Image Database Export Citations


Conservation-Development Nexus in Local CPRs Governance: The Role of Social Capital

Show full item record

Type: Conference Paper
Author: Tai, Hsing-Sheng
Conference: Survival of the Commons: Mounting Challenges and New Realities, the Eleventh Conference of the International Association for the Study of Common Property
Location: Bali, Indonesia
Conf. Date: June 19-23, 2006
Date: 2006
URI: https://hdl.handle.net/10535/2365
Sector: General & Multiple Resources
Social Organization
Region: East Asia
Subject(s): IASC
common pool resources
economic development
social capital
state and local governance
Abstract: "This paper examines attempts by local common-pool resource institutions to integrate resource conservation and socio-economic development, focusing particularly on the pivotal role of social capital. Among numerous factors influencing the conservation-development nexus-- including natural, physical, human, financial and social capital--we emphasize the importance of social capital, since this capital directly impacts local collective actions that initiate and maintain conservation/ development efforts. The aims of this paper are twofold. First, we develop an analytical framework addressing interactions among conservation, development, social capital, collective action and institutions. Second, we further investigate issues surrounding how social capital can be created or undermined and how it functions. In the specific context of this paper, the following question arises: will conservation/development efforts affect the formation of social capital? And, how will a given stock of social capital exert influence on subsequent collective action, internal institutional capacity building, and conservation as well as development performance? In other words, we study the dynamic, cyclical interrelation among conservation, development, social capital, collective action and institutions, in which we argue that social capital plays a pivotal, mediating role. "Conservation and development efforts typically face two kinds of, i.e. first- and second-order, social dilemma. Beyond these similarities, however, conservation and development efforts differ much in their nature and in how they affect the subsequent formation of social capital. Various effects triggered by conservation/development initiatives are then analyzed. These effects specifically include demand for collective action, elite capture, interest heterogeneity, and economic incentive. All these effects will positively or negatively affect the formation of bonding and bridging social capital. Again, combinations of these two types of social capital will influence collective action regarding subsequent internal institution capacity building, and resultant conservation and development performance in turn. Finally, internal institutions can feed- back to the conservation/development decision-making and implementation process, which again changes social capital combinations. "Aside from theoretical analysis, the dynamic evolution processes of three indigenous CPRs regimes in Taiwan are studied. Empirical findings then verify four proposed hypotheses regarding origins and influences of various forms of social capital. Furthermore, some conclusions concerning the role of social capital in the conservation-development nexus in local CPRs governance can be drawn. First, to reconcile conservation and development successfully, a critical level of bonding social capital is always needed to maintain continuous collective action and institutional capacity building, while bridging social capital, depending on contexts, may positively or adversely affect collective action. Optimal social capital combinations are accordingly dynamic, and depend on required tasks at different developmental stages. Second, participatory conservation efforts themselves, at least in an indigenous context, may constitute a key source of bonding capital that continually reinforces itself in process, while development efforts primarily contribute to building bridging social capital. Development initiatives themselves, in addition, can easily undermine bonding capital in situations when elite-capture and interest heterogeneity arises. Finally, empirical cases show that there is indeed a dynamic, cyclical interrelation among institutions, incentive and social relations."

Files in this item

Files Size Format View
Tai_Hsing_Sheng.pdf 162.4Kb PDF View/Open

This item appears in the following document type(s)

Show full item record