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PDF
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Type:
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Conference Paper |
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Author:
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Apesteguia, José J. |
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Conference:
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Constituting the Commons: Crafting Sustainable Commons in the New Millennium, the Eighth Biennial Conference of the International Association for the Study of Common Property |
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Location:
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Bloomington, Indiana, USA |
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Conf. Date:
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May 31-June 4 |
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Date:
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2000 |
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URI:
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https://hdl.handle.net/10535/1086
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Sector:
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Theory |
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Region:
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Subject(s):
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IASC
common pool resources--theory
game theory
information--theory
Nash equilibrium
investment--theory
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Abstract:
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"The effects on behavior of two different levels of information about the payoff structure are analyzed in a fifty period Common-Pool Resource game of six players with no communication. Six groups of six players played a complete information game while other six groups played the same game but without knowledge of the payoff functions. Players in the incomplete information treatment only had some qualitative information about the interdependent character of the decision situation. It will be shown that the aggregated decision patterns are remarkably similar in both treatments. After arguing that this is of special importance to the literature on learning models, three such models are contrasted with the data. It will be concluded that the predictions of a simple extension of a learning model based on average payoffs cannot be rejected to be equal to the observed data."
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