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Browsing by Author "van Damme, Eric"

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    An Experimental Test of Direct and Indirect Reciprocity in Case of Complete and Incomplete Information
    (2000) Dufwenberg, Martin; Gneezy, Uri; Güth, Werner; van Damme, Eric
    "Direct reciprocity means to respond in kind to another person whereas indirect reciprocity is understood here as rewarding someone else. We perform corresponding experiments which use a similar underlying structure as the reciprocity experiment of Berg, Dickhaut, and McCabe (1995). Another variation concerns the information about the multiplier of donations where we compare the benchmark case with a commonly known multiplier to a condition where the multiplier is known for sure only by donators. Questions which we try to answer are: Will indirect reciprocity induce higher or lower donations?, will donators with the high multiplier 'hide behind the small one?', how do receivers respond to the different situations?"
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    Information, Strategic Behavior and Fairness in Ultimatum Bargaining; An Experimental Study
    (1993) Güth, Werner; van Damme, Eric
    "This paper reports on an experimental study of ultimatum bargaining situations in which an inactive third player is present. The proposer X makes a proposal(x,y, z) on how to divide a cake between X, Y and Z. Information, a message m, about this proposal is sent to the responder Y who has to decide whether to accept or reject the proposal. If Y accepts, each player gets paid according to the proposal, otherwise each player gets zero. There are three possible messages m = (x, y, z),rh = y, and m = z. The information condition is common knowledge. The main regularity observed is that, the extent of strategic behavior decreases with the information content of the message."
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