Browsing by Author "Bushouse, Brenda K."
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Working Paper Electoral Reform in Japan: Where Are the Rules(1993) Bushouse, Brenda K."Pressures for electoral reform have existed in Japan for many years and yet no substantive changes have ever been instituted. Although there has been mass urban migration the electoral apportionments have not kept pace. This has produced a rural bias in the electoral process.1 Voter inequality between the least rural districts and the most populated has risen as high as one to 5.26 in the Upper House and one to 4.99 in the Lower House (Hata, 1990:160). Along with favoring the rural districts the electoral process also favors larger parties. Taagepera and Shugart (1989) present data from Japanese elections to gauge its degree of proportionality (see Graph 1). As is shown from the graph, the electoral process consistently grants the LDP more seats than it has votes. Conversely, the smaller parties consistently win fewer seats than their percentage of votes. Electoral reforms to date have split populated districts in half, given seats to the most populated districts and in one occasion (1986) taken seats from the least populated districts. However, voter inequality remains high and elections favor the larger parties."Conference Paper The Family Child Care Decision: A Transaction Cost Approach(1995) Bushouse, Brenda K."In recent decades, women's participation in the formal labor force increased dramatically. In 1960, 37 percent of women participated in the civilian labor force. By 1990, the rate of participation increased to 58 percent. This trend is particularly pronounced for women in their prime child bearing years (ages 25 to 34). Participation for this age group increased from 36 percent in 1960 to 74 percent in 1990. The increased labor force participation of women in their child bearing years results in a concommitant demand for child care services. 1991 statistics indicate that when mothers of young children are employed about one-third are cared for in the home by the father or other adult, one-third are cared for in another home, and the remaining third are in organized child care facilities (Bureau of the Census, 1994). The number of organized child care facilities increased from around 13,000 in 1982 to over 40,000 in 1987 (Census of Service Industries, 1987). As a result of these trends, child care entered the U.S. domestic policy agenda. In fiscal year 1992 and 1993, the federal government funded more than 90 early childhood programs in 11 federal agencies and 20 offices (GAO, 1994a). These programs use diverse policy instruments such as regulation, subsidies, and targeted funding to achieve their goals."Conference Paper The Missing Link: Collective-Choice Policymaking in Nonprofit, For-Profit, and Public Child Care Centers(1999) Bushouse, Brenda K."Much of nonprofit research over the past twenty years focuses on how a nonprofit enterprise is different than a for-profit or public enterprise. Influential early theorists relied on the legal constraint nonprofits have in redistributing profit to explain nonprofit production of certain types of goods. Hansmann (1980, 1986) developed Contract Failure Theory to explain consumer demand for nonprofit production of private goods with information asymmetry between buyer and seller. Weisbrod (1977, 1988) developed the theory of Market/Government Failure to explain nonprofit production of collective goods (defined to include goods that have shared benefits). In these foundational theories, the nondistribution constraint is the primary justification for the nonprofit institutional form. In Contract Failure Theory it signals quality to consumers because of the legal constraint nonprofits have in reinvesting all profit back into the enterprise. In Market/Government Failure Theory nonprofits will be formed to produce collective goods to meet under satisfied demand because the nondistribution constraint removes the incentive for the nonprofit to place profit above quality."Thesis or Dissertation The Mixed Economy of Child Care: An Institutional Analysis of Nonprofit, For-Profit, and Public Enterprises(1999) Bushouse, Brenda K."Nonprofit theory predicts nonprofit enterprises will be more trustworthy than for-profit enterprises in the delivery of goods for which quality is difficult to determine because nonprofit enterprises are legally required to reinvest all profits back into the enterprise. Theoretically, consumers should demand these types of goods from the nonprofit sector or nonprofits should emerge to produce such goods for under served populations. However, empirically, mixed economies exist for the health care, nursing home, and child care industries. While there appears to be a large divide between theory and empirical reality, many public policies use sector as the basis for determining which types of enterprises can participate in public programs. However, if the theorized link between sector and trustworthy behavior (i.e., higher quality) is not supported empirically, then this brings into serious question preferential policies for nonprofit enterprises. This dissertation focuses on determining the factors most likely to produce quality service delivery and their relation, if any, to sector. "Primary data from four states indicate three key findings. First, entrepreneurial motivations for starting child care centers vary within sectors; not all for-profit entrepreneurs are profit maximizers and not all nonprofit centers are trustworthy. Second, sector does not predict adoption of quality enhancing policies (QEP). However, once the sectors are divided into categories representing differences in governance structures, variations in QEP do emerge. Therefore, while the relationship between sector and QEP is not significant, there is significant intra-sectoral variation in mean QEP scores. This finding points towards intervening variables which are the focus of the third major finding. Data analysis reveals that those centers with institutional environments fostering adoption of QEP are ones in which: monitoring systems between the owner/board and the director are strong; budgets are sufficient; competition with other centers is based on quality rather than price; and, the director is well integrated into the early childhood professional community. Therefore, public policies favoring one sector over another are not likely to result in improving child care quality. Based on this research, effective public policies must encourage these institutional variables in order to positively impact center adoption of quality enhancing policies."