Browsing by Author "Duraiappah, Anantha Kumar"

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Compensation and Rewards for Environmental Services in the Developing World: Framing Pan-Tropical Analysis and Comparison
(2009) Swallow, Brent M.; Kallesoe, Mikkel F.; Iftikhar, Usman A.; van Noordwijk, Meine; Bracer, Carina; Scherr, Sara J.; Raju, K. Vengamma; Poats, Susan V.; Duraiappah, Anantha Kumar; Ochieng, Benson O.; Mallee, Hein; Rumley, Rachael
"This is the first of a series of papers that review the state of knowledge and practice regarding compensation and rewards for environmental services in the developing world. The paper begins with an assessment of the historical development of compensation and reward mechanisms within a broader context of changing approaches to nature conservation and environmental policy. The assessment shows that greater interest in compensation and reward mechanisms has emerged within a policy context of changing approaches to nature conservation and flexible multi-stakeholder approaches to environmental management. In the developing world, an even greater variety of perspectives has emerged on the opportunities and threats for using compensation and rewards for environmental services. Within that background, the paper clarifies key concepts—including the distinction between compensation and reward —and presents a conceptual framework for typifying and characterizing different types of mechanisms that link ecosystem stewards, ecosystem service beneficiaries, and intermediaries."
Land Tenure and Conflict Resolution: A Game Theoretic Approach in the Narok District in Kenya
(2001) Amman, Hans M.; Duraiappah, Anantha Kumar
"Many conflicts in numerous parts of the developing world can be traced to disputes over land ownership, land use and land degradation. In this paper we test the hypothesis that differences in knowledge structures on land tenure and market systems between different leaders within these countries has caused marginalisation of some leaders by the others. A sustained process of marginalisation driven by this inequality has caused the disadvantaged to revolt, resulting, in many cases, in violent clashes. In this paper we develop a game theoretic model to test our hypothesis by analysing the complex interdependencies existing among the various leaders in the Narok district in Kenya. Violent clashes have been increasing in the district since the first outbreak in 1993. Preliminary results seem to confirm our suspicion that differences in knowledge structures among the various leaders in over land and agricultural markets might have been the catalysts of these conflicts. In order to reduce these discrepancies, we recommend two institutional reforms. The first involves the adoption of a hybrid land tenure system whereby land ownership is based on individual titles, while the use and sale of the land is governed by communal rules established by a community participatory process. The second recommendation involves the formation of an information network comprising all leaders, with the main objective to provide a forum for exchange of ideas and information pertaining to land use options and the opportunities offered by the market system."