Browsing by Author "Herr, Andrew"

Now showing 1 - 6 of 6

Appropriation Externalities in the Commons: Repetition, Time Dependence, and Group Size
(1995) Herr, Andrew; Gardner, Roy; Walker, James M.
"The use of Common Pool Resources (CPR) generally implies the existence of appropriation externalities. The externality studied in this paper arises because the cost of appropriation is a function of all players' appropriation. We derive the equilibrium predictions and conduct experiments for games in which the appropriation externality is either time independent or time dependent. In the repeated time independent CPR game, the appropriation externality is occurs as the cost of appropriation for each individual in a given decision round is a function of other individuals appropriation round. In the time dependent game, individual appropriation costs are a function of appropriation of all individuals across all rounds, with the cost of appropriation increasing with the life of the CPR. This time dependency exacerbates the appropriation externality at the subgame perfect equilibrium, as appropriators race to utilize the resource. Finally in a result reminiscent of the tragedy of the commons, the appropriation externality is exacerbated as the number of players rises. Preliminary results from experiments with two and five players are presented."
Appropriation Externalities in the Commons: Theory and Experimental Evidence
(1996) Herr, Andrew
"A common-pool resource (CPR) is defined as any resource in which exclusion is difficult and consumption of resource units is rival. Examples of CPRs include groundwater basins, fisheries, forests, grazing ranges, and irrigation systems in which property rights--or the ability to uphold such rights--do not allow for privatization. In situations where these characteristics exist, the predicted outcome is overuse of the resource relative to the social optimum, commonly known as the 'tragedy of the commons.' This dissertation combines the tools of game theory and experimental methods to gain a broader understanding of the incentives that underlie this prediction. "First, an extensive analysis of a game theoretic CPR model is conducted. A distinction is made between two types of appropriation externalities: those that are restricted to a single period (time-independent), and those that occur across several periods (time-dependent). This study examines the impact of various factors--including group size, heterogeneities, myopia, and the ability of appropriators to commit to an extraction path--on the predicted outcome of the CPR game. The behavioral impacts of time-dependency and group size are then examined in a controlled experimental setting designed to capture the essential features of the model. "While the equilibrium of the game theoretic model provides a fairly accurate prediction of aggregate outcomes, it fails to satisfactorily explain behavior at the individual level. Most notably, individual behavior in time-dependent designs is characterized by myopia, in the sense that subjects appear not to consider the full impact of their current decisions on future payoffs. This myopic behavior exacerbates the predicted tragedy of the commons."
Institutional Analysis in Outback Australia
(2008) Leitch, Anne; Lynam, Timothy; Larson, Silva; Straton, Anna; Maru, Y.; Stone-Jovicich, Samantha; Heckbert, Scott; LaFlamme, Michael; Ward, John R.; Marshall, Nadine A.; Herr, Andrew; Vella, Karen; Nursey-Bray, M.
"The Australian outback is a unique ecological and social landscape. The people who live here cope with harsh and variable environmental conditions, particularly in terms of rainfall and the availability of surface water. The human population density is very low and the dominant land use is grazing, while other land uses include agriculture, mining, tourism, defence, and nature conservation. These harsh environmental factors frame all human activities in these regions and, in turn, these activities can have adverse environmental impacts, shaping what is possible in the future. To manage these impacts, all tiers of government impose institutional constraints, such as legislation and regulations that seek to influence the activities and aspirations of individuals and communities. The research project Outback Institutions used the Institutional Analysis and Development framework to assess institutional arrangements in this context through four case studies in outback regions of Queensland and the Northern Territory. The IAD framework was found to provide an effective means for structuring an institutional analysis. However, the room left for interpretation made comparison between case studies challenging, especially when comparing different stakeholder driven processes and analysing cross-scales feedbacks and institutional dynamics. The case study analyses found that the lack of real influence and power of community members in the decision making process and the lack of rules to stipulate and govern the monitoring of water use were two of several aspects of the institutional arrangements that did not enable the alignment of formal government legislation and regulations with individual and community actions and aspirations."
The Power and Limitations of Proportional Cutbacks in Common-Pool Resources
(1998) Gardner, Roy; Herr, Andrew; Ostrom, Elinor; Walker, James M.
"This paper examines the success and limitations of proportional cutbacks as an allocation rule for improving the performance of common pool resources (CPRs). Two field cases, one success and one failure, motivate the analysis. For symmetric CPRs, we establish the existence of efficiency-enhancing proportional cutbacks. We then introduce complications that arise in the presence of asymmetries, where there are high value types and low value types. This asymmetry induces a continuum of proportional cutbacks that raise efficiency above Nash equilibrium. Calibrating a linear-quadratic CPR model to global carbon dioxide emissions, the efficiency and distributional consequences of proportional cutbacks like those embodied in the Kyoto Protocol are derived."
Voting on Allocation Rules in a Commons Without Face-to-Face Communication: Theoretical Issues and Experimental Results
(1995) Walker, James M.; Gardner, Roy; Ostrom, Elinor; Herr, Andrew
"An immense outpouring of empirical studies has been published during the past decade focusing on the norms and rules that have evolved or been chosen to govern smaller, relatively homogeneous common-pool resources. In many field settings, the tragedy of the commons has been avoided and robust institutions have been used to govern fragile common-pool resources for several centuries. Empirical studies of existing field settings, while crucial for establishing external validity, are not immune to four threats to establishing a firm explanation of observed cooperative behavior. First, scholars can rarely obtain quantitative data about the potential benefits that could be achieved if participants cooperate at an optimal level or about the level of inefficiency yielded when they act independently. Second, it is thus difficult to determine how much improvement has been achieved as contrasted to the same setting without particular institutions in place. Third, without using expensive time series designs, studies only include those resources that have survived; and, the proportion of similar cases that did not survive is unknown. Fourth, many variables differ from one case to the next. This means a large number of cases is required to gain statistical control of the relative importance of diverse variables. In this regard, the few studies that have attempted cross sectional control using a relatively large number of field cases have produced important results that complement individual case studies."
Voting on Allocation Rules in a Commons: Predictive Theories and Experimental Results
(1997) Walker, James M.; Gardner, Roy; Ostrom, Elinor; Herr, Andrew
"An immense outpouring of empirical studies has been published during the past decade focusing on the norms and rules that have evolved or been chosen to govern smaller, relatively homogeneous common-pool resources. In many field settings, the tragedy of the commons has been avoided and robust institutions(Shepsle, 1989) have been used to govern fragile common-pool resources for several centuries (Netting, 1981; E. Ostrom, 1990). Empirical studies of existing field settings, while crucial for establishing external validity, are not immune to four threats to establishing a firm explanation of observed cooperative behavior. First, scholars can rarely obtain quantitative data about the potential benefits that could be achieved if participants cooperate at an optimal level or about the level of inefficiency yielded when they act independently. Second, it is thus difficult to determine how much improvement has been achieved as contrasted to the same setting without particular institutions in place. Third, without using expensive time series designs, studies only include those resources that have survived; and, the proportion of similar cases that did not survive is unknown. Fourth, many variables differ from one case to the next. This means a large number of cases is required to gain statistical control of the relative importance of diverse variables. In this regard, the few studies that have attempted cross sectional control using a relatively large number of field cases have produced important results that complement individual case studies."