Browsing by Author "Regmi, Ashok"

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Farmer Managed Irrigation Systems in the Chitwan Valley of Nepal
(2004) Regmi, Ashok
"Despite many valuable lessons that have been learnt regarding resource and resource user attributes there are some relationships that have yet to be understood. One such confounding issue has been the impact of heterogeneity among the users of a community-based natural resource. Traditional commons research has mostly assumed the prevalence of homogeneity among resource users, however, it is known that differences (e.g. in socio-economic attributes, natural resource endowments, physical circumstances etc) can be present. It is mostly under assumptions of homogeneity that researchers have been able to collect evidence that shows that groups have been able to successfully self-organize. What impact does heterogeneity have on collective action is an issue that is not yet fully understood and is the focus of much contemporary research in the common pool resource area. Similarly, the relationship between the nature of the resource and the ease with which users are able to organize around it is also not straightforward. This paper is an attempt to explore these issues with respect to Farmer Managed Irrigation Systems in the Chitwan Valley of Nepal."
Robustness, Vulnerability, and Adaptive Capacity in Small-Scale Social- Ecological Systems: The Pumpa Irrigation System in Nepal
(2010) Cifdaloz, Oguzhan; Regmi, Ashok; Anderies, John M.; Rodriguez, Armando A.
"Change in freshwater availability is arguably one of the most pressing issues associated with global change. Agriculture, which uses roughly 70% of the total global freshwater supply, figures prominently among sectors that may be adversely affected. Of specific concern are small-scale agricultural systems that make up nearly 90% of all farming systems and produce 40% of agricultural output worldwide. These systems are experiencing a range of novel shocks including increased variability in precipitation and competing demands for water and labor that challenge their capacity to maintain agricultural output. This paper employs a robustness- vulnerability trade-off framework to explore the capacity of such systems to cope with novel shocks and directed change. Motivated by the Pumpa Irrigation System in Nepal, we develop and analyze a simple model of rice-paddy irrigation and use it to demonstrate how institutional arrangements may, in becoming very well tuned to cope with specific shocks and manage particular human interactions associated with irrigated agriculture, generate vulnerabilities to novel shocks. This characterization of robustness-vulnerability trade-off relationships is then used to inform policy options to improve the capacity of small-scale irrigation systems to adapt to changes in freshwater availability."
The Role of Group Heterogeneity in Collective Action: A Look at the Intertie between Irrigation and Forests. Case Studies from Chitwan, Nepal
(2007) Regmi, Ashok
"Although considerable agreement exists among scholars about the attributes of a resource and about resource users that are conducive to self-organization, there are also puzzling issues related to the effects of size and heterogeneity of the user group. Prior empirical studies indicate that user-group differences do not have a uniform effect on the likelihood of sustaining collective action. The effects can be either positive, negative, or unrelated to self-organization efforts. Since many of the results are derived from individual case studies, or only a small number of cases, I adopt a more rigorous strategy to address the effect of these variables on self-governance and outcomes. I draw on a relatively large number of cases from two different types of common-pool resources in Nepal -- irrigation and forests -- to explore associations between group heterogeneity (measured in diverse ways) and collective action to address whether local resource management efforts may be affected. Through the use of in-depth case studies, I further examine the institutions governing both types of resource systems in a setting where members from the same community use both resources. Not only does this provide insights into how resource users organize around two different types of resource systems, but also allows us to assess and compare performance of these self-governed commonpool resource institutions. Using data generated by the Nepal Irrigation Institutions and Systems (NIIS) and International Forestry Resources and Institutions (IFRI) research programs, and my own fieldwork in the Chitwan District of Nepal, I find that some heterogeneity variables (such as, ethnic composition) are less likely than others to be an impediment to self-organization; the same heterogeneity variable (wealth disparity) may have opposite effects on different resource types; resource conditions are more likely to be affected by ability or inability of resource users to enforce rules rather than by their group differences; and that self-organized groups are able to mediate the perceived costs and benefits of organizing through institutional design."
Water Security and Farmer-Managed Irrigation Systems of Nepal
(2007) Regmi, Ashok
"One of the key objectives of this paper is to underscore the idea that local user groups, under certain conditions, are able to self-organize and successfully govern their natural resources. Successful self-organized groups are not only able to craft optimal rules and enforce them at low costs but in many instances are also able to out-perform centrally governed resource systems. I draw on examples from the irrigation sector to show that farmer managed irrigation systems (FMIS) are consistently better at delivering water to their tail ends, maintaining their infrastructures, and realizing greater agricultural productivities than agency managed irrigation systems (AMIS). Farmers in FMIS are, therefore, able to ensure better water security to their members than their counterparts in AMIS. "The paper is organized in the following manner. First, I provide a brief overview of the irrigation sector and its performance in Nepal. Second, I explore the incentive structures facing farmers in self-organized and in agency-managed systems to assess why farmers in the former system tend to be better motivated than those in the latter. Then, after reviewing the organization and governance structure of Farmer Managed Irrigation Systems (FMIS) I compare its performance with Agency Managed Irrigation Systems (AMIS). I then explore how resource settings may affect cooperation and conflict in self-organized systems before making policy recommendations on how performance can be improved in irrigation systems."