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Abstract:
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"Irrigated water and irrigation infrastructure are common-pool resources. Common-pool resource scholars have advocated taking distributional aspects and power relations into account when analyzing institutional change in common-pool resource management. The way benefits are distributed among various actors is decisive, and the respective political weight of the latter can influence the likelihood of institutional change. When social dilemmas are solved and new rules implemented, some people benefit more than others. Indeed, some may even benefit at the expense of others. Empirical evidence from Bulgaria supports the view that local actors use power asymmetries to maintain their benefits. Ostrom (2007, p.190) points out that, in contrast to the early stages in a process of collective action, inequalities in distribution of benefits may, however, reduce trust and cooperation later in the process.
"In the empirical part of this paper, I will highlight the incongruity between formal and effective rules as a transition-typical feature and one environmental determinant for the evolving of destructive leadership. The empirical material highlights that the incongruity of rules enables heterogeneous participants to misuse power asymmetries and, thus, maintain opportunistic strategies. Thereafter, I will present direct empirical evidence for low level of trust in formal actors and perception of corruption. This is typical for an environment where destructive leadership can evolve.
"Regarding these empirical results, the paper continues to discuss the need of some heterogeneity, such as the appearance of well-educated and connected leaders to start the process of local cooperation. Yet, the remaining challenge is how to facilitate leadership in early stages of a collective action process without encouraging power misuse of individuals at a later stage."
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