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Applying General Equilibrium Analysis & Game Theory to Exchange Networks

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dc.contributor.author Whitmeyer, Joseph en_US
dc.date.accessioned 2009-07-31T14:57:50Z
dc.date.available 2009-07-31T14:57:50Z
dc.date.issued 1997 en_US
dc.date.submitted 2008-03-17 en_US
dc.date.submitted 2008-03-17 en_US
dc.identifier.uri https://hdl.handle.net/10535/3152
dc.description.abstract "Under conditions holding in most experimental and simulation studies of exchange networks, the CORE as derived by game theory yields a solution set of exchange outcomes more appropriate than the equilibrium generated by general equilibrium analysis (see Yamaguchi 1996). This is because general equilibrium analysis assumes a large number of actors for each position in the exchange system--essentially that a network and its actors are afloat in a market of like networks and actors. I suggest a derivation of the core for isolated (i.e., not in a market) strong power networks alternative to that offered by Bienenstock and Bonacich (1992). Since the core for isolated networks is large, power distributions in such networks are necessarily the consequence of both network structure and actor strategies." en_US
dc.subject game theory en_US
dc.subject networks--models en_US
dc.title Applying General Equilibrium Analysis & Game Theory to Exchange Networks en_US
dc.type Journal Article en_US
dc.type.published published en_US
dc.subject.sector Social Organization en_US
dc.subject.sector Theory en_US
dc.identifier.citationjournal Current Research in Social Psychology en_US
dc.identifier.citationvolume 2 en_US
dc.identifier.citationnumber 2 en_US
dc.identifier.citationmonth July en_US
dc.submitter.email rshivakoti@yahoo.com en_US

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