The Evolution of Cooperation from a Non-cooperative Game with Public Goods

Found at: https://hdl.handle.net/10535/2205
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Type:	Conference Paper
Author:	Laine, Charles; Roumasset, James A.
Conference:	Common Property Conference, the Second Biennial Conference of the International Association for the Study of Common Property
Location:	Winnipeg, Manitoba
Conf. Date:	September 26-30, 1991
Date:	1991
URI:	https://hdl.handle.net/10535/2205
Sector:	Theory
Region:
Subject(s):	game theory public goods and bads--models IASC cooperation--models
Abstract:	"When players systematically underestimate public goods provision by others due to pessimism or risk-aversion, it is possible that efficient provision will emerge even in a non-cooperative setting. Once efficient provision is reached, it can be sustained in a repeated game setting as the focal point of strategic punishment to sustain the cooperative outcome."

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