Browsing by Author "Maxwell, John W."

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The Dynamics of Continuing Conflict
(2000) Reuveny, Rafael; Maxwell, John W.
"There is a relatively small but growing literature in economics that examines conflictive activities using a framework in which agents allocate their resource endowments between wealth production and appropriation. To date, studies in this literature have employed a similar one period game theoretic framework. We propose a methodology to extend this literature to a dynamic setting, and illustrate it by modeling continuous conflict over renewable natural resources between two rival groups--an interesting topic in its own right. Recent case studies suggest that natural resource scarcities in less-developed countries (LDCs) lead to conflict, and predict more conflict in the future. However, instances of conflict over resources in LDCs, absent resource scarcity, also exist. Thus, it appears that the role of renewable resources in conflict may be greater than simply a conflict trigger. Our model illustrates a complex non-linear dynamic interaction between the populations of the groups and the resource stock, with periods of heavy and light conflict. The system's steady states are identified, and comparative statics are computed. The system's global dynamics are investigated in simulations. Applications of our methodology to other types of conflice are discussed at a general level."
Self-Regulation and Social Welfare: The Political Economy of Corporate Environmentalism
(1999) Maxwell, John W.; Lyon, Thomas P.; Hackett, Steven C.
"We extend the economic theory of regulation to allow for strategic self-regulation that preempts political action. When political 'entry' is costly for consumers, firms can deter it through voluntary restraints. Unlike standard entry models, deterrence is achieved by overinvesting to raise the rival's welfare in the event of entry. Empirical evidence on releases of toxic chemicals shows that an increased threat of regulation (as proxied by increased membership in conservation groups) indeed induces firms to reduce toxic releases. We establish conditions under which self-regulation, if it occurs, is a Pareto improvement once costs of influencing policy are included."