Abstract:
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"We analyze the economic determinants and effects of prior appropriation water rights that were voluntarily implemented across a vast area of the US West, abruptly replacing common-law riparian water rights. We build upon Ostrom and Gardner (1993) and model irrigation as a coordination problem to show how the features of prior appropriation were necessary to support welfare-increasing contracts for securing and sharing water and financing irrigation infrastructure among numerous, heterogeneous agents. We construct novel dataset of 7,800 rights in Colorado, established between 1852 and 2013 including location, date, size, infrastructure investment, irrigated acreage, crops, topography, stream flow, soil quality, and precipitation to test the predictions of the model. Prior appropriation doubled infrastructure investment and raised the value of agricultural output beyond baseline riparian rights. The analysis reveals institutional innovation that informs both our understanding of the development of property rights, prior appropriation, and contemporary water policy."
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