| dc.contributor.author |
Schauf, Andrew |
|
| dc.contributor.author |
Oh, Poong |
|
| dc.date.accessioned |
2021-11-09T19:27:05Z |
|
| dc.date.available |
2021-11-09T19:27:05Z |
|
| dc.date.issued |
2021 |
en_US |
| dc.identifier.uri |
https://hdl.handle.net/10535/10822 |
|
| dc.description.abstract |
"When populations share common-pool resources (CPRs), individuals decide how much effort to invest towards resource extraction and how to allocate this effort among available resources. We investigate these dual aspects of individual choice in networked games where resources undergo regime shifts between discrete quality states (viable or depleted) depending on collective extraction levels. We study the patterns of extraction that emerge on various network types when agents are free to vary extraction from each CPR separately to maximize their short-term payoffs. Using these results as a basis for comparison, we then investigate how results are altered if agents fix one aspect of adaptation (magnitude or allocation) while letting the other vary. We consider two constrained adaptation strategies: uniform adaptation, whereby agents adjust their extraction levels from all CPRs by the same amount, and reallocation, whereby agents selectively shift effort from lower- to higher-quality resources. A preference for uniform adaptation increases collective wealth on degree-heterogeneous agent-resource networks. Further, low-degree agents retain preferences for these constrained strategies under reinforcement learning. Empirical studies have indicated that some CPR appropriators ignore—while others emphasize—allocation aspects of adaptation; our results demonstrate that structural patterns of resource access can determine which behavior is more advantageous." |
en_US |
| dc.language |
English |
en_US |
| dc.subject |
SOCIAL-ECOLOGICAL SYSTEMS |
en_US |
| dc.subject |
SIMULATIONS |
en_US |
| dc.subject |
SELF-ORGANIZATION |
en_US |
| dc.subject |
COMMON POOL RESOURCES |
en_US |
| dc.subject |
COMPLEXITY |
en_US |
| dc.subject |
COMPLEX SYSTEMS |
en_US |
| dc.subject |
NETWORKS |
en_US |
| dc.subject |
AGENT-BASED COMPUTATIONAL ECONOMICS |
en_US |
| dc.subject |
ALLOCATION RULES |
en_US |
| dc.subject |
BOUNDED RATIONALITY |
en_US |
| dc.subject |
DEPLETION |
en_US |
| dc.subject |
DIVERSITY |
en_US |
| dc.subject |
ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR |
en_US |
| dc.subject |
ENVIRONMENTAL DEGRADATION |
en_US |
| dc.subject |
EVOLUTION |
en_US |
| dc.subject |
GAME THEORY |
en_US |
| dc.subject |
HETEROGENEITY |
en_US |
| dc.subject |
HUMAN-ENVIRONMENT INTERACTION |
en_US |
| dc.subject |
NASH EQUILIBRIUM |
en_US |
| dc.subject |
OVEREXPLOITATION |
en_US |
| dc.subject |
RESILIENCE |
en_US |
| dc.subject |
SOCIAL DILEMMAS |
en_US |
| dc.subject |
SOCIAL STRUCTURE |
en_US |
| dc.subject |
STRUCTURE |
en_US |
| dc.subject |
TRAGEDY OF THE COMMONS |
en_US |
| dc.subject.classification |
Complex systems |
en_US |
| dc.title |
Adaptation Strategies and Collective Dynamics of Extraction in Networked Commons of Bistable Resources |
en_US |
| dc.type |
Journal Article |
en_US |
| dc.type.published |
published |
en_US |
| dc.type.methodology |
Game Theory |
en_US |
| dc.subject.sector |
General & Multiple Resources |
en_US |
| dc.subject.sector |
Social Organization |
en_US |
| dc.identifier.citationjournal |
Scientific Reports |
en_US |
| dc.identifier.citationvolume |
11 |
en_US |
| dc.identifier.citationpages |
1-12 |
en_US |
| dc.identifier.citationnumber |
21987 |
en_US |
| dc.identifier.citationmonth |
November |
en_US |