| dc.contributor.author |
Drury, Richard Toshiyuki |
en_US |
| dc.contributor.author |
Belliveau, Michael E. |
en_US |
| dc.contributor.author |
Kuhn, J. Scott |
en_US |
| dc.contributor.author |
Bansal, Shipra |
en_US |
| dc.date.accessioned |
2009-07-31T14:49:43Z |
|
| dc.date.available |
2009-07-31T14:49:43Z |
|
| dc.date.issued |
1999 |
en_US |
| dc.date.submitted |
2009-03-03 |
en_US |
| dc.date.submitted |
2009-03-03 |
en_US |
| dc.identifier.uri |
https://hdl.handle.net/10535/2406 |
|
| dc.description.abstract |
"Pollution trading has been touted as a great innovation in environmental policy making and a key tool for sustainable development. Pollution trading allows a polluter to forego reductions in pollution (or increase pollution) at its own facility in exchange for reducing emissions elsewhere or by purchasing credits which represent someone elses pollution reduction. Pollution trading advocates argue that this approach saves money, promotes innovative technology, and continuously reduces pollution through market incentives. In contrast, they claim that technology-based regulations, commonly referred to as command and control, are economically inefficient and rigidly over-prescriptive." |
en_US |
| dc.subject |
environmentalism |
en_US |
| dc.subject |
emissions |
en_US |
| dc.subject |
air pollution |
en_US |
| dc.subject |
economics |
en_US |
| dc.title |
Pollution Trading and Environmental Injustice: Los Angeles' Failed Experiment in Air Quality Policy |
en_US |
| dc.type |
Journal Article |
en_US |
| dc.type.published |
published |
en_US |
| dc.coverage.region |
North America |
en_US |
| dc.coverage.country |
United States |
en_US |
| dc.subject.sector |
New Commons |
en_US |
| dc.identifier.citationjournal |
Duke Environmental Law & Policy Forum |
en_US |
| dc.identifier.citationvolume |
9 |
en_US |
| dc.identifier.citationnumber |
2 |
en_US |
| dc.identifier.citationmonth |
January |
en_US |