Browsing by Author "Hara, Mafaniso"

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Commons Governance in Southern Africa
(2009) Hara, Mafaniso; Matose, Frank; Wilson, Douglas C.
"The commons (or common-pool resources) are the most important resources in southern Africa. The livelihoods of the majority and economies of most countries depend on them. Although common property regimes are often condemned as environmentally unsustainable, economically unviable or socially anachronistic, this mode of natural resource tenure and governance remains vitally necessary in the livelihoods of the rural poor across much of the region. Away from a limited number of project-based efforts for community-based management (often focused on specific natural resource sectors), such as Zimbabwe’s high-profile CAMPFIRE, millions of poor, rural people across the region continue their own integrated efforts to manage and live from the ecosystems that surround them. This, above all, is a challenge to governance. The poor must tackle it – and governments and development agencies must support their endeavours."
Dilemmas of Democratic Decentralisation in Mangochi District, Malawi: Interest and Mistrust in Fisheries Management
(2008) Hara, Mafaniso
"To establish participatory fisheries management, in 1993 Malawis Fisheries Department constituted elected Beach Village Committees (BVCs) with village headmen as ex-officio members. But, struggles between elected BVC members and traditional authorities (TAs) over benefits from fisheries undermined the authority of elected members. Legal ambiguity on who should make decisions facilitated the takeover by headmen. Further, the BVC was elected by the population as a whole, representing more than just the fishers, whom these committees were designed to control. This resulted in the sabotaging of the BVCs activities by the fishers. Under these conditions, representing the whole population undermined the effectiveness of the BVCs. In 1998, decentralisation reforms placed community inclusion in fisheries management under Village Development Committees (VDCs), whose members would be appointed by elected District Assemblies (DAs). This reform is likely to unleash a struggle over BVC-VDC relations. But, different visions of decentralisation, shared mistrust of local democracy, higher level battles for authority among the government, politicians and TAs stalled the decentralisation process. Donors supporting these reforms were also mistrustful of representative local institutions. The institutions chosen and recognised by the government under donor pressure are the sites of political struggles in which representation, a sense of belonging and downward accountability are losing ground."
Dilemmas of Democratic Decentralization in Mangochi District, Malawi: Interest and Mistrust in Fisheries Management
(2007) Hara, Mafaniso
"This paper explores the politics of local representation and belonging during the devolution of authority for fisheries management decentralization in Mangochi District, Malawi. To establish 'participatory' fisheries management, in 1993 Malawi's Fisheries Department established democratically elected Beach Village Committees (BVCs) with village headmen as ex officio members. But, the struggle between elected BVC members and traditional authorities over benefits from fisheries undermined the authority of elected members. Legal ambiguity as to whether the appointed or elected elements of the BVC should make decisions facilitated the takeover by some headmen. In addition, because the BVC was elected by universal suffrage, the members reflected the population as a whole - not just fisher interests whom these elected committees were designed to control. Being stacked against the fishing communities, these 'vested' interests resisted BVC activities - further hampering their effectiveness. Ironically, reflecting and being accountable to the population as a whole undermined the effectiveness of these elected BVCs. In 1998, a broader decentralization reform placed 'community inclusion' in fisheries management under Village Development Committees (VDCs), whose members would be appointed by elected District Assemblies. The proposed establishment of VDCs unleashed a struggle over how to arrange BVCs-VDCs relation. But, due to lack of a shared vision for decentralization and a shared mistrust of local democracy, higher-level battles for authority and relevance among government, politicians and traditional authorities have brought the decentralization process to a halt. In addition, donors supporting these reforms, who also mistrust the new democratic institutions created under decentralization, have an inadequate appreciation of the political complexities involved. The institutions chosen and recognized by government under donor pressure are the site of political struggles in which representation, belonging and downward accountability are losing ground."
Nesting Participatory Fisheries Management Within District Decentralisation: Case of Mangochi District, Malawi
(2006) Hara, Mafaniso
"Devolution of administrative and political authority to district level will entail nesting participatory fisheries management under decentralisation structures. Decentralisation in Malawi faces many challenges such as managerial and technical capacity of functionaries to execute the required tasks, a narrow revenue base, political commitment and the sequencing of decentralisation and empowerment. On its own, participatory fisheries management has been fraught with problems in relation to representation and power dynamics around committees meant to represent fishing communities. Decentralisation is likely to add to problems of local democratic participation in development and resource management activities. The proliferation of institutions and the resulting plurality in lines of authority is likely to increase confusion, participation fatigue and apathy in the target community. If decentralisation is to lead to promotion of sustainable livelihoods, improved resource management and poverty reduction, local institutions will have to muster sufficient funding, adequate powers and have in place mechanisms for ensuring accountability."
Transforming Ownership and Governance: Lessons from Capital Intensive Pelagic Fisheries in South Africa and Zimbabwe
(2010) Nyikahadzoi, Kefasi; Hara, Mafaniso; Raakjær-Nielsen, Jesper
"This article is on the political economy of transformation and governance reform in industrial fisheries in Southern African states undergoing political and socio-economic transformation. Specifically, it focuses on the experiences of transformation and reform of governance in the pelagic fisheries of South Africa and Zimbabwe. A democratic South Africa and independent Zimbabwe each inherited a dual socio-economic system characterised by racially based inequitable distribution of political and economic powers, and productive assets in favour of the white minority. This study provides a comparative analysis of the driving forces for transformation and governance reform in the two countries. The study demonstrates that reliance on market mechanisms as the main driving force for change in both countries has merely reinforced the existing ownership patterns and power relations, with a limited number of strategically positioned black elites benefiting. Neither the state nor the market place has been able to secure equitable distribution and the creation of an inclusive governance system. Instead disputes are often still settled in courts. This paper concludes that the solution could be found in innovative approaches to transformation and governance that genuinely include the players without undermining the economic viability of the industry rather than the use of conventional top-down state and free market interventions."