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Anticommons, the Coase Theorem and the Problem of Bundling Inefficiency

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dc.contributor.author Major, Ivan
dc.contributor.author King, Ronald F.
dc.contributor.author Marian, Cosmin Gabriel
dc.date.accessioned 2016-05-11T19:05:34Z
dc.date.available 2016-05-11T19:05:34Z
dc.date.issued 2016 en_US
dc.identifier.uri https://hdl.handle.net/10535/10024
dc.description.abstract "The Coase theorem is most often formulated in terms of bi-lateral monopoly, for instance between a polluting factory and an affected neighbour. Instead, we introduce multiple affected neighbours and the concept of anticommons, in which autonomous actors with separate yet necessarily complementary inputs each has the right to deny but not to permit use. Once we posit multiple owners possessing complementary rights, strategically maximizing against each other as well as against the actor who wishes to purchase a portion of that right, the outcome is neither efficient nor invariant. Our finding, based on non-cooperative game theory, is sustained even under the restrictive Coase assumptions regarding complete information, perfect rationality, and zero transaction costs. The implication is that suboptimal bundling agreements in cases of multiple stakeholders is not the mere product of market imperfection, but instead is a systematic result." en_US
dc.language English en_US
dc.subject anticommons en_US
dc.subject Coase theorem en_US
dc.title Anticommons, the Coase Theorem and the Problem of Bundling Inefficiency en_US
dc.type Journal Article en_US
dc.type.published published en_US
dc.type.methodology Theory en_US
dc.subject.sector Theory en_US
dc.identifier.citationjournal International Journal of the Commons en_US
dc.identifier.citationvolume 10 en_US
dc.identifier.citationnumber 1 en_US

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