DLC

Permanent link for this communityhttps://hdl.handle.net/10535/1

Browse By

Now showing 1 - 17 of 17

The Challenge of Reform in France, Italy and Spain
(1999) Sabetti, Filippo
"It is hard to imagine many countries so similar and dissimilar - at times amici/nemici all at once - as France, Italy and Spain. In addition to physical proximity and characteristics, they share common linguistic and cultural roots, have for the most part genuflected at the same altar, and assimilated, emulated and, at times, sought to avoid each another's customs, institutions and ways of life. Seldom severed for long periods, the movement of ideas, people and goods between them has proceeded over the centuries through mutual consent, rivalry, imitation, alliance, dynastic or territorial aggrandizement and force. The network of relations became more fixed, but no less complex to understand, with the Enlightenment, the French Revolution and their political and economic reverberations. A Neapolitan Bourbon monarch and Neapolitan advisers in the eighteenth century helped to make Spain a nation state, but it was Napoleon's brother who was truly the first king of Spain. Before becoming king of France in 1830, Louis Philippe sat as a peer in the Sicilian parliament. The Spaniards fought against the Napolepnic state being created in France and Italy but undertook to create a more centralized and more egalitarian constitutional arrangement of their own in 1812, in the process giving the world the term 'liberal' and setting a precedent for a military veto to constitutional and institutional reforms (the so called pronunciamientos) that was to afflict Spanish public life until the Franco regime."
Colorado Water Law as Customary Law: The South Platte and Arkansas River Basins
(1999) Schlager, Edella
"This paper tells the story of a particular manifestation of customary law - the 'Colorado Doctrine'. The Colorado Doctrine is based on the principle of prior appropriation. Prior appropriation allocates water on the basis of first in time, first in right. The person making the first appropriation of water from a stream holds rights to a portion of the water senior to all subsequent appropriators. The next person in time to appropriate water from that same stream holds rights to a portion of the water senior to all subsequent appropriators, but not to the first appropriator. Under such an allocation rule, if water is scarce, appropriators do not equally share in reductions, instead, the rights of senior appropriators are satisfied and junior appropriators are foreclosed. The justification for this is that in times of shortage, if all were to share equally in reductions no one would receive sufficient water to serve their purposes. Instead, it is better that at least some be served."
Comparing and Explaining the Success of a Common Endowed with Different Degrees of Sanctioning
(1999) Ostmann, Axel; Wojtyniak, Beate; Beckenkamp, Martin
"Commons are institutions that induce a kind of social dilemma, a 'situation in which private interests are at odds with the collective interests'. Often a group of members manage a common pool resource like fish, meadow, forest or water. The members of a common are competitors in use: What one user takes affects the chances for other users. Under the assumption of rational actors game-theoretical analyses of such commons prescribe an overuse of the resource for a large and relevant class of situations. There are static and dynamic environments."
The Constitutional Foundations of Development
(1999) Shivakumar, Sujai
"The constitutional foundations of development can refer to a given political framework within which economic growth or social progress is to be engineered, or it can concern itself with the manner of composition and constraints which, through building up the rules of interaction among individuals in society, can enhance the potential for greater well-being. The first interpretation, as taken up in the Orthodox Development literature, refers implicitly to a model of the State. The second, examined here, set out how systems of collective action can be designed and conditioned to enable individuals in association with others to realize each their adaptive potentials."
Cooperation or Conflict in Common Pools
(1999) Ternström, Ingela
"Many of the world's common pool resources are located in poor countries, where consumption levels may be low enough to adversely affect the users' health. Under these circumstances, an agent's utility function may be described as an S-shaped function of consumption. Using non-cooperative game theory, very poor groups of users are shown to have lower probability of cooperative management of common pool resources than groups with adequate consumption levels. However, users that are only moderately poor have the greatest chance for cooperation. For this group, if resource productivity varies, cooperation may break down in periods of low productivity. The theoretical results concur with empirical evidence of cooperation in common pool resources."
Democratic Peace and Integration: Survival and Legitimacy Across Levels of Analysis
(1999) Starr, Harvey
"The primary purpose of this paper is to review the connections that demonstrate the democratic peace to be a subset of more general integration processes. The following sections will discuss integration, democracy and legitimacy. I will show how the key element of the democratic peace—-the absence of large-scale military violence between democracies—-flows from the development of a Deutschian 'security community.' After pulling all of these elements together in a discussion of 'the good society,' the paper will turn to democracy and development."
An Ethical Approach to Re-Think the Present and the Future of the Common Fisheries Policy in the European Union
(1999) Bailly, Denis; Collet, Serge
"In the arena of sectorial policy-making, the Common Fisheries Policy is one of the most advanced expression of the economic and political integrative process that developed in Europe after World War II. After a few steps toward common fish market and structure policies in line with the European agricultural policy in the early seventies, the evolution of the international law of the sea has led to the declaration of the 200 miles Economic Exclusive Zones and the European Community Member-States have started negotiating a Fisheries Common Policy."
Foundations of Democracy: Tocqueville on the Art of Association in America's Federal Democracy
(1999) Allen, Barbara
"A rich civic culture is generally correlated with a properly functioning democracy, but there is surprisingly little theoretical discussion of how and why voluntarism makes democracy 'work.' Self-reliance can invite insularity along with independence. Parochialism and local tyranny may typify communal routines as surely as the openness, innovation, and reciprocity for which they are lauded. Not all voluntary societies act in socially responsible ways; not all examples of volunteerism bespeak the virtues of self-government."
Institutional Arrangements, Community Attributes, and Performance of Coastal Fisheries in Korea
(1999) Kim, In
"Korean government approves the appropriation rights of neighborhood coastal fishing grounds as common property resources, and give the rights to the fraternity of fishing village (FFV). This paper aims to find appropriate institutional arrangements and community attributes which influence performance of neighborhood coastal fishery in Korea, and to propose recommendations for the efficient management of neighborhood coastal fishing grounds. By the result of this study, institutional framework can be used usefully to analyze the Korean social problems, especially CPRs problems, even though the critics of institutional approach or framework often assert that it is well operative in western society where they keep the rules well. It is because that many rules specifying how to use and preserve the CPRs are greatly related with performance of CPRs management, preservation of resources in Korea."
The Missing Link: Collective-Choice Policymaking in Nonprofit, For-Profit, and Public Child Care Centers
(1999) Bushouse, Brenda K.
"Much of nonprofit research over the past twenty years focuses on how a nonprofit enterprise is different than a for-profit or public enterprise. Influential early theorists relied on the legal constraint nonprofits have in redistributing profit to explain nonprofit production of certain types of goods. Hansmann (1980, 1986) developed Contract Failure Theory to explain consumer demand for nonprofit production of private goods with information asymmetry between buyer and seller. Weisbrod (1977, 1988) developed the theory of Market/Government Failure to explain nonprofit production of collective goods (defined to include goods that have shared benefits). In these foundational theories, the nondistribution constraint is the primary justification for the nonprofit institutional form. In Contract Failure Theory it signals quality to consumers because of the legal constraint nonprofits have in reinvesting all profit back into the enterprise. In Market/Government Failure Theory nonprofits will be formed to produce collective goods to meet under satisfied demand because the nondistribution constraint removes the incentive for the nonprofit to place profit above quality."
Modernity and the Challenge of Metropolitan Governance: Failure of Structural Solutions and the Polycentric Alternative
(1999) Raadschelders, Jos C. N.; Toonen, Theo A. J.
"It will come as no surprise that throughout the 20th century various avenues have been proposed,and some experimented with, to 'solve' the problem of metropolitan governance once and for all. Our thesis in this paper is that the 'solutions' advanced so far,as idea or as experiment, aimed at being permanent. By the nature of, at least: Dutch, thinking about government, the solution to metropolitan problems was usually found in structural arrangements rather than through process-approaches. A permanent structural solution in the Netherlands focuses on redefining jurisdictions, on developing legal means to further voluntary or mandatory joint provisions, or on establishing a fourth tier of government. The idea that solutions could depart from a process angle, e.g. arrangements for decision making and consultation, is only toyed with in academic pursuits and rather weakly applied in covenants. We will argue that a real solution to the problems of metropolitan governance is only possible if it establishes flexible arrangements for governance, and hence are a combination of structural and processual approaches. It is in this combination that the polycentric perspective offers a 'global age' alternative to the structural modernistic approach."
On the Constitution of Order in Norway. Equality and Leadership: Strength in a Weak State?
(1999) Berge, Erling
"By order in this headline is meant something opposite of chaos or anarchy. The Norwegian society is not in anarchy or chaos. A person can go about his or her business expecting other persons to follow the same rules. And if someone does break the rules there are established procedures for sanctioning. And moreover, the order in Norway is seen as a democratic rule-of-law. "For the discussion here I will by democracy understand a society where collective action problems ultimately are solved be the consent of the people, either directly or indirectly (through negotiations by representatives). This does not necessarily mean a parliamentary democracy, but it means that there is some orderly way of making the difficult collective decisions, implement them, monitor them and sanction their breach. In short it means there is some kind of central government. And further, it means there has to be some orderly way of replacing this government if 'the people' thinks some of the available alternatives for governor will take better care of their common interest."
State Commons and Local Democracy in Northern Peripheries
(1999) Sandberg, Audun
"This paper attempts to bring together two quite different lines of theoretical development that has been, and still are, very central to the crucial questions of how to govern the use of natural resources in a sustainable way. These two lines of thought might at first glance seem quite unrelated to each other, but as the paper will show, at closer examination they allow themselves to be woven together into a neat fabric that has considerable explanatory powers: In a number of seemingly unresolvable resource conflicts in the modern world, the causes must be sought in deep-rooted societal institutions that lies at the base of modernization itself. The analysis must therefore examine the foundations for these institutions and the necessary remedies might therefore often challenge the vested interests in these institutions."
State Formation in Community Spaces: Control over Forests in the Kumaon Himalaya, India
(1999) Agrawal, Arun
"In the early part of this century, 1916 and 1921 were especially dry years in the Kumaon region of the Indian Himalaya. In each of these years, forest fires racked the countryside, burning beyond the power of the colonial British government to control or extinguish. It was not just the dry weather that was to blame. Villagers in Kumaon set the forest on fire; the dry weather merely helped their efforts along. The containment of this 'planned incendiarism' was one of the main planks of the scientific forestry that the colonial state had begun to introduce in the hills in the last quarter of the 19th century, and especially from around 1910."
Toward a Political Economy of Local Governance in Africa: Policies, Institutions, Interests, and Consequences
(1999) Wunsch, James S.
"This paper is an attempt to develop and explore a model of what might be called the 'political economy' of local governance in Africa, and how it affects several of the policies and institutions used to organize key aspects of decentralization and local governance. It explores how the various institutions and policies developed by the center affect, impede, and sometimes destroy nascent local governance. The paper's thesis is that these key functional and structural issues have not yet been resolved in a way which works to encourage and sustain effective local governance. It is also that these failures are caused, by at least in part, by the political economy that in Africa seems to grow up around local governance in Africa."
Towards a Sustainable Russian Forest Sector
(1999) Carlsson, Lars
"Russia's forest resources are enormous but despite almost ten years of transition problems are still immense, both in terms commercial output and with respect to forest management. In this article it is suggested that one way of changing the situation is to initiate an introduction of community managed forests. Using the Swedish forest commons as an example it is argued that such a change in property rights will provide an alternative to massive privatization of the forests as well as to an undesirable continuation or strengthening of state forest management. Finally, it is concluded that such an introduction of new property rights regimes will not provide the solution to the problems but contribute to the establishing of a better institutional framework in the Russian forest sector."
Why Fairness? Facial Expressions, Evolutionary Psychology, and the Emergence of Fairness in Simple Bargaining Games
(1999) Eckel, Catherine; Wilson, Rick K.
"One of the successes in contemporary social science is the development and proliferation of game theory. For a wide range of phenomena, game theory produces enormous insight into the strategic interaction of individuals. Its greatest power lies with predicting the behavior of large groups -- whether this is in the context of markets, political elections, information aggregation or when confronting large-scale social dilemmas. However, as Ostrom (1998) reminds us, game theory also generates predictions for small group behavior that are at variance with the results of carefully controlled (and replicated) laboratory experiments. "The primary approach adopted to explain the non-equilibrium behavior observed in experiments and connect it more carefully with game theoretic models is 'behavioral game theory' (Camerer, 1997). Two branches of theoretical and experimental research have dominated recent research: the investigation of bounded rationality and learning behavior - how individuals learn to play a new game in an unfamiliar context; and the extension of utility functions to include so-called 'exotic' preferences - other-regarding preferences for fairness, altruism, spite, status.1 Both approaches have achieved considerable insight. This research focuses on the latter."

Browse By

Browsing DLC by Conference "Workshop on the Workshop 2"