Book Chapter

Permanent link for this collectionhttps://hdl.handle.net/10535/3

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Negotiating Access and Rights: A Case Study of Disputes over Rights to an Irrigation Water Source in Nepal
(Draft, 1997) Pradhan, Rajendra; Pradhan, Ujjwal; Meinzen-Dick, Ruth; Bruns, Bryan
"Nepal has a long history of irrigation but until the middle of this century direct involvement of the Nepalese state in irrigation management and development was limited except when it benefitted the ruling elite. Although the state did construct or finance the construction or repairs of irrigation systems and managed or supervised the management of some systems, its main contribution to irrigation development was by means of laws and regulations which encouraged and sometimes forced local elites and ordinary farmers, usually tenants, to construct and operate irrigation systems. Legal tradition and weak administration made it possible and necessary for the irrigators to construct and manage their irrigation systems with little interference from state agencies."
Practicing Polycentric Governance
(Cambridge University Press, 2019) Bruns, Bryan; Thiel, Andreas; Blomquist, William A.; Garrick, Dustin E.
"How can communities, associations, governments, and other organizations work better together? Principles for practicing polycentric governance include organizing at multiple scales, embracing self-governance, customizing solutions, and learning together. Communities working together to govern surface and groundwater commons in Rajasthan, India offer an example of challenges and opportunities for developing polycentric governance, as do various strategies to improve basin governance. Putting polycentric governance into practice can start with assessing how stakeholders are already interconnected and appreciative exploration of how they might improve their interactions. Institutional artisans can apply principles and mechanisms to craft overarching rules and other specific arrangements for polycentric governance. Polycentric governance can be facilitated by convening discussions among stakeholders, sharing knowledge, and empowering self-organized mutual adjustment."
Transforming Climate Dilemmas from Tragedy to Cooperation
(Cambridge University Press, 2021) Bruns, Bryan; Foster, Sheila; Swiney, Chrystie
"Climate change has often been analyzed as a tragedy of the commons, a social dilemma where cooperation could make everyone better off but incentives induce individuals, businesses, and nations to keep on emitting greenhouse gasses. However, the simple game theory model of tragedy of the commons, Prisoner’s Dilemma, is just one of many possible models for climate conflict and cooperation. The topology of payoff swaps in 2x2 games shows relationships between games, including their potential transformations. Changes in the ranking of outcomes can transform Prisoner’s Dilemma into a Stag Hunt with the potential for win-win cooperation or Chicken with a shared fear of catastrophe, and then create convergent incentives that yield the best for both in Concord. Models of climate negotiations about whether to abate or pollute can be compactly displayed in a table based on how payoffs from symmetric games combine to form asymmetric games. Maps for transforming climate dilemmas reveal symmetric and asymmetric pathways to climate cooperation through fear of catastrophe, or assuring cooperation that is best for both, or adjusting incentives even if a polluter always want to avoid abating while the other pollutes. Maps for transforming climate games show the diversity of climate dilemmas and potential pathways to cooperation."
Water Rights in the State of Nature: The Dynamic Emergence of Common Expectations in an Indonesian Settlement
(Vistaar and Intermediate Technology Publications, 1997) Vermillion, Douglas L.; Bruns, Bryan; Meinzen-Dick, Ruth
"This study examines how a socially recognized and predictable pattern of water rights and allocation emerged from a process of trial and error with water allocation and negotiations in a resettlement area in North Sulawesi, Indonesia. Balinese farmers in two newly developed irrigation systems recognized that the traditional rule of water allocation that divides water proportionately to area served was a simplistic first approximation. "Through inter-personal exchanges a set of socially-recognized criteria emerged to justify certain farmers in taking more than proportional amounts of water, 'borrowing water,' in response to diversity among fields in soils, access to secondary water supplies, distance from the headworks and other factors. A decision tree model uses field observations of water distribution over two seasons to assess criteria used for modifying distribution. Such criteria constituted a second approximation for more equitable water allocation among farmers."

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Browsing Book Chapter by Author "Bruns, Bryan"