Browsing by Author "Bates, Robert"

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Demographics and Institutions
(1995) Bates, Robert; Shepsle, Kenneth A.
"Douglass North transformed his field. He first encountered economic history as a branch of economics; his work has reconstituted it as a branch of political economy. Economic historians focus on endowments, technologies, preferences and the operations of markets, and seek, among other things, to explain rates and patterns of economic growth. North introduced another factor -- the society's endowment of institutions. In a variety of studies, he argues that societies with similar economic endowments would vary in their economic performance, should their institutions differ. Societies with institutions that safeguarded property rights; equated the social and private returns to productive effort; reduced the costs of transacting; or facilitated the making of credible commitments would elicit higher rates of economic growth, all else being equal, than would societies lacking such institutions. It is governments that create institutions, or that provide the legal framework that empowers them. Thus did North's insight encourage those trained as political scientists — Barry Weingast, Margaret Levi, Jean-Laurent Rosenthal, and others — to turn to economic history, or to the adjacent field of development."
Interest Groups, Electoral and Party Systems: Chaebol in Korea and Agriculture in Japan
(1992) Bates, Robert; Brady, David
"This paper examines the relationship between interest groups and electoral/party systems. We argue that interest group behavior is sophisticated in that they shape their strategies in response to the political strategies of the politicians they seek to influence. In short, contrary to the dominant interpretation of interest group behavior, we argue that their behavior is endogenous. We analyze electoral reform in Japan and party reform in Korea to demonstrate the endogeneity of interest groups' strategy. The creation of a new party in Korea after the Democratic Justice Party's loss of the 13th National Assembly Election was, we show, in part, the result of the Chaebol's lobbying to create a stable one party dominant system. The proposed electoral reforms in Japan were defeated by agricultural interests in order to preserve their present status and the status quo in agricultural policy."
Political Institutions and Economic Policies: Lessons From Africa
(2002) Humphreys, Macartan; Bates, Robert
"Scholars, activists, and policy makers have argued that the route to economic growth in Africa runs through political reform. In particular, they prescribe electoral accountability as a step toward economic reform, seeing it as inducing the choice of publicly beneficial as opposed to privately profitable economic policies. To assess the validity of such arguments, we first characterize a set of political institutions that render political elites accountable and derive their expected impact on the policy choices of governments. Using ratings of macro-economic policy produced by the World Bank and ratings of corrupt practices produced for private investors, we explore the relationship between institutional forms and policy choices on both an African and global sample. While key elements of the model find empirical support, the central argument receives mixed support in the data. Political institutions have a stronger influence on policy making in Africa than elsewhere and variation in African institutions and in the structure of African economies account for differences between policy choices in Africa and those made in the rest of the world. Political accountability however does not influence the choice of macro-economic policies in the manner suggested by reformist arguments; although it does appear to lead to less political predation."