are conventionally assumed to be. By March 2007, a lot of additional money had been spent on an empty site, and the villagers, who had initially agreed to move nine months earlier, were still refusing to shift. The displacement authority was then reduced to pleading with the villagers and simultaneously trying to manipulate internal factions within the oustee community, as a way to initiate the move; both clear indications of state unease. Moreover, even these fairly drastic measures to encourage the villagers to shift did not prove as effective as one might have expected. The main move only began a considerable time after the March meetings, and when it did, a range of other important reasons were also given by the villagers to justify when they shifted and why.

Botezari's pre-relocation phase then displayed characteristics indicative of power dynamics somewhat different from those commonly described as typical of conservation-related displacement operations. These power dynamics may very well alter again as the oustees settle into their new site. Indeed, my current phase of research in Tolewahi is suggesting that they have already begun to do so. However, this does not take away from the fact that, prior to relocation, the influence that the villagers commanded was significant, and more than 'powerless' oustees are generally reported to possess.

Indications of comparable shifts in power dynamics in the pre-relocation phase can also be detected in certain other cases of recent conservation-related displacement in India. Kolsa, the other TATR village that gave its official consent to be displaced (also to Tolewahi), seems now to be delaying its relocation, and bargaining with the displacement authority, to a greater extent than Botezari did. While Botezari held out from June 2006 until April/May 2007, the majority of Kolsa villagers are still, to date, refusing to relocate unless certain demands, such as an irrigation tank, are fulfilled. Other recent examples of conservation-related displacement in India suggest related trends. Karanth (2005) reports that the 2001-2 displacements from Bhadra Wildlife Sanctuary, Karnataka, were conducted in a sensitive and participatory fashion, partly

⁷ This 'escalation of commitment' (e.g. Bazerman and Neale, 1992: 9) appears in negotiation and organizational behaviour theory, describing a tendency to stay committed to a particular course of action, to justify previous expenditure on it, even when its completion is becoming economically unviable.

because the villagers agreed voluntarily to relocate only on the condition that their socioeconomic needs were met. Along analogous lines, the 2001-3 displacements from Melghat Tiger Reserve, Maharashtra, although not the subject of independent research, have been fairly widely lauded as being receptive to oustee demands, as have the displacements from Rajiv Gandhi National Park, Karnataka (see Chakrabarti, 2003) and from Corbett Tiger Reserve, Uttaranchal (see Negi, 2003). Finally, an element of meaningful bargaining and negotiation is reported to have taken place in the pre-relocation phase of Nasehalla village's recent displacement from Kudremukh National Park, Karnataka (Awasthi, 2008).

However it must be emphasized here that such slight changes in conventional power relations are, at present, still limited. Indeed, this paper does not claim that any dramatic transformation of power relations took place in the Botezari case. It also does not make any claim of broad generalization. Rather, it merely suggests that the Botezari example *may* point (bearing also in mind the other cases referred to above) to the very early beginnings of a changing trajectory of conservation-related displacement in India; a trajectory underpinned by (1) the recent emergence there of relatively sensitive (but by no means flawless) displacement policies and legislation, such as the MPAPR Act and the National Rehabilitation and Resettlement Policy⁸ (2007), (2) a new vibrancy of civil society⁹ in the country, and (3) an increasingly citizen-responsive bureaucracy. Indeed, following Corbridge et al. (2005), India's governance regime seems increasingly able to facilitate an unprecedented breadth and depth of citizen participation, engagement and empowerment, with the resultant beginnings of some perceptible and positive changes to the lives of the poor.

India's governance crisis (e.g. Brass, 1994; Kohli, 1990), which, over the mid to late twentieth century, served to ostracize the poor, is now receding, under the influence of a lasting, even deepening (e.g. Ganguly, 2007), democratic system (e.g. Drèze and Sen, 2002), and an invigorated structure of decentralized local self government (e.g. Mitra, 2001). Building on India's second democratic upsurge (e.g. Yadav, 2000), state-poor encounters are being restructured, and a more inclusive political culture is emerging, driven by an ever more dynamic and engaged civil society. Notions of 'participation' and 'empowerment' are gaining official favour, querying earlier state strategies that dictated the constituents of poverty, compartmentalized the 'poor' into particular target groups, such as 'below poverty line', and then imposed upon these groups the resources they were seen to require (Corbridge et al., 2005). Necessarily schematic, such compartmentalization tends to conceal essential features of any real and functioning social order (c.f. Scott, 1998). It can be as excluding as it is including (Harriss-White, 2005; Seeta Prabhu, 2001), and, once people are made legible, or 'seen' by the state (Scott, 1998) as part of such groups, they can readily be reproached, stigmatized and pathologized (Escobar, 1995; Williams et al., 2003). Building upon these realizations, and the suggestion that poverty is more than merely income-related (e.g. Sen, 1999),

⁸ This national policy is likely to be promulgated in statutory form shortly.

⁹ Civil society is a contested concept. The term is here used to cover all forms of voluntary association and social interaction (Jayal, 2001) that are neither coercive (Saberwal, 2005) nor controlled by the state, but rather act to empower non-state actors and monitor the functioning of the state.

the Indian state is moving away from such, often detrimental, 'top-down' categorizations of poverty, and starting to embrace the view that the poor are knowledgeable beings that should themselves be given the opportunity to define what it means to be poor (e.g. Chambers, 1997), and then dictate accordingly their requirements of the state.

Increasing state adoption of certain 'technologies of rule' or practices 'that structure and even produce settings for the conduct of business between "the state" and its citizens' (Corbridge et al., 2005: 5-6) can be seen as indicative of this embryonic, yet distinguishable, socio-political change taking place in India. *Panchayati Raj* institutions (e.g. Rajaraman and Sinha, 2007), Village Education Committees (e.g. Subrahmanian, 1999), the Right to Information Act and associated movements (e.g. Jenkins and Goetz, 1999), the National Rural Employment Guarantee Act (e.g. Jacob and Varghese, 2006), and even the Scheduled Tribes and Other Traditional Forest Dwellers (Recognition of Forest Rights) Act (e.g. Ramnath, 2008) are all measures that are beginning to help produce and institutionalize new and more responsive forms of government interaction with the poor. While the effects of such measures have yet to be seen in some cases, and in others, have been variable and uneven (e.g. Chakraborty, 2007), they are helping, at least partly, to enhance citizen ability to address their own poverty, problems in government provision, and to scrutinize, criticize and limit high-handed state behaviour.

Moreover, such technologies of rule not only reflect a change in state attitudes and actions towards the rural poor, but their adoption is also helping to alter how the rural poor encounter, meet (Painter, 2007) or 'see'¹⁰ the state (Corbridge et al., 2005). They are serving to instil in the poor a sense that the state must satisfy their rights and demands, and a belief in the power of civil society to ensure that it does. For Corbridge (2007), certain day-to-day activities are indicative of this change in the way the state is locally 'seen'. For example, while a poor widow collecting her pension may, by reason of rank over right, be kept waiting and be addressed roughly, she will have legitimate expectations of the state, which will generally be realized, and she will express herself in the language of rights. Another day-to-day indication of this change in local perceptions is the increasing emergence of a culture of complaining, often related to inadequate state service provision. Following Corbridge (2007), it is partly through complaining, and increasing state receptiveness, that a sense of being a citizen, and being part of an ever more vibrant civil society, is gradually built up. Such culture of complaint and state responsiveness also satisfies the two prerequisites of a deepened civil society identified by Beteille: increased citizen power in relation to the state, and new citizen values and beliefs or 'habits of the heart and the mind' (1999: 2589).

This is not to denigrate the work of less optimistic critics. While Chatterjee's conception of civil society as 'the closed association of modern elite groups, sequestered from the wider popular life of the communities, walled up within enclaves of civic freedom and rational law' (2004: 4) is extreme and ignores various detectable changes in Indian state-society interactions such as those mentioned above, these changes are still embryonic. The concept and operation of civil society is often romanticized (Pandey, 2005) and

¹⁰ For various critiques of this 'sighting' metaphor see *Geoforum* (2007): 38(4): 597-613.

frequently continues to exclude particular societal groups (Chandhoke, 2003). Participatory development in practice may still often fail truly to disrupt the knowledges of the powerful (Sharp, 2007). Finally, the state in a 'shadow' form (Harriss-White, 2003: chapter 4), eroded away, and then infiltrated by corruption, is a persisting reality in numerous areas (e.g. Jeffrey, 2000; Jenkins, 2007). As a result, the agency of many rural poor actors remains considerably limited (e.g. Drèze and Sen, 2002), or mediated by political society (Véron et al., 2003), which, though not inherently destructive (Corbridge et al., 2005), regularly can be (Chatterjee, 2004). The state is a complex and messy entity that operates and engages unevenly with the rural poor. Accordingly, numerous 'degrees of democracy' or depths of citizenship exist in India (Heller, 2000: 485), such that the dynamism of civil society is still subject to considerable spatial and other variations (e.g. Dahiya, 2003; Varshney, 2000).

However, distinguishable positive changes are becoming more widespread, with the recent emergence and considerable success of particular citizen movements, such as the pro-accountability Mazdoor Kisan Shakti Sangathan movement in Rajasthan (Ackerman, 2004), being one example. Another comes from Vidarbha, Maharashtra, in the area where the Botezari relocation took place. Since 1999, two connected civil society organizations, Shramik Elgar and Elgar Pratishthan, have been seeking to empower the rural poor there. Despite it being known as a 'backward' region, these organizations have made some progress in grassroots organization, human rights education and legal aid provision, whilst also encouraging local government accountability and transparency (PACS, 2006). Indeed, an expansion of local spaces of empowerment is increasingly being documented, not only in typically 'progressive' areas such as West Bengal and Kerala (Drèze and Sen, 1999), but also in these more 'backward' regions, even Bihar and Jharkhand (Corbridge et al., 2005).

Argument caveats

I have argued above that a particular set of power relations emerged during the year prior to Botezari's relocation from TATR which provides some challenge to the theory of the powerless oustee. I have also suggested that the Botezari case may be indicative of the very early beginnings of a wider changing trajectory and politics of conservation-related displacement in India, underpinned by new displacement policies and legislation, a current deepening of Indian civil society and an increasingly citizen-responsive Indian bureaucracy.

There are, however, certain caveats to this argument that require comment. The first is that the land which the Botezari villagers received in Tolewahi is still officially designated as Reserved Forest. Consequently, by shifting, the villagers had to give up their ownership *patta* (land title) for tenancy *patta* at the new site. This issue appears to have first come to the attention of the displacement authority in a letter dated 3 June 2006 from a senior Forest Department member who was prompted to write when officer 2, unaware of the *patta* problem, issued Botezari's final land allotment order (no. 317) on 2 June 2006, ostensibly giving the villagers ownership *patta* for an area that was still Reserved Forest:

'I issued that irreversible land allotment order when I was not permitted to do so. You see, unbeknownst to me, the area was still Reserved Forest. Hopefully...this situation will be fixed as we should be able to get that area converted to revenue land' (interview 50-officer 2).

Since early June 2006, attempts have been made by the displacement authority and also, independently, by the socially-concerned local NGO, to have the Tolewahi land denotified under section 27 of the Indian Forest Act. However, the Central Empowered Committee of the Supreme Court, while allowing the land to be allocated to, and used by, the oustees on a lease basis, has refused, to date, to permit its dereservation, stating that 'the legal status of the land will remain unchanged'. An appeal, filed by the displacement authority on 20 April 2007, is currently still pending before the Supreme Court, but unless or until this is successful, the villagers' tenancy status will prevent their sale of the land and may also inhibit their use of it as security. However, the fact that the villagers relocated in spite of this much-discussed outstanding issue does not negate this paper's central argument. Ultimately the villagers concluded that the *patta* issue was not decisive. Whether that decision was wise or not, and whether the villagers were right to rely on assurances that they would not be significantly disadvantaged by it, is a matter for debate, but overall they thought that the benefits of displacement would outweigh such disadvantages. Nonetheless, the existence of the *patta* issue highlights that, while some change in conventional power relations occurred in the year prior to Botezari's relocation, the villagers still remained under significant state pressure: by relocating without ownership *patta*, they took a potentially serious risk.

The second caveat concerns irrigation. During the year prior to the relocation, the Botezari villagers repeatedly demanded an irrigation tank so that, unlike in TATR, they would be able to take two crops per year at the new site. However, according to the MPAPR Act (schedule: part 3) and subsequent Maharashtra Revenue and Forest Department clarifications, the amount of irrigated land to be provided per oustee HH should be around half the amount to be provided if *jirayat* (dry) land is given. Thus, the displacement authority was unwilling to provide irrigation as part of the displacement package as this would substantially limit the size of landholdings that the villagers would be eligible for. However, as a compromise, the villagers were assured that, sometime after relocation, they would receive separate micro irrigation facilities such as *shet tala* (individual field ponds). While this assurance was sincere, the displacement authority also promised to apply to the state government for funds to construct either an irrigation tank or a large-scale dam project in the Tolewahi area post relocation. This promise was essentially meaningless: displacement authority members implied to the author on several occasions that such a proposal would be unlikely to receive approval. Such a disingenuous negotiation strategy illustrates that while the Botezari villagers were able to modify traditional state-oustees power dynamics during their pre-relocation phase, this modification was not without some considerable constraints.

Conclusion

This paper has proposed that, prior to displacement, the residents of Botezari were given some space to vocalize their views on local natural resource management, and on their role within such management. I have also suggested that the villagers were in many ways genuinely willing to move out of TATR, and that there was a certain amount

of meaningful local participation and state-oustee communication and negotiation in the pre-relocation phase.

As government policies, laws and practices that fail to take into account the views of the rural poor slowly become less tenable in the Indian context, and being a citizen, a resident of a protected area and an oustee comes to engender more influence in relation to the state, it may be that this very slight shift in power that took place in the Botezari case (and also in the few other comparable cases referred to above) will become more common features of future conservation-related displacement operations in the country.

A lot of existing work on conservation-related displacement is based upon displacements that have either taken place in countries lacking mature and stable structures of democratic governance and/or on populations displaced in organizational contexts centrally underlain by traditional, 'top-down', autocratic approaches to development and conservation. Perhaps as a result of this, the acute powerlessness of the displaced versus the uncontrollable power of the state has been heavily emphasized. In contrast, India, today, not only has a lasting, and fairly stable, vibrant democracy, but is beginning to experience a deepening of civil society and the emergence of a more citizen-responsive bureaucracy. At the same time, fairly precise and sensitive displacement policies and laws have started to materialize, while participatory approaches to development and conservation are increasingly gaining official favour. In this context, a more unpredictable and fluctuating set of power configurations may be in the process of emerging, thereby beginning to render slightly less absolute the conventional theory of the powerless oustee there. Whilst further studies of other current and pending conservation-related displacements are required before any final conclusions can be drawn, it could be that conservation-related oustees are very slowly starting to gain a somewhat heightened level of influence in relation to an increasingly anxious state; a level of power that enables them to play a still restricted, but nevertheless slightly more central role in shaping their own destinies and those of the natural resources that surround them.

References

- Ackerman, J. (2004) 'Co-Governance for Accountability: Beyond "Exit" and "Voice"', *World Development* 32(3): 447-63.
- Asher, M. and A. Kothari (2005) 'Unsettling: the Reality of Resettlement in Orissa', *Down to Earth* 14(6): 40-1.
- Awasthi, K. (2008) 'Many Takers of a Park', *Down to Earth* 16(23): 22-7.
- Bazerman, M. H. and M. A. Neale (1992) *Negotiating Rationally*. New York: Free Press.
- Beazley, K. (2006) 'Exclusion in Madhav National Park: Is Policy Change Required?' *Economic and Political Weekly* 41(45): 4684-93.
- Beteille, A. (1999) 'Citizenship, State and Civil Society', *Economic and Political Weekly* 34(36): 2588-91.
- Brass, P. R. (1994) *The Politics of India since Independence*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Brockington, D. (2004) 'Community Conservation, Inequality and Injustice: Myths of Power in Protected Area Management', *Conservation and Society* 2(2): 411-32.
- Brockington, D. and J. Igoe (2006) 'Eviction for Conservation: a Global Overview', *Conservation and Society* 4(3): 424-70.
- Cernea, M. and K. Schmidt-Soltau (2006) 'Poverty Risks and National Parks: Policy Issues in Conservation and Resettlement', *World Development* 34(10): 1808-30.
- Chakrabarti, S. K. (2003) 'Relocation of Tribals from Rajiv Gandhi National Park, Karnataka', Draft Proceeding of Seminar on 'Relocation of People from Protected Areas in India: Policy and Process', New Delhi: Council for Social Development.
- Chakraborty, P. (2007) 'Implementation of Employment Guarantee: A Preliminary Appraisal', *Economic and Political Weekly* 42(7): 548-51.
- Chambers, R. (1997) *Whose Reality Counts? Putting the First Last*. London: Intermediate Technology.
- Chandhoke, N. (2003) *The Conceits of Civil Society*. New Delhi: Oxford University Press.
- Chatterjee, P. (2004) *The Politics of the Governed: Reflections on Popular Politics in Most of the World*. New York: Columbia University Press.
- Chatty, D. and M. Colchester (eds) (2002) *Conservation and Mobile Indigenous Peoples: Displacement, Forced Settlement, and Sustainable Development*. Oxford: Berghahn Books.
- Choudhary, K. (2000) 'Development Dilemma: Resettlement of Gir Maldharis', *Economic and Political Weekly* 35(30): 2662-8.
- Corbridge, S. (2007) 'The (Im)possibility of Development Studies', *Economy and Society* 36(2): 179-211.
- Corbridge, S., G. Williams, M. Srivastava and R. Véron (2005) *Seeing the State: Governance and Governmentality in India*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Dahiya, B. (2003) 'Hard Struggle and Soft Gains: Environmental Management, Civil Society and Governance in Pammal, South India', *Environment and Urbanization* 15(1): 91-100.
- Dickinson, D. and M. Webber (2007) 'Environmental Resettlement and Development, on the Steppes of Inner Mongolia, PRC', *Journal of Development Studies* 43(3): 537-61.
- Drèze, J. and A. Sen (1999) *India: Economic Development and Social Opportunity*. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
- Drèze, J. and A. Sen (2002) 'Democratic Practice and Social Inequality in India', *Journal of Asian and African Studies* 37(2): 6-37.
- Escobar, A. (1995) *Encountering Development: the Making and Unmaking of the Third World*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Ganguly, S. (2007) 'Six Decades of Independence', *Journal of Democracy* 18(2): 30-40.
- Ghate, R. (2003) 'Global Gains at Local Costs: Imposing Protected Areas: Evidence from Central India', *International Journal of Sustainable Development and World Ecology* 10(4): 377-89.

- Ghate, R. (2005) 'Tadoba-Andhari Tiger Reserve: Relocation versus Wildlife Preservation', *Economic and Political Weekly* 40(46): 4807-09.
- Ghate, R. (2007) 'Bureaucratic Strategies in Relocation', *Economic and Political Weekly* 42(45): 21-4.
- Ghate, R. and K. Beazley (2007) 'Aversion to Relocation: A Myth?', *Conservation and Society* 5(3): 331-4.
- Government of India (2005) *The Report of the Tiger Task Force: Joining the Dots*. New Delhi: Ministry of Environment and Forests.
- Harriss-White, B. (2003) *India Working: Essays on Society and Economy*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Harriss-White, B. (2005) 'Destitution and the Poverty of its Politics - with Special Reference to South Asia', *World Development* 33(6): 881-91.
- Heller, P. (2000) 'Degrees of Democracy: Some Comparative Lessons from India', *World Politics* 52(4): 484-519.
- Jacob, A. and R. Varghese (2006) 'NREGA Implementation – I: Reasonable Beginning in Palakkad, Kerala', *Economic and Political Weekly* 41(48): 4943-5.
- Jayal, N. G. (2001) *Democracy and the State: Welfare, Secularism and Development in Contemporary India*. New Delhi: Oxford University Press.
- Jeffrey, C. (2000) 'Democratisation without Representation? The Power and Political Strategies of a Rural Elite in North India', *Political Geography* 19(8): 1013-36.
- Jenkins, R. (2007) 'Civil Society versus Corruption', *Journal of Democracy* 18(2): 55-69.
- Jenkins, R. and A. M. Goetz (1999) 'Accounts and Accountability: Theoretical Implications of the Right-to-Information Movement in India', *Third World Quarterly* 20(3): 603-22.
- Kabra, A. (2007) 'The Impact of Displacement on Poverty and Livelihood Security: the Case of Kuno Wildlife Sanctuary, Madhya Pradesh, India', PhD dissertation, Jawaharlal Nehru University.
- Karanth, K. K. (2005) 'Bhadra Wildlife Sanctuary. Addressing Relocation and Livelihood Concerns', *Economic and Political Weekly* 40(46): 4809-11.
- Kohli, A. (1990) *Democracy and Discontent: India's Growing Crisis of Governability*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Mehra, D., S. Ghate, R. Ghate, A. Chaturvedi, P. K. Garlapati, A. Bose, S. Hate and R. Humaane (2004) 'Impact of Relocation on Forest-Dependent Communities: a Case of Protected Area of Vidarbha Region in Maharashtra State, India', SHODH Working Paper no. 5-04. Nagpur: SHODH.
- Mitra, S. K. (2001) 'Making Local Government Work: Local Elites, *Panchayati Raj* and Governance in India', in A. Kohli (ed.) *The Success of India's Democracy*, pp. 103-26. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Negi, A. S. (2003) 'Relocation of People in Corbett Tiger Reserve, Uttaranchal: History and Process', Draft Proceeding of Seminar on 'Relocation of People from Protected Areas in India: Policy and Process', New Delhi: Council for Social Development.
- Neumann, R. P. (1998) *Imposing Wilderness: Struggles over Livelihood and Nature Preservation in Africa*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Olivier, E. and Y. Goudineau (2004) 'Planned Resettlement, Unexpected Migrations and Cultural Trauma in Laos', *Development and Change* 35(5): 937-62.
- PACS (2006) *Poorest Areas Civil Society Programme 2001-2008: PACS Impact: Strategic Action Areas and Implementation*. Pune: InfoChange.
- Painter, J. (2007) 'Stateness in Action', *Geoforum* 38(4): 605-7.
- Pandey, V. N. (2005) 'State and Civil Society: Reframing the Question in the Indian Context', in N. Jayaram (ed.) *On Civil Society: Issues and Perspectives*, pp. 90-109. New Delhi: Sage.
- Rajaraman, I. and D. Sinha (2007) 'Functional Devolution to Rural Local Bodies in Four States', *Economic and Political Weekly* 42(24): 2275-83.

- Ramnath, M. (2008) 'Surviving the Forest Rights Act: Between Scylla and Charybdis', *Economic and Political Weekly* 43(9): 37-42.
- Rangarajan, M. and G. Shahabuddin (2006) 'Displacement and Relocation from Protected Areas: towards a Biological and Historical Synthesis', *Conservation and Society* 4(3): 359-78.
- Rogers, S. and M. Wang (2006). 'Environmental Resettlement and Social Dis/re-articulation in Inner Mongolia, China', *Population and Environment* 28(1): 41-68.
- Rugendyke, B. and N. T. Son (2005) 'Conservation Costs: Nature-Based Tourism as Development at Cuc Phuong National Park, Vietnam', *Asia Pacific Viewpoint* 46(2): 185-200.
- Saberwal, S. (2005) 'Democracy and Civil Society in India: Integral or Accidental?', in N. Jayaram (ed.) *On Civil Society: Issues and Perspectives*, pp. 110-23. New Delhi: Sage.
- Schmidt-Soltau, K. and D. Brockington (2007) 'Protected Areas and Resettlement: What Scope for Voluntary Relocation?', *World Development* 35(12): 2182-202.
- Scott, J. C. (1985) *Weapons of the Weak: Everyday Forms of Peasant Resistance*. New Haven: Yale University Press.
- Scott, J. C. (1998) *Seeing like a State: how Certain Schemes to Improve the Human Condition have Failed*. New Haven: Yale University Press.
- Seeta Prabhu, K. (2001) *Economic Reform and Social Sector Development: a Study of Two Indian States*. New Delhi: Sage.
- Sen, A. (1999) *Development as Freedom*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Shahabuddin, G., R. Kumar and M. Shrivastava (2005) *Forgotten Villages: a People's Perspective on Village Displacement from Sariska Tiger Reserve*. New Delhi: Council for Social Development.
- Sharma, A. and A. Kabra (2007) 'Displacement as a Conservation Tool: Lessons from the Kuno Wildlife Sanctuary, Madhya Pradesh', in G. Shahabuddin and M. Rangarajan (eds) *Making Conservation Work: Securing Biodiversity in this New Century*, pp. 21-47.
- Sharp, J. (2007) 'Embodying the State and Citizenship', *Geoforum* 38(4): 602-4.
- Subrahmanian, R. (1999) 'Matching Services with Local Preferences: Managing Primary Education Services in a Rural District of India', *Development in Practice* 9(1): 68-77.
- Varshney, A. (2000) 'Is India Becoming More Democratic?', *Journal of Asian Studies* 59(1): 3-25.
- Véron, R., S. Corbridge, G. Williams and M. Srivastava (2003) 'The Everyday State and Political Society in Eastern India: Structuring Access to the Employment Assurance Scheme', *Journal of Development Studies* 39(5): 1-28.
- Williams, L., A. Kjørstad and P. Robson (eds) (2003) *Law and Poverty: Poverty Reduction and the Role of the Legal System*. London: Zed Books.
- Yadav, Y. (2000) 'Understanding the Second Democratic Upsurge: Trends of Bahujan Participation in Electoral Politics in the 1990s', in F. R. Frankel, Z. Hasan, R. Bhargava and B. Arora (eds) *Transforming India: Social and Political Dynamics of Democracy*, pp. 120-45. New Delhi: Oxford University Press.