Browsing by Author "Tang, Shui-Yan"

Now showing 1 - 8 of 8

All CPR's Are Not Created Equal: Two Important Physical Characteristics and Their Relation to the Resolution of Commons Dilemmas
(1991) Blomquist, William; Schlager, Edella; Tang, Shui-Yan
"Policy prescriptions offered in the now-voluminous literature on common-pool resources (CPRs) frequently focus upon the strategic situation of resource users, paying relatively less attention (or none at all) to the characteristics of the common-pool resources themselves. In short, most contributions to the policy literature presume that all CPRs are alike. Based on our reconsideration of the strategic situations users face, and our empirical observation of three kinds of CPRs fisheries, irrigation systems, and groundwater basins we conclude that two physical characteristics of CPRs have vital implications for the likelihood of successful resolution of difficulties over resource use, and for the types of resolutions users develop. Those physical characteristics are the degree of stationarity of flow units and the existence of storage capacity. Speaking generally, fisheries are CPRs with fugitive flow units and without storage capacity, irrigation systems have fugitive flow units but possible availability of storage, and groundwater basins have relatively stationary flow units and storage capacity. Using comparisons among these types of CPRs, we analyze the effects of these physical characteristics upon the. prospects for the emergence- of successful cooperation in resource use."
Democratization and the Environment: Entrepreneurial Politics and Interest Representation in Taiwan
(1997) Tang, Shui-Yan; Tang, Ching-Ping
"Democratization in Taiwan has created both opportunities and obstacles for groups representing diffuse interests to influence environmental policy. On the one hand, electoral competition, together with political struggle for leadership succession in the ruling party, has led to increased influences of concentrated business interests in policy making. On the other hand, democratization has also enabled and encouraged groups representing environmental interests of the diffuse public to battle against concentrated business interests by bringing freedom of association and more open political processes to Taiwan. As illustrated by two case studies—the anti-golf movement and the Kuan-tu Nature Park—environmental groups are more likely to win if they can mobilize sufficient support from the general public and press their cause through political channels that are more open to the public's scrutiny. These groups are less effective when the public lacks information about the nature of the particular environmental problem, concentrated business groups wield greater influence through their close connections with politicians, and there is a lack of institutional channels to challenge government decisions. To further consolidate democracy in Taiwan, institutional channels need to be strengthened to encourage more entrepreneurial politics at various levels of the political system."
Informal Credit Markets and Economic Development in Taiwan
(1994) Tang, Shui-Yan
"Taiwan is a case which shows how informal credit markets help to compensate for the limitations of the formal financial system, especially in satisfying the needs of medium and small enterprises. Government regulations and policies affect the way participants in informal credit markets solve selection, enforcement, and incentive problems. Recent changes demonstrate the continued resilience and relevance of informal credit markets during a process of financial liberalization."
An Institutional Analysis of Housing Issues
(1986) Tang, Shui-Yan
"Housing is one of the most important goods we consume daily. Most people spend most their time in their houses each day. The location of your house affects many other aspects of your life. It constrains your choice of your children's schools. It also determines how much time you have to spend commuting to your place of work everyday. In most market-oriented societies, the bulk of housing is provided by the private sectors. However, in most of these societies, governments also play an important role in regulating the housing markets. Some government even directly provide housing for part of their populations. This paper aims at examining the proper role of collective or governmental actions in housing. It is the basic contention of this paper that housing is a good with multiple characteristics, such as structural features, locations and neighborhood. Different households may have different preference orderings of these characteristics. Since demands for some of these characteristics of housing may not be best satisfied through markets, some collective or governmental actions may be necessary. However, since the nature of each of these characteristics may differ from the others, complex institutional arrangements may be required to satisfy housing needs and demands. This paper First discusses some characteristics of housing. Next, some institutional considerations regarding housing are introduced. Then three housing issues ? building regulations, housing subsidies and urban renewal -- are discussed briefly to highlight how different institutional arrangements may be used to tackle different kinds of housing problems."
Institutions and Collective Action in Irrigation Systems
(1989) Tang, Shui-Yan
"Cultivators using an irrigation system face two kinds of collective action problems: joint investments in the system and the allocation of water from the system. Most irrigation systems will deteriorate rapidly if cultivators fail to devise ways to coordinate their investment and water allocation activities. "Using a theoretical framework derived from institutional analysis and transaction costs economics, I examine the structures of incentives faced by cultivators as these are shaped by rules-in-use and the physical and community systems involved. Information from 47 in-depth case studies of irrigation systems in various parts of the world is used to examine arguments about how various institutional, physical, and community attributes are related to the performance of irrigation systems. In particular, I focus on the differences in incentives, behaviors, and outcomes occurring in community irrigation as contrasted to bureaucratic irrigation systems."
Negotiated Autonomy: Transforming Self-Governing Institutions for Local Common-Pool Resources in Two Tribal Villages in Taiwan
(2000) Tang, Ching-Ping; Tang, Shui-Yan
"The current literature on common-pool resources suggests that appropriators autonomy in determining access and harvesting rules is a pre-condition for successful local self-governance. Yet few studies have been done to examine how local communities that are faced with outside intrusion can regain such autonomy. This paper examines this issue by studying how two mountain tribal villages in Taiwan have attempted to rebuild their indigenous rules governing the use of their local stream fisheries. One village, Shan-Mei, has been more successful than another village, Li-Chia, in restoring its indigenous rules and fishery, because villagers in Shan-Mei were able to attain a negotiated autonomy by developing mutually beneficial relationships with external stakeholders."
On Maintenance in Irrigation Systems: A Preliminary Analysis
(1987) Tang, Shui-Yan
"In this paper, I report some preliminary analysis on 16 irrigation cases we have coded. Since only the location, resource, operational level, and subgroup forms have been entered in our database for all 16 cases, I concentrate the analysis on how the attributes of the resource and the community of appropriators affect maintenance of the irrigation systems. Operational and collective choice rules are discussed when they are closely related to this context. In our coding, we assign a confidence level ranging from '1' (very confident) to '5' (ambiguous information) to most of the answers. In view of the limited number of cases coded, I do not use these confidence levels to differentiate more reliable data from less reliable ones. These 16 cases may not be representative of all codable cases. They were chosen for the first round of coding because they are easily accessible and provide relatively detailed information needed for our coding. This paper merely illustrates what can be done with our data. An extended analysis will be undertaken when a wider sample of cases is codes."
The Survival and Performance of Irrigation Organizations: An Institutional Analysis: A Dissertation Proposal
(1987) Tang, Shui-Yan
From page 1: "The works of Garrett Hardin (1968) and Mancur Olson (1965) underscore the difficulty individuals face in taking collective action to advance their common interests. Their works have been used extensively in discussions about environmental and resource issues. According to their arguments, a commons dilemma easily arises when a scarce resource is jointly used by multiple individuals. The dilemma would lead to 'over-exploitation' or 'inefficient use' of the resource. For some biological systems, such as fisheries, 'over-exploitation' may even lead to permanent destruction of their regenerative capabilities. "An important problem arises, therefore, as to how individuals can avoid the 'tragedy of the commons' in relation to the use of valued resources such as irrigation systems, forests, and fisheries. Hardin (1968) himself argues that the dilemma can hardly be avoided unless a bureau, backed by coercive power, is established to manage the resource. Lewis and Cowen (1983), on the other hand, argue that it is possible even in an open-access resource to avoid the 'tragedy of the commons' if some information, enforcement, and monitoring conditions are fulfilled. Others argue that the establishment of clear private property rights is the best way to avoid the problem (e.g., Demsetz, 1967). Still others suggest that some kinds of communal systems may be appropriate under certain conditions (e.g., Dahlman, 1980; National Research Council, 1987). "A brief survey of cases in natural resource management, however, indicates that there is no 'one best way' to avoid the commons dilemma. We can find different combinations of private, communal, and public arrangements in well-managed natural resource systems such as water basins, in-shore fisheries, and grazing lands (E. Ostrom, 1986b). An important research problem, therefore, is how various institutional arrangements may be used to tackle different commons dilemmas. My dissertation will attempt to address this important problem in relationship to the organization of irrigation systems."