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Observations On Common Property Resource Management

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dc.contributor.author Bromley, Daniel W. en_US
dc.contributor.author Ostrom, Elinor en_US
dc.contributor.author Peters, Pauline E. en_US
dc.date.accessioned 2009-07-31T14:35:55Z
dc.date.available 2009-07-31T14:35:55Z
dc.date.issued 1988 en_US
dc.date.submitted 2009-01-09 en_US
dc.date.submitted 2009-01-09 en_US
dc.identifier.uri https://hdl.handle.net/10535/1318
dc.description.abstract "The conference from which the book Common Property Resource Management was derived brought together social and biological scientists with a wealth of knowledge about a wide variety of resource situations. The participants represented a range of theoretical and empirical experiences that are well reflected in the volume. An open-minded economist, upon perusing the book, will be struck by several observations. "The behavioral assumption that drives much of contemporary economic theory concerns the autonomous utility maximizer who acts in his/her own self interest. This behavior finds its empirical manifestation in the isolation problem modeled as the prisoners' dilemma, and in alleged ubiquitous free-riding. The 'tragedy of the commons' allegory, being congenial to economic theory, finds wide allegiance among economists taught to believe that the only solution to resource degradation, poverty, and overcapitalization of resource-extractive industries is private property rights vested in the individual decision maker. The idea of collective action to formulate the institutional arrangements that will both constrain and liberate individual maximizing behavior is not well understood, nor is it regarded as an entirely legitimate activity. Rather collective action is usually regarded as an undesirable alternative to atomistic choice, and one that invariably is driven by the desire to engage in 'rent-seeking' behavior. This two-step process of agreeing on institutional arrangements, and then making economic choices from within that structure of institutional arrangements, is not often analysed by economists." en_US
dc.relation.ispartofseries Working Paper, no. W88-1 en_US
dc.subject Workshop en_US
dc.subject common pool resources--theory en_US
dc.subject resource management en_US
dc.title Observations On Common Property Resource Management en_US
dc.type Conference Paper en_US
dc.type.published unpublished en_US
dc.publisher.workingpaperseries Workshop in Political Theory and Policy Analysis, Indiana University, Bloomington, IN en_US
dc.subject.sector Theory en_US
dc.identifier.citationconference Seminar at the World Bank en_US
dc.identifier.citationconfdates February 25, 1988 en_US
dc.identifier.citationconfloc Washington, DC en_US

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