

**EXTREMIST CONFLICTS, STATE FAILURE AND DEVELOPMENT IN AFRICA:
PEACE AND GOVERNANCE OPTIONS FOR CITIZENS**

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Introduction

Any close observer of events in that continent cannot fail to notice that there has been a deliberate extension of sphere of influence and activities of Islamic extremists from Asia to African states in recent years. Within the last two years, the following countries have been attacked: Algeria, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Egypt, Kenya, Mali, Nigeria and Somalia in some cases with increasing boldness and devastating results. This article tries to establish why this is the case and what constitutes the most effective institutional containment strategies and policy responses.

Islamic insurgency was initially focused on South and East Asian countries of Afghanistan, Pakistan, Malaysia and Indonesia. Al Qaeda launched its attack on the United States of America from Afghanistan on September 11, 2011. Other terrorist acts such as the London bombing in May 2005 and other assaults including the planned bombing of an American plane on Christmas eve of 2009 were planned in these parts of the world or in the Middle East. In the last several years, however, there has been a shift to African countries.

This article argues that this increasing inclusion of Africa in Islamic terrorist embrace constitutes a deliberate and strategic shift in Islamic insurgency thinking. By the time many African countries obtained their independence from the late 1950s to early 1960s, there were Islamic movements that fought Jihads with ambitious plans to take whole countries for Islam. The colonial enterprise obstructed and scuttled the construction of these Islamic empires especially in Western and Eastern Africa. Instead new states were created which had responsibility for maintaining law and order in these societies. Many of these states were successful in their late colonial and early post-independence periods in the 1950s and 1960s. There was a deliberate effort to build on the legacy of political and bureaucratic institutions they had inherited from the West. That some of these countries succeeded was borne out in spurts of socio-economic developments in the region and there was much hope of an African resurgence. Unfortunately, hope gave way to disillusionment as these nations attained political independence and the quality of political and administrative leaderships systematically declined. Centralization, abuse of power, corruption became the order of the day in many countries, especially those that had the greatest potential due to their demographic size and economic resource base.

The years of plenty gave way to lean years as many of these countries took the structural adjustment loans in the 1970s that sent their societies and economies reeling. Unfortunately, even when for a multitude of reasons the economic fortunes of these countries improved in more recent years, many of the countries did not focus on building their governance systems that are required by all states. The result is that they became soft states, and this has attracted the attention of Islamic insurgents.

States exist to provide basic responsibilities to the societies they govern. First, they are to provide security and for this they have the monopoly of violence or at least a superiority that cannot be contested. Second, they provide basic services which the private producers would not or cannot produce. Finally, they represent their people in international fora such as at the United Nations and other global and regional organs.

In order to provide these basic services, a state requires legitimacy, authority and capacity. Unfortunately most of the African states lack these basic requisites, hence they have become soft targets for Islamic insurgents.

With the above narrative we review the relevance of some of the institutional and policy options being considered against the Islamic insurgents in these countries today.

1. REVIEW OF CURRENT CONTAINMENT OPTIONS

The options being proposed can be classified into three. The first is a regional and international coalition for military or information campaign such as on stopping the Seleka rebels in Central African Republic or rescuing the nearly 300 girls from their school in Chibok, Northeastern Nigeria. The second is a military option, to be carried out essentially by the national armies and the last is a political option, focused on negotiating with the Islamist extremists to lay down their arms and become a part of the domestic political competition for power. Each of these options is reviewed in turn. .

- a. **Regional Coalition:** The regional option is attractive in that insurgents do not respect the artificial state boundaries, they are transnational. Besides, what one nation cannot do, two or more nations combining their efforts and forces, especially with assistance from the wider international community such as the UN or even AU, might succeed and have actually succeeded in some cases. On the flip side, however, is the fact that since most of these countries are weak, their combined efforts have been insignificant in confronting Islamic insurgency which seem to be better resourced than the national armies and are more highly motivated than them. In country after country, previous regional efforts have depended on external states, usually the former colonial power, working through the United Nations system and the African Union; to assist in foiling and stopping Islamic insurgency...This was the case in Mali, Cote D'Ivoire and CAR with French forces providing assistance. The critical question is while a coalition of nations can help to dramatically solve a specific military operation, it is difficult and definitely impossible for them to sustain this on the long run. The lesson from Mali is that foreign forces can help to win a specific war but the insurgents can always bid their time, regroup and return as they have done presently—and as they have done in other parts of the world, e.g. Afghanistan, Pakistan and now Iraq.

Besides, foreign forces atimes confuse human rights with the challenge of fighting insurgents who have no respect for human lives. Experiences of how these foreign forces have dealt with insurgents elsewhere shows that there are limits to which the respect for the human rights of such insurgents can be pressed without jeopardizing the lives of their victims and of informants and supporters who try to help the regional and global coalitions. How much human right was Osama Bin Laden allowed to exercise before he was terminally put away? Or the insurgents in Pakistan, Afghanistan and Somalia –

on whom drones have been deployed by the United States—or the manner in which French forces confronted the insurgents in Mali?

- b. A **military option** has also been touted. But all the available facts point to the fact that the Islamic extremists in Africa are actually better funded, better resourced and determined than the domestic military formations. These national military units are incapacitated by institutionalized corruption, lack of esprit des corps, equipment or intelligence. For instance, the Nigeria military is understood to have had an annual budget of US\$6 billion for the 60,000-strong military over many years and yet even salaries are not paid as and when due nor do the fighting units have reliable vehicular transportation.
- c. Finally, there are those who have suggested **the political option**. The key question to be answered here is: How do you appease people who reject the authority of the state, democracy or even the concept of a multi-faith, pluralistic society?

The sad truth is that the kind of conflicts currently being witnessed in these African countries is symptomatic of the failure of these states.

At the heart of the African challenge therefore is the crisis of the state. The state in Africa has become overly soft and incapable. The insurgents seem to be targeting especially those states that have the greatest potential for economic prosperity, especially as many African countries entered an era of prosperity, so they could become their staging post for global jihad which is really at the heart of their struggle. The fact that it is the states with larger size and resources that are most at risk makes the challenge not only more real but more dangerous for the region and the world. We discuss next Africa's most serious development opportunities and challenges.

2. AFRICA'S DEVELOPMENT CHALLENGES

The African continent is presently at the cross-road of change. For too long, Africa was regarded as the laggard continent, and was referred to as the 'hopeless continent'-(The Economist, 2010). Suddenly, Africa has become the newest and latest destination of foreign direct investment, the new Eldorado and the continent with great possibilities in all areas—demography, economics, politics etc. The economy of many African countries has grown at rates that exceeded all expectations at a time when other countries have stagnated or even experienced recession with the threat of depression.

Africa's development challenges are many and complex but they can be reduced to three major ones. These are **conflicts, corruption** and **weak and declining institutional capacity** to sustain peaceful governance. As these are all governance issues, the quality of the African state is core to the resolution of these challenges.

But the problem of Africa is not of her many small countries. It is of the big countries. Some of the small countries like Seychelles, Mauritius, Botswana, and even our neighbor and kins in Benin Republic are relatively well –governed and have

COUNTRY	POPULATION	PEACE INDEX	State of Peace	CORRUPTION INDEX
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experienced sustained high levels of growth, which is the hallmark of development. But the problem of Africa is the big players, with Nigeria leading the pack. These countries-Nigeria, Angola, Egypt, Ethiopia, Sudan, Republic of South Africa, Central African Republic, and Democratic Republic of the Congo and others contain more than two thirds of the total African population (see Table 1). They were regarded as dysfunctional states in a book whose key question was why Africa’s large states, by population and land mass, have not been the locomotives of the continent but weights and drags in the drive towards development (Clapham 2006).

TABLE 1: SIZE, PEACE AND CORRUPTION INDICES IN AFRICA-2013

increased –at sub-national, national, regional and continental levels--but (good) governance declined?

Of the three problems mentioned above, the most visible and most confounding today especially in Africa and especially in her largest country, Nigeria, is conflict.

Nigeria has recently surpassed RSA as Africa's largest and biggest economy. The country had after a long time and in the face of problematic data finally recalculated her gross domestic product and incorporated neglected sectors, such as Nollywood. But it was also a week when the following events occurred, that has caused domestic and international consternation:

--Boko Haram which had focused its operations in the northeastern part of Nigeria was able to launch two attacks at our national capital in broad daylight killing and maiming innocent citizens as they went to work in the early morning hour bus rush.

--Almost 300 girls in a secondary school in Chibok village in North-Eastern Nigeria were abducted by this same group killing in the process a soldier and policeman on guard.

As the nation prepared to host the World Economic Forum a global warning went round that hotels such as Sheraton in Lagos and Abuja might be the next targets of the Boko Haram thugs. In fact, Boko Haram has unleashed a spate of attacks at different cities and villages in Kano, Borno and Abuja FCT.

Yet, another story which is also making the rounds in academic and research circles is that Nigeria is the third of three countries in the whole world experiencing the fastest growth of Christianity, especially Pentecostal or protestant Christianity in the world. The first is China and the next is Brazil (Freston 2009).

What do these all have in common, we must ask, we try to discuss this in the next section.

3. CLARIFICATIONS AND CAUSATION BEFORE CURES

Conflicts might indeed have their uses as they could help to clarify differences and provide opportunities for synthesis and compromise. However, perpetual conflicts lead not only to the tragic loss of life and property; they also lead to loss of opportunities to make progress. An extensive study in Denmark recently found that conflicts even among partners lead to earlier deaths 2-3 times more compared to more peaceful peers (*USA Today* 2014). Conflictual relationships in larger contexts, aggravate and are aggravated by corruption and institutional capacity decline. But the problem confronting most of the African countries, especially the ones with the best potentials is a special form of conflict, ones borne out of extremism. And there are different forms of extremism—Islamic (such as being experienced in Somalia, Egypt, Nigeria, Kenya, Algeria, Mali, CAR, Sudan); Christian extremism—such as by the Lord's Resistance Army against the Ugandan state. One can also speak of political extremism----as in Eritrea; Sierra Leone, Liberia, Morocco, DRC, Ethiopia etc

and economic extremism—such as the wild -cat strikes between employees and employers in the Republic of South Africa—but the Islamic extremism threat is the most widespread danger confronting many countries in the region.

A state by definition has the monopoly of violence and as the sovereign actor in the territory and society it juridically represents; it is expected to perform three main functions. These are: *security, welfare and representation*. In order to deliver on these functions a state requires three major attributes which are: *authority, capacity and legitimacy*. States are classified according to these attributes on a continuum, analyzed in detail in Table 2 to determine whether they are *resilient, capable, fragile, failed to collapsed states*.

The crucial quality required for effective states is *resilience*. Resilience enables a state 'sustain its core purpose and integrity in the face of dramatically changed circumstances' (Zolli and Healy 2012:7). Resilient states are prepared for all kinds of stresses and shocks; good and bad times using structured learning and feedback mechanisms. It is this capability that has been absent in many African countries and in other countries that are now dubbed fragile as well. In essence what is needed is to create institutions that enable society to better absorb shocks and disruption, to 'operate under a wide variety of conditions, shifting more fluidly from one circumstance to another' without complete system breakdown. This capacity cannot be imposed from above; it must be nurtured in the social structures that govern peoples' everyday lives. (Zolli and Healy 2012). We Africans must build and sustain resilience using a combination of political and technical resources from within our own social structures and experiences.

The quality of these institutional structures and capacities determines also whether a society would experience good or bad governance. Both secular and scriptural authorities therefore prioritize peace and good governance. However, since many Christians are largely unaware of these, I plan to give some space to discussing this as briefly as possible in this keynote address.

But first, what is peace? Peace can be defined in two ways, negatively as the absence of war or conflict, the most used measurement in international statistics and data gathering. However, it is also possible to conceive peace as the existence of social capital or bonding among people living in the same social space (Putnam 2010).

How about governance? It is the relationship between the fundamental *rules* by which *rulers* and *ruled* relate to one another in any social setting. When governance is good, it's transparent, responsive, equitable and accountable and the outcome is peace, both in its negative and positive forms. Other benefits include progress, security and prosperity...and the building of sustainable human and system capacities. This might also explain why there is so much interest in these two concepts --peace and governance--today.

Unfortunately, the most available statistics show that peace is declining in our world and this is the case even when peace is defined in a negative sense as the absence of conflict. If we defined it in the positive sense it's even more stark...and this in spite of the existence of huge and well-resourced organizations such as the United

Nations agencies dedicated to the promotion of peace and also of global factors such as increasing democratization and globalization, two factors that should promote peace in our world (Olowu et al 2014).

It's helpful to point out that African countries top the list of the most fragile countries in our world. A report by the African Development Bank (2012) noted that a third of the people in the region lived in countries regarded as fragile...these are countries prone to conflicts and that rate low on the three key indices of statehood: legitimacy, authority and capacity. This trend was confirmed by the Fund for Peace Foundation in the Failed States Index for 2013 (Tables 2 and 3).

The linkages between conflicts and a failed state can be expressed as follows:

**CONFLICTS----INSTITUTIONALIZED CORRUPTION—CAPACITY DECLINE---
DESTRUCTION OF CRITICAL INSTITUTIONS AND NORMS—POLITICAL
PARALYSIS—RESOURCE CURSE—STRONG EXIT/ WEAK VOICE--STATE
FAILURE.**

Table 2: ATTRIBUTES AND BROAD INDICATORS OF STATEHOOD

	ATTRIBUTES	INDICATORS
LEGITIMACY	<p>Virile institutions for state –society interface</p> <p>Accountable and Transparent Institutions</p>	<p>No Repression or politically Motivated emigration</p> <p>Guaranteed Freedoms (association, religion, expression, movement, political participation)</p> <p>Effective state-society and Central –local engagement</p>
AUTHORITY	<p>Monopoly of Violence</p> <p>Peace & Security of Persons</p>	<p>Absence of civil strife and war</p> <p>Law and order maintenance</p> <p>Enforcement of contracts and property rights</p>

CAPACITY	Effective Policy Process for Economic Management & Service Delivery Societal Innovation	Competent, Non-corrupt, Well compensated & High Performing Public institutions Solid & Improving Infrastructure & Basic Services Research & Development/ Economic Success
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Source: Adapted from Olowu and Chanie (2014)

TABLE 3: AFRICAN COUNTRIES IN THE FAILED STATES INDEX-2013

RANK	COUNTRY	OVERALL SCORE
1	Somalia	114
2	Congo DRC	112
3	Sudan	111
4	South Sudan	110.6
5	Chad	109
9	CAR	105.3
10	Zimbabwe	105.2
11	Cote D D'ivoire	103.5
14	Guinea	101.3
15	G/Bissau	101.1
16	Nigeria	100.7
17	Kenya	99.0
18	Niger	99.0
19	Ethiopia	98.0
20	Burundi	97.6
22	Uganda	96.6
23	Liberia	95.1
25	Eritrea	95.0
27	Cameroon	93.5
31	Mauritania	91.7

Source: Fund for Peace, Washington D.C

4. CONTAINMENT STRATEGIES, POLICIES AND PROGRAMS

African countries have sought to tackle their problems through two major ways in the past. The first is through a resort to arms. Military takeovers were the answers to the problems of governance in the 1960s and 1970s...but the results were most unimpressive in any of the countries. The military establishment became a part of the problem instead of becoming a part of the solution. Several reasons have been accorded for this...the training and orientation of the military, their inability to act above their social contexts etc.

Africans have also sought assistance from external actors, especially their colonial masters, acting directly or through the instrumentalities of the United Nations. We already discussed the significance of this option but also its many problems.

This then leads us to pose the question of what could be an assured way forward. The response of this author is that there would need for a rebuilding of state capacity. As the state cannot achieve this by herself, there would need to be a broad coalition to make it happen. But the problem of civil society is that those that readily meet the conventional definition are weak and completely dependent in many cases on foreign or external partners. This has compromised their effectiveness and clout.

The discourse on state rebuilding suffers from four major problems especially in Africa. The first is the 'historical amnesia' of people now living in industrialized countries of how long and painful it took them to build basic modern political institutions which they take for granted. These are the institutions that make governments, as legal representatives of the state, *accountable* and *effective*. The three most basic of these institutions (rules-in-use or socially sanctioned rules) are: *the state, rule of law and accountable government*. These three promote state resilience precisely because they work in tension against one another—a strong centralized executive under the watchful oversight of autonomous organs that restrict governmental powers at the center and atimes in the periphery through federalism or devolution (Fukuyama 2012, McGinnis 1999). The full list of such institutions include: universal suffrage or democracy, professional and non-partisan bureaucracy, an independent judiciary, property rights regimes, corporate governance and financial institutions and social welfare and labor institutions (Chang Ha-Joon 2004). These political and economic institutions (Acemolu and Robinson 2012) can be classified into two broad types of institutions—political and economic institutions which provide the potential for citizens to transform extractive zero-sum relations between rulers and ruled into inclusive positive sum ones. While the shift from extractive to inclusive institutions could happen by historical accident, more often than not, it takes place through struggle by ordinary citizens.

This first point is strategic because policy makers and researchers in the rich world determine and dominate the development policy agenda; hence short shrift is given to the challenge of building robust indigenous institutions that promote inclusive extractive economic and political institutions. But this first problem is aggravated by the second and is of greater magnitude: the lack of appreciation of the critical importance of the above-mentioned institutions and their significance for social and economic welfare by African leaders, thinkers and even ordinary citizens, including Christians. At best, the latter pay a lip service to constitutionalism, even though they go through the motion of constitution-making but turn around to make a mockery of these core institutions—which such constitutions confer on the society: ‘constitutions without constitutionalism’ (Okoth-Ogendo 2000). The history of African politics unfortunately to-date is one in which the above –mentioned critical institutions have been bastardised.

This brings us to the third problematic—the sidelining of critical groups from the peace discourse and practice. Such critical groups include businesses, youths and faith communities. As the latter has done so much to contribute to the improvements in peace and governance in historic times in diverse countries that are today developed, and there are clear instructions on these matters in their holy books (Babatunde 2013, Olowu 2012), the rest of this paper would discuss what has been and should be the appropriate response faith communities to the decline of peace generally but especially in African countries. While civic groups have been given prominence in development policy in recent years, doubts have been expressed as to whether faith communities or better faith-based organizations (FBOs) qualify to be treated as civic groups, because in some cases they are not voluntary and in some cases are exclusive (Ter Haar 2011).

The fourth and perhaps most difficult problematic is paradoxical—the discovery of rich raw materials and resources in Africa, but especially mineral resources. Normally, resources should lead to improved economic conditions but around the world, when resources exist in countries or contexts in which the governance conditions are problematic it has led to the exact reverse, a condition the economists refer to as ‘resource curse’. Africa has always been blessed indeed more than all other regions of the world with raw materials, fauna and minerals. However, in the last several years, new technologies and innovations in exploration and extraction are making many African countries rich. It is for instance, estimated that over \$3million trillions of oil and gas would be pumped into African countries, some of them poorest and least developed. 25 billion barrels would be available for export in the next decade. This is just oil and gas, not diamond which abound in countries like CAR or uranium and other rare metals in Eastern Africa. These oil finds are concentrated in two geographical areas, the Rift Valley in eastern and the gulf of Guinea in western Africa in which the Islamic extremists have also focused their operations.

The resource curse impacts on a country in three pernicious ways. First, economically, it fuels inflation, distorts exchange rates, and competitiveness for traditional exports, also undermines industrialization as easy (bad) money chases out much more difficult and ‘good’ money. This is the dreaded ‘Dutch disease’, first used to describe what happened to the Netherlands’ economy when it discovered large gas resources in the late 1950s. Second, financially it reduces the incentive to

improve and mobilize more resources from the traditional source of income for all governments, taxes as citizens and public officials rely more unearned income or rents. This has serious economic and governance implications as it undermines entrepreneurship and investment but also impairs the social contract that exists between the governors and the governed if the main governments' revenues had come from taxes. The clarion, 'no taxation without representation' sums up this contract. Those who pay taxes demand not only accountability but also representation in determining priorities on which the monies would be spent. Natural resources undermine this contract and in fact in Africa, it accrues to the state in Africa, much like development assistance or aid. In such a situation, governments, and there are many that derive a substantial portion of their incomes from natural resource or development aid, can exist without the people. Finally, in the absence of transparent and accountability institutions, these huge resource inflows encourage waste and corruption in governance. Further, it tends to attract the worst elements into politics who force their way into power (making politics not only dangerous and dirty) and make legislations that fosters impunity. They obstruct any efforts to improve governance or accountability and proceed to make it impossible for more civic people to emerge as leaders in governance. Unfortunately, such actors work closely with external actors who collaborate to pillage these countries.

It's a perfect case of what the Ostroms would refer to as a common pool of public resources which should be public goods becoming public bads (Mcginnis 1999). According to those who studied the subject closely: no major oil and gas exporter from any developing country is a democracy; and 'increase in natural resource wealth are strongly correlated with greater corruption, authoritarianism, political and economic instability and civil war'. (Diamond and Mosbacher 2013: 88, 90).

In the circumstance, we highlight five crucial measures for turning things around at the heart of which must be the reconstruction and revitalization of the African states as the strongest defenders of their respective societies in a sustainable manner. The critical question would be how can politics which is not only dirty but dangerous as we see above be tamed in Africa? How can resilient replace the soft states of today? We believe that there are lessons in history and in contemporary experiences which would be found relevant.

- a. First, the resource curse can be and have been reversed by the collective will of the people putting these resources beyond politics based on a collective consensus of automatic transfers to citizens directly and indirectly. This could be in the form a long-term decision to invest a substantial portion of these resources (ranging from 30-70 %) in long term transformation of infrastructure, education, science, research and technology and social safety nets for families and individuals. Countries that have done this have included the Netherlands, Norway, and Brazil not to mention some of the oil-rich Arab states like Kuwait, Qatar and Saudi Arabia that make lavish payments to their citizens. Recently some new ideas on distributing a proportion of these funds directly to citizens have been experimented in many countries. Even donors are discovering that development funds made directly to citizens might be more impactful if sent through civic bodies or directly to citizens than when sent through government agencies. One team has suggested schemes whereby such direct payments

to citizens would be treated as incomes and with some of these taxed back. Several countries, as many as 60 including mainly in Latin America and Asia have already been making such transfer payments, only African case are Botswana and Nigeria, the small petroleum tax (2%). Mobile phone and community banking would be expected to further promote these widely across many African countries if the political class can be compelled to excise some of the power they receive through the ballot box to such automatic transfers. This kinds of decisions can also be taken by a coalition government of national unity that cuts across the political parties whose principal aim is to avert an impending crisis such as Islamic terrorism that has hit many countries in the region.

- b. Privatize and Decentralize Public Policy: If the first measure can be tagged the automatic transfer of resources to citizens, the second is the extensive privatization and decentralization of public policy. First, privatization, a subject onto which many African countries have signed onto with positive effects, sets free huge resources and incentives. Nevertheless, the national governments would have responsibility for setting policy for the issues mentioned above to ensure that broad national standards. The application of the subsidiarity principle would ensure that matters that can be resolved at community levels are kept at that level. National policies would also be implemented at subordinate levels by appropriate regional and local governmental bodies that would have real power to decide and finance projects and programs. Past decentralization programs lacked effective accountability and this is an issue that would need to be resolved by organs besides the national government as we argue below. Finally, most of the issues on which religious fanatics feed on –language, culture, religion, would be adjudicated at local levels while security would be effectively devolved to ensure that each community effectively polices its immediate environment, with support through co-production, collaboration and effective integration of services across jurisdictions applying Elinor Ostrom (1999) eight principles. Many countries in Africa would need to revisit the principles of federalism and devolution as well as the division of societal pillarization as articulated by Abraham Kupers, the Dutch Christian politician and activist- (Heslaam 2002).
- c. Professionalize Administration through Meritocracy: All nations experience corruption especially in their public sectors. One of the most effective weapons against this social cancer is a *virile, competitive and merit –based professional public service*. Such a service exists through a rigorous enforcement of merit principle, in the same manner in which many business corporations do. In the public service, senior officers function as partners of political leaders in the formulation of policy but also in its implementation and programing. They also function as gate keepers and repositories of public interest because as servants of the state they are insulated somewhat from the rest of the polity. This enables them to resist corruption by political bosses and other interests, although this creates also the temptation for them to pursue self-interest instead of the national or public interest, especially where the ethos, training and institutions for regulating the institution is weak. Finally, this arrangement ensures that the public services function like efficient machines delivering predictable, quality infrastructures which are the key to sustained

development. The fact that this has worked in the past in these countries is important especially as other countries around the world have kept this institution in one form or other (Adamolekun 1986, Olowu 2001, Mahubani 2008, Page 2010). Unfortunately, in most of the African countries, merit bureaucracies have been slaughtered at the altar of representation, quota and political connections –both in the civilian and the military services. A rigorous application of the merit principle needs to be urgently restored in both services if insurgency is to be arrested.

- d. Engage Communities in Development: African governments have sought to govern from a distance, especially when awash with natural resources and/or development aid. That this has not resulted in great outcomes is borne out by the relatively poor performance of African countries on social indicators with the prospect that many countries would fail to meet the 2015 MGD goals. Some of the development fads have encouraged this but real development when it occurs is shared. The people must be mobilized for their own development. As long ago as 1955, the then western Nigeria government launched a program of universal primary education which most observers were certain could not be done in view of limited resources. Today, in the same country, Boko Haram is contesting western education in some parts of the north and they indeed have sympathizers because of what is regarded as governmental neglect. If the communities and individuals would be mobilized in the manner in which Kenyan governments promoted haram be in the communities in the 1960s to 1990s, much more positive results would be achieved. It's however significant that in these two examples from east and north that the faith –based communities were involved in the campaign for change. This has sadly been lacking in many other initiatives across the continent for reasons we touch on next.
- e. Engage Indigenous Civil Society: Civil society refers to organs that exist between private individuals and government. As already pointed out above, conventionally, faith communities were included as a part of the civic society but post-modern scholars object to the any faith organization being included as civil societies for some understandable reasons—lack of voluntariness and openness—in some cases. The exclusion of faith communities is unfortunate given the importance of faith in these developing societies and their resource base and political potential. What is even worse is that the faith communities themselves also exclude themselves from the political arena believing; quite rightly that politics is dirty and –dangerous—as argued above. The tragedy is that this posture provides a great opportunity for radical elements in all these faith communities to take advantage of the political opportunities and use them to cause havoc in their respective communities. This must be reversed.
- f. Educate especially Young People on Peace and Promotion: Peace is important intrinsically and as the means to enjoying other goods such as prosperity, progress and posterity. However, very little peace education goes on in our world. It's important that in particular, young people who are often the victims and the perpetrators of violence get exposes to peace education. It perhaps should not matter whether these are from faith or non-faith communities. Nevertheless, historically faith communities have played positive

roles in peace promotion in their various societies. This is why it's important that they be mobilized for peace promotion efforts as some organizations, have now begun to do.

Conclusion

The question can be raised as to who would be responsible for implementing the above ambitious program. The answer would be that it must be a coalition of all the positive forces within and outside a society, especially the African social political space, concerned about the advances and strategies of the extremists Islamists that are determined to promote jihad irrespective of the cost to themselves or to the societies they claim to represent. It must be a coalition of faith and non-faith peoples, young and old, domestic and external actors.

In other words, it must be the strongest and well –resourced coalition that must be mobilized to fight what can best be described as a rapacious social cancer that is determined to wreak havoc across the region. These elements must be stopped at all costs by all concerned.

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