Browsing by Author "Theesfeld, Insa"

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Approach Towards an Operational Tool to Apply Institutional Analysis for the Assessment of Policy Feasibility within SEAMLESS-IF
(SEAMLESS Integrated Project, 2007) Schleyer, Christian; Theesfeld, Insa; Hagedorn, Konrad; Aznar, O.; Callois, J.M.
"This Deliverable D2.4.2 comprises the work done by Task 2.4 (Activities 2.4.1-3) on the development of indicators characterising policy delivery systems and institutional environments. Task 2.4 addresses, in particular, the issue of the institutional conditions required to implement policies that acknowledge and promote sustainability and multifunctional aspects of agriculture. The final goal of Task 2.4 is to produce ex-ante an institutional assessment of agri-environmental policy options through their impact on the contribution of agriculture to sustainable development. For this purpose, the 'Procedure for Institutional Compatibility Assessment' (PICA) has been developed as a formalised methodology to assess the compatibility between policy options and various institutional contexts."
Breach of Tradition During Socialism: The Case of Water Syndicates in Bulgaria
(2003) Theesfeld, Insa; Boevsky, Ivan
"During the post-socialist transition period, the Bulgarian irrigation facilities deteriorated to a large extent and no longer meet the needs of the new landowner and agricultural production structure. The Bulgarian government therefore enacted two new laws to encourage collective action and to establish water user associations in order to achieve sustainable water management. "In this article, we will question the frequent argument that water user associations could easily be established in Bulgaria, because they are rooted in the water syndicates. Empirical findings from village case studies reveal that limited collective memory exists today about former water syndicates' rules-in-use and patterns of action. We will explain this breach of tradition by the migration from villages to cities, the suppression of precommunist so-called capitalist behaviour, and the length of the communist period. Moreover, the analysis of the historical cooperative development in Bulgaria shows that the water syndicates were enforced by a top-down approach and did not have much in common with the classic cooperative principles."
Can Water Abundance Compensate for Weak Water Governance? Determining and Comparing Dimensions of Irrigation Water Security in Tajikistan
(2017) Klümper, Frederike; Herzfeld, Thomas; Theesfeld, Insa
"In this paper we consider both hydrology and governance as critical dimensions for irrigation water security. We scale down the overall water security concept to the agricultural sector, suggest an index of irrigation water security faced by farmers, and provide an empirical illustration in the case of Tajikistan. Irrigation water security is investigated by three different dimensions: (a) a hydrology dimension, expressing a lack of water availability; (b) a governance dimension, the perceived difficulty in accessing water; and (c) a hybrid dimension of governance and hydrology. We developed an irrigation water security index, which we empirically tested using farm household survey data (N = 399). This index provides evidence that different farm types, e.g., small versus large, perceive different water security threats. Further, we found that if one dimension is less distinctive, the complementary dimension occurs as a coping mechanism. Thus, we conclude that diversified support mechanisms for infrastructure and management are needed to reach a higher level of water security."
Collective Action in Bulgaria's Irrigation Sector as Restricted by Opportunistic Behaviour: Empirical Results
(2002) Theesfeld, Insa
"Water for irrigation and irrigation infrastructure are both common pool resources, due to their low excludability and high rivalry. The well-known common pool resource dilemma is often the consequence. Collective action may be a way how societies can overcome this dilemma. First results from a three-month empirical field study in Bulgaria are presented trying to explain how actor groups characteristics, such as lack of trust between community members and effective institutional settings at the local level, such as information asymmetry, limited sanctioning and enforcement mechanisms and almost no monitoring mechanisms provide conditions under which opportunistic behaviour dominates. The effective rules-in-use in local communities are presented. The simplest example is watering crops without paying the water price. Individuals will use their power to maintain their opportunistic strategies and, consequently, they will not agree to any rule change. Moreover, the actors' attitude towards collective action is very pessimistic. This has a crucial impact on the evolving of credible commitment which is one prerequisite for collective action. The effects on water management can be severe and the common pool resource dilemma situation may continue. This article questions if there are additional influencing variables inherited from the transformation process that will have an impact on the institutional change and constrain the emergence of collective action solutions. The discussion is based on empirical material from Varbiza village in the south of Bulgaria."
Commons in a Changing Europe
(2013) Sandberg, Audun; Theesfeld, Insa; Schlüter, Achim; Penov, Ivan; Birimanova, Violeta
"The International Journal of the Commons published in 2008 a special issue on 'The commons in Europe: from past to future' (IJC Vol. 2, No. 2, July 2008). This volume traced the development of European commons from the Middle Ages to the modern environmental services organized as commons. In the northern and Western European continent, most historical commons had by the end of the 19th century changed their character by the enclosure movement and general land consolidation. But it also showed that many resources in the European region are still governed by common user associations or by community institutions in the form of alpine forests, mountain pastures etc. The volume also identified a number of 'new commons' in the European region (leisure areas, ecosystem services etc.) that has caught the interest of commons scholars. In summing up the contribution of the first IASC European Regional meeting in Brescia (2006) and that first special issue, there was a discussion of what was missing at that stage in the development of commons scholarship in Europe. One type of missing research identified was connected to the large field of fisheries and use of coastal areas (costal commons) for aquaculture and sea-ranching. Another type of missing research was related to urban commons and new ways of organizing various community services."
Constraints for Collective Action in Bulgaria's Irrigation Sector
(2001) Theesfeld, Insa
"Water for irrigation and irrigation infrastructure are both common pool resources, due to their low excludability and high rivalry. The well-known common pool resource dilemma is often the consequence. Collective action may be a way how societies can overcome this dilemma. First results from a three-month empirical field study in Bulgaria are presented trying to explain how actor groups characteristics, such as lack of trust between community members and effective institutional settings at the local level, such as information asymmetry, limited sanctioning and enforcement mechanisms and almost no monitoring mechanisms provide conditions under which opportunistic behaviour dominates. The effective rules-in-use in local communities are presented. The simplest example is watering crops without paying the water price. Individuals will use their power to maintain their opportunistic strategies and, consequently, they will not agree to any rule change. Moreover, the actors' attitude towards collective action is very pessimistic. This has a crucial impact on the evolving of credible commitment which is one prerequisite for collective action. The effects on water management can be severe and the common pool resource dilemma situation may continue. This article questions if there are additional influencing variables inherited from the transformation process that will have an impact on the institutional change and constrain the emergence of collective action solutions. The discussion is based on empirical material from Varbiza village in the south of Bulgaria."
Dangers of Commonism, or Ostrom vs. the Commonizers
(2024) Theesfeld, Insa; McGinnis, Michael D.; Cole, Daniel H.
The community of scholars exploring governance and institutions for the management of an increasing range of resources systems is steadily growing. As long as we were dealing with classical, traditional natural resource governance, the resource units and property regimes were relatively easy to define. In the last two decades new commons and global commons have been added to the research agendas of commons scholars and gained lots of attention in society. The considered resource unit needs to be specified and may not always be subtractable nor the system excludable. The focus is not the appropriation, but rather the joint provision of the resource system. Following this thought, sometimes, commons have been interpreted as social constructions that guarantee the transformation of society towards sustainability and well-being. From a Bloomington School perspective, we want to critically review this development of the recent radical-normative use of the term “commoning.” After addressing the shifting meaning of “commoning” in the literature, our goal in this paper is to “rescue” “commons” as an analytical concept from normative “commonism.” Inter alia, we not only raise concerns but also offer suggestions for structuring empirical observations in the hope of inspiring more constructive discussion.
Elite Capture in Local Fishery Management: Post-Socialist Experiences from Albania
(2011) Schmidt, Oscar; Theesfeld, Insa
"Local self-governance based on institutions for collective action can help overcome social dilemmas in the management of complex Common Pool Resources, such as fish. A common path towards local self-governance is decentralization, and within this context, a transfer of property rights from central government to local resource users. Yet, despite the well-documented successes of many decentralization policies in support of local common property regimes, the phenomenon of elite capture remains a risk. This paper investigates elite capture in Albania’s Lake Ohrid fishing region. Our empirical findings draw onto an in-depth case study on local consequences of 2002’s decentralization efforts by the Albanian fishery administration. We show how ‘blueprint’ approaches, top-down implementation, and weak institutions led to further empowerment of privileged locals. Our findings further indicate how those privileged locals realize significant personal gains at the expense of distributional inequity within the community. Specifically original insights are derived from our analysis of implications from the post-socialist context, which we show to facilitate capture because of a common susceptibility for destructive leadership and a lack of confidence in collective action. We believe that to understand those contextual peculiarities - and to act upon this understanding- represents a pivotal prerequisite to the functional and equitable governance of common property regimes in any transitional society."
From Power Misuse to Leadership in Bulgaria's Irrigation Sector
(2009) Theesfeld, Insa
"Irrigated water and irrigation infrastructure are common-pool resources. Common-pool resource scholars have advocated taking distributional aspects and power relations into account when analyzing institutional change in common-pool resource management. The way benefits are distributed among various actors is decisive, and the respective political weight of the latter can influence the likelihood of institutional change. When social dilemmas are solved and new rules implemented, some people benefit more than others. Indeed, some may even benefit at the expense of others. Empirical evidence from Bulgaria supports the view that local actors use power asymmetries to maintain their benefits. Ostrom (2007, p.190) points out that, in contrast to the early stages in a process of collective action, inequalities in distribution of benefits may, however, reduce trust and cooperation later in the process. "In the empirical part of this paper, I will highlight the incongruity between formal and effective rules as a transition-typical feature and one environmental determinant for the evolving of destructive leadership. The empirical material highlights that the incongruity of rules enables heterogeneous participants to misuse power asymmetries and, thus, maintain opportunistic strategies. Thereafter, I will present direct empirical evidence for low level of trust in formal actors and perception of corruption. This is typical for an environment where destructive leadership can evolve. "Regarding these empirical results, the paper continues to discuss the need of some heterogeneity, such as the appearance of well-educated and connected leaders to start the process of local cooperation. Yet, the remaining challenge is how to facilitate leadership in early stages of a collective action process without encouraging power misuse of individuals at a later stage."
The Grammar of Institutions: The Challenge to Distinguish Between Norms and Rules
(2008) Schlüter, Achim; Theesfeld, Insa
"This paper discusses the grammar of institutions developed by Sue Crawford and Elinor Ostrom and tries to show avenues where the grammar could be extended. One of the ambiguities in the grammar is the clear distinction between norms and rules. The paper compares the distinction made by Crawford and Ostrom with other distinctions made between norms and rules. Apart from minor additional criteria the distinction between rules and norms in the grammar is the or else statement. We argue that on the one hand, apart from routine based behaviour we can always assume an or else characterising institutional statements and, on the other hand, we are often not aware of the possible consequences of disobeying a rule and act due to internal and external emotional factors. Therefore, the distinction between norms and rules becomes difficult. We propose to draw a line between rules and norms based on the continuous seriousness of sanctionability of the or else, we distinguish between automated, internal and external emotional and more tangible fine sanctions. It is argued that internal and external emotional factors, the delta parameters in the language of the grammar, are the ones on which we should focus if we want to understand the reasons people follow or disobey an institutional statement."
Institutional Challenges for National Groundwater Governance: Policies and Issues
(2010) Theesfeld, Insa
"Understanding the issues surrounding groundwater governance is a precondition for developing policy recommendations for both national and transboundary groundwater governance. This review discusses groundwater attributes relevant to the design of governance systems and provides a systematic review of current national groundwater governance differentiated by various policy instruments. The synthesis of both resource system characteristics and experience with policy instruments allows us to conceptualize institutional aspects of groundwater governance. This leads to six institutional aspects: (1) voluntary compliance; (2) tradition and mental models; (3) administrative responsibility and bureaucratic inertia; (4) conflict resolution mechanisms; (5) political economy; and (6) information deficits. Each of these issues embodies institutional challenges for national and international policy implementation."
Institutional Change in Central-Eastern European Irrigation Systems: The Bulgarian Case
(2006) Theesfeld, Insa
"The Central and Eastern European transition countries have experienced a simultaneous change from a centralized planned to a market- oriented economy and from a communist-determined to a democratic political system. In contemporary Bulgaria and other transitional economies, this had severe impacts on the agricultural sector. Irrigation, until recently a major water user in Bulgaria, has been drastically affected. Uneven distribution of Bulgarians natural water resources over time and space makes irrigation necessary to reduce production risk and insures the common-pool resource a continuous high economic importance. Yet, the irrigation systems were built to serve large production units during socialism and do not meet the needs of the huge number of small-scale landowners that emerged following the land restitution process. Moreover, the facilities have largely deteriorated, the property rights on the infrastructure are ambiguous and the water loss in the system amount to 70 percent due to un- maintained facilities and water stealing. "In Bulgaria, we can observe formal attempts to reform the sector and to implement common-property resource management. Collective action solutions have been propagated by the Bulgarian Government and the World Bank in recent years. However, enforcement of the Bulgarian Water Law in 2000 and the Water User Association Act in 2001 do find no common ground where collective action can grow. Given that villagers often hardly know anything about water user associations that had been established on paper, the local situation is closer to one of open access, with efforts by some powerful individuals to exert some authority. "Institutional analysis show that features specific for the transformation process, namely the incongruity of formal and informal rules, opportunistic behaviour and deteriorating social capital, hinder the emergence of collective action in the irrigation sector. Empirical results from four case study villages indicate that local actors use power asymmetries to maintain their opportunistic strategies. This, in turn, intensifies the already low level of social capital and contributes to its further deterioration, otherwise a prerequisite for collective action. There is empirical evidence for a high level of distrust between community members. The paper concludes that the transplantation of organizational blueprints, such as that of water user associations from other parts of the world, will not be effective in Bulgaria, unless it is adapted to the distinct mental models and action patterns of Bulgaria's rural society. With every new rule, the distribution of benefits and duties among various actors change. Distributional aspects and power relations have to be taken into account as actors in the fear of loosing their powerful favourable positions will oppose the new rule. The paper points to the risk that new formal rules might be implemented that allow selfish individuals to maintain and strengthen power abuse strategies. This is due to the high level of information asymmetry and contradicts the envisaged policy aim."
Irrigation Sector in Bulgaria: Impact of Post-Socialist Policy Reforms
(2008) Theesfeld, Insa
"In Bulgaria's irrigation sector, collective action solutions have been propagated by the Bulgarian Government and the World Bank in recent years. However, the introduction of a World Bank Project, the enforcement of the Bulgarian Water Law in 2000 and the Water User Association Act in 2001 find no common ground where collective action can grow. Given that villagers often hardly know anything about the water user associations that had been established on paper, the local situation is closer to one of open access, with efforts by some powerful individuals to exert some authority. "This paper will show that what formally gives the impression of being a devolution oriented policy reform by turning over decision power in resource management to local communities is, in fact, a further concentration of power in the irrigation sector. Empirical evidence is provided for pseudo devolution which is due to the actual implementation process of Bulgaria's recent legislation in the irrigation sector, which results in a concentration of property rights with state authorities. Likewise, individual actors who are capable of achieving short-term access to and management rights for the resource system are able to take advantage of the actual ambiguous local assignments of property rights and gain private benefits."
The Land–Water–Food Nexus: Expanding the Social–Ecological System Framework to Link Land and Water Governance
(2019) Klümper, Frederike; Theesfeld, Insa
"Besides looking at land and water nexus from the ecological, hydrological or agronomic angle, not much attention has been paid on the governance interface between the two agricultural input resources. Likewise, in widely used heuristic frameworks, such as the social–ecological system (SES) framework, governance interactions between resources are not sufficiently addressed. We address this gap empirically, using the case of Tajikistan, based on a farm household survey analysis of 306 farmers. The results indicate that land system variables contribute to the willingness to cooperate in irrigation management. Specifically, formal land tenure has a positive effect on farmers paying for water as well as on the likelihood of their investing time and effort in irrigation infrastructure, which is decisive for Tajikistan’s food and fiber production. Irrigation system variables show that, e.g., being an upstream user increases the likelihood to contribute to labor maintenance efforts. We further discuss how decisions with respect to the land sector could be designed in the future to facilitate cooperation in other resource sectors. From a conceptual perspective, we suggest that the SES framework can be expanded in two ways in order to serve an integrated analysis of changes in the governance of two natural resources, here land and water. Either (1) by adding a second-tier 'governance nexus' variable inside the governance variable of an irrigation system; or (2) by adding a land resource unit and system outside the irrigation system. Trade-offs of both options will be discussed."
Perceived Power Resources in Situations of Collective Action
(2011) Theesfeld, Insa
"This paper discusses various concepts of power. Its goal is to shed light on a better method for implementing the power concept. The case of Bulgarias water user associations failure shows the abuse of power by local actors who fear they will lose their influence and the private benefits that they have enjoyed under the former system. The paper provides an empirical study of power resources verified by actors perceptions rather than having resource endowments quantified. It also illustrates the contrast between empirically revealed perceived power resources in a local context and their theoretical examination in the distributional theory of institutional change. Studies that set power resources in relation to one another are scarce. Therefore, in this study an innovative, interactive method is used that leads to a ranking of perceived power resources, which is robust against the impact of belonging to different territorial, social, and agricultural producer groups: 1) unrestricted access to information, 2) personal relationships, 3) trustworthiness, 4) cash resources for bribing, 5) menace, and 6) physical power and violence. The implication of this gradation of power resources on collective action solutions addresses complementary measures to disseminate information and compensation measures for those who fear losing their benefits and may therefore oppose the new institutions."
Review on National Groundwater Policy Instruments: Grasping Institutional Aspects for Transboundary Groundwater Governance
(2008) Theesfeld, Insa
"A profound understanding of different options for national groundwater governance and of the experiences gained with them is a precondition for developing policy recommendations for transboundary groundwater governance, likewise. The question raised is what can we learn from a comprehensive empirical review of national groundwater governance about institutional constraints of transboundary governance. The paper reviews and analyzes current national groundwater policy instruments, mainly from South-East Asia. The paper discusses crucial institutional aspects of groundwater governance derived from this review: 1) voluntary compliance, 2) tradition and mental models, 3) bureaucracy, 4) conflict resolution mechanism, 5) political economy, 6) information. Each of them adhere specific institutional challenges that either hinder or foster effective policy implementation. The six items help to account for relevant institutional aspects, for instance with the debate on either extending the mandates of existing river and/or lake basin organizations for transboundary groundwater governance or establishing new aquifer management organizations that cover the whole resource systems."
The Role of Agri-Environmental Contracts in Saving Biodiversity in the Post-Socialist Czech Republic
(2014) Prazan, Jaroslav; Theesfeld, Insa
"Agri-Environmental Schemes are a voluntary policy measure of the Common Agricultural Policy of the European Union. Since 2004, these have been implemented in the post-socialist new Member States. Agri-Environmental Schemes could help to achieve a higher level of biodiversity in protected landscapes. In particular, we analyse whether such types of contract between farmers and state organisations represent a useful tool in the protection of shared natural resources, such as biodiversity. We analyse the determinants that allow for such a policy to be implemented more successfully. In addition, the administrative structure of such a policy measure is very complex since responsibilities overlap among various administrative units, and transactions between farmers and government need to be regulated. Therefore, institutional cooperation among so many parties is challenging. We analyse why implementation has been easier in some Protected Landscape Areas (PLAs) than in others. The research focuses on selected factors which showed differences in performance. In particular, these factors are trust and reciprocity between farmers and state administrative bodies, information spreading and the availability of advisory services. Despite the demanding process, we find an indication that trust tends to grow following a previous good experience. The case study was carried out in two large and two small PLAs in the Czech Republic."
The Role of Pseudo-Commons in Post-Socialist Countries
(2019) Theesfeld, Insa
"Since Garret Hardin published his 'Tragedy of the Commons', scholarship has revealed what Hardin did not recognize: that a wide range of shared agricultural resources can be sustainably managed through commons governance approaches. These governance forms are often embedded in a polycentric system. Yet, there are common-property regimes that only exist on paper not filled with activities, or may be set up purposefully to serve individual benefits. Alike, their embeddedness in a polycentric system might be used as a means of avoiding regulation, as some example in this paper indicate. I argue why we find these pseudo-commons increasingly in post-socialist countries. Findings from the agricultural water and forestry sector point to theoretical underpinnings and implementation of real socialism, dominant groups of political and economic elites, but also to the persisting socialist legacy and the prevailing Soviet-mentality as being responsible for the appearance of pseudo-commons in these countries. The tragedy is that these pseudo-commons manifest inequality between social groups in agrarian post-socialist societies and destroy the trust in this kind of otherwise proven successful management regimes. The theoretical question is whether we can find repeating causalities that allow for a theory building of pseudo-commons and polycentric governance in post-socialist countries and abroad."
Water Grabbing and the Role of Power: Shifting Water Governance in the Light of Agricultural Foreign Direct Investment
(2012) Bues, Andrea; Theesfeld, Insa
"In recent years, the trend for foreign actors to secure land for agricultural production in low-income countries has increased substantially. The concurrent acquisition of water resources changes the institutional arrangement for water management in the investment areas. The consequences of 'land-grabbing' on the local water governance systems have not so far been adequately examined. This paper presents an institutional analysis of a small-scale irrigation scheme in Ethiopia, where foreign and national horticultural farms started to use water from an irrigation canal that was formerly managed as a user-group common-pool resource by local smallholders. The study follows a qualitative case-study approach with semi-structured interviews as the main source of data. For the analysis we employed the Common-pool Resource Theory and the Distributional Theory of Institutional Change. We found that the former management regime changed in that most of the farmers’ water rights shifted to the investment farms. We found three key characteristics responsible for the different bargaining power of the two actor groups: dependency on natural resources, education and knowledge, and dependency on government support. We conclude that not only the struggle for land but also the directly linked struggle for water is led by diverging interests, which are determined by diverging power resources."