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The Evolution of Cooperation from a Non-cooperative Game with Public Goods

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Type: Conference Paper
Author: Laine, Charles; Roumasset, James A.
Conference: Common Property Conference, the Second Biennial Conference of the International Association for the Study of Common Property
Location: Winnipeg, Manitoba
Conf. Date: September 26-30, 1991
Date: 1991
URI: https://hdl.handle.net/10535/2205
Sector: Theory
Subject(s): game theory
public goods and bads--models
Abstract: "When players systematically underestimate public goods provision by others due to pessimism or risk-aversion, it is possible that efficient provision will emerge even in a non-cooperative setting. Once efficient provision is reached, it can be sustained in a repeated game setting as the focal point of strategic punishment to sustain the cooperative outcome."

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