Journal Article

Permanent link for this collectionhttps://hdl.handle.net/10535/5

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La Tragedia de los Comunes: Un Enfoque Teórico-Experimental
(2012) Franco, Juan Carlos Agu
"El agotamiento de los recursos naturales se produce, además de por causas naturales, como consecuencia de la actuación del hombre, y el efecto de su actuación tendrá mayor o menor incidencia en función del tipo de recurso de que se trate. En concreto, en lo que hace referencia a los recursos biológicos, su supervivencia dependerá no solamente de cuestiones naturales que puedan afectar al crecimiento de la biomasa, sino también del uso que realicemos de ellos. Generalmente existen intereses encontrados entre los potenciales usuarios de este tipo de recursos, especialmente cuando existe libertad de acceso para su explotación. Para asegurar su supervivencia, sería necesario que no se utilizaran sistemáticamente por encima de su tasa natural de regeneración, pero la lógica individual lleva a seguir explotándolos por encima de dicha tasa, dado que los costes de la sobreexplotación recaen sobre el conjunto, mientras que las ganancias se producen en su totalidad para cada individuo. Este hecho es conocido como la “tragedia de los comunes”. Este problema se presenta frecuentemente como un “dilema del prisionero”, pero éste no plasma en su totalidad las características que deﬁnen a los recursos biológicos, en especial en lo que hace referencia a ese progresivo agotamiento del re-curso, ni a la interacción entre varios individuos –más de dos- inmersos en un problema de estas ca-racterísticas. En el marco de la teoría de juegos realizamos experimentos de laboratorio que reproducen estos problemas, lo que nos permite aislar y controlar las variables que puedan afectar al comporta-miento de los individuos en este tipo de situaciones."
Local Actions, Global Effects? Understanding the Circumstances in which Locally Beneficial Environmental Actions Cumulate to Have Global Effects
(2011) Rudel, Thomas K.
"Environmentally beneficial actions come in diverse forms and occur in a wide range of settings ranging from personal decisions in households to negotiated agreements between nations. This article draws upon both social and ecological theory to outline, theoretically, the circumstances in which localized actions, undertaken by citizens, should cumulate to have global effects. The beliefs behind these actions tend to be either ‘defensive environmentalism’ in which actors work to improve their personal, local environments or ‘altruistic environmentalism’ in which actors work to improve the global environment. Defensive environmental actions such as creating common property institutions, limiting fertility, reducing waste streams, using energy efficient technologies, and eating organic foods have cumulative effects whereas altruistic environmental action often occurs through threshold crossings following a focusing event. Defensive environmentalism expedites altruistic environmentalism by persuading politicians, after focusing events, that rank and file citizens really do want a regime change. The resulting political transformation should, at least theoretically, create a sustainable development state that would promote additional defensive and altruistic environmental actions."
Private Provision of a Public Good: Cooperation and Altruism of Internet Forum Users
(2015) Ros-Galvez, Alejandro; Rosa-Garcia, Alfonso
"We ran an experiment with users of Internet forums. In a dictator game, we find that the level of altruism is positively related to the activity in the forum. In a public good game, there is no relation between cooperation in the game and contribution to the content of the forum. Subjects are not more altruistic with partners from the same forum but do cooperate more with them. These results suggest that the public good provided in Internet forums is mainly provided by a group of unconditional altruistic users, and that the sense of belonging supports the cooperation in that provision."
Trust with Private and Common Property: Effects of Stronger Property Right Entitlements
(2010) Cox, James C.; Hall, Daniel T.
"Is mutually beneficial cooperation in trust games more prevalent with private property or common property? Does the strength of property right entitlement affect the answer? Cox, Ostrom, Walker, et al. report little difference between cooperation in private and common property trust games. We assign stronger property right entitlements by requiring subjects to meet a performance quota in a real effort task to earn their endowments. We report experiment treatments with sequential choice and strategy responses. We find that cooperation is lower in common property trust games than in private property trust games, which is an idiosyncratic prediction of revealed altruism theory. Demonstrable differences and similarities between our strategy response and sequential choice data provide insight into the how these protocols can yield different results from hypothesis tests even when they are eliciting the same behavioral patterns across treatments."

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